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Impact of the Crises on the Efficiency of the Financial Market: 
Evidence from the SDM 
 
B. FAKHRY 
 
Abstract 
The efficient market hypothesis has been around since 1962, the theory based on a simple 
rule that states the price of any asset must fully reflect all available information.  Yet there 
is empirical evidence suggesting that markets are too volatile to be efficient.  In essence, 
this evidence seems to suggest that the reaction of the market participants to the 
information or events that is the crucial factor, rather than the actual information.  This 
highlights the need to include the behavioural finance theory in the pricing of assets.  
Essentially, the research aims to analyse the efficiency of six key sovereign debt markets 
during a period of changing volatility including the recent global financial and sovereign 
debt crises.  We analyse the markets in the pre-crisis period and during the financial and 
sovereign debt crises to determine the impact of the crises on the efficiency of these 
financial markets.  
We use two GARCH-based variance bound tests to test the null hypothesis of the market 
being too volatile to be efficient.  Proposing a GJR-GARCH variant of the variance bound 
test to account for variation in the asymmetrical effect.  This leads to an analysis of the 
changing behaviour of price volatility to identify what makes the market efficient or 
inefficient.  In general, our EMH tests resulted in mixed results, hinting at the acceptance 
of the null hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be efficient.  However, 
interestingly a number of 2017 observations under both models seem to be hinting at the 
rejection of the null hypothesis.  Furthermore, our proposed GJR-GARCH variant of the 
variance bound test seems to be more likely to accept the EMH than the GARCH variant 
of the test.   
Key words: Efficient Market Hypothesis, Behavioural Finance Theory, Volatility Tests, 
GJR, GARCH, EGARCH-M, SWARCH, Sovereign Debt Market, Crise 
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1.0 Introduction 
The efficient market hypothesis has been the cornerstone of asset pricing since the mid-
1960s. Essentially, as Malkiel (1962) and Fama (1965) hint the efficient market hypothesis 
simply dictate that the price of any asset should incorporate all available information 
immediately. This means that in the short term markets should follow a random walk as 
noted by Malkiel (2003). Yet the efficient market hypothesis relies on some untestable 
assumptions like markets have to be perfectly competitive and market participants are 
rational risk averse profit maximisers. While these assumptions are made regularly in 
neoclassical economic, yet they do not always reflect the real world. Hence as hinted by 
Ball (2009), there have been many criticisms from policy makers and academics, especially 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  
In essence, there is no way of testing the efficient market hypothesis directly. However, 
since the efficient market hypothesis dictates that prices should immediately reflect the 
information, thus meaning that markets should follow a random walk pattern in the short 
term. Hence, by testing the random walk hypothesis, we could test for weak form efficient 
market hypothesis using the variance ratio test as proposed by Lo & MacKinlay (1988). 
However, at the heart of the efficient market hypothesis, lays the key assumption that the 
price must immediate reflect the available information. Therefore, suggesting that the price 
must not deviate from the fundamental value by too much for too long, since, volatility is 
a measure of the movement in the price from the expected long-term price. Hence, a key 
test would be to test if the market is too volatile to be efficient using the variance bound 
test proposed by Shiller (1979) and Leroy & Porter (1981). Bollerslev and Hodrick (1992) 
argue that given the seasonality and clustering issues, a possible approach to the tests of 
market efficiency is the use of ARCH/GARCH models in the tests. 
In essence, a market that is too volatile to be efficient hints at the requirement to study the 
psychology of the market participants. Since as De Bondt et al. (2008) hints market 
participants are homo sapiens and not homo economics. Therefore, pointing to the 
behavioural finance theory if we are going to understand such influencing anomalies as 
asset price bubbles and over- or under-reaction in the financial market. Both of which were 
present during the pre-crisis period and potentially both crises hint at the market 
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participants’ reactions to news and events leading to the price to deviate. Therein lays the 
key to understanding the behavioural finance theory; as Lee et al. (2002) hints it is not the 
information that is important, it is the reaction of the market participants to the information. 
As highlighted by Blanchard & Watson (1982) and Branch & Evans (2011) the factors 
influencing the behavioural finance theory and in particular the asset price bubbles hint at 
the use of the ARCH/GARCH models in order to understand them. Hinted by Blanchard 
& Watson (1982) and more recently Branch & Evans (2013), another factor is that on some 
occasions an asset price bubble could periodically collapse suggesting the use of a regime-
switching model. 
With an estimated total global outstanding balance of $50.3 trillion as of end of 20131, the 
sovereign debt market is a large and key part of the global financial market. As stated by 
many (Giovannini, 2013; Fisher, 2013; Nakaso, 2013; Hannoun, 2013), it is often regarded 
as the low risk or risk free asset and thus large financial institutions are oblige to hold these 
assets as part of their portfolio by the Basel III regulations and national regulators. 
However, the sovereign debt crisis in both the Eurozone and US has highlighted a number 
of issues.  Perhaps the biggest issue is how these securities are regarded as low risk, let 
alone risk free, as argued by Giovannini (2013), Fisher (2013), Nakaso (2013) and 
Hannoun (2013) among others. For these reasons, it would be interesting to test the impact 
of the crises on the efficiency of the sovereign debt market.  
In essence, it is hard to argue against the fact that each of the recent financial and sovereign 
debt crises did change the global financial market environment in general and more 
specifically the sovereign debt market. Importantly, this research does not go into any 
depth with regard to the impact of both crises on the financial market. However, the articles 
of Brunnermeier (2009), Caballero & Krishnamurthy (2009) and Masood (2010) amongst 
others highlight the multitude of articles written about the impact of the financial crisis. 
Equally, the sovereign debt crisis has attracted many research publications as illustrated by 
Schwarcz (2011), Metiu (2011) and Mohl & Sondermann (2013).  The interesting factor is 
the impact of this changing global financial market environment on the efficiency of the 
sovereign debt market. 
                                                 
1 The Economist Intelligence Unit on 4th April 2014 
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Although the efficient market hypothesis dictate that prices should reflect all available 
information. Yet whichever way you look at it, the key here is the information transmitted 
by the fundamentals and the news to the market participants. The evidence certainly does 
seem to be suggesting that there is a link between the pricing of information and the 
sovereign debt market as illustrated by Brandt & Kavajecz (2004) and Caballero & 
Krishnamurthy (2008), the later highlights the impact of information from news on the 
market participants in the financial market. However, the former highlights the impact of 
macroeconomic information on the sovereign debt market, which is key to understanding 
the impact of the fundamentals on the market participants. 
This last statement is significant in understanding the sovereign debt crisis since the 
information underpinning the market is the macroeconomic policies of the central banks 
and governments, in other words monetary and fiscal respectively.  These two policies are 
at the heart of the response to the financial crisis, as highlighted by Feldstein (2009) and 
Taylor (2008), and essential to understanding the ensuing sovereign debt crisis on both 
sides of the North Atlantic Ocean. The problem as hinted by Tobin (1971), there are issues 
in both policy responses to the financial crisis and at the heart of the sovereign debt crisis 
is the huge increase in the debt. 
Although in general, the research targets the economics and finance academic 
environment. Yet the results and conclusions could be of interest to market participants 
and central bankers alike. Certainly, the emphasis on what influences the behaviour of price 
volatility in the sovereign debt market over an observed timescale including periods of 
financial and economical upturns and downturns would appear to market participants. 
Since highly volatile markets leads to added uncertainty, hence, as was obvious during the 
financial and sovereign debt crises market participants could suffer big losses. We hope 
this research shed lights on what makes markets highly volatile and therefore what moves 
the price in the financial market. On the other hand, this could also appeal to central bankers 
in their attempt at keeping market stability. Since the research sheds lights on the behaviour 
of market participants in a fast changing and highly volatile global market environment. In 
questioning the fundamental paradigms and theories underpinning asset pricing of the past 
40-odd years, we hope to contribute to the academic discussions raging between 
proponents of the efficient market hypothesis and the behavioural finance theory 
 4 
 
This last statement is the main motivation of the thesis to add to the discussion already 
taking place. On a more personal level, the motivation of undertaking such a hotly debated 
research is that it would provide a stepping-stone for my career as a research fellow in the 
academic environment where I can continue my research into the behaviour of volatility in 
the global financial market. Therefore, ultimately, contributing to the “next” theory of asset 
pricing. Another factor is that I wanted to extend my knowledge of the theories influencing 
asset pricing. In deciding to extend the research to cover the behavioural finance theory I 
hope I have added an important piece to the unfinished jigsaw. I have always subscribed 
to the age-old adjective “You never stop learning”. 
The introductory section of the thesis is in four main sections as is traditional with a 
research of this type. The first section is an in-depth description of the research idea and 
objectives. The second section is a review of the main contributions to the literature and 
thus knowledge made by the thesis. The third section is a brief review of the main 
conclusions in this research. The final section is a description of the structure of the thesis. 
1.1 Objectives 
The basic idea underpinning the research is the changing environment in the sovereign debt 
market in the aftermath of the financial and sovereign debt crises. An influencing factor in 
the pre-crisis period is that in many countries there was a prolonged economic upturn, 
which led to an asset price bubble in the mid-2000s. The research is based on the question 
did the financial and sovereign debt crises effect the efficiency of the sovereign debt 
market? In doing this, we hypothesise that the market is efficient and the alterative 
hypothesis is that the market too volatile to be efficient. Since essentially the market is 
either too volatile or not to be efficient, we need to analyse the behaviour of price volatility 
to understand what made the market efficient or inefficient during the pre-crisis, financial 
crisis and sovereign debt crisis period. This leads to the question: did the market 
participants underreact or overreact to events and information including news during the 
three observed periods?  
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Thus, the key questions underpinning the objectives are as follow: 
1. Is the sovereign debt market efficient? 
The efficient market hypothesis dictates that the market should incorporate all available 
information immediately into the price, thus meaning that the market resembles the 
random walk model as hinted by Fama (1965) and Malkiel (2003). This leads to the 
utilization of the Lo & MacKinlay (1988) variance ratio test in testing the observed 
sovereign debt markets for any deviation from the random walk model. We also follow 
Shiller (1979) and LeRoy & Porter (1981) in utilising the excess volatility in the 
sovereign debt market to determine whether the market is efficient. Since as hinted by 
Bollerslev & Hodrick (1992), the seasonality and clustering issues in the financial 
market, dictate the use of ARCH/GARCH models in testing and modelling the markets. 
We implement a version of the variance bound test (Shiller, 1979, 1981) using the 
GARCH model to test for excess volatility therefore testing the efficient market 
hypothesis. We also propose testing the efficiency of the market using a GJR-GARCH 
variation of the variance bound test to account for the different reaction of market 
participants to negative and positives shocks to the market.    
 
2. Did the efficiency change in the aftermath of the financial and sovereign debt crisis? 
We use a timeline analysis to identify whether the crises affected the efficiency of the 
market. The observations subdivide into three sample periods: pre-crisis, financial 
crisis and sovereign debt crisis. Using table A1.1 in the appendix, we date the two crises 
periods. This allows us to analyse the change in the market efficiency and behaviour 
of price volatility in order to understand the effect of the both crises.  
 
3. What does the volatility tell us about the behaviour? 
The evidence seems to be suggesting that there are other factors influencing the 
sovereign debt market. We base our analysis of the behaviour of volatility in the 
sovereign debt market on the GARCH group of models introduced by Engle (1982) 
and Bollerslev (1986). As indicated by Branch & Evans (2011, 2013) the existence of 
bubbles leads to the use of two different GARCH models in order to understand the 
effect of bubbles on the sovereign debt market. Branch & Evans (2011) hints at 
feedback effects influencing the bubbles hinting at the use of the GARCH-m (Engle et 
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al, 1987) in understanding these feedback effects. As highlighted earlier in this review 
information affects the view of agents on the asset price and hence influence the bubble, 
this is crucial to understand the method of bubbles. In effect this point to the use of an 
asymmetrical model such as the EGARCH (Nelson, 1991) to understand this effect. 
Hence, we use the EGARCH-m (Nelson, 1991) to identify the feedback and leverage 
effects in the behaviour of volatility. And as Branch & Evans (2013) states there is 
certainly a hint of GARCH (Bollerslev, 1986) effect influencing the asset price bubble 
pointing towards volatility clustering effects. We use both the GARCH and EGARCH-
m models to explain the behaviour of volatility in the sovereign debt market. 
 
4. Does volatility follow a regime-switching trend in the sovereign debt market? 
As alluded by Blanchard & Watson (1982), Evans (1991) and more recently Branch & 
Evans (2011), a periodic collapsing bubble can be analysed using a Markov switching 
process. There are many implementations of the SWARCH model, however the two 
most relevant are the Cai (1994) and Hamilton & Susmel (1994). The key to the Cai 
(1994) model is that the ARCH intercept is regime dependant, thus retaining volatility 
clustering and allowing the model to overcome spurious persistence. We opt to use the 
SWARCH model proposed by Cai (1994) to establish whether the trend in the price 
volatility does follow a regime-switching model and hence analyse the trend. 
There are two additional objectives, which are contained within the efficient market 
hypothesis. One connected directly to the concept of the fundamental value whereas the 
other is at the heart of the assumptions underpinning the efficient market hypothesis. The 
key to understanding these two objectives lays in the two paradigms of economic: 
macroeconomics and microeconomics. In relation to this research, the different is that 
microeconomics is about the behaviour of rational market participants in the global 
financial market. Macroeconomic, on the other hand, deals with the fundamental economic 
indicators (i.e. inflation, growth and unemployment) and policy (i.e. fiscal and monetary) 
of the country. 
The key assumptions underpinning the neoclassical economics theories of market 
participant behaviour dictate the efficient market hypothesis. These assumptions are at the 
heart of the on-going debate about the recent financial crisis and the banking sector. The 
debate mainly based around the microeconomics behavioural concepts of profit 
 7 
 
maximisation, rational market participants and risk aversion. In order to understand the 
effect of these concepts on the efficient market hypothesis, we need to study the theories 
influencing them. 
Since as dictated by Fama (1965), the price must not deviate from the fundamental value 
in the long run. This means that the price must reflect the fundamentals and news and 
therein lays the key to the second additional objective. This basis of the research is the 
sovereign debt market; hence, in order to study the impact of the fundamentals there is a 
need to research the macroeconomic theories. This highlights the fiscal and monetary 
policies implemented in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The objective is to analyse the 
theoretical foundation of these two policies and what are the benefits and costs of 
implementing such huge countercyclical policies. 
1.2 Contributions to the Literature 
The research contributes to the literature on financial economics in several ways. The main 
contribution is in the extension of the variance bound test; originally proposed by Shiller 
(1979, 1981) and LeRoy & Porter (1981). The variance bound test is essentially a test of 
whether the fundamental value as given by the present value equation does determine the 
behaviour of the price. Hence, as Shiller (1992) puts it the argument is that any excess 
volatility in the price is evidence of inefficient markets. Conversely, Shiller (1992) does 
not give any ideas as to which econometric model to build the variance bound test upon, 
and although Bollerslev & Hodrick (1992) point to the existence of seasonality and 
volatility clustering issues regarding the fundamental value leads to the GARCH family of 
volatility models as a better way to test for excess volatility. Yet the majority of GARCH 
based variance bound tests use a plain vanilla symmetrical GARCH (p, q) model as derived 
by Bollerslev (1986). Since as documented by many including (Dungey et al. (2009), Metui 
(2011), Tamakoshi (2011) and Mohl & Sondermann (2013)) market participants 
differentiate between negative news and positive news meaning they usually react with 
greater intensity to negative news.  Hence, we proposed extending the variance bound test 
to include more complex, asymmetrical GARCH models by deriving a GJR-GARCH 
based variance bound test.  
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Another key contribution is that we research the effect of the crises on the efficient market 
hypothesis and the behaviour of price volatility. Since as hinted earlier the impact on the 
sovereign debt market did change in the aftermath of each crisis as illustrated by many2. 
This means that we subdivide the observation into three main observational periods: pre-
crisis, financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis. By using this methodology, we could 
analyse the effect of each period and the impact of the crises on the efficiency of the 
sovereign debt market.  
An influential contribution s wee undertake a study into what made the sovereign debt 
market efficient or inefficient in the aftermath of the crises by analysing the behaviour of 
volatility. Since as hinted by Blanchard & Watson (1982), Bollerslev & Hodrick (1992) 
and Evans & Branch (2011, 2013) amongst others the information contained in the 
GARCH family of volatility models could be the key to understanding many price 
anomalies in the sovereign debt market which cannot be explained by the efficient market 
hypothesis or neoclassical economics. Essentially, we use the GARCH, EGARCH-m and 
SWARCH models in the attempt to understand the behaviour of market participants in a 
fast changing environment, although there are many more that could be useful in providing 
an explanation. 
In addition, we contribute to the literature via the observed dataset we use which has a 
double contribution.  The first is that unlike all the empirical evidence concerning the 
sovereign debt market, we use the actual prices on the issues obtained from Bloomberg in 
our research. The past empirical evidence used the yields (Dotz & Fisher, 2011; Metui, 
2011; Tamakoshi, 2011; Laopodis, 2010) and spreads (Mohl & Sondermann, 2013; Groba 
et al., 2013; Favero & Missale, 2011; Missio & Watzka, 2011).  The second contribution 
is the use of two issues for each of the sovereign debt market3 to highlight the changing 
environment in the sovereign debt market following the crisis.  
Perhaps the more important contribution is in the results. Firstly, the results seem to be 
indicating that the market environment does have an impact on the efficiency of the market. 
Although in general the market was too volatile to be efficient, however a key factor is that 
                                                 
2 For the impact of the financial crisis see Brunnermeier (2009), Caballero & Krishnamurthy (2009) and 
Masood (2010) and sovereign debt crisis see Schwarcz (2011), Metiu (2011) and Mohl & Sondermann 
(2013). 
3 The Greek was limited to just the 2002. 
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the markets are more efficient than was otherwise expected. Surprisingly during the periods 
of the crises, a number of the markets accepted the efficient market hypothesis most due 
to the GJR-GARCH. Hence, it would seem that the addition of an asymmetrical effect; 
may make the market more efficient. An influencing and key contribution factor in the 
possible explanation of the efficiency of the market is the overreaction/underreaction stead 
state, which leads to the markets being efficient.  This works by the over- and under-
reaction within the observed period cancelling each other out, resulting in an 
overreaction/underreaction steady state meaning the markets accept the efficient market 
hypothesis for the observed period. 
1.3 A Brief Review of the Main Conclusions 
An influential part of the contribution to the literature on financial economic is our 
empirical evidence.  Perhaps the most influential contribution in our research is the 
proposal to extend the variance bound test to include the GJR-GARCH model. In including 
the GJR-GARCH model, we accounted for the different reaction on the volatility from 
positive or negative shocks to the market. Interestingly our evidence seems to be 
suggesting that the use of different models of volatility would produce varying results of 
efficiency.  Indeed the inclusion of the asymmetrical effect in the GJR-GARCH model 
seem to be hinting at the observed markets being increasingly efficient than using a plain 
vanilla symmetrical GARCH model. However, our test of the model specification given 
our observed datasets would point to the use of the GARCH model being more likely able 
to explain the information contained in the dependent variable. Nevertheless, notably the 
choice of the model depends on the observed datasets and periods. 
As hinted in the previous paragraph, the observed dataset and periods explain part of the 
results. This is crucial in the conclusion for several reasons, firstly it highlight one of the 
main contributions, which is the impact of the crises on the efficiency of the sovereign debt 
market. The results from our empirical evidence seem to be going against expectation that 
during the financial and sovereign debt crises the observed markets were inefficient. Both 
our tests of the observed 2017 bonds seem to suggest that during both crises the majority 
of the observed markets were hinting at the rejection of the null hypothesis of the market 
being too volatile to be efficient. Coincidentally, during the pre-crisis period, the majority 
of the observed markets were hinting at inefficient markets in the 2012 bonds. However, 
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what is more interesting is that for the same crises periods under the 2012 bonds the 
majority of the observed markets were inefficient. This could be due to the “on-the run” 
effect of the newly issued bonds and “maturity” effect of bonds approaching the end of 
lives.     
The evidence from the GARCH models seem to be indicating that the behavioural finance 
theory is more likely to provide an explanation of asset pricing as indicated by various 
literature on the behavioural finance theory, especially Blanchard & Watson (1982), 
Bollerslev & Hodrick (1992) and Evans & Branch (2011, 2013). The evidence seems to be 
suggesting the existence of bubbles during the financial crisis, which hints at flights to 
quality or liquidity in action. The evidence certainly hints at the existence of a flight to 
quality or safety in the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis. 
In essence, this evidence is not surprising since market participants are homo-sapiens and 
not homo economics. The neoclassical economics assumptions underpinning the efficient 
market hypothesis, such as the existence of perfectly competitive markets and rational 
market participants, do not reflect the real world. Although there could be arguments made 
for both profit maximization and risk aversion, yet there is a conflict between the two 
illustrated by the financial crisis and to a lesser extent the sovereign debt crisis. As Abreu 
& Brunnermeier (2003) illustrates, the evidence certainly shows that even rational well-
informed market participants seem to take by price bubbles and rides them too long. An 
interesting finding in our empirical evidence is that our results from the behaviour of 
volatility indicate that the efficient market hypothesis could be accounted for using the 
overreaction/underreaction hypothesis.  Essentially, the counter-balances of these two 
reaction resulting in an overreaction/underreaction steady state indicating the efficiency of 
the market.   
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The structure of this thesis follows the standard format for a research of this type; divided 
into three main sections: Literature Review, Methodology and Empirical Evidence. 
However, each of these three sections subdivided into a number of sections reflecting the 
main subjects or objectives making the thesis easy to publish as articles according to each 
objective.  The literature review contains several key subjects linked to the behaviour of 
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volatility in the sovereign debt market.  The section reviews the theory and past empirical 
evidence where applicable.  The next main section is the methodology, which lays the 
specification of the econometrics models used in the empirical evidence.  The fourth 
section reviews the economic factors influencing the sovereign debt market including the 
main financial market indicators, monetary policies and fiscal policies over the observed 
period.  These two sections build up to the empirical section, which present our evidence.  
As with all research, the final section presents the conclusions. 
The literature review is the key section in any research of this type.  Hence, there is a need 
to give a brief overview of the main sub-sections composing our literature review.  The 
first section critically reviews the theories and neoclassical economics models influencing 
the assumptions of the efficient market hypothesis.  It also reviews the literature on the 
theories and models underpinning the tests of the efficient market hypothesis.  The second 
section briefly reviews the behavioural finance theory.  Moving on to review the main 
factors and evidence influencing two key issues in the behavioural finance: 
underreaction/overreaction and the asset price bubbles.  The third section critically 
evaluates the two fundamental macroeconomic policies influencing the sovereign debt 
market: monetary and fiscal policies.  A special emphasis placed on countercyclical 
policies adopted by many central banks and governments in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis. 
The fourth section is mainly a review of the theories and empirical evidence influencing 
the GARCH models of volatility in the sovereign debt market.  It opens with a brief review 
of the alternative to the GARCH family of volatility models: ARCH, stochastic volatility 
and realized volatility.  It continues to give an in depth review of the literature on the 
theoretical and empirical evidence of the GARCH models and also gives a brief overview 
of each model interpretations of the behaviour of volatility.  The final part of this section 
is the switching ARCH/GARCH models, firstly reviewing the Markov switching model 
influencing these models.  Then we review the theory and limited evidence of the 
SWARCH models. 
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2.0 Literature Review 
In essence, this research is a study of the driving forces influencing the price volatility in 
the sovereign debt market.  In order to understand these forces we must therefore 
understand the influencing factors underpinning the two fundamental theories of asset 
pricing: the efficient market hypothesis and behavioural finance theory.  As proposed by 
Malkiel (1962) and Fama (1965), the efficient market hypothesis argues that the price of 
any asset must immediately reflect fundamental information about the asset.  Whereas the 
behavioural finance theory, as argued by Statman (2008) and Subrahmanyam (2007), states 
that in order to truly understand the movement of asset prices there is a requirement to 
include the psychology of the market participants. 
Essentially, there are two factors underlying the efficient market hypothesis, the 
neoclassical economics theory and information (i.e. fundamentals and news).  The 
assumptions underpinning the efficient market hypothesis are dictated by the neoclassical 
economics model of perfect competition which imply that market participants exhibit 
rational, risk averse (see Pratt & Zeckhauser (1987) and Kimball (1993)), profit 
maximising (see Friedman (1953) and Alchian (1950)) behaviour.  Since, the 
macroeconomic factors mainly influence the sovereign debt market, thus dictating the 
fundamentals originate from the monetary and fiscal policies. 
Testing the efficiency of the market utilises two basic assumptions of the efficient market 
hypothesis: the random walk model and the fundamental value.  The efficient market 
hypothesis dictates that prices would resemble a random walk and prices should not deviate 
from the fundamental value in the long run as stated by Malkiel (9620 and Fama (1965).  
Therefore, we review the variance ratio test and variance bound test proposed by Lo & 
MacKinlay (1989) and Shiller (1981a) respectively. 
An opposing view is that various phenomena often influence asset prices, such as 
overreaction/underreaction as hinted by De Bondt (2000) and bubbles as defined by 
Barlevy (2007), which explained only by the inclusion of the behavioural finance theory.  
Put in simple terms, the behavioural finance theory dictates that the reaction of market 
participants to news or information that determines the price of the asset and since each 
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market participant interprets the information individually the price deviate from the 
fundamental value. 
Of cause the underlying themes of the research is the behaviour of volatility in the 
sovereign debt market.  Hence, we review the literature and past empirical evidence on a 
number of volatility models such as the GARCH family first proposed by Engle (1982) 
and Bollerslev (1986).  As highlighted by Blanchard & Watson (1982) and Branch & Evans 
(2011), the factors influencing the behavioural finance theory and in particular, the asset 
price bubbles hint at the use of the ARCH/GARCH models in order to understand them.  
Part of the research is to detect any changes in the behaviour of price volatility due to the 
impact of the financial and sovereign debt crises; in this case, the switching ARCH/GRCH 
models could provide an explanation of the behaviour of volatility before and after the 
crises.  We mainly review the SWARCH models of Hamilton & Susmel (1994) and Cai 
(1994). 
The structure of the literature review, split into two formats: the first three sections derive 
from the theoretical factors influencing the issues and a brief empirical subsection, which 
highlights the usage of the theory supplemented by a concluding review.  The next three 
sections consist of two main sub-sections: theoretical and empirical evidence.  The 
structure of the literature review is organised as following: 
1. A review of the efficient market hypothesis and neoclassical economics influencing 
the assumptions of the efficient market hypothesis, followed by a review of the tests 
of the efficient market hypothesis 
2. A review of the behavioural finance theory, overreaction hypothesis and rational 
bubbles 
3. A review of the monetary and fiscal policies and their impact on the financial and 
sovereign debt crises 
4.  A review of the GARCH and switching ARCH/GARCH models 
2.1 The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The dominant theory since the early to mid-1960s have been the efficient market 
hypothesis, developed through the contributions of prominence articles such as Malkiel 
(1962) and Fama (1965, 1970).  However, to a certain degree the efficient market 
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hypothesis relies on some untestable assumptions and models.  Yet it is possible to test the 
key assumptions of random walk and efficiency individually thru the use of prominent tests 
like the variance ratio and bound tests proposed by Lo & MacKinlay (1989) and Shiller 
(1981a) respectively. 
At the basic level, the efficient market hypothesis is the perfect competition, which is 
widely used in neoclassical economics.  Perfect competition implies the assumption that 
market participants are rational, risk averse and profit maximising.  This assumption of 
market participants’ behaviour extends to the efficient market hypothesis, as proposed by 
Fama (1965) and Malkiel (1962).  This highlights the needs to evaluate the assumptions 
influencing the behaviour of market participants under uncertainty before we can research 
the efficient market hypothesis. 
In this section, we will firstly evaluate the microeconomic behavioural theories influencing 
market participants under neoclassical economics.  Next, we review the fundamental 
theory underpinning the efficient market hypothesis and analyse the empirical evidence on 
the pricing of information.  Finally, we review the tests of the efficient market hypothesis 
and the empirical evidence of these tests. 
2.1.1 The Microeconomics Behavioural Theories 
Historically, neoclassical economics have been the dominant view in explaining the 
behaviour of financial markets under uncertainty.  In essence, this view dictates that 
rational market participants should follow the key assumptions of profit maximization, 
Friedman (1953) and Alchian (1950), and risk aversion, Pratt & Zeckhauser (1987) and 
Kimball (1993), in their choice of investment.  The key in understanding this argument is 
the negative correlation effect that the assumptions of profit maximization and risk 
aversion have on financial asset prices.  This view have been criticised by many including 
proponents of the theory of behavioural finance such as Freeman et al. (2004) and Kourtidis 
et al. (2011).  The key problem is the assumptions underpinning the view, are unrealistic, 
for example rational agents as explained by De Bondt et al. (2008) and stockholder theory 
as argued by Philips (1997).  In this section, we critically review the neoclassical view 
concentrating on the arguments influencing the assumptions of profit maximization and 
risk aversion. 
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However, since financial institutions with stockholders, dominate the sovereign debt 
market; it is necessary to discuss the stockholder theory.  The stockholder theory dictates 
that businesses only exist to maximize the stockholders wealth within the rule of the law; 
and as Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953) hints this means the realization of profits; put 
simply as Alchian (1950, p. 213) states: 
“This is the criterion by which the economic system selects survivors: those who 
realize positive profits are the survivors; those who suffer losses disappear.” 
This is also argued by Friedman (1953, p. 22)  
“Whenever the determinant happens to lead to behavior consistent with rational 
and informed maximization of returns, the business will prosper and acquire 
resources with which to expand; whenever it does not, the business will tend to lose 
resources and can be kept in existence only by the addition of resources from 
outside.” 
However, as many proponents of the stakeholder theory (such as Freeman et al. (2004), 
Philips et al. (2003), Philips (1997) and Hosseini & Brenner (1992)) would point out there 
is more to business ethics than just profits.  The idea as defined by Jensen (2002) is that 
businesses have to take into account the interests of all stakeholders in the firm.  By 
definition stakeholders includes all individuals and groups who can affect the welfare of 
the business and not just shareholders.  However, Friedman (1970) argues that the only 
social responsibility for a business is to increase its profit. 
This seems to be suggesting that as dictated by the market selection hypothesis in order for 
the financial institutions to survive, there is a need to attract investment funds and thus 
generate huge profits as hinted by Dutta & Radner (1999).  The problem is that the 
behaviour of many of these financial institutions during the assert price boom of the mid 
2000s points towards pure profit maximization.  As defined by De Scitovszky (1943), pure 
profit maximization is the constant shifting of profit targets to maximize the utility function 
of the shareholders.  In contrast, the key argument of Alchian (1950) and Tintner (1941) is 
that businesses just have to make a positive profit to survive.  The key point is, if they make 
losses they struggle to survive as hinted by many including Alchian (1950) and Friedman 
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(1953).  A point in case is the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and hence the government 
bailout of many financial institutions during the financial crisis. 
In a way this led to the accusations by many including government inquiries4 into the crises 
of financial institutions being too risk loving and greedy.  However, the point defined by 
Kimball (1993), standard risk aversion follows a marginal increasing function, which 
means that bearing one risk makes the market participant less willing to bear another risk.  
Another argument highlighting this is that increasing risk leads to an upward shift in risk 
aversion as noted by Diamond & Stiglitz (1974).  This seems to be the overwhelming 
behaviour during the recent financial and sovereign debt crises.  A counter argument is that 
market participants’ behaviour seems to be following proper risk aversion.  As defined by 
Pratt & Zeckhauser (1987), proper risk aversion dictates that with respect to two 
independent risks, the rejection of one risk does not automatically deflect the market 
participants from taking the other independent risk.  This is mainly due to market 
participants hedging their risks by the use of derivatives instruments such as options and 
futures.  An example is the use of credit default swaps as hedges against the risk of a 
government defaulting on its debts.  However, a key point made in Alchian (1950) 
definition above is that companies that make losses do not survive and this highlights an 
alternative argument that many market participants display loss aversion rather than risk 
aversion.  As defined by Kahneman et al. (1991) and Thaler et al. (1997), loss aversion 
dictates that market participants tend to be increasingly sensitive to a loss than to a gain or 
put simply the feedback effect.  This is obvious from the reaction of the financial 
institutions during the sovereign debt crises where a loss made the institutions averse to 
any further losses.  This meant that the crises quickly spread from Greece to other sovereign 
debt markets. 
This leads us to the utility functions of the agents, since these agents caused the problems 
as often cited by government inquiries into the crises (see footnote 4).  Given an option 
between a number of similarly risky investments, utility maximization theories dictate that 
the agent choses the one with the highest income.  However, in a situation where the agents 
of financial institutions face investments of different risks, the key question is how can 
                                                 
4 Such as the House of Commons Treasury Committee Report Number 416 in the UK and Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission Report of January 2011 in the US. 
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they choose the investment, which maximizes their utility?  This problem occurs if interest 
rates are low and banks therefore take on larger risks for a higher return.  This has resulted 
in the development of a sub-prime mortgage market, for example, where prices no longer 
reflect the risks, which ultimately led to the collapse of the market.  The collapse occurred 
despite the existence of derivatives instruments such as CDS to insure against that risk.  
Surely, this would conflict with the utility maximization behaviour of buying risky 
securities such as subprime mortgage securities.  Still, this behaviour can be justified as 
rational, when one takes into account an S-shaped utility curve.  Friedman & Savage (1948) 
and Hartley and Farrell (2002) argue the possibility of non-concave or non-diminishing 
marginal utility function leads to different behaviour towards risk.  This could explain the 
rational behaviour of the huge gamble taken by the agents during the recent housing and 
mortgage backed securities prices bubble.  So in essence, the argument is that even efficient 
markets can lead to market instabilities.  As the crisis has shown, however, many market 
participants did not actually know what they were buying as illustrated by (Beltran & 
Thomas, 2010; Brunnermeier, 2009; Gorton, 2008).  Therefore, the validity of this 
argument is questionable in the least. 
However, as argued by Pennings & Smidts (2003) the evidence points towards an S-shaped 
utility function curve governed by the agent’s attitude towards profit and loss, in other 
words, the shape of the utility function depends on the initial situation, which is not 
compatible with rational behaviour.  As this makes the utility function unstable resulting 
in higher volatility of observed bond prices, as buying and selling of bonds depended on 
the changing utility function.  So in essence, the argument is that even efficient markets 
can lead to market instabilities. 
The utility function of the agents in the financial sector dictates the supply and demand 
model is the reverse of the standard model as suggested by Cifuentes et al. (2005) and Shin 
(2005).  And as hinted by Shin (2005), this means under profit maximization behaviour 
demand in high return assets increase putting upward pressures on the equilibrium price, 
while risk aversion behaviour not only reverses the demand for high return assets, due to 
the high risk associated with these assets, but also increases supply leading to a decrease 
in the equilibrium price.  The sovereign debt crises elegantly illustrated this, in the high 
demand environment of the flight to liquidity or quality during the financial crises; 
governments were able to control the increase of demand by issuing more debt.  During 
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the sovereign debt crises demand for several sovereign debts decreased hugely but the point 
here is, the supply also increased putting huge downward pressures on the prices.  The 
reasons are simple unlike the standard model of supply and demand which dictates when 
prices go down the issuer could reduce the supply to ease the pressures on the equilibrium 
price.  The existence of a secondary market meant that as market participants became 
increasingly risk averse due to a high possibility of defaults, they sold the debts meaning 
the secondary market became overstocked and the prices plummeted.  So no matter what 
the governments of the GIPS nations or the Eurozone tried to do, they could not reduce the 
supply and hence the yield. 
As already hinted above, an argument often used against the neoclassical economics is that 
market participants are not all rational as suggested by Hong & Stein (1999) and Kourtidis 
et al. (2011).  In addition, unlike the assumption dictating that the impact on the prices 
from irrational market participants is short-lived, the evidence from Barberis & Thaler 
(2003) is that the impact is long-lived.  The other issue concerning neoclassical economics 
is that the basis for many of the simplifying assumption of the models is that all market 
participants exhibit rational risk averse profit maximisation behaviour.  As with the 
previous argument, the existence of heterogeneous market participants each with a 
different attitude to risks and earnings means that this assumption of homogeneous 
behaviour regarding risks and earnings does not hold.  In this case, we need to use 
behavioural finance theories to identify the impact of heterogeneous market participants in 
different circumstances as illustrated by Hong & Stein (1999). 
2.1.2  Review of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Before we can start reviewing the efficient market hypothesis, there is a need to define 
information in the context of this research.  Although as hinted by Fama (1970) and Malkiel 
(2003), the efficient market hypothesis dictates that prices should reflect all available 
information (which is why we use prices rather than spreads to check for market efficiency 
in this thesis).  It is common practice to distinguish information in terms of fundamental 
and non-fundamental information (Bollerslev and Hodrick, 1992).  In other words, 
information is the summation: 
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• the fundamentals, such as yields or macroeconomic factors in the sovereign debt 
market, as hinted by Cochrane (1991) and Malkiel (2003), 
• non-fundamentals, such as information from news (i.e. they do not have any direct 
relationship to the asset but still have the power to influence the price such as the 
9/11 terrorist attacks, Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 2008 and Japanese 
Earthquake in 2011), as hinted by Caballero & Krishnamurthy (2008). 
Fama (1970) notes simply put the efficient market is a market where market participants 
are assumed to exhibit rational profit maximization behaviour and prices always fully 
reflect available information.  In essence, as Malkiel (2003) states the view influencing the 
efficient market hypothesis is information spreads quickly and priced into asset valuation 
immediately.  Hence, as Malkiel (2005) states this means that no arbitrage opportunities 
exists that allows for excess returns without excess risks.  As Malkiel (2003) hints in an 
efficient market, competition will mean that opportunities for excessive risk adjusted 
returns will not persist.  However, this does not mean that the efficient market hypothesis 
imply market prices will always be accurate and all market participants will always exhibit 
rational profit maximization behaviour. 
According to Fama (1970), the efficient market hypothesis dictates that any model of 
expected price should follow the notation of 𝐸𝐸�𝑝𝑝�𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1�𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡� = �1 + 𝐸𝐸�?̃?𝑟𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1�𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡��𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡.  The 
importance of this equation in the concept of this research is 𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡.  According to Fama 
(1970), this suggests that the expected price based on all available information at present 
is the price at present plus the expected return based on all available information at present.  
As Fama (1970), states this notation of the expected price, means regardless of which 
model (e.g. APT or CAPM) used to derive the equilibrium price, expected return should 
fully reflect all information available at present, transaction costs and taxations being 
equal.  Remember, as noted by Fama (1970), where expected excess value or return on the 
asset is equal to zero then by definition the excess value or return is a fair game with respect 
to the information available.  In essence as quoted by Malkiel (1962), the expectation of 
the future price of the asset strongly influences the price of any long-lived asset.  However, 
as put by Malkiel (1962), it is plausible that the recent past dictates the market participants’ 
expectations. 
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As suggested by both Fama (1965) and Malkiel (2003), the efficient market hypothesis is 
associated with the idea influencing the random walk model.  A big issue with regard to 
the pricing of information, as seen in numerous events during the recent financial and 
sovereign debt crises, is nobody can predict the impact of information especially under 
uncertainty.  Hence, as Fama (1965) states during periods of uncertainty the equilibrium 
price can never be determined exactly.  Moreover, as hinted by Fama (1965) the 
instantaneous adjustment property of the efficient market hypothesis may cause successive 
independent price changes, which imply prices follow the random walk model.  As defined 
by Malkiel (2003, p. 59) 
“The logic of the random walk idea is that if the flow of information is unimpeded 
and information is immediately reflected in stock prices, then tomorrow's price 
change will reflect only tomorrow's news and will be independent of the price 
changes today.” 
Although, as stated by Fama (1970), the random walk model does not state that past 
information has no value in assessing distribution of future returns.  However, the random 
walk model does state that the sequencing of past returns has no value in assessing 
distribution of future returns.  This last statement could infer the random walk model 
simply put is the direction in the short run of expected returns and hence prices is 
unpredictable given all available information; however in the long run the trend in the 
market prices is partially predictable as stated by Malkiel (2005).  Furthermore, as stated 
by Timmermann & Granger (2004), this makes the efficient market hypothesis notoriously 
difficult to forecast prices and returns.  The key logic behind this is if prices and returns 
were forecastable, it would mean the existence of unlimited profit, which would make the 
economy unstable as noted by Timmermann & Granger (2004). 
As hinted by Ball (2009), many in the regulatory, financial markets and academic 
environments were critical of the efficient market hypothesis in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis.  The reasoning behind their argument boils down to the key notation 
underpinning the efficient market hypothesis that market prices should reflect all available 
information.  This led to the false sense of security by regulators and market participants 
that market prices were correct based on all information leading to an asset price bubble.  
Ball (2009) argues that while like all good theories the efficient market hypothesis does 
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have major limitations; however, appear to exaggerate the criticisms in the aftermath of 
the global financial crises.  Since the theory of the efficient market hypothesis was only 
published by Fama (1965), this argument is invalid since there have been many crises based 
on the asset price bubble before the advent of the efficient market hypothesis.  Ball (2009) 
points to the fact that the efficient market hypothesis states current asset prices are correct 
based on all available information; this means that market participants should accept asset 
prices as correct.  However, in the pre-crises asset price bubble many market participants 
thought that asset prices were “incorrect” and hence they could beat the market.  This does 
seem to suggest that for some market efficiency based on all information the price is 
right/correct.  However, this is misleading, since the efficient market hypothesis, as defined 
by Fama (1970), does not state that the price is right/correct; it only states the price should 
reflect all available information. 
A key argument often put against the efficient market hypothesis is that sometimes asset 
prices deviate from the fundamental value as hinted by many including Barberis & Thaler 
(2003) and De Bondt et al. (2008).  In addition, as illustrated by Barberis & Thaler (2003) 
these deviations can be long-lived and substantial.  Another issue raised by Hong & Stein 
(1999) is that market participants may not have access to all the information.  And even if 
they do, as suggested by De Bondt (2000) and Daniel et al. (1998) they may have different 
sentiment about the information. 
A key assumption used in the efficient market hypothesis is the existence of well-informed 
wealthy rational arbitrageurs who push the asset price back to its fundamental value (Fama, 
1965).  As Hong & Stein (1999) illustrate the existence of these arbitrageurs does not 
counter the effect of other market participants and Abreu & Brunnermeier (2003) argue 
that these arbitrageurs sometime like to take advantage of the circumstances therefore 
pushing the price further from the fundamental value. 
Another key argument is that markets often go thru phrases where the efficient market 
hypothesis is not enough to explain the anomalies, e.g. bubbles (see Blanchard & Watson 
(1982), Hong & Stein (1999), De Bondt (2000), Abreu & Brunnermeier (2003)).  Hence, 
there is a need to research the psychology of market participants as suggested by De Bondt 
et al. (2008) and Kourtidis et al. (2011).  This leads towards the use of the behavioural 
finance theory. 
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The evidence seems to suggest there is a link between the pricing of information and 
sovereign debt markets and as Brandt & Kavajecz (2004) hints there are two main 
mechanisms for the daily changes in yields on sovereign debts: flow of public information 
and price discovery.  However, as illustrated by the numerous empirical studies, the 
majority of the evidence is on the effect of macroeconomic information and the 
heterogeneous interpretation, known as price discovery, or public information.  
Christiansen (2000) argues that contrary to equity and corporate bond, in general there is 
no private information in sovereign debts returns.  Thus, generally any movement in the 
returns on sovereign debts must come from public information, i.e. macroeconomic 
announcements and since the time varying return volatility of financial assets are 
autocorrelated and highly persistent, hence macroeconomic announcements could explain 
the high persistent observed in the volatility of sovereign debt markets.  However, 
according to Greenwood & Vayanos (2010), macroeconomic variables sometimes cannot 
fully explain the variation in the yield curve and hence shifts in demand and/or supply of 
sovereign debts are other important drivers in understanding the movements in the yield 
curve. 
According to Fleming & Remolona (1999), the key implications stemming from how 
public information influences the US Treasury market is the extent to which it drives the 
price movement and market makers are not confronted by imperfect information when 
trading.  As implied by the article unlike many other financial markets, the treasury market 
being dominated by non-market based trading hence it is restricted by maximum or 
minimum limits on bid-ask spreads or price changes, therefore spreads and prices can 
adjust endogenously on public information.  They identify two stages in the market’s 
adjustment for price formation and liquidity provision in the immediate aftermath of the 
announcement of public information: during the brief first stage, there is a sharp and 
instantaneous change in prices and a reduction in the trading volume.  During the next 
stage persistence trading surges leads to high price volatility and moderately wide bid-ask 
spreads. 
Bollerslev et al. (2000) analysed the 5 min intraday US Treasury bond futures data over 
the period January 1994 to December 1997; researching long-memory volatility in 
macroeconomic announcements in the observed data.  They found that US Treasuries 
futures exhibit long memory volatility in certain macroeconomic announcements.  
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According to their research, the open and close of markets have higher volatilities than 
mid-day.  The results indicate macroeconomic announcement is a key source of US 
Treasuries market volatility compared with prior results for FX and equity markets. 
In an empirical study by Balduzzi et al. (2001) on the effect of regular macroeconomics 
news on a number of US Treasuries, the study found the greater the unexpected 
macroeconomic news announcement is, the more significant the impact on the price of at 
least one of the US Treasuries.  They found that generally the price is usually the first 
affected by the announcement hinting that public information mainly drives the initial price 
adjustment.  The next stage is the widening of the bid-ask spread suggesting informed 
trading drives both volatility and volume.  The final stage is the continuation of the 
volatility and volume beyond the normality of the bid-ask spread hinting at liquidity 
trading.  According to the article, different macroeconomic factors have different effects 
on the various securities.  However, several announcements have significant impact on a 
number of securities and the impact varies depending on the maturity.  They conclude that 
surprises in the announcement have a substantial impact on the price volatility but the bid-
ask spreads seem to recover quickly hinting at public information being rapidly absorbed 
into the price. 
In another empirical study by Brandt & Kavajecz (2004); show that price discovery is not 
necessarily concentrated around the time of the public information announcement.  They 
imply at the existence of many factors influencing changes in the daily yield and therefore 
the structure of the yield curve but highlight two main complimentary factors: public 
information flow, such as periodically macroeconomic information releases, and 
heterogeneous interpretation of public information, i.e. price discovery, via trading in the 
Treasury market. 
Interestingly, the Andersson et al. (2006) study of the effect of macroeconomic news from 
various countries on price discovery in the German long-term government bonds market 
finds that in general macroeconomic news have a stronger longer-lasting impact on 
volatility.  In addition, they found that macroeconomic news from the US have more 
influence than the Eurozone announcements or various countries within the Eurozone. 
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An important aspect of market participants’ behaviour as hinted by Caballero & 
Krishnamurthy (2008) is market participants face immeasurable systemic risks under 
certain market conditions, which lead to market participants exhibiting flight to quality or 
liquidity behaviour.  Acknowledged as Knightian Uncertainty, it is believed to explain the 
behaviour of market participants in the aftermath of a wide range of events such as the 
Lehman Brothers Collapse in September 2008, Greek sovereign debt crisis and 9/11 
terrorist attacks.  The common factor is the lack of previous similar events to base 
information on.  However, these events are based on news and hence as hinted by Malkiel 
(2003) news is by definition unpredictable resulting in price changes tending towards 
unpredictability and hence randomness. 
2.1.3 A Review of the Tests of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
In testing the efficient market hypothesis, we need to test whether markets follow the 
random walk model and prices incorporate information immediately.  The variance ratio 
tests of Lo & MacKinlay (1988) allow the testing of the random walk model, the 
influencing assumption in the weak form efficient market hypothesis.  However, a key 
factor is as stated by Fama (1970, 1991), any test of the efficient market hypothesis 
involves a joint hypothesis of the equilibrium expected rates of returns and market 
rationality.  Thus, there is a need to review the variance bound test of Shiller (1979) and 
LeRoy & Porter (1981) which states any excess volatility in the price of any asset is the 
result of inefficient markets as argued by Shiller (1992).  This would mean that in a rational 
market, fundamental information is not the driving force of the price and inefficiency in 
the market drives the price away from the long-term equilibrium. 
As stated by Bollerslev & Hodrick (1992) past empirical evidence suggests that there is a 
difference between short and long horizons with short horizons displaying only minor 
violations of the efficient market hypothesis while with long horizons, large proportions 
are more predictable based on the price variance being largely explainable by past prices 
alone.  Of course, this does not mean that markets are inefficient.  A possible explanation 
is that the price variations could be due to time varying risk premium.  However, as Poterba 
& Summers (1988) argue the magnitude of the variability is too large, to be explained by 
the rational pricing theory.  The evidence from the long horizon tests seem to point at an 
overlapping issue suggesting the statistics are better estimated with an alternative 
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asymptotic distribution as derived by Richardson & Stock (1989),  although, as Bollerslev 
& Hodrick (1992) state this problem could also be overcome by using the vector 
autoregression method. 
Although as pointed by Lo & MacKinlay (1988) an empirically refutable efficient market 
hypothesis must be model-specific, historically the tests of the market efficiency have 
focused on the forecastability of assets prices or returns.  Since as hinted by Fama (1970, 
1991), the random walk hypothesis is used to test the weak form efficient market and hence 
the unpredictability of the financial market.  As Illustrated by Charles & Darne (2009), in 
any {𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡}𝑡𝑡=1𝑇𝑇  series, the random walk hypothesis corresponds to 𝛼𝛼 = 1 in the first order 
autoregression model 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇 + 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡.  The variance ratio test works by exploiting 
the fact that the variance of random walk increments is linear in all sampling intervals. 
Of course, as stated by Lo & MacKinlay (1988) the empirical evidence against the random 
walk model does not mean a rejection of efficient markets or prices are not rational 
assessment of fundamental values.  In essence, rational expectation of equilibrium prices 
need not follow a martingale sequence.  Hence, although the empirical evidence may reject 
one economic model of efficient market, there may exist another model of efficient market, 
which could be consistent with the results. 
The basis of the variance ratio test proposed by Lo & MacKinlay (1988) is the linearity in 
the sampling interval of the variance in the incremental random walk.  This means that a 
random walk model (possibly with drifts) of asset prices would be such that the variance 
of the monthly sample of log-prices would be four times the variance of the weekly sample 
of log prices.  Hence, a comparison of the variance of the period samples (e.g. monthly and 
weekly) could indicate the plausibility of the random walk model in efficient markets. 
Although as stated by Lo & MacKinlay (1988) traditionally the random walk model has 
been based on normally distributed homoscedasticity residuals, put simply residuals are 
said to be independently and identically distributed.  However, there is strong evidence 
that financial time series follow a heteroskedastic and non-normal distribution.  Lo & 
MacKinlay (1988) derive two tests of variance ratio to test the random walk hypothesis 
under heteroskedastic non–normal and homoscedasticity normal distributions.  They set 
 26 
 
three theorems for the model to follow; two based on both tests and the third based on the 
heteroskedastic model. 
The empirical evidence from Lo & MacKinlay (1988) using their variance ratio test rejects 
the random walk hypothesis for the weekly stock markets.  Although as suggested earlier 
this does not mean they reject nor confirm the efficient market hypothesis.  The omission 
of an economic model, which viably explains this behaviour of the asset prices, is the key 
issue. 
Although Lo & MacKinlay (1988) originally proposed the overlapping data method as an 
improvement of the power of the variance ratio test, however, as stated by Charles & Darne 
(2009), the use of overlapping data led to issues concerning the exact distribution of the 
variance ratio statistics in the long horizon.  Another issue concerning the distribution is 
that in multiple tests the asymptotic distribution can lead to a severe bias and right 
skewness in finite sampling, thus leading to misleading inferences.  However, as illustrated 
by Lo & MacKinlay (1988) and Richardson & Smith (1991) a key benefit of using the 
variance ratio test is when testing the random walk against several alternative hypotheses. 
The concept of the volatility tests is a comparison of the variability of prices with the 
variability of the future cash flows.  The basic argument is that in an ideal world, future 
cash flows should determine the behaviour of prices today; therefore, as Shiller (1992) 
argues, any excess volatility is evidence of inefficient markets.  As emphasized by LeRoy 
(1989), the underlining factor of the volatility or variance bound tests is that market 
efficiency dictates that asset price volatility should be relatively low in comparison with 
returns volatility.  Another key factor, highlighted by LeRoy (1989), is there exists a 
negative relationship between the variances of the asset price and returns given the amount 
of information market participants have.  Empirical evidence from Shiller (1979, 1981b) 
and LeRoy & Porter (1981) suggests asset prices are more volatile than is consistent with 
the efficient market hypothesis. 
And while the evidence is mostly geared towards the stock market with both LeRoy & 
Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981b) suggesting that the price seems to be more volatile than 
the returns in the stock market, suggests that the efficient market hypothesis is rejected due 
to information not being uniformed across all market participants.  The empirical evidence 
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provided by Shiller (1979) illustrates that the tests reject the expectation model; in essence, 
these results seem to be suggesting a negative relationship.  This hints at the long-term 
interest being too volatile and therefore rejecting the efficient market hypothesis. 
As emphasized by Shiller (1981a), there are a number of different interpretations for the 
simple pricing model depending on the underlying market and market variables used.  For 
example in LeRoy & Porter (1981), they used earnings instead of the dividends used in 
Shiller (1981b) on the stock market and in Shiller (1979), he uses the long-term yields with 
the expectation model to analyse the bond market. 
As Shiller (1979) emphasizes, an argument often made against rational expectation models 
of the term structure is long term interest rates are too volatile.  The expectation model of 
the term structure dictates long averages of expected short-term interest rates plus a 
liquidity premium could dictate long-term interests.  Additionally, in a conditional mean 
rational expectation model any shock to the trend should only occur on the arrival of 
important new information, which does not happen too often.  Past empirical evidence on 
long-term interest rates suggests that they follow the efficient market or random walk.  
Hence, the evidence of long-term interest rates being too volatile contradicts the past 
empirical evidence. 
As stated by Shiller (1981a) the simple pricing model dictates that the price of any asset 
(i.e. stock or bond) is fundamentally the present value of rationally expected or optimal 
forecastable earnings (i.e. dividends or coupons) divided by a discount factor.  The efficient 
market hypothesis states that information regarding fundamentals is priced immediately.  
This would suggest that the change in the price depends on information about the dividends 
or coupons.  Thus, any deviation from the long run equilibrium is therefore the result of 
information about the dividends or coupon rate.  In essence, the basis of the present value 
is the long weighted moving average, thus suggesting that the equilibrium long run 
expected prices are smooth.  However, a major issue is that occasionally asset prices are 
too volatile for the information to explain away.  This means that the changes in asset prices 
seem to be too large in association with the sequence of events influencing the information. 
The basis of the volatility test of LeRoy & Porter (1981) are the three theorems about the 
relationship between the variance of the dependent and independent variable processes.  
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The theorems are the basis for tests of validity of the present value relation in asset pricing.  
The efficient market hypothesis implies the present value relationship between the asset 
price and earning.  This means that the theorems are validity by the efficient market 
hypothesis and thus the variance bound test can test the efficient market hypothesis. 
As Shiller (1981a) states, the inequalities suggest that using the volatility or variance bound 
tests of the efficient market hypothesis have certain advantages over the conventional tests 
such as simplicity and understandability.  However, the key benefit is greater power of 
robustness to data errors such as misalignment.  The basis of the empirical evidence is a 
number of inequalities, which limits the price and returns in terms of the standard deviation 
of: 
• The equilibrium price (LeRoy & Porter (1981a) and Shiller (1981b)) 
• The dividends or earnings  (Shiller, 1981b) 
• Dividends or earnings differentials (Shiller, 1979) 
As hinted by Bollerslev & Hodrick (1992), a key factor in the financial market is many 
financial asset returns are characterised by periods of asset booms followed by periods of 
asset busts.  Since the basis of most pricing models is around the mean-variance trade-off, 
thus the time variations of the conditional second moments of returns and the underlying 
process are important in the testing of market efficiency. 
As suggested by Shiller (1981a), a possible test of the model is to use a conventional 
regression technique and the F-test on the resulting coefficients.  However, based on the 
assumptions made earlier, conventional regression techniques no longer suggest the 
likelihood test and the volatility test have more power under certain parameters.  
Nevertheless, as pointed by Bollerslev & Hodrick (1992) the use of ARCH/GARCH 
models in the estimation process can overcome seasonality in fundamentals and volatility 
clustering issues. 
As hinted by Cochrane (1991), there is a misinterpretation in the hypothesis underlining 
the volatility test as purposed by Shiller (1979, 1981b) and LeRoy & Porter (1981).  Many 
seem to be suggesting that the hypothesis points to a rejection of the efficient market 
hypothesis when the test shows that prices are too volatile.  In essence, the tests are 
equivalent to the Euler-equation based tests of the discount rate models; hence, the 
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hypothesis is that markets are forecastable due to the current discount rate models leaving 
a residual.  In fact as hinted by Bollerslev & Hodrick (1992), the volatility tests are a joint 
hypothesis of the return generating process and first order condition for economic agents 
similar to the Euler-equation based tests. 
As suggested by Cochrane (1991), opponents of the efficient market hypothesis do not 
argue that changes in prices are predictable; the basis of their argument is why prices move 
so much in the absence of any relevant news on the fundamental factors e.g. dividends.  In 
addition, tests of the coefficients in a return-forecasting regression or the variance bounds 
do not show the true and enormous size of the error term or the unpredictable part of the 
price changes. 
The evidence from the first generation of volatility tests as originally derived by Shiller 
(1979, 1981b) and LeRoy & Porter (1981) pointed to a clear rejection of the efficient 
market hypothesis with actual prices displaying excessive volatility in comparison to 
implied prices.  As suggested by Shiller (1981a) a possible explanation was the existence 
of speculative bubbles and/or fads in the actual prices.  As stated by Shiller (1981a), there 
are a number of alternative hypotheses such as rational bubbles, fads and unsuspected 
“disaster” or Knightian Uncertainty events.  However, as suggested by Cochrane (1991), 
since the alternatives such as fads and bubbles are not testable hypothesis in a time varying 
model of asset pricing, i.e. there are no rejectable models; the empirical evidence is not 
convincing.  Moreover, Hayek (1945) presents a possible explanation for the market prices 
behaviour, market participants need not know all the information about the fundamental 
elements; hence, they only need to know their own piece of information and market prices. 
Efficient market hypothesis tests are always conditioned on the model of equilibrium 
expected returns.  Simply put the basis of the tests is the assumptions of normal price 
behaviour under the efficient market.  However, as mentioned in Schwert (1991), there are 
a number of issues regarding the assumptions in the volatility tests.  As hinted by Schwert 
(1991) the empirical evidence provided by Shiller (1992) is the existence of sampling 
errors and bias.  This seems to be pointing at excess volatility not causing the bound 
violation present in the empirical evidence.  However, as Shiller (1979) argues 
conventional tests of the efficient market hypothesis may be weak. 
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As stated by Schwert (1991), in fact past empirical evidence points towards expected 
earnings being time varying rather than constant.  Hence, the excess volatility shown by 
some of the volatility tests could be due to time varying expected returns.  As highlighted 
by Bollerslev & Hodrick (1992) relaxing the assumption of a constant discounts rate results 
in a mixed picture of excess volatility and market inefficiency.  Another problem with the 
earlier models as stated by Bollerslev & Hodrick (1992) is that they did not take account 
of non-stationary prices and fundamentals in calculating and interpreting the test statistics 
results. 
Of course, there are many alternative tests of market efficiency.  One possible alternative 
test of the efficient market hypothesis as used by Fama & French (1988) and Lo & 
MacKinlay (1988) is to test for statistically significant negative or positive serial 
correlation, which would hint at predictable prices.  Fama & French (1988) found 
significant negative serial correlation in long horizon returns.  Furthermore, Lo & 
MacKinlay (1988) found significant positive serial correlation in weekly and monthly 
holding returns. 
Another alternative test for market efficiency suggested by Lai & Lai (1991) is the 
cointegration test whereby if the series are cointegration of i(0) suggesting both series are 
stationary at level order differentiation then it can be shown that the market is efficient.  In 
theory, this means that if there is a cointegration relationship between two series then one 
series is an unbiased predictor of the other series, which is consistent with the efficient 
market hypothesis. 
The Engle & Granger (1987) test for cointegration was originally used to test the market 
efficiency.  The basic idea of the test was that the hypothesis of an equilibrium relationship 
existing between the two series, if the hypothesis was accepted then we could suggest that 
series one is an unbiased predictor of series two.  The influencing factor is that the least 
square residuals are tested for stationarity; if the residuals are not stationary then the null 
hypothesis is rejected.  However, Lai & Lai (1991) argue there are a number of issues 
regarding the Engle & Granger (1987) test; the first is that no inference can be made with 
respect to the coefficients and the second is the estimated standard errors can be misleading 
for hypothesis testing. 
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One possible solution is using the Johansen cointegration test proposed by Johansen (1988, 
1991) to test the market efficiency.  Using the maximum likelihood method, which allows 
the likelihood ratio to test the coefficients of the equilibrium relationship between the non-
stationary series, can derive the test statistics.  An advantage of the Johansen cointegration 
test is it utilises the vector autoregression model whereas Engle & Granger (1987) test uses 
a single equation model. 
2.1.4  Concluding Review 
In concluding, it is hard to understate the roles of the neoclassical economics view and 
efficient market hypothesis in modern finance.  Yet both have attracted some big criticisms 
highlighted by the financial crisis and exacerbated by the global economic downturn and 
ensuing sovereign debt crisis.  At the heart of the criticisms lay two key factors efficient 
markets and profit maximization highlighting the misinformation and under-pricing of risk 
in the pre-crisis period.  Therein is the problem as argued in this section and the next section 
on behavioural finance, many neoclassical economics models are based on simplifying 
assumptions that do not hold in reality, for example the assumptions of rational market 
participants and perfectly competitive markets. 
Another issue as highlighted by Ball (2009), many were critical of the efficient market 
hypothesis in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  The issue seem to be based around the 
price is correct argument, however this is dangerously misleading; since the efficient 
market hypothesis only states the price should reflect all available information at the time.  
There are two arguments regarding this issue; firstly, as highlighted by Ball (2009) in the 
pre-crisis period many market participants thought prices were incorrect and using 
sophisticated forecasting models, they could beat the market.  Secondly, the efficient 
market hypothesis does not work when there is unequalled access to information resulting 
in incomplete or asymmetrical information.  This goes back to the neoclassical economics 
assumption of perfect competition; in a perfectly competitive environment, information 
should be complete and accessible to all market participants. 
Of course, a key neoclassical economics assumption is that market participants are risk 
averse.  However, as hinted by Buiter (2007) and Feldstein (2007), as early as 2005 many 
thought there was massive under-pricing of risks.  Hence, market participants were not 
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following this fundamental assumption of neoclassical economics and thus the efficient 
market hypothesis.  This goes to the heart of the problem during any asset price bubble, as 
illustrated in the next section, it is often the case that market participants usually think they 
could beat the market and therefore consistently under-price risk in the attempt of making 
increasingly large profits.  Therefore, distorting the market from the fundamental price 
leading to increased asymmetrical information. 
The key is determining whether the financial market accept the efficient market hypothesis, 
we presented strong historical empirical evidence suggesting financial markets are not 
efficient.  The tests and methods used to test the efficiency of the markets in the empirical 
evidences are wide ranging, e.g. variance bound tests (Shiller, 1979; LeRoy & Porter, 
1981a), variance ratio tests (Lo & MacKinlay, 1988) and cointegration tests (Engle & 
Granger; 1987; Johansen, 1988).  Moreover, although  the majority of the evidence seems 
to be based around the stock market, yet it does suggest that the global financial market is 
not random and asset prices are too volatile to be explained by the information.  This is the 
key to our research, if markets are too volatile to be efficient then what is explaining the 
behaviour of volatility in the markets.  Another key factor to our research as pointed out 
by Bollerslev & Hodrick (1992), the use of GARCH models can overcome clustering 
issues with the variance bound tests.  A possible issue in the variance bound tests is that 
market participants seem to react differently to negative or positive information.  In order 
to analyse whether markets are more efficient during phases of negative or positive shocks, 
there is a requirement to include the asymmetrical/leverage effect in the variance bound 
test.  However, a key issue is the selection of the lagged system influencing the variance 
bound test; there are a number of lagged systems within the daily frequency.  Perhaps two 
of the most relevant lagged systems for such tests are: 
• The weekly, which depending on the definition of the week in the observation could 
be a 5 or 7 day, lagged system 
• The monthly, which depending on the definition of the month in the observation 
could be a 20, 22 / 23, 30 / 31 and 28 / 29 day lagged system 
In concluding, it is easy to criticise the neoclassical economics view and efficient market 
hypothesis in the aftermath of the financial crisis and ensuing sovereign debt crisis.  Many, 
including governments and central bankers, would argue that the pursuit of profit 
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maximization and the assumption of efficient markets led to the financial and ensuing 
sovereign debt crises.  However, both the neoclassical economics view and efficient market 
hypothesis are essentially just models of the financial market and are therefore best used 
as benchmarks and not observations of the real world.  Used in that sense they might be 
powerful tools to regulate the markets and for market participants to really appreciate the 
risks and returns. 
As mentioned in the last paragraph, the problem is while both neoclassical economics and 
the efficient market hypothesis are powerful benchmark tools; they do not reflect the real 
world.  As stated by many including De Bondt et al. (2008) and Kourtidis et al. (2011) 
market participants are homo-sapiens and not homo economics, hence there is a 
requirement to include the behavioural finance theory. 
2.2 The Theory of Behavioural Finance: An Alternative Theory 
Essentially, as stated by De Bondt (2000), there are three perspective on asset prices: “the 
price is right” view proposed by Fama (1970), the price is driven by animal spirit view of 
Keynes (1936) and any uptrend in an asset price must eventually come down resembling 
Newton’s law of universal gravitation.  Interestingly the third perspective is the key to 
understanding the empirical studies of behavioural finance.  As illustrated by section 2.1, 
some of the issues regarding the pricing of assets cannot be addressed without a reference 
to the behavioural finance theory.  A criticism (for example De Bondt et al. (2008) and 
Kourtidis et al. (2011)) often put against the neoclassical economics model and in 
particular, the efficient market hypothesis is that market participants are homo-sapiens and 
not homo economics.  Hence, in order to address these issues there is a requirement to 
understand the psychology of the market participants.  This led to the alternative theory of 
behavioural finance being put forward by Statman (2008) and Subrahmanyam (2007) 
amongst others.  A key notion in behavioural finance theory as put by Bernard Baruch is: 
 “What is important in market fluctuations are not the events themselves, but the 
human reactions to those events.” (Lee et al., 2002, p. 2277). 
As illustrated in section 2.1, one of these issues is the price deviation from the fundamental 
value.  As the comment from Bernard Baruch above hints, the key to understanding this 
deviation is the reaction of the market participants.  This lends itself to the overreaction 
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hypothesis as suggested by Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998), Hong & Stein (1999) 
and De Bondt (2000).  This leads to another issue, the existence of bubbles, which causes 
the asset price to temporary deviate from the fundamental value in the short to medium 
term as illustrated by Kindleberger & Aliber (2005). 
This section will give a brief overview of the behavioural finance theory.  It will then 
evaluate the overreaction hypothesis.  The concluding part of this section is a review of the 
effect of rational bubbles. 
2.2.1 A Brief Overview of Behavioural Finance Theory 
In essence, De Bondt et al. (2008) and Kourtidis et al. (2011) argue that there is a necessity 
to understand the psychology of market participants in order to provide an explanation of 
market abnormalities, such as asset price bubbles and crashes, and comprehend the 
efficiency of the financial markets.  This would seem to suggest it is difficult to fully 
understand and research the global financial market without reference to the behavioural 
finance theory.  In addition, as hinted by Kourtidis et al. (2011), the obvious existence of 
irrational market participants making random transactions in the market can only be 
adequately explained by taking account of behavioural factors.  As stated by Barberis & 
Thaler (2003), the impact on the price from these irrational market participants can be long-
lived and substantial.  According to Barberis & Thaler (2003), these two issues (i.e. the 
psychology and the long-lived impact of irrational market participants) form the building 
blocks of behavioural finance. 
As stated by Kourtidis et al. (2011), whereas traditionally financial theories examines how 
people behave with respect to wealth maximization, behavioural finance is interested in 
how people “actually” behave in a financial environment.  Essentially, as defined by De 
Bondt et al. (2008) and Statman (2008) behavioural finance is the psychological study of 
the market participants and their interaction with the financial markets where the market 
participants may be individual households or organizations.  As stated by De Bondt et al. 
(2008) the behavioural finance theory is not necessarily based on the assumption of rational 
market participants and efficient markets.  An important factor in the behavioural finance 
theory, indicated by Statman (2008), is that market participants are assumed to behave 
normal in the sense that they act rational but with a limited information set.  As a result, 
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markets are not efficient but hard to beat.  The main idea influencing the behavioural 
finance theory is a number of behavioural factors influences market participants, to fully 
understand this reaction of market participants there is a need to research these behavioural 
factors.  Kourtidis et al. (2011) state there are many behavioural factors highlighted in the 
literature on behavioural finance that explain the behaviour of market participants in the 
financial market.  However, they limit their study to four major behavioural factors in 
analysing the market participants’ behaviour in the financial market: over-confidence, risk 
tolerance, social influence and self-monitoring. 
According to Subrahmanyam (2007) there seems to be evidence to suggest that the 
assumptions and models underpinning the behavioural finance theory are plausible.  He 
state there is evidence to suggest that non-risk based factors influence the predictions of 
returns more than risk-based factors.  There also seem to be evidence to suggest that 
psychological hypothesises about market participants’ biases can be tested in an ex-ante 
manner.  And although the evidence seem to be suggesting that markets are inefficient and 
predictable patterns do exist, this does not mean that individual market participants can 
make large excess returns.  However, there is evidence that institutional market participants 
are able to take advantage of these predictable patterns in the financial markets.  He argues 
that although there is evidence suggesting that irrational agents do influence the market in 
the short run, however there is also strong evidence that irrational agents do influence the 
market in the long run. 
As hinted by Subrahmanyam (2007), there is evidence to suggest that asset prices are 
influenced by a reference price and the disposition effect.  This evidence seems to be 
pointing towards the existence of a pattern in the trading activity of individual market 
participants. Moreover, as he hints although there is evidence to suggest that market 
participants seem to be constructing their portfolios from a limited number of simple 
strategies like locality, knowledge and word of mouth.  However, there seem to be a lack 
of emphasis in the literature on portfolio choice of market participants.  Another key factor 
as stated by Statman (2008) is that the hypothesises underpinning the behavioural finance 
theory, such as the disposition hypothesis which predict market participants will realize 
rapid gains but defer losses, are testable.  Thus meaning they can be rejected or accepted 
depending on the analysis of the data and have been shown by many empirical studies to 
be capable of accurately predicting market participant’s behaviour. 
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2.2.2 The Overreaction Hypothesis 
A key assumption of the efficient market hypothesis is that current prices should fully 
reflect all information on the asset as hinted by Fama (1965) and Malkiel (1962).  There is 
an issue with this statement in that the current price does not reflect the information but the 
sentiment of the market participants with respect to the information as suggested by De 
Bondt (2000) and Daniel et al. (1998) among others.  Therein lays the key to understanding 
the overreaction hypothesis (as hinted by Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998), Hong 
& Stein (1999) and De Bondt (2000)); since market participants have different perspectives 
on how to interpret the new information, therefore the price could deviate from the 
fundamental value.  Essentially, as hinted by De Bondt (2000), the overreaction hypothesis 
states that sometimes market participants tend to disproportionately react to information 
(fundamentals and news) causing a temporarily and dramatic deviation from the 
fundamental value.  Usually the price does revert to the fundamental value within a short 
period of time as market participants digest the information. 
In essence, according to De Bondt (2000), most overreactions are due to errors in market 
participants’ forecasts.  A common issue is that market participants are often upbeat during 
bull markets and gloomy during bear markets, this is reflected in their perspectives of the 
asset price.  Another issue is the problem of overestimation of the information on the asset 
during the issuance or initial public offering stage by the agents.  According to Barberis et 
al. (1998), a key factor in the overreaction hypothesis is that a sequence of good or bad 
news can lead to an overreaction by market participants assuming the continuation of the 
trend.  Daniel et al. (1998) suggest there is a differentiation based on whether the 
information is public or private.  Thus meaning market participant are overconfident in 
their private information leading to an overreaction in the market.  Whilst in general they 
tend to underreact to public information.  Moreover, as discussed in Barberis et al. (1998) 
the evidence seems to be pointing at some market participants’ conservative attitude to 
updating the model incurring the underreaction hypothesis. 
However, as Hong & Stein (1999) highlight it is essential to analyse the interaction 
between heterogeneous market participants.  They analyse two types of bounded rational 
market participants: momentum traders and news watchers and to illustrate the effects on 
one another both types have simplifying assumptions.  The results seem to be suggesting 
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that when news watchers pick up new information, in general they underreact.  This is 
mainly due to the gradual diffusing of information and the assumption that they do not 
observe prices.  When short run momentum traders enter the market, seeing a chance to 
profit, instead of pushing the price towards the fundamental value, they cause an 
overreaction to any news.  While in the short run market participants could make a profit, 
in the long run they make losses due to the price exceeding the long run equilibrium price.  
According to Hong & Stein (1999), the inclusion of well-informed fully rational 
arbitrageurs does not eliminate the effects of other less informed and rational market 
participants.  Thus meaning overreaction continues to have an impact on the price. 
Recent empirical evidence have painted a mixed picture for the overreaction hypothesis, 
in Spyrou et al. (2007) they find a split between large and small capitalization stocks in the 
London Stock Exchange.  Large capitalization stocks were consistent with the efficient 
market hypothesis, while medium to small stocks seem to underreact to news shocks for 
many days.  This underreaction is unexplained by risk factors or any other known effect. 
Kirchler (2009) finds evidence of underreaction leading to overvaluation during bullish 
markets and undervaluation during bearish markets by market participants.  This leads to 
an asymmetrical effect between the bull markets and bear markets with the bull markets 
illustrating a higher degree of consistency to the efficient market hypothesis.  The 
reasoning for the observed underreaction in the market is the relatively high volatility 
influencing the fundamental value. 
However, contrary to the two previous articles, Lobe & Rieks (2011) find significant 
evidence of short-term overreaction in the Frankfurt stock exchange is not limited to small 
capitalization stocks.  The explanation seems to be in the anomalies and stock 
characteristics.  However, transaction costs and unpredictable markets mean that market 
participants may not be able to exploit these effects.  This means that due to the 
unforeseeable direction of the reaction and the existence of transaction costs prohibiting 
the implementation of consistent profit making strategies, they conclude the evidence seem 
to be suggesting no violation of the efficient market hypothesis. 
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2.2.3 A Review of the Effects of Rational Bubbles 
Essentially, as hinted by Barlevy (2007) the popular notion is bubbles are initiated by rapid 
upwards pressures on the price of a particular type of asset or index in a short interval of 
time, eventually causing downward pressures to correct the price or more dangerously a 
collapse in the price.  In simple terms, as hinted by Blanchard & Watson (1982), a popular 
notion defines a bubble as a price deviation from the fundamental value that is apparently 
unjustified by the information available at the time.  This was evidence in the technology 
boom of the late 1990s to early 2000s and housing market boom of the early to mid-2000s.  
As illustrated by Kindleberger & Aliber (2005), history is filled with such episodes, the 
first recorded bubble often referred to as the Dutch tulip bubble of the 1630s, the South 
Sea Company bubble of 1719-1720 and the US stock market bubble of the 1920s, which 
ended with the Wall Street crash of 29th October 1929. 
However, as Barlevy (2007) argues this popular definition is ambiguous about the scale 
and length of time of a bubble.  At the heart of this argument is the fact large price swings 
could occur under normal market conditions due to shifts in supply and demand.  An 
example is an asset with cyclical changes in demand, therefore causing dramatic price 
changes.  These price changes are sometimes known as fads.  In essence, as Barlevy (2007) 
states many economists define a bubble as a rapid upwards deviation from the fundamental 
value. 
As noted by Blanchard & Watson (1982), therein lays the difference between economists 
and market participants.  Economists believe that any deviation from the fundamental value 
is evidence of irrational behaviour whereas market participants believe extraneous events 
could influence the price of any asset or index.  In other words, “crowd psychology” is an 
important element in the behaviour of asset pricing as pointed by Blanchard & Watson 
(1982).  And as Brunnermeier (2001) highlights, there is empirical evidence provided by 
LeRoy & Porter (1981) and Shiller (1979) among others of excess volatility in asset prices 
meaning prices deviate from their fundamental value more than predicted by the efficient 
market hypothesis.  This evidence would suggest there could be rational deviation from 
the fundamental value i.e. rational bubbles.  Rational bubbles appear in asset prices 
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“If market participants are willing to pay more for the stock than they know is 
justified by the value of the discounted dividend stream because they expect to be 
able to sell it at an even higher price in the future, making the current high price 
an equilibrium price” as defined by Gurkaynak (2008, p. 166). 
Furthermore, as Blanchard & Watson (1982) point rational behaviour and expectation does 
not imply that prices must follow fundamental values.  Of course, there is some evidence 
of irrational behaviour in the market that could cause irrational bubbles for a survey of this 
type of asset price bubbles see Vissing-Jorgensen (2004). 
As stated by Abreu & Brunnermeier (2003), the efficient market hypothesis implies that 
bubbles do not exist by virtue of the existence of rational well informed and financed 
arbitrageurs guaranteeing that any potential mispricing will be corrected (Fama, 1965).  
However, as Abreu & Brunnermeier (2003) argue some rational arbitrageurs also like to 
take advantage of the bubble to further their earnings while the bubble last, hence ideally 
leaving the market just before the crash.  Nevertheless, since each rational arbitrageur have 
their own model and assumption of when to leave this leads to asymmetrical information 
and different viewpoints.  The key argument against the assumption of the existence of 
rational and financed arbitrageurs is this incoordination between the very agents that will 
supposedly correct any mispricing in the assets.  Moreover, as Abreu & Brunnermeier 
(2003) illustrate many supposedly rational agents have lost out on huge profits or made 
huge losses by mistiming their exit.  As exemplified by the different cases of Julian Robert, 
Tiger Hedge Fund, and Stanley Druckenmiller, Quantum Fund, during the tech bubble of 
the late 1990s early 2000s see Abreu & Brunnermeier (2003, p. 175). 
As Blanchard & Watson (1982) illustrate there are a number of theoretical paths for the 
development of a bubble.  The first is as they term the deterministic bubble where the 
upward price deviation is justified by higher capital gain but the price deviation grows 
exponentially.  This means in rationality the price inflation has to go on forever meaning 
it is implausible.  The second path introduces the concept of probabilities into bubble where 
chance of a bubble continuation is π and the chance of the bubble bursting is 1-π.  Thus 
means that the probability of the bubble ending may be a function of either the duration of 
the bubble or the distance of the price from the fundamental value. 
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In essence, these two paths move independently of the fundamental value.  However, this 
is0 not necessarily the path bubbles take.  As hinted by Blanchard & Watson (1982), there 
is a third path that bubbles could take which is linked to the fundamental value.  This path 
is governed by the existence of a ratio between the fundamental value and the price in a 
bubble, which continues as long as the bubble still exists.  An example is that the ratio is 
at 0.25 if the bubble continues and 0 if the bubble bursts.  Thus meaning that as long as the 
bubble continues the price will go up by a further 25% of the fundamental value, however 
if the bubble burst then the price will collapse with the fundamental value. 
An illustration of the long held assumptions underpinning most models and theories in the 
financial market shows with or without them bubbles can still occur.  As shown by 
Blanchard & Watson (1982) and illustrated earlier, prices can still deviate from the 
fundamental value even if we take into account the arbitrage assumption thus creating or 
maintaining a bubble. 
Blanchard & Watson (1982) show that there can be bubble even after accounting for the 
assumption of all agents having access to the same information on the asset.  However, it 
is known that bubbles are increasingly likely to occur if there is an information differential 
among the agents but the key question would these bubbles have greater intensity and 
duration?  The answer probably lays in the expectation of the agents and their models.  As 
explained earlier agents can take different viewpoints based on their information. 
A key assumption influencing many theories and models of financial asset pricing is that 
market participants or agents are risk averse.  Moreover, as illustrated by Blanchard & 
Watson (1982), since bubbles are likely to increase the risk associated with the assets at 
the centre of the bubbles.  Hence, risk averse agents require higher returns to encourage 
them to hold the assets.  This means that the price will not only have to increase due to the 
increased probability of a crash but also due to the increase in risk aversion to compensate 
agents. 
Branch & Evans (2011) raise another intruding assumption based on agents’ ability to use 
econometric models to learn about the price deviation from the fundamental value.  Rather 
interestingly, the results seem to indicate that adaptive learning techniques can reinforce 
bubbles and the inevitable crashes.  This can be exemplified by the agents’ attitude to risks 
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in the market; the econometrics models are used to readjust estimates of risk and hence 
expected returns.  Conversely, when combined these two forces can cause the price to 
deviate from the fundamental value.  In a market where the risk factors are perceived to be 
low and the returns are relatively high, this can lead to an upward deviation from the 
fundamental value.  As agents continually readjust their models due to the perceived low 
risk factor and hence raising prices, thus reinforcing the positive feedback effect which 
inevitably leads to a bubble.  Eventually, the changing estimates of risk are deemed to be 
too high for the expected returns leading to downwards pressures on the price.  This leads 
to a hiked in the risk factors, which forms the negative feedback effect and hence the price 
crashes below the fundamental value. 
This raises the interesting topic of using econometrics to model the effect of bubbles and 
their inevitable crashes on the prices of assets.  As Blanchard & Watson (1982) illustrate 
the positive/non correlation between the innovations in the bubbles and asset returns could 
lead to the bubble increasing the conditional variance in the price.  This leads to the 
possible modelling of bubbles by different econometrics models to understand the factors 
influencing the bubbles.  Branch & Evans (2011) hints at feedback effects influencing the 
bubbles hinting at the use of the GARCH-m (Engle et al, 1987) in understanding these 
feedback effects.  As highlighted earlier in this review, information affects the view of 
agents on the asset price and hence influences the bubble; this is crucial to understanding 
the method of bubbles.  In effect this point to the use of an asymmetrical model such as the 
GJR-GARCH (Glosten et al, 1993) or EGARCH (Nelson, 1991) to understand this effect.  
In addition, as Branch & Evans (2013) states there is certainly a hint of ARCH and hence 
GARCH effect influencing the asset price bubble pointing towards volatility clustering 
effects. 
However, on some occasions there can be the appearance of multiple bubbles occurring 
over a short duration. This periodic collapse in a bubble can be analysed thru the use of a 
Markov process as alluded by Blanchard & Watson (1982), Evans (1991) and more 
recently Branch & Evans (2011); this process can be modelled by the use of Markov 
Switching models (Hamilton, 1988).  Moreover, since as illustrated previously the 
correlation between the innovations and asset returns points to the use of the 
ARCH/GARCH models, so hinting at the use of the SWARCH (Hamilton & Susmel, 1994; 
Cai, 1994) to model the impact of the bubble on the behaviour of price volatility. 
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In a survey of the econometric tests for rational asset price bubbles, Gurkaynak (2008) 
critically reviews the econometrics methods proposed for the detection of rational asset 
price bubbles.  Surveying the literature on: 
• Variance Bound Tests see Shiller (1979, 1981b) and LeRoy & Porter (1981) 
• West’s Two Step Tests see West (1987) 
• Integration/Cointegration Based Tests see Diba & Grossman (1988) 
• Intrinsic Bubbles see Froot & Obstfeld (1991) 
• Bubbles as an Unobserved Variable see Wu (1997) 
Gurkaynak (2008) concludes there are issues underlining the econometrics tests for rational 
bubbles, both theoretically and empirically.  Whether the researcher conclusion hints at the 
existence of a bubble or fundamental factors in the data is really a matter of what side of 
the argument the researcher is on.  In essence, the bubble remains a term that encompasses 
the asset pricing movement unexplained by the fundamental model. 
As highlighted by Evans (1991), there have been many tests, see Blanchard and Watson 
(1982), which have found evidence that asset prices deviate from their fundamental values.  
This evidence could be interpreted in two different ways depending on which side of the 
argument you are on; it is either evidence of the existence of bubbles and fads or 
unobservable market fundamentals.  An alternative test for the bubble hypothesis, as 
explained by Evans (1991, p. 922, footnote 2), is to analyse the stationarity properties.  As 
stated by Evans (1991), a suggested behaviour of some bubbles is that they generate an 
explosive component that is detectable over the dividend at stationary using k-differentials.  
This has shown that bubbles do not exist.  However, as Evans (1991) illustrates the 
existence of a type of bubble, which cannot be detected using stationarity analysis leads to 
standard unit root and cointegration tests being unable to distinguish between stationary 
processes and periodically collapsing bubbles. 
As West (1987) states previous empirical studies were unable to detect bubbles, due to the 
tests being too few and not powerful enough.  In overcoming the issues of previous tests, 
he develops and applies a test specifically for the alternative of bubbles.  He uses a two 
present value estimates method: one using an arbitrage equation while the other is an 
ARIMA model.  The basis of the test is if the markets are in accordance with the efficient 
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market hypothesis than the two sets of estimates should be the same, apart from the 
sampling errors.  However, the alternative hypothesis of the two estimates being different 
would suggest the existence of a bubble.  Using the Standard and Poor’s 500 index (1871- 
1980) and Dow Jones index (1928-1978), the data rejects the null hypothesis of no bubbles.  
As West (1987) states the rejection seem to be due to the coefficients in the regression of 
the price on the dividends being upward bias. 
As Philips et al. (2011) hints standard econometrics tests seem to have difficulties in 
detecting rational bubbles.  Hence, they use a forward recursive regression method based 
on the ADF unit root test which when added to new techniques permitting valid asymptotic 
confidence intervals for explosive autoregressive processes and tests of explosive 
behaviour in the time series; would allow for the identification and dating of explosive 
behaviour in the asset pricing.  Basically the idea consists of a repeated right tailed ADF 
test.  This technique would overcome the criticism of Evans (1991), as highlighted 
previously, on some tests inability to detect periodically collapsing bubbles.  Using the 
new technique on the NASDAQ index from 1973 to 2005, they identify and date the 
dotcom bubble of the 1990s as starting in 1995 and ending between September 2000 and 
March 2001. 
In essence as Philips et al. (2012) state just like the existence of multiple financial crises in 
a long time series, so is the likelihood of multiple asset pricing bubbles in a long time 
series.  Therein lays the problem if as we have already illustrated it is difficult to detect a 
single bubble then as Philips et al. (2012) points detecting multiple bubbles with 
periodically collapsing behaviour is substantially more complicated.  However, this is 
important not only for market participants but also to central bank, economists and 
regulators who want to control asset price bubbles.  Hence, Philips et al. (2012) extend the 
econometrics test of Philips et al. (2011) to the possible existence of multiple bubbles by 
generalising the repeated right tailed ADF test to a more broader and flexible range of 
sample sequence.  Using the extended generalised method on the S&P 500 index from 
January 1871 to December 2010, they detected key historical bubbles including the stock 
market bubble of the 1920s and dotcom bubble of the 1990s.  In comparison, the alternative 
tests including the Philips et al. (2011) test detected fewer explosive rational bubbles. 
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2.2.4  Concluding Review 
In concluding, it is hard to explain the recent financial and to a certain extent sovereign 
debt crises without referring to the behavioural finance theory.  In essence, the psychology 
of humans dictates that under normal conditions each market participant would interpret 
the given information about a financial asset differently.  The nature of financial crises is 
such that information becomes increasingly asymmetrical and news has a greater impact 
than fundamentals.  Hence, as illustrated throughout this section, there is ample evidence 
suggesting that financial markets are governed by the reaction of market participants to 
events such as De Bondt et al. (2008), Kourtidis et al. (2011) and Lee et al. (2002).  Another 
factor highlighted by Bernanke (2010) and Barberis (2011) is the possibility of increases 
in asset prices beyond the fundamental value dictated by the information over a period.  
These two factors point to the existence of asset price bubbles and overreaction hypothesis 
influencing the behaviour of prices and hence volatility. 
As illustrated earlier, evidence in the financial markets suggest a mixed picture for the 
overreaction hypothesis see Spyrou et al. (2007), Kirchler (2009) and Lobe & Rieks 
(2011).  On the other hand, the evidence seem to suggest that market participants do react 
to certain extreme events such as the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, Lehman Brothers 
Bankruptcy and the Japanese tsunami of 2011.  This seem to be explained by Knightian 
Uncertainty which dictates under certain market conditions market participants are faced 
with immeasurable systemic risks which lead to market participants overreacting as hinted 
by Caballero & Krishnamurthy (2008).  In essence, this evidence seems to be suggesting 
that it is news and not fundamentals influencing the financial markets during any financial 
crisis.  In addition, the overreaction/underreaction hypothesis may provide a part of the 
explanation for the asset price bubbles. 
There is ample evidence throughout history of asset price bubbles, yet a fundamental 
weakness of the efficient market hypothesis is its assumption that bubbles cannot exist due 
to the existence of rational well-informed and financed arbitrageurs see (Fama, 1965).  
However, as illustrated earlier in this section, there is a hint of catch 22 for these 
arbitrageurs that lead to huge losses or miss-opportunities see (Abreu & Brunnermeier, 
2003).  This highlights the difficulties of planning strategies during episodes of asset price 
bubbles, since it is very difficult to know when an asset price bubble will burst.  The 
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problem is further complicated by the existence of mixed evidence in the detecting of asset 
price bubbles see (Evans, 1991; Gurkaynak et al., 2008).  An interesting and influencing 
factor in the context of our research, as illustrated previously, is that it could be possible to 
model the effect of bubbles and their inevitable bursts using econometric models. 
Indeed, there are many features of asset price behaviour picked up by the GARCH family 
of volatility, which can explain the behaviour of market participants.  Key among those is 
the fact that in some cases price changes of similar magnitude irrespective of signs tend to 
follow each other as highlighted by Mandelbrot (1963) and Branch & Evans (2013), this 
is sometimes referred to as clustering.  As illustrated by Blanchard & Watson (1982) and 
Branch & Evans (2011), another key behaviour is demonstrated by many market 
participants is the risk/return trade-off, which dictates that the higher the risk the higher the 
required returns acknowledged as the feedback effect.  It is a well-established fact that 
market participants react to market shock differently as hinted by Black (1976) and Glosten 
et al. (1993).  This suggests that a negative shock has a greater impact on market 
participants than a positive otherwise known as the asymmetrical/leverage effect.  Of 
course in some cases the behaviour of the market participants seem to be changing in a 
manor suggesting a temporary shift in their behaviour towards an asset as alluded by 
Hamilton & Susmel (1994) and Cai (1994).  In addition as hinted by Blanchard & Watson 
(1982) amongst others, a bubble can periodically collapse.  These two behaviours can be 
analysed by a regime-switching model. 
In conclusion, behavioural finance is an essential theory in the explanation of the behaviour 
of asset price volatility.  This is highlighted by the existence of homo-sapiens in the global 
financial market as the decision makers.  In essence, neoclassical economics and the 
efficient market hypothesis do not explain certain types of behaviours in the financial 
market such as asset price bubbles and market participants’ reactions to news or 
information.  However, the mixed empirical evidence, especially in the case of testing for 
asset price bubbles and to a lesser extent the overreaction hypothesis, seem to be pointing 
towards a lack of econometrical tests and understanding of how market participants react 
to certain events and information. 
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2.3 The Review of Economic Policies 
The financial crisis and ensuing economic downturn and sovereign debt crisis have bought 
a heated debate about which policy to implement during a long and deep economic 
downturn.  Both countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies have their benefits and costs.  
The debate is between inflationary pressures see (Rudebusch, 2010) or high taxes see 
(Tobin, 1971).  The other issue is that lags in the implementation of any fiscal stimulus 
policy may have a delayed and hence adverse effect on the economy see (Friedman, 1948).  
However, as hinted by Feldstein (2009) and Taylor (2008) it seems that there is a need for 
both policies in the current climax.  In this section of the literature review, we critically 
review the theory and evidence for both stimulus policies. 
2.3.1 The Macroeconomic Arguments Influencing the Monetary Policy 
In a way, as Bernanke & Reinhart (2004) state the function of monetary policy is to 
influence the prices and yields of financial assets, thereby affecting the economic decisions 
and hence the direction of the economy.  Moreover, as Clarida et al (1999), Romer & 
Romer (1989) and Bernanke & Mihov (1996) state that monetary policy influences the 
economy in the short term. 
According to Friedman (1982), a monetary policy targeting full employment or economic 
growth is not feasible. Furthermore, as Barro & Gordon (1983) argue there is no changing 
relationship between monetary policy and employment. Additionally, as Friedman (1968) 
states many would suggest that the role of monetary policy is to keep interest rates low in 
order to offset the interest payment on sovereign debt in an alternative fiscal policy 
solution.  However, as illustrated by many episodes of high inflationary pressures holding 
interest rates low, i.e. cheap money, could be counterproductive. 
Friedman (1968) advocated the used of an aggregate money supply target to control the 
economy and asset prices.  This means in times of an economic upturn there would be a 
decrease in money supply and in times of an economic downturn, there would be an 
increase.  There is the option of alternating between policies of inflation rate targeting thru 
the use of interest rate and aggregate money supply targeting by altering money supply as 
suggested by Bernanke & Reinhart (2004).  Moreover as argued by Bernanke & Reinhart 
(2004), a key question is what happens when the short-term interest rate is approximating 
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or at zero.  According to Bernanke & Reinhart (2004), there are a number of options open 
to the central bank: 
• Since the prices of many financial assets depend on the expected short-term interest 
rate in the long run, a possible option is to influence the market participants short 
to medium term expectation on the short-term interest rate.  This could be either 
unconditional or conditional on a set of economic factors. 
• Another option is to change the composition of its balance sheet.  In essence, this 
involves either selling and buying short//long or selling and buying different assets 
e.g. selling sovereign debt in favour of stocks or other bonds.  This would have the 
same effect of changing the supply/demand curve and hence the equilibrium price. 
• Another alternative is to embark on a policy of quantitative easing or increasing 
money supply by expanding the balance sheet.  In essence, this would mean the 
central bank buying financial assets from commercial banks, thereby reducing the 
risk factors and increasing the money in the economy.  A key condition of this 
policy is that the overnight rate is zero. 
However, as argued by both Leeper & Roush (2003) and Woodford (2007), there is limited 
evidence to suggest a relationship between inflation and money supply.  In fact, the 
evidence seems to be suggesting an increase in money supply leads to an increase in the 
rate of inflation in the long run.  Additionally, as Clarida et al (1999) states the optimal 
monetary policy is to target an optimal inflation rate by adjusting the nominal rate, thus 
altering the real rate. 
As stated by Leeper & Roush (2003), many central banks (i.e. Bank of England and more 
importantly in the context of this research the European Central Bank and Federal 
Reserves5) have opted to a long run policy of inflation rate targeting thru the use of interest 
rates. The problem with this policy is which price index to use and at what level should the 
target be set.  As Bernanke & Mishkin (1997), hints the index needs to allow for shocks or 
a one-time shift in the short run without affecting the long run trend.  A major issue as 
pointed by Bernanke & Mishkin (1997) is that setting, inflation rate targets too low, i.e. 
                                                 
5 The Maastricht Treaty mandates price stability as the primary objective of the European Central Bank.  The 
Economic Growth and Price Stability Act of 1995 require that the Federal Reserve maintain price stability. 
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close to zero, could cause unanticipated deflation, which can creates major problems to the 
financial system and inevitably economic contraction.  A case in point is Japan. 
Bernanke & Gertler (1999) suggest that since monetary policy has been relatively 
successful in the fight against inflation, it is likely that the next issue facing monetary 
policy will be a different target.  They argue that evident from a number of industrialised 
nations seem to be pointing at increased volatility in asset prices that is instrumental in 
stock and real estate bubbles.  Therefore, by tuning monetary policies to respond to asset 
price volatility, central bankers could reduce the threat of a bubble.  The key word here, 
being ‘reduce’ because, while monetary policy is a key element, it is not the only required 
element in the elimination of the asset price bubble.  They discuss several methods open 
for policymakers to use in controlling asset price bubbles.  In concluding, they hint at a 
lack of desirability in responding to asset prices instead suggesting a flexible inflation-
targeting policy. 
Tobin (1983) states that the monetary policy of one nation could influence financial 
markets and instruments, i.e. interest and foreign exchange rates, of the other nations.  In 
short as Tobin (1983) states the interdependent of the global economies and financial 
markets means a coordination of monetary policies.  In other words as Tobin (1983, p. 16) 
referring to the European Community, Japan and the US says: 
“None of the three locomotives can claim it is too small to influence the world 
economy” 
Benigno & Benigno (2006) also argue this point and Devereux & Sutherland (2007) who 
agree an integrated globalise economy makes it hard for any country to be mutual exclusive 
in monetary policy.  Devereux & Sutherland (2007) also argue that due to the integration 
of financial markets and the diverse nation of market participants’ portfolios, there is a 
need for monetary policy to control for inflation and foreign exchange rates, continuing 
that the optimal policy should be asset price stability using inflation targeting.  This 
argument was the basis for Taylor (2009a) suggesting to introduction of global inflation 
reference target to eliminate the adverse effect of one country’s policy on others  
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Many articles have documented the recent financial and sovereign debt crises6 leading to 
the global economic recession.  In the aftermath of these crises, monetary policy had to 
adapt to a fast changing and challenging environment.  Here we will review the literature 
on monetary policy during the crises and economic downturn. 
As highlighted by Blanchard et al. (2010), in the advent of the crises two key factors 
challenged the long held views.  The first factor is that stable inflation is necessary but not 
by itself sufficient.  Some have argued that the theory is too limiting and does not 
incorporate the increases in house prices.  However, the problem is that no single inflation 
index could account for the movement in prices.  Another issue is that both the combined 
stability of inflation and output could lead to misrepresentation of the undesirable 
behaviour of asset prices and credit aggregates.  The second factor is that setting inflation 
too low leads to deflationary pressures or deteriorating fiscal positions. 
As Bernanke (2009) hints aggressive reduction of interest rates is the first course of action 
available during a financial crisis for any central bank.  However, as Bernanke (2009) states 
another key role of the central bank is to act as the lender of last resort to financial 
institution.  This means the provision of liquidity in the shape of short-term loans for 
financial institutions i.e. commercial banks and primary brokers such as investment banks. 
In many ways the provision of liquidity had mixed results, as Bernanke (2009) states on 
the one hand it does reduced the stress of short-term liquidity and increase the ability for 
these financial institutions to lend and operate in the market.  However, as hinted by 
Bernanke (2009), as was obvious during the financial crisis and to a certain extent the 
sovereign debt crisis, this does not solve the problems in certain markets such as the 
commercial paper and asset backed loans.  The problem with the asset backed loan market 
was the loss of confidence in the quality of the assets held by these financial institutions.  
So many central banks gave short-term loans against commercial papers and triple A rated 
asset backed securities in an attempt to provide liquidity to these markets according to 
Bernanke (2009). 
                                                 
 
6 Financial crisis (Brunnermeier (2009), Chari et al (2008), Gorton (2008), Grosse (2010)) 
Sovereign  debt crisis (Blundell-Wignall &Slovik (2011), Caceres et al (2010)) 
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However, as Mishkin (2009) says many have argued that monetary policy has been 
ineffective during the financial crisis and similarly to a certain extent the sovereign debt 
crisis.  In addition, Mishkin (2009) hints that the majority of these arguments could be 
broken into two conclusions: credit easing has failed and hence monetary policy is 
ineffective, so there is no reason to continue with it.  The second conclusion is easing 
monetary policy could lead to inflationary pressures.  Contrary to this view, Mishkin 
(2009) argues that aggressively relaxing monetary policy by cutting interest rates have 
helped reduced credit and macroeconomic risks.  The key thing is that it had kept interest 
rates on default-free bonds such as Treasuries lower.  In providing liquidity to the financial 
markets, the central banks have reduced the inability of the markets to perform. 
In essence, as stated by Mishkin (2009), controlling inflation is down to controlling the 
expectation of the markets and public about future inflation.  The key here is clear 
communication about the monetary policy and the reputation of the central bank in 
controlling inflation. 
Taylor (2009a) argues the key issues with the policies were firstly that a deviation from the 
standard and largely successful monetary policy meant that interest rates were too low for 
too long which caused the bubble.  Secondly, a misdiagnosis of the problem early in the 
crisis meant for the policy makers, providing liquidity took priority over focusing on the 
root of the problem, which was a rise in risks.  The third problem was the ununiformed 
action of providing assistance to one some and none to other financial institutions. 
Friedman (1968) warned against fixing nominal interest rate when inflation was moving, 
as it would cause instability.  Since as Blinder (2010) states effectively there was a fixed 
zero nominal interest rate, thus meaning a drop in inflation will lead to a rise in real interest 
rates causing deflationary pressures.  This generally leads to a downwards-trending 
economy with weak aggregate demand.  The problem is that once nominal interest rate hit 
the zero lower bound, “conventional monetary policy is out of bullets” as Blinder (2010, p. 
466) puts it.  Therefore, as is the case with the ECB and Federal Reserve, the central banks 
started using unconventional monetary policy including quantitative easing. 
According to Blinder (2010), quantitative easing works thru two channels, either by 
flattening the yield curve or reducing risks/increasing liquidity.  And as Blinder (2010) 
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states there two methods of operating a quantitative easing policy: the first method is thru 
changing the composition of the balance sheet from “riskless” or short to risky or long 
securities.  The second is to increase money supply and buy securities therefore enlarging 
the balance sheet. 
As stated by Krishnamurthy et al. (2011), the idea behind flattening the yield curve is to 
sell short term in favour of long-term securities.  Thus flattening the yield curve and 
reducing the long-term interest rates, in the hope of stimulating economic activity.  As 
highlighted by Krishnamurthy et al. (2011), the evidence does point to a reduction in the 
medium to long-term interest rates.  In contrast to the evidence of small impact on risky 
assets of the purchasing of only Treasuries and agency bonds as hinted by Krishnamurthy 
et al (2011).  However, there is strong evidence that the purchase of risky or illiquid assets 
does have a positive impact on the rates of these assets. 
As Rudebusch (2010) states an issue for any central bank, regarding these unconventional 
monetary tools is the exit strategy.  One key factor in the decision is that these tools could 
lead to high inflationary pressures, however a counter argument is that exiting too quickly 
could lead to big issues concerning the economy and financial market.  A case in point is 
quantitative easing where exiting the policy too quickly could lead to an increase in supply 
and hence to a high downwards pressures on the assets prices.  As highlighted by 
Rudebusch (2010) there is little historical empirical evidence on the effect of the timing 
and magnitude of selling the securities.  In fact, as will become clear in the next paragraph, 
there is recent evidence from the Japanese economy and financial market on the effect of 
unconventional stimulus monetary policies.  The case of Japan seems to suggest 
deflationary pressures are just as likely. 
In order to assess the likely impact of the current use of unconventional monetary policies 
on the economy and financial markets, it is essential to understand the experience of 
Japan’s monetary policy of the late 1990s-early 2000s.  As Shiratsuka (2010) argues, there 
are similarities between the actions of the Bank of Japan in the late 1990s-early 2000s and 
the major central banks responses throughout the recent crises and economic downturns.  
In order to ease the pressures of liquidity and credit, the Bank of Japan changed its main 
monetary policy to targeting a level of outstanding balance of the current account balances, 
which was originally set to 5trillion yen, and eventually rising to 30-35trillion yens.  Due 
 52 
 
to the deflationary pressures, until the inflation rate stabilised and above zero, the Bank of 
Japan was committed to this policy.  Initially the Bank of Japan concentrated on the long 
term Japanese government bonds, in the later stages of the policy they diversified to asset-
backed securities. 
Since, as stated by Shiratsuka (2010), the evidence suggests monetary expansion had little 
effect on output and inflation in the case of Japan and given that our research is essentially 
on the behaviour of financial markets.  This means that we will concentrate on the impact 
of the Bank of Japan policy on the Japanese financial markets.  The policy and commitment 
led to the restoration of liquidity in the markets, therefore stabilizing the financial sector.  
However, the positive impact from the quantitative easing policy did not transfer to the 
wider non-financial commercial sector suggesting that the policy did not have a strong 
impact on the deflation expectation of the financial markets.  Another big issue is due to 
the Bank of Japan lending schemes, which were at very low interest rates, the financial 
institutions became reliance on these schemes and hence the money markets were unable 
to recover.  In the end, the key to the success of the policy was the clear communication 
and commitment by the Bank of Japan as hinted by Shiratsuka (2010). 
2.3.2 The Macroeconomics Argument Influencing the Fiscal Policy 
At the heart of the argument on whether or not to use a fiscal stimulus policy are two related 
basic issues.  The issues are the costs and impact of any such fiscal stimulus policy on the 
economy.  A key factor is, as highlighted by the recent use of fiscal stimulus policies, they 
can be very expensive and hence adding to the already high debt levels of most countries.  
As Tobin (1971, p. 91) states 
“How is it possible that society can merely by the device of incurring debt to itself 
can deceive itself into believing that it is wealthier? Do not the additional taxes 
which are necessary to carry the interest charges reduce the value of other 
components of private wealth?” 
Hence, in the medium to long term the burden of the debt on the economy is likely to be 
high either, leading to a reduction in the fiscal expenditure or an increase in the tax levels 
in the long run and in some cases both.  A point illustrated by Auerbach (2003) who argues 
past experiences hints at increases in tax and/or decreases in expenditure whenever there 
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is a large increase in expenditure leading to a budget deficit.  However, as Keynes (1923) 
argues 
 “The long run is a misleading guide to current affairs.  In the long run we are all 
dead.  Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous 
seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is past the ocean is flat again.” 
However, as Auerbach (2003) hints that any fiscal stimulus would have to take into account 
the huge debt and cost of servicing that debt.  The problem is as Mydral (1939) states 
during a depression all types of fiscal revenue decrease even without a reduction in the tax 
rates while the fiscal expenditure increases holding welfare expenditure stable.  Hence, as 
Mydral (1939, p. 183) highlights 
“with few exceptions, a budget is never, and never has been balanced in a 
depression” 
Mydral (1939) states that the optimal fiscal policy depends on the state of the economy, 
whether it is in a temporal setback or a prolonged stagnation.  In essence, a stagnating 
economy, as in the case of the US in the 1930s, hints at specific adjustment issues in the 
structure of the economy.  The problem is most fiscal stimulus policies do not attack the 
fundamental root causes of the large adjustment problems.  Hence, in such situations the 
optimal fiscal policy is the one that patiently reforms the deep causes of the adjustment 
problems.  As Magud (2008) argues, the initial economic condition at the time of the shock 
based on the fiscal status of the government should determine the fiscal policy response to 
the economic downturn. 
As Magud (2008) explains the classical fiscal policy, approach to an economic downturn 
implies the reduction of government fiscal deficit by a decrease in expenditure.  Therefore, 
reducing demand for credit and hence the interest rates, this should have the effect of rising 
demand for investments and consequently the economy pulls out of a recession via the 
private sector.  In contrast, Keynesian fiscal policy dictates that the government should 
response by raising expenditure to boost aggregate demand and hence output improving 
employment.  As put by Keynes (1936) since the level of output and employment are 
determined by aggregate demand, hence in an economic downturn the government need to 
stimulate demand to improve the economy. 
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However, Friedman (1948) proposed that a fiscal policy should be fixed and based on a 
stable and progressive personal taxation system whereby government expenditure on 
goods and services would not change unless the perspective of the “community” changes.  
Moreover, Friedman states that changes in the tax system should reflect the changing 
“community” perspective on the levels of expenditure on goods and services. 
Friedman (1948) argued against fluctuating the fiscal policy with the business cycle, stating 
that lags would make the stimulus too late to have any real impact.  A point also argued by 
Blanchard et al. (2010) who state that lags in the fiscal policy meant that in general the 
impact of a stimulus policy on the economy was too late due to most recessions being too 
short.  Remember, many recessions since the late 1980s have lasted only two or three 
quarters in many advanced countries, the obvious exception was Japan.  As Blanchard et 
al. (2010) hint the prevailing view in many advanced economies was the reduction of 
sovereign debt to more sustainable and stable levels.  And as Blanchard et al. (2010) state 
many were sceptical about the effect of fiscal policy and the general view was that 
monetary policy provided stable output gap, hence there was little reason to use another 
policy.  Therefore, as Blanchard et al. (2010) indicate the main fiscal policy response to a 
shock to output was the automatic stabilisers, which kicked in whenever the economy 
showed signs of a downturn, as these policies did not affect the sustainability and stability 
of the debts. 
Auerbach (2002) hints at uncertainty regarding the size of the impact from a fiscal stimulus 
policy on the output.  He states that there is little evidence to suggest a fiscal stimulus 
policy would have a stabilizing impact on the economy.  Also suggests contractionary 
fiscal policy may have a bigger positive impact on output. 
In order to understand the general factors influencing the current arguments, there is a need 
to review the current literature.  As was highlighted by Blanchard et al. (2010) and 
Auerbach (2002) not so long ago the consensus was that fiscal stimulus policies did not 
work mainly due to the large impact on the debt and the lagged effect and hence 
countercyclical monetary policy was the way forward during economic downturns.  
However, as highlighted by Blanchard et al. (2010) the basis of this view the factors that 
are redundant in the 2008/2009 environment.  Previously stated by Magud (2008) the fiscal 
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policy response should be determined by the economic condition at the time and the fiscal 
statistics. 
As Taylor (2000) hints in the 1980s and 1990s, the emphasis was on using the automatic 
stabilizers as the tool of choice for fiscal stimulus policy.  Mainly, because the economic 
environment did not need a full stimulus policy, but also because of advances in monetary 
policy rendering such policies and their huge expenditure redundant.  However, as Taylor 
(2009) states this view has changed amongst academics and policy makers alike in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, which led to the deepest recession since the 1930s.  He 
highlights the success of the rebate policy of 2001 and 2008 in overcoming the fiscal 
stimulus policy lag problems.  Nevertheless, he concludes that there is no rationality for 
the revival of fiscal stimulus policies. 
Although Feldstein (2002a) agrees that there is little evidence of fiscal stimulus policies 
having a positive impact on the economy, yet he argues there is one strong area where the 
use of fiscal stimulus policies could have a positive impact on the economy.  A long and 
sustained economic downturn where interest rates, inflation and aggregate demand are low 
or falling; examples are the Japanese economy of the 1990s to early 2000s and the US 
economy during the great depression of the 1930s.  A key argument against the use of 
fiscal stimulus policies is that they increase the budget deficit and thus lead to a higher total 
debt; however, as Feldstein (2002a) notes a fiscal stimulus policy need not raise budget 
expenditure.  If the policy aims at, providing increased incentives to spend then it could 
increase economic activity, therefore reducing the fiscal deficit. 
Feldstein (2009) argues contrary to popular beliefs the evidence suggests that the massive 
stimulus programs of the 1930s did not do as well as some believe.  Unemployment 
remained high until the outbreak of World War 2, so it was war that finally brought 
unemployment under control.  Yet the pursuit of active fiscal policy in the form of 
Keynesian economics remained even after the war, leading to increasingly volatile cyclical 
economics.  This led to high inflation and unemployment throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 
Hence as stated by Feldstein (2009), in the 1980s counter cyclical policy shifted to the use 
of monetary policy instead, this resulted in a stable economy where both inflation and 
unemployment were relatively low and stable.  Generally, during this period economic 
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downturns were the results of monetary policy attempting to reduce inflation by raising 
interest rates for the short run.  The reversal of this monetary policy tightening took place 
when inflation was under control, which meant that consumers were able to take advantage 
of the interest rates and more importantly expenditure increased. 
As Feldstein (2009) highlights the difference is that the current economic downturn was 
caused by the massive under-pricing of risks and excessive leverage by the banks because 
of the low interest rates.  Consequently, the financial crisis forced the banks into a re-
pricing of risk and deleveraging which caused the credit markets to freeze.  The problem 
is that most householders/consumers are reliant on the credit markets to offset their 
expenditure when this froze consumer expenditure collapsed.  Feldstein (2009) estimated 
the loss on the economy of the reduction in consumer expenditure to be $400billion per 
year resulting in an economic downwards spiral.  This led to a sharp decrease in house and 
share prices, which eroded the householder wealth to the tune of $10trillion as estimated 
by Feldstein (2009). 
Both Taylor (2008) and Feldstein (2009) states given the economic environment, it is hard 
not to see why many are considering a second fiscal stimulus.  Since the economic 
downturns lasted 18 months, from December 2007 to June 2009 and interest were and still 
predicted to remain low, previous issues with fiscal stimulus such as the policy lags and 
high interest rates did not impede.  However, Taylor (2008) argues given the increase in 
debt it is natural for householders to think there will be tax increases in the medium to long 
run. 
However, as Taylor (2008) argues there is a requirement to analyse the first stimulus in 
order to learn about the options for the second stimulus.  As both Feldstein (2009) and 
Taylor (2008) argue, the evident shows the temporary rebate plan of the Economic 
Stimulus Act of 2008 did not have the desired impact on personal expenditure.  Taylor 
(2008) states this was not surprising since the permanent income theory of Friedman 
dictates that temporary increases in income will lead to only small temporary changes in 
consumption.  In short, limited period income will not lead to an economic recovery and 
will lead to a long-term increase in the debt.  Another lesson highlighted by Taylor (2008) 
is do not aim the stimulus at a particular group and increase taxation on business and 
investments.  In an economic downturn where two factors threaten householders, a 
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reduction in their lifelong savings and unemployment, the last thing they need is increase 
taxes, which might put their jobs on the lines or further reduce their investments.  Taylor 
(2008) argues the key weakness underpinning most stimulus policies and indeed most 
policymakers’ statements is the lack of predictability and agreement to a stable plans 
ensuring that the financial markets remain unstable and householders and firms cannot 
properly plan.  In essence, both Feldstein (2009) and Taylor (2008) argue against short-run 
stimulus policies, which do not stabilize the economy and leads to massive debt with little 
impact on the economy. 
Both Feldstein (2009) and Taylor (2008) argue a permanent tax cut and indefinite 
postponement of tax rises on wealth, dividends and capital gains is likely to help.  Feldstein 
(2009) also argues that under the current climax of high youth unemployment and low 
demand, the defence budget should not be decreased, the defence sector is key in maintain 
output and providing young unemployed with the skills to use when the economy recovers.  
As Feldstein (2009) states evidence suggests that research and development by business 
and academia will likely lead to new opportunities for the economy, hence he argues 
against cut in research funds and for investments tax credits.  Essentially, both Feldstein 
(2009) and Taylor (2008) argue since there is an obvious agreement for a fiscal stimulus 
policy, it is of paramount important that the policy is aimed at permanent long run solutions 
that will stabilize both the financial markets and economy. 
Aizenman & Pasricha (2010) found that although the federal stimulus expenditure was 
high but the evidence seems to suggest the collapse in the local and state budgets neglected 
the impact of the stimulus.  This was mainly due to the big reductions in tax revenue and 
limited borrowing capabilities of the states.  The problem is there are many issues regarding 
any new stimulus policy concerning both public and economists alike.  The main issues as 
highlighted by Aizenman & Pasricha (2010) are: 
• the lagged effect which could lead to inflationary pressures in the long run, 
• the high debt/GDP ratio which could be a signal for higher taxation or/and a 
reduction in the federal expenditure in the long run, 
• the moral hazard issue of rewarding states that are less prudent, especially in the 
case of the US, 
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However, as in the recent case of Valencia in Spain, this is not limited to the US. 
Although there is an obvious, lack of literature on the impact of the recent US Fiscal Cliff 
and Debt Celling crisis episodes on the financial markets.  Yet it is vital to understand the 
impact of the fiscal cliff on the global financial market.  To put things in to perspective, 
the US sovereign debt market is by far the largest single financial market with an estimated 
$16.7trillion as of end 2013 according to the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis.  The 
world’s biggest financial institutions and sovereign wealth funds regard the US sovereign 
debt market as the risk free liquid benchmark financial asset in many of their portfolios.  
Bearing this in mind, a default by the US Federal government would probably lead to a 
financial crisis on a scale many times larger than the recent financial and Eurozone 
sovereign debt crises.  However, the key question is would any of the two main parties, the 
Republican or Democrats, have risked the dangerous consequences of a global financial 
system meltdown and deeper global recession just when the global economy was 
struggling to recover from the deepest recession since the 1930s? The answer lays in the 
deadline agreement on each occasion with both sides making concessions.  Another key 
question is how did both crises affect the global economy and financial markets in both the 
short term and long term? 
One could look at the previous default by the US for clues; in 1979, the US defaulted on 
interest payments, which resulted in a hike on interests for US Federal debts and inevitably 
US households’ debts and firms’ debts.  However, the impact on the global economy and 
financial markets were limited.  The problem is, as explained earlier, the integrated global 
financial sector of today is different from 1979 and many global financial institutions 
regard the US Treasuries market as the risk fee liquid market.  The answer may lay in the 
reaction of the market to the Greek sovereign debt crisis.  However, if the US does default 
it will be a technical default on a single interest payment.  This however will be enough to 
signal a single downgrade in the credit rating of the US Treasuries as hinted by the credit 
rating agencies. 
In order, to understand the effect of the economic downturn and sovereign debt crisis on 
the Eurozone, there is a need to understand the effect of monetary union on the monetary 
and more importantly fiscal policies.  As highlighted by Gali & Perotti (2003), the main 
criticism of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact is the constraints they 
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put on the fiscal policy of member states of the Eurozone with ratios of 3% deficit and 60% 
debt to GDP.  The argument is during an economic downturn, the member states cannot 
use a fiscal stimulus policy to ease the pressure because of the limits on the deficits put by 
the Stability and Growth Pact.  As a result, the Stability and Growth Pact could work 
against the countries, in an economic downturn, due to the procyclical effect on the 
economy.  This means that instead of increasing expenditure to assist in a fiscal stimulus 
policy, the countries may have to tighten fiscal policy making the downturn worse because 
they have lost control of monetary policy.  The criticism that the Stability and Growth Pact 
in some countries has impaired the ability to provide an adequate level of services and 
infrastructure extends this argument. 
At the time, Gali & Perotti (2003) did not find much evidence in support of these 
arguments.  In contrast, they find evidence of increasing counter-cyclical policy, although 
not at the level of some other industrialized nations.  While public investments in services 
and infrastructure have steadily decreased over the years but that is not limited to the 
Eurozone countries, they find evidence of reductions in public investments in other 
industrialized countries.  They conclude one reason for their findings is that since the 
initiation of the EMU, real recessions have been rare amongst the member countries.  
Hence, the empirical evidence may not have tested the constraints implied by the Stability 
and Growth Pact. 
However, the current environment changed that perspective.  The already large debts in 
some countries, while in some countries an economy that has been on a downward trend 
for a long time before the financial crisis.  The fiscal stimulus policies only served to 
worsen the fragile economy in those countries and led to a complete imbalance between 
the revenue and expenditure with unemployment rising.  This led to the sovereign debt 
crisis as markets lost trust in the fiscal policy of most of these countries in the aftermath of 
the Greece upwards revival of their fiscal deficit.  This along with the inability of the 
Eurozone leadership to come to a unified agreement on how to solve the economic crisis 
underpinning the sovereign debt crisis led to the deepening of the crisis.  The other problem 
is as highlighted earlier by Taylor (2009b) is miscommunication, as hinted by Carmassi & 
Micossi (2010).  The problems were amplified by the display of confusion among the 
European Community and often conflicting statements by politicians. 
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A key issue in any financial market is as Keynes (1932) states since the markets require a 
diverse range of government debts of various maturities and types, it would be possible for 
the government to minimize the cost of debt by supplying heterogeneous debts.  This is 
especially so during a financial crisis where flights to quality, liquidity or safety are in 
action.  However, Mydral (1939) hints some governments attempt to conceal budgets 
deficits and thus present a “balanced” budget, this leads to asymmetrical information 
during economic upturns as well as downturns.  This could lead to a lack of trust by the 
financial markets in the governmental statistics as in the case of Greece recently. 
2.3.3 Concluding Review 
In concluding, as will be illustrated in section 4.2 and by many such as Feldstein (2009) 
and Taylor (2008, 2009b), the financial crisis and ensuing economic downturn left the 
global economy in such a state that conventional countercyclical monetary policy on its 
own was never going to be enough.  However, neither were any conventional fiscal 
automatic stabilizers enough to tackle the economic issues as illustrated by Feldstein 
(2009) and Taylor (2008, 2009b).  This highlighted an argument between proponents of 
unconventional monetary and fiscal stimulus policies.  In truth, the debate was about 
whether using any unconventional policy to stimulate the economy in the short run would 
outweigh the costs of implementing such policies in the long run.  The other debate was 
whether to use unconventional fiscal policies or unconventional monetary policy. 
It is essential to note, as highlighted earlier in this section, that long before the turn of the 
century monetary policy in both the Eurozone member states and the US have been 
successful in controlling inflation and keeping the economy growing as hinted by Bernanke 
& Gertler (1999) and Taylor (2009a).  Therefore, many academics, economists and policy 
makers saw little need for stimulus policies, especially fiscal as highlighted by Auerbach 
(2002) and Blanchard et al. (2010). 
In essence, such was the state of the economy that both policies were used in the early 
stages in some countries such as the US and UK.  And in the absent of monetary policy to 
stabilize their economy, contrary to the stated constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact, 
many Eurozone member states implemented unconventional fiscal stimulus policies.  As 
will be illustrated by section 4.2, these policies resulted in high debt/deficit to GDP ratios 
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and highly inflated central banks’ balance sheets with very low interest rates.  However, 
though these statistics could contribute to a huge share of the problems in the sovereign 
debt markets, it is fair to say that asymmetrical information and the ensuing lack of trust 
was at the heart of the initiation of the sovereign debt crisis as in the case of the Greek 
crisis.  On top of that, there was a general lack of agreement between the different parties 
on how to solve the crisis as in the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the US fiscal cliff 
crisis.  The problem as indicated by the fall in prices to below the par values of the 
sovereign debts from the GIPS group of nations over the past few years and recently the 
US, is this crisis hits demand. 
In many way, the issue today is that how to scale back the stimulus policies without hurting 
the economy.  With respect to monetary policy, the problem is the longer the 
unconventional monetary policy is still in use the higher the chance of inflationary 
pressures in the long term.  However, in contrast, the quicker the reduction in central bank’s 
balance sheet, the more likely, that the market will become over supplied which will hit 
the asset prices leading to a liquidity trap.  The concern for monetary policy makers is how 
to unwind the quantitative easing policy without leading to inflationary pressures and 
downwards pressures on the asset prices.  The problems faced by the fiscal policy makers 
are similarly tough; the choice is between higher taxes or lower expenditure, get the 
balance wrong and the economy could be in a bad state for the long run. 
In concluding, the issue at the heart of this hot debate remains unresolved that is how to 
stimulate an economy, which had just faced a big financial crisis leading to a huge 
economic downturn.  There is a hint of catch 22 about this in that as Tobin (1971) hints in 
the long run there are issues with both policies one leads to inflationary pressures and the 
other leads to either tax increases or expenditure decreases.  However, as Keynes (1923) 
argues the problem is there are big issues facing the economy in the short run. 
2.4 Review of the Models of Volatility 
Volatility is a key indicator of the risks in the financial markets and a measure of the price 
movement in accordance with the information.  In a one period hypothetical world, there 
are two methods of calculating the volatility based on past price or returns data: variance 
and standard deviation.  This assumes that market participants will not hold the asset for 
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more than one period and more importantly, volatility is unconditional.  However, as 
observed by Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986), a relevant factor in the research of 
financial/economical time series is that most, if not all, observed datasets seem to be 
following a time varying volatility or conditional variance pattern.  Hence, as hinted by 
Engle (2001), the calculation of the volatility usually used an equally weighted average of 
the standard deviation or variance method with a fixed number of recent lags, e.g. 22 or 5 
days for a working month or week respectively.  A key weakness in this method was the 
assumption of equal weights, mainly because recent observations should carry a greater 
weight than older observations.  Furthermore, this method renders useless any observation 
older than the chosen fixed period.  Hence, disregarding any past information on the 
volatility contained in the older observations.  As Engle (1982) alludes, the current 
conditional variance depends upon all past information.  As noted by Engle (2001), thus 
far virtually no methods took into account all past information accounted for in the 
observations. 
Engle (1982) introduced the ARCH model, a generalised model of the bi-linear model 
devised by Granger & Andersen (1978), which had the drawback of the unconditional 
variance being either zero or infinity.  As Bollerslev et al. (1992) states the ARCH model 
allowed for the changing variance and covariance as noted earlier by Mandelbrot (1963) 
and Fama (1965) amongst others.  As described by Engle (1982), the ARCH allowed a 
discrete time stochastic process to estimate the conditional variance.  As hinted by 
Bollerslev (2008), the qth-order linear ARCH as described by Engle (1982) captured 
another financial time series phenomena first hinted by Mandelbrot (1963), volatility 
clustering, as defined later in this review.  See Bollerslev et al. (1992) for a more in depth 
review of the theory and empirical evident underpinning the use of the ARCH model of 
volatility in finance. 
There are many other alternative models of time varying volatility such as stochastic 
volatility, realized volatility and EWMA as advocated by RiskMetricsTM (JP Morgan, 
1996)7.  Although they are not within the scope of this research, yet mainly due to their 
                                                 
7 J. P. Morgan (1996) , ‘RiskMetrics – Technical Document’, Available at 
http://www.msci.com/resources/research/technical_documentation/td4e.pdf  (accessed on 27 December 
2013) 
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innovative and different method of modelling the volatility, there is a need to discuss two 
such models: stochastic volatility and realized volatility. 
As Ghysels et al. (1996) states, the origin of stochastic volatility came from researching a 
different issue.  Clark (1973) suggested that asset returns follow a time deformational 
approach yielding a time-varying model of volatility.  As Ghysels et al. (1996) illustrate 
two further models of stochastic; volatility came thru different works by Tauchen & Pitts 
(1983) and Hull & White (1987).  In a key research on financial returns using two 
stochastic processes, Taylor (1982) derived a discrete time stochastic volatility model as 
an alternative to the ARCH model.  In general as Andersen & Benzoni (2010) hints, there 
are two distinct applications for stochastic volatility models in the literature.  One 
application is to signify that the volatility in financial returns displays a time varying 
random fluctuation.  The second imply that returns variation seems to follow unobserved 
random shock, therefore inferring that volatility is inherently latent.  However, as hinted 
by Bollerslev & Zhou (2002), the estimations of stochastic volatility models were difficult 
due to two reasons: the assumed latent volatility and the general unavailability of closed 
form expressions for the corresponding transitions density functions for continuous time 
models. 
However, as illustrated by McAleer & Medeiros (2008), the previous two families of 
volatility models briefly discussed, ARCH and stochastic volatility, do not fully describe 
several phenomena’s’ observed in financial time series.  Realized volatility as defined by 
Andersen & Benzoni (2008) is nonparametric ex-post estimate of the return variation.  
Essentially, the model is an aggregated number of high frequency, usually five minutes, 
returns as noted by Asai et al. (2012).  Therefore, they overcame the limitations of the other 
two models as illustrated by Corsi et al. (2006), Andersen et al. (2003) and McAleer & 
Medeiros (2008) among others. 
As previously stated, according to Bollerslev & Hodrick (1992) there is evidence of 
seasonality and volatility clustering issues effecting the fundamentals and prices.  
Therefore, pointing to the use of ARCH/GARCH models to overcome these issues in the 
Shiller volatility test.  Another important factor in the use of GARCH models is as 
illustrated by Blanchard & Watson (1982) and Branch & Evans (2011, 2013), there are 
several features within an asset price bubble that can be picked up by the use of the GARCH 
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family of volatility models.  Branch & Evans (2011, 2013) hints at feedback and 
asymmetrical features in an asset price bubble, therefore implying the use of GARCH-m 
and GJR-GARCH in order to understand the impact of bubbles on asset prices. 
However, a much less reviewed model but of equal significant in the explanation of the 
behaviour of volatility is the SWARCH model.  Although the evident on the regime 
switching in the sovereign debt market in the last few year have been strong (Georgoutsos 
& Migiakis (2009, 2010 and 2012), Pozzi & Sadaba (2013) and Schuster & Uhrig-
Homburg (2012)).  There seem to be a lack of emphasis on the effect of regime switching 
in the conditional volatility in the financial market in general and more specifically in the 
sovereign debt market.  And in general, the evident in the literature isn’t strongly oriented 
towards the issues of the sovereign debt market i.e. Christiansen (2008) research is geared 
toward the short rate models and Abdymomunov (2013) is more towards identifying 
financial stress in the financial sector (essentially the US banking sector) using a number 
of financial indicators or variables.  As hinted by Blanchard & Watson (1982) and more 
recently Branch & Evans (2013), a relevant factor is that on some occasions an asset price 
bubble could periodically collapse thus alluding to the use of a Markov switching model 
to understand the impact of a bubble on the prices. 
The rest of this review is concerned with the use of the GARCH family in the estimation 
of the conditional variance and the interpretation of the behaviour of volatility.  The 
structure of this review follows the standard format of first critically reviewing the 
theoretical model underpinning the chosen GARCH models and then reviewing the recent 
empirical evident in the literature on the sovereign debt market volatility.  We will review 
a number of behaviours modelled by the GARCH family: volatility clustering, feedback 
effect, leverage effect and leverage-feedback effect.  We conclude by reviewing the 
SWARCH models of Cai (1994) and Hamilton & Susmel (1994). 
2.4.1 The use of the GARCH Family in the Sovereign Debt Market 
Perhaps the best and most widely used group of time varying volatility models are the 
GARCH family.  There are many research papers based on the use of the univariate 
GARCH family to capture the time varying volatility.  And as illustrated and summarised 
by Engle (2001) and Bollerslev (2008) there are many variants of the univariate GARCH 
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model, each proposed to address a different issue in the time varying volatility.  In this 
section, we intend to concentrate on a limited number of the GARCH family addressing 
the following volatility issues within the sovereign debt market: volatility clustering, 
leverage, feedback and leverage-feedback effects. 
A key observation, frequently referred to as volatility clustering, often made in finance and 
economic is that 
“Large changes tend to be followed by large changes, of either sign, and small 
changes tend to be followed by small changes” as quoted by Mandelbrot (1963, p. 
418). 
As intended originally, the introduction of the ARCH model proposed by Engle (1982) 
aimed at modelling the volatility clustering effect.  The model was generalised by the 
introduction of the GARCH model by Bollerslev (1986), which benefited from the 
inclusion of a flexible lag structure and long memory. 
The literature is full of research into the volatility clustering effect in the sovereign debt 
market, using variant of the GARCH model, two such papers are Jones et al. (1998) and 
Bollerslev (2000).  In researching the persistent of volatility in the US Treasury market 
through macroeconomic news announcement shocks, Jones et al. (1996) using a GARCH 
model find that there is limited or no persistent in volatility on bond markets in the days 
following the announcement.  However, Bollerslev (2000) using a FI-GARCH model find 
the presence of long memory volatility in the bond markets in the aftermath of 
announcements.  There are many other researches, which have identified volatility 
clustering in the sovereign debt market such as Christiansen (2000). 
However, as indicated by Engle et al. (1987), theory dictate that market participants require 
increasingly high premium on returns for investing and/or holding increasingly risky assets 
which is often referred to as the feedback effect.  Engle et al. (1987) devised the ARCH-m 
model, which was generalised as a GARCH-m to model the feedback effect, thus extending 
the ARCH-m by inserting the conditional variance into the conditional mean equation. 
There are many research papers on the feedback effect in the sovereign debt market.  
However, two of the most influential in the context of our research are Engle et al. (1987) 
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and Bollerslev et al. (1988); both papers were interested in researching the time-varying 
risk/return trade off in the context of the sovereign debt market.  And indeed Bollerslev et 
al. (1988) use a multivariate GARCH model to estimate the CAPM Beta These are two 
distinct empirical evident for the feedback effect, while Engle et al. (1987) originally 
introduced the ARCH-m to model the risk-return trade-offs in the term structure of US 
interest rates.  They conclude that the risk premium sought by the market participants is 
not constant; it varies with respect to the perception of uncertainty over time.  Bollerslev 
et al. (1988) derived a model first purposed by Engle et al. (1987) in extending the ARCH-
m to include the conditional covariance and thus implementing a multivariate GARCH-m 
model.  They extended the CAPM to be time varying by using the conditional covariance 
to calculate the Beta and time varying CAPM to calculate the expected returns from the 6-
month Treasury bill, 20-year Treasury bond and stocks.  Among the conclusions they 
observe is that the results points at the CAPM Beta being time varying. 
A key observation made primarily in stock markets, there is a negative correlation between 
returns and volatility as hinted by Black (1976).  Thus meaning a negative movement has 
a greater impact than a positive movement of similar magnitude on the volatility.  Glosten 
et al. (1993) proposed a model, aka GJR-GARCH, extending the GARCH-m model to 
allow for asymmetries in the conditional variance, thus generalising the GARCH-m to 
model the leverage-feedback effect.  It is essential to note that the GARCH –m is integrated 
into the GJR-GARCH model which mean that when there is no leverage effects the model 
collapses to a GARCH-m. 
However, another model often used to estimate the leverage effect is the EGARCH 
proposed by Nelson (1991).  The key different is that unlike many other GARCH models 
where the need arises to constraints the coefficients to ensure the positive conditional 
variance, the EGARCH model uses the log of the conditional variance.  However, as 
Bollerslev (2008) notes the inclusion of the log of the conditional variance complicates the 
unbiased forecasts for the future variances.  As stated by Nelson (1991), an extension to 
the EGARCH could be the capture of the leverage-feedback effect by combining the 
EGARCH and GARCH-m, thus deriving the EGARCH-m.  Unlike the GJR-GARCH, the 
EGARCH-m model does not contain the GARCH-m model; the EGARCH-m is from two 
separate models.  This is helpful in analysing the feedback and leverage effects due to the 
separation of the effects coefficients. 
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The leverage or asymmetrical effect is well documented in the stock markets but little 
empirical evident have been documented in the sovereign debt market e.g. Dungey et al. 
(2009), especially with the `GJR-GARCH.  In a sense Dungey et al. (2009) is interesting 
not only due to the leverage effect research in the sovereign debt market but also to the 
flight to quality effect.  Dungey et al. (2009) analyse the leverage effect of flight to quality 
in respect to the US Treasuries market.  Using the asymmetric GARCH model TGARCH 
(or TARCH) proposed by Zakoian (1994), they explain the positive sign asymmetries find 
in most flights to quality.  During any period of uncertainty such as the recent banking 
crisis, increasingly risk averse market participants tend to sell high-risk assets and buy low 
risk assets.  As noted by Dungey et al. (2009), this leads to low risk asset markets, such as 
the US Treasuries, exhibiting positive sign asymmetries i.e. ‘a positive price shock in the 
low risk asset may generate a disproportionately large volatility response’.  While the high 
risk asset will suffer from negative asymmetries. 
Like the leverage effect there is limited empirical evident of the leverage-feedback effect 
in the sovereign debt market i.e. Brunner & Simon (1996).  Brunner & Simon (1996) use 
the EGARCH-M model to research the robustness of the predictive powers of the yield 
curve in using the conditional variance as the risk premium.  They use the excess returns 
of the US Treasury 10 year notes, 20 and 30-year bonds over a one-month bill; from the 
Federal Reserve over the period from January 1968 to March 1993 using a weekly 
frequency provided the data.  They find highly significant evident of leverage effect and 
the results from the EGARCH-M seem to hint at a feedback effect, although the slope of 
the yield curve continues to forecasts excess returns.  There is a positive correlation 
between the volatility on the excess returns and the level of short-term rates. 
Recently much of the empirical evident have concentrated on the volatility during the 
financial or sovereign debt crisis and their effect on the Eurozone.  It is important to note 
that the underlying issue in most of these researches is the effect of the crises on the 
integration of the financial markets within the Eurozone.  Another key issue studied is the 
contagious effect of the crises especially among the GIIPS nations within the Eurozone 
due to monetary unification.  Good examples of such studies on the effect of the recent 
crises on the volatility within the Eurozone are Dotz & Fisher (2011), Metui (2011), 
Tamakoshi (2011) and Mohl & Sondermann (2013). 
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In a research on the effect of the financial crisis on the Eurozone sovereign debt markets, 
Dotz & Fisher (2011) used a number of univariate GARCH-in-mean specifications to 
analyse the liquidity, risk premium and expected loss component in ten Eurozone sovereign 
debt markets.  The empirical study use daily yield data from eleven Eurozone sovereign 
debt markets over the period between 4 February 2002 and 30 April 2009.  The results 
seem to indicate in the aftermath of the rescue of Bear Stearns in March 2008 market 
perceptions to sovereign debt risks changed where many sovereign debt markets were 
previously seen as safe havens with a negligible implied probability of default, now were 
seen as having high default risks.  The high-implied default probabilities reflect an 
increasing expected loss influenced by the soundness of the country’s financial sector, 
among others.  Although there is little evidence the widening spreads of high yields 
spreads’ countries impact both risk and liquidity premia; the evidence seems to suggest 
that these two premia had a major role in other countries widening spreads.  However, the 
dominant roles of the expected loss seem to points to fundamental sovereign factors 
playing a key role in comparison with global factors such as market participants’ risk 
aversion. 
In a paper researching contagion among the Eurozone sovereign debt markets, Metui 
(2011) employ the GJR-GARCH model to analyse the effect of news on spread volatility 
relative to the US Treasury 10 year note yields.  They use daily 10-year benchmark yields 
from 11 core, Eurozone and the US markets obtained from Datastream between 1April 
1999 and 29 April 2011.  In concluding, the results seem to be suggesting a strong leverage 
effect for all countries; hinting at a surprise increase in the yield premia having greater 
impact than a surprise decline.  Using timeline analysis they illustrate that volatility in the 
one period ahead 95% VaR seem to correspond with the periods of high financial distress 
during the recent financial and following sovereign debt crises.  They find statistical 
evident of contagion in the Eurozone during a credit crisis in one or more countries.  This 
last statement is of importance due to the integrated markets meaning sovereign debt crises 
in small open economies such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal can become systematically 
important due to contagion links.  Concluding, they argue for the implementation of an 
early warning mechanism for market participants in the sovereign debt market; 
implementing a periodic stress test on sovereign borrowers. 
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In an empirical research into the volatility spillover effect of 10-year sovereign debt yields 
during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, Tamakoshi (2011) use a number of AR (k)-
EGARCH (p, q) model specifications to fit each of the seven datasets.  They use daily 10-
year yield data from seven Eurozone members (i.e. GIIPS plus Germany and France) 
observed over the period between 1 January 2007 and 31 March 2011.  He concludes that 
the analysis points to the existence of short-term spillover effects across the seven 
Eurozone countries with the biggest pre-crisis spillover coming from Portugal and France.  
However, the biggest post-crisis spillover comes from Portugal and Italy.  Although 
Germany remains the strongest economy and has the best credit rating driven by strong 
sound fiscal policies, yet the evident seem to hint at volatility spillover effect from 
Germany on some Eurozone long-term bond yields.  Concluding, this finding has 
important implications for portfolio diversification in the Eurozone sovereign debt 
markets. 
In a study by Mohl & Sondermann (2013) on the impact of political communication on the 
spreads of the GIIPS nations relative to the German benchmark yields during the Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis.  They use an EGARCH model to measure the conditional mean and 
variance among three categories of political communications concerning restructuring, 
bailout and the European Financial Stability Facility.  They use the daily spreads and news 
over the period between 1st May 2010 and 30th June 2011 from Haver and a number of 
news agencies (i.e. Bloomberg, Dow Jones Newswire, Market News International and 
Reuters).  The results seem to be hinting at a limited impact on statements concerning 
bailouts.  However, statements concerning restructuring increased volatility and the EFSF 
decreased volatility.  Their results seem to be indicating statements from major 
contributing nations about the restructuring seem to have more impact than receiving 
nations.  In contrast, statements on the EFSF from receiving countries have a larger 
negative impact on the conditional volatility.  In concluding, they state that political 
communication played a key role in the Eurozone crisis.  They extend their finding by 
supporting the calls for an improve communication discipline. 
Of course, there are other univariate GARCH/ARCH models of volatility, which could be 
useful in our research of the behaviour of volatility.  Here we briefly analyse four such 
models: 
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• GARCH-X by Brenner et.al. (1996) 
• GARCH-Jump 
• Spline-GARCH by Engle & Rangel (2008) 
Interest rates are essential in theoretical and empirical economic and finance.  Hence, 
modelling the volatility of interest rates However, as noted by Brenner et al. (1996), models 
which parameterize volatility as a function of the level of interest rates tend to 
overemphasize the sensitivity of volatility to the level.  In addition, GARCH models fail 
to capture the relationship between interest rate levels and volatility.  Hence, Brenner et al. 
(1996) proposed an extension to the GARCH model to allow the volatility of the interest 
rate to depend on the levels of the interest rate and the shocks to the information.  However, 
the empirical evidence regarding the variants of the GARCH-X model is mostly in the 
volatility of the short-term interest rate.  Good examples of such studies are Meade & Maier 
(2003), Staikouras (2006) and Hou & Suardi (2011). 
A key feature of the impact of news on financial assets is a temporarily hike in the return 
and volatility otherwise known as a jump.  A number of studies have highlighted jumps in 
the volatility of the sovereign debt market in the aftermath of news or announcements 
regarding events or fundamentals, such as Jones et al. (1998) and Bollerslev et al. (2000).  
However, another channel of research on jumps in volatility is thru communication by 
policy makers such as central bankers or politicians.  Good examples of such research are 
Collignon (2012), Collignon et al. (2013) and Dewacther et al. (2014).  Essentially, under 
GARCH jumps can be modelled using two different methods: GARCH-Jump Mixture and 
non-normal distribution GARCH.  The GARCH-Jump Mixture relies on a combination of 
the GARCH and jump whereby the GARCH accounts for the smooth changes in the 
volatility and the jumps explain the large infrequent discrete movement in the returns e.g. 
the GARJI model proposed by Maheu & McCurdy (2004).  According to Dael & Yu 
(2005), the problem with this method is that it requires substantial amount of processing 
power and may not provide a better-fit top the distribution of the data.  The second method 
relies upon a non-normal distribution model of the underlying data (e.g. student t, skewed 
t-distribution, non-central t-distribution) and a GARCH model capable of picking up the 
non-normality.  However, with this method, a problem is that the jump could occurs in the 
volatility and not in the data. 
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Since as stated earlier there is no private information in sovereign debt returns, therefore 
the movement in the returns must be coming from public information.  In essence, public 
information in the sovereign debt market is from two sources: news and macroeconomic 
announcements.  And since macroeconomic announcements is a regular source of price 
movement in the sovereign debt market, hence there has been many researches on the 
relationship between macroeconomics indicators and the sovereign debt market such as 
Balduzzi et al. (2001), Brandt & Kavajecz (2004) and Andersson et al. (2006).  Engle & 
Rangel (2006) recognise that volatility is higher during macroeconomic announcements.  
However, there is a limitation in these studies, since as hinted by Engle & Rangel (2008) 
part of the problem is the difference in the data frequency level.  In essence, price/return 
volatility has a much higher frequency than macroeconomics indicators/announcements.  
In order to overcome this issue Engle & Rangel (2008) introduced the Spline-GARCH 
model, which allows the linking of high frequency financial data with the low frequency 
macroeconomic data.  The model is also based upon a key factor in that unlike most 
GARCH models the unconditional variance is time varying.  There seem to be a lack of 
empirical evidence with respect to the Spline-GARCH model in the sovereign n debt 
market.  However, Becker & Clements (2007) using a slightly modified version of the 
Spline-GARCH model found that number of macroeconomics indicators have significant 
explanatory powers on the unconditional volatility in the S&P 500 index.  Azad et al. 
(2011) using the Spline GARCH also found a strong relationship between the volatility in 
the Japanese interest rate swap markets and macroeconomics indicators. 
2.4.2 The use of the MV-GARCH Family in the Sovereign Debt Market 
While univariate GARCH are certainly of importance in studying the behaviour of 
volatility in the sovereign debt market, however as Silvennoinen & Terasvirta (2008) states 
it is equally essential to understand the co-movements of returns and volatility.  The two 
key factors in the co-movements of financial assets are correlation and covariance.  
However, in the context of the behaviour of volatility in any financial market, the research 
of integration/diversification and contagion/spillover effects is highly relevant at any time.  
Mainly due to the recent financial and sovereign debt crises, the empirical evidence in these 
issues has increased.  While to a certain extent these effects can be modelled using 
univariates GARCH models as Christiansen (2007) shows, yet the basis of the majority of 
empirical evidence are multivariate GARCH models such as the BEKK proposed by Engle 
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& Kroner (1995) and DCC proposed by Engle (2002).  There are other multivariate 
GARCH models; Bauwens et al. (2006) and Silvennoinen & Terasvirta (2008) provide a 
good summary on the theories and models of the multivariate GARCH models. 
As Abad et al. (2010) concludes the evidence on integration within the Eurozone sovereign 
debt market was not strong even before the financial and sovereign debt crises.  The 
problem is that the crises had increased the diversification among the Eurozone countries.  
However, while this could be a problem for policy makers, this is not a problem for market 
participants who hold partial or complete sovereign debt portfolios, mainly due to the 
opportunities for portfolio diversification within the Eurozone. 
As illustrated by Pericoli & Sbracia (2003) and Louzis (2013) the evidence on contagion 
and spillover effects are strong.  As noted by Pericoli & Sbracia (2003), this evidence is 
not limited to countries within a region but there is also evidence of cross-regions volatility 
transmissions.  Louzis (2013) also notes the strong evidence of cross-markets spillover 
effects during the crises highlighting the volatility transmission between the stock and 
sovereign debt markets during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. 
As noted previously, much of the recent empirical evidence has concentrated on the 
spillover effect and contagion during the financial or sovereign debt crisis and their effect 
on the Eurozone.  Good examples are Missio & Watzka (2011), Favero & Missale (2011) 
and Groba et al. (2013).  Another popular route in the recent empirical evidence is the 
effect of market integration on portfolio diversification as hinted by Laopodis (2010). 
In an empirical study, into dynamic linkage in the yields among the four major sovereign 
debt markets, Laopodis (2010) used two econometric models: a bivariate VAR model and 
the DCC model.  They use monthly data on the 10-year yields from four major sovereign 
debt markets (i.e. the US, UK, Germany and Japan) over the period between 1990 and 
2009.  In concluding, they found significant short-run relationship among the yields in the 
pre-euro period.  They also find that US yields have an increased significant impact on the 
British and Japanese yields in the post-euro period.  The resulting correlations between the 
British, German and American markets seem to vary over both periods.  However, the 
Japanese correlation with the other three markets has strong upside and downside 
variances.  They suggest that the inclusion of the German and American bonds in a 
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portfolio may not reduce overall risk.  These findings seem to suggest that higher 
integrations and close substitution of sovereign bonds diminishes market participants’ 
portfolio diversification.  Moreover, greater interdependent of the sovereign bond yields 
reduces the central bank’s ability to influence the long-term interest rates and hence 
objective. 
In a research on the effect of financial contagion and sovereign credit rating 
announcements from the sovereign debt crisis on seven Eurozone yield spreads, Missio & 
Watzka (2011) use a DCC multivariate model.  Using daily yields from eight Eurozone 
10-year sovereign debt markets observed over the period from 31 December 2008 to 31 
December 2010 obtained from Datastream.  Fitch provided the ratings announcements 
during the period for each country, in addition to Moody’s and S&P for the Greek negative 
rating announcements.  In common with the analysis, there are two conclusions to the 
study.  In term of the effect of financial contagion, they state that strong dynamic 
correlation results from the DCC model for a number of countries in relationship with 
Greece, especially during the summer of 2010, hint at financial contagion.  This period of 
high dynamic correlation coincides with the first bailout of the Greek economy.  In term 
of the effect from rating announcements, the results seem to hint at strong dynamic 
correlations for a number of countries in relation with Greece concerning bad rating 
announcements.  However, in both cases other DCC results seem to imply that financial 
contagion only effect economically or politically unstable countries. 
In a paper researching the determinants of sovereign debt yield spreads on German bunds 
of 10 Eurozone members, Favero & Missale (2011) use the BEKK to analyse the effect of 
contagion for Italy and Spain.  They use the weekly 10-year yields of 10 sovereign debt 
markets to calculate the spreads on German bunds over the period June 2006 to June 2011 
while also using the US Baa and Aaa rated corporate bonds to calculate the risk aversion 
spread.  They also use other key economic factors.  The results seem to indicate the 
financial crisis and following sovereign debt crisis both affected the Italian and Spanish 
spreads.  It would seem that the local economic fundamentals could explain part of the 
volatile effect on the spreads of these two markets.  However, the overreaction to global 
risk factors among the financial markets, which can heighten the contagion effect, explains 
the other part.  Given the other issues discussed in the paper and the contagion effect, they 
conclude that maybe Eurobond is not what is wanted right now but increase political 
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integration and introduction of Eurozone fiscal governance will help.  However, they argue 
that maybe the introduction of the Eurobond will help with these two policies. 
In an article researching the impact of distressed economies in the EU sovereign debt 
market, Groba et al. (2013) analyse the transmission of default risks among the EU 
countries during the recent financial and sovereign debt crises using the information 
contained in the CDS.  The article used an EGARCH and a bivariate BEKK to capture the 
leverage and volatility spillover effects respectively in the observed CDS markets.  They 
use the weekly CDS spreads with maturities 1, 3 and 5 years denominated in US$ for 14 
EU sovereign debt markets8 observed over the period 2008 – 2010.  In common with Dotz 
& Fisher (2011), the results from the EGARCH model seem to be hinting at a regime 
switch in the CDS spread volatilities among the observed markets in March 2008.  A key 
finding is the observation of a transmission of risk from the GIIPS nations to other nations 
during the observed period.  This seems to be pointing at a fragmentation of the EU 
sovereign debt market into financially distressed economies and other EU nations. 
2.4.3 A Review of the Markov Regime-Switching ARCH Models 
As stated by Hamilton (1989) the basis of a number of previous researches studying the 
relationship between the business cycle and GNP is the assumption of the observed data 
following a linear stationary process.  However, as a number of studies have proved the 
assumption of linearity and stationary in key macroeconomic datasets is weak.  Hence, in 
an article on non-stationary time series and the business cycle, Hamilton (1989) introduced 
a regime-switching model based on an autoregression method using a discrete-state 
Markov process.  See Hamilton (2008) and Piger (2011) for a more descriptive survey of 
the different Markov switching models. 
Like the GARCH group of models, the multivariate Markov switching models has a 
number of scenarios to prove the case.  There are a number of complex multivariate models 
such as the Markov switching vector autoregression as defined by Krolzig (1997) and 
vector error correction.  As hinted by Krolzig (1999, 2000), the Markov switching vector 
autoregression model extends the Markov switching autoregression model to a multivariate 
                                                 
 
8 The 11 core Eurozone members plus Denmark, Sweden and the UK 
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model with vector autoregression as the basis.  This model allows for the analysis of the 
relationship between endogenous variables in a Markov switching model over the observed 
period.  Hence, a key factor in the use of this model is the co-integration of economic 
variables during different regimes.  Since we will only be using a univariate Markov 
switching model, we will not be diving into an in depth analysis of the multivariate models.  
See Krolzig (1997) for a more descriptive analysis of the various multivariate Markov 
switching models. 
The recent financial and sovereign debt crises have certainly resulted in an uplift in 
empirical studies of the Markov switching model in the sovereign debt market i.e. 
Georgoutsos & Migiakis (2009, 2010, 2012), Pozzi  & Sadaba (2013) and Schuster & 
Uhrig-Homburg (2012).  However, the basis of most of this evidence is a multivariate 
Markov switching model, i.e. Georgoutsos & Migiakis (2009) using MS-VECM.  Most of 
the basis of the recent research is around the sovereign debt crisis and to a lesser extent the 
financial crisis effect on the Eurozone sovereign debt market. 
It has long been acknowledge financial markets sometimes go thru alternate periods, 
characterized by high volatility and others by low volatility as noted by Hamilton & Susmel 
(1994) and Cai (1994) among others.  In researching monthly short-term interest rates, 
Hamilton (1988) concludes the possible present of regime shifts in ARCH effects could 
explain the estimates of the ARCH-m of Engle et al. (1987).  In fact a common problem in 
the estimation of ARCH/GARCH is spuriously high persistent of volatility across 
subsamples as stated by Hamilton & Susmel (1994).  Diebold (1986) and Lamoureux & 
Lastrapes (1990) argue that structural changes in the observed dataset could be the reason 
for a high estimate of the ARCH/GARCH parameter, which leads to high persistent. 
Thus meaning that sometimes, simple ARCH/GARCH models do not entirely explained 
volatility, there is a need to combine the regime-switching capabilities of the MS model 
with conditional volatility models such as ARCH/GARCH.  As noted by Cai (1994), a key 
factor in the use of SWARCH is the endogenisation of parameter shifts, thus allowing shifts 
to be determined by the observed dataset.  Additionally, a key advantage is that it 
distinguishes between the effects enabling the analysis of their impact on the properties of 
the observed dataset.  This led to a number of integrated models generally called 
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SWARCH, i.e. Cai (1994), Hamilton & Susmel (1994) and Hamilton & Lin (1996).  As 
the name suggests the SWARCH model was a combination of the MS and ARCH. 
Gray (1996) introduced a GARCH version of the SWARCH in analysing the regime-
switching behaviour of one-month US T-Bill yield’s volatility; found a mean reverting 
high volatility with low volatility persistence.  He also finds the opposite behaviour with a 
non-mean reverting low volatility state with high volatility persistence.  However, the 
evident for conditional volatility as oppose to stochastic volatility in the sovereign debt 
market is not strong.  Dahlquist & Gray (2000) used a similar model to Gray (1996) in 
analysing the short-term interest rates of EMS members.  They conclude there is a different 
between “non-credible” and “credible” regimes whereas “non-credible” regimes displayed 
high and volatile interest rates with strong mean reversion.  “Credible” regimes previously 
characterized by low volatility and weak mean-reversion, which seem to display a unit-
root like behaviour. 
Although the MS-GARCH models seem to produce stronger results than the SWARCH, 
however as Cai (1994) states the complexity of the estimation in integrating a GARCH 
with the Markov switching model makes it less feasible in large datasets.  The problem is  
that the lagged structure of the GARCH model means that each state in a Markov switching 
model takes two values, thus implying a total of 2t probabilities.  Moreover, as stated by 
Guidolin (2012) the GARCH model has high volatility persistence, which can be a double-
edged knife.  On the one hand, it can be an advantage for research such as the one 
influenced by Cai (1994) and Hamilton & Susmel (1994) in highlighting that the high 
volatility persistence observed in some research is the result of regime switch.  On the other 
hand, the use of a Markov Switching model could exaggerate the high volatility persistence 
displayed in a GARCH model.  Another issue is as highlighted by Guidolin (2012); the 
MS-GARCH model is hugely complicated to estimate.  Although Gray (1996) and Dueker 
(1997) overcame these issues, however their models are very complicated.  There are 
several alternative MS GARCH models, which are summarised by Guidolin (2012) and 
Hamilton (2008). 
Although the models of Cai (1994) and Hamilton & Susmel (1994) are based on SWARCH 
implementation, they adopt different methods of implementing the SWARCH.  Cai (1994) 
models the shifts in the asymptotic long-run variance of the SWARCH process.  Thus in 
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this model the intercept of the conditional variance is allowed to change in response to the 
discrete shifts in the regimes.  Whereas Hamilton & Susmel (1994) also model the shifts 
in the dynamic process of the conditional variance, this means that the basis of the regime 
shifts are the changes in the scales of the conditional variance. 
The literature on the empirical evident of the SWARCH in the sovereign debt market is 
not a huge one in comparison with other models.  Although the Markov switching and 
GARCH models separately have been the focus of attention since the financial and 
sovereign debt crises, yet there is a drought in the empirical evident of the SWARCH.  As 
with the other models analysed in this research, we find a two way split in the evident with 
a group, such as Christiansen (2008), researching the yields and the second group of 
research such as Abdymomunov (2013) studying the returns.  The significant of these two 
papers is that they also use different SWARCH implementations whereas Christiansen 
(2008) uses the Cai (1994) method; Abdymomunov (2013) uses the Hamilton & Susmel 
(1994) method. 
In a research on the relationship between the volatility on the short rate of the US and UK 
and the US and Germany, Christiansen (2008) extended the Cai (1994) implementation of 
the SWARCH model to a bivariate model in order to estimate both volatilities, i.e. US and 
UK and US and Germany, simultaneously.  The research used the weekly 1-month 
Eurodollar, Libor and Euromark9 for the US, UK and Germany respectively; observed 
from January 1975 to December 2004 obtained from the Federal Reserve and Datastream.  
They found the inclusion of the level effect and regime switching in the model seems to be 
rendering the ARCH effect in the conditional volatility insignificant.  In addition, the 
regime switching occurs in the level or constant in the ARCH model specification.  
Moreover, they find evident suggesting that neither a state dependant level nor volatility 
have an advantage over the other.  The results seem to be indicating a mixed picture with 
each country short rate model conforming two different models with respect to the two 
states. However, there is a difference in the models each country conforms with respect to 
the states.  There seem to be no evident of contagion between the US and Germany and 
US and UK.  However, in general they did fund some evident of Granger causality.  This 
                                                 
9 After the introduction of the Euro, the rate used was Eurocurrency 
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seems to be suggesting that the ECB in particular can exert some influence on the Eurozone 
short rate volatility. 
In a study on the impact of financial stress from abrupt and large changes in the volatility 
of key financial variables on the US financial, Abdymomunov (2013) extends the Hamilton 
& Susmel (1994) model to a multivariate SWARCH model.  They use transformed weekly 
TED spreads, value-weighted stock NYSE returns and capital-weighted CDS from a 
number of bank a\s the financial variables.  Various places such as Bloomberg and the 
FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis provided the data observed over 
the period 6 December 2000 to 29 September 2010.  However, the CDS data observed 
between 10 November 2004 and 29 September 2010.  They find strong evident of the high 
volatility state in the joint variables mimicking times of financial stress such as the 
subprime crises and credit crunch in August 2004 and the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 
September 2008.  The results seem to suggest that a possible indicator of financial stress 
could be the joint variables regime-switching model. 
2.4.4 Concluding review 
In concluding, there was a large and growing literature on the use of the GARCH family 
to analyse the behaviour of volatility in the financial market and in particular the sovereign 
debt market e.g. Engle et al. (1987), Bollerslev et al. (1988), Brunner & Simon (1996), 
Jones et al. (1998), Bollerslev (2000) and Christiansen (2000).  This has grown over the 
last few years due to the recent financial and sovereign debt crises e.g. Dungey et al. (2009), 
Dotz & Fisher (2011), Metui (2011), Tamakoshi (2011) and Mohl & Sondermann (2013).  
Essentially, the empirical evidence of the last few years has illustrated the changing 
behaviour of volatility during a period of crises.  However, what is important to notice in 
these articles is the different impact from the financial and sovereign debt crises on the 
sovereign debt market. 
In essence, this evidence certainly points to a change in the behaviour of volatility in the 
aftermath of each of the crises.  During the financial crisis the evidence seem to be 
suggesting that most sovereign debt markets were seen as safe haven due to the crisis in 
the financial market e.g. equity, asset backed securities (such as MBS and CDO) and 
corporate bonds especially those issued by the financial sector.  While the evidence during 
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the sovereign debt crisis seem to hint at a flight to safety from the GIIPS nations to the 
German and US markets as contagion/spillover effects impacted the market.  This point to 
a change in the behaviour of market participants during both crises, which can be picked, 
using timeline analysis with fixed subsamples, linked to the financial and sovereign debt 
crises.  Although, the financial and sovereign debt crises had their roots long before the 
summer of 2007 and autumn of 2009 respectively.  Yet most analysts and academics would 
acknowledge the Bear Stearns’ Funds problems on 7th June 2007 as the start of the global 
financial crisis as hinted by Brunnermeier (2009) and the Greek annual deficit revision on 
5th November 2009 as the start of the sovereign debt crisis as hinted by Lane (2012).  
Therefore, we can subdivide both the 2012 and 2017 observed datasets into samples 
corresponding to the global financial and sovereign debt crises. 
In essence the period before the financial and sovereign debt crises was highlighted by the 
asset price bubble, introduction of the Euro and some extreme events i.e. 11 September 
2001 terrorist attacks.  It is interesting to see how the asset price bubble effected the 
behaviour of volatility in the sovereign debt market and hence the market participants.  The 
problem is the evidence is not clear when the bubble started which is inductive of how 
difficult it is to spot a bubble in the first place as highlighted previously.  Although there 
is ample evidence that the main market behind the mid-2000s asset price bubble, the 
housing market, had collapse by 2005 as hinted by Masood (2009).  Yet the asset backed 
price bubble was still going strong until early to mid-2007 as noted by Masood (2009).  
The aftermath of the introduction of the euro blighted the pre-crisis period, which 
continued to affect the global financial market for a number of years after 1999 and 2002 
as illustrated by Galati & Tsatsaronis (2003).  A class of events, which blighted the 
sovereign debt market in this period of the observations, are extreme events inducing high 
systemic risks in the global financial markets such as the terrorist attacks of September 
2001 as illustrated by chart 1 in Goldberg & Leonard (2003). 
Moreover the evidence from the literature seem to be suggesting that the behaviour of 
volatility in the sovereign debt market during the crises period is influenced by two factors 
fundamentals and news.  However, there is a separation with the weight of influenced being 
larger during the sovereign debt crisis with respect to the fundamentals.  In contrast, the 
financial crisis is weighted towards news being the influencing factor, expected since 
throughout the sovereign debt crisis, the macroeconomic factors initiated and dictated the 
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events, as highlighted by a number of articles including Collignon (2012), Feldstein (2009) 
and section 2.3.  Whereas the financial crisis was governed by news, a good example is the 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, from other financial markets (such as the equity, corporate 
bond and securitization, i.e. CDO and MBS, markets) transmitting volatility to the 
sovereign debt market.  This is usually done thru the Knightian uncertainty mechanism, 
which induces systemic risk in a given market thus instigating a flight to safe or higher 
quality assets, e.g. the sovereign debt market as exemplified by Fratzscher (2009) and 
Caballero & Krishnamurthy (2009).  In summary, the literature suggests that the particular 
period or point in time could have influenced the market efficiency.  We therefore suggest 
testing the relationship of the market efficiency before, during and after the crises.  The 
rationale is that if markets were efficient, any (arbitrary) period selection should not have 
any impact on the result, i.e. should show that markets are efficient.  In turn, if this is not 
the case, then we can draw conclusions regarding permanent market efficiency. 
While there, is a large and growing database of articles or papers on the volatility in the 
sovereign debt market.  Yet past empirical studies had concentrated on the yields (Dotz & 
Fisher, 2011; Metui, 2011; Tamakoshi, 2011; Laopodis, 2010) or spreads (Mohl & 
Sondermann, 2013; Groba et al., 2013; Favero & Missale, 2011; Missio & Watzka, 2011) 
in analysing the volatility in the sovereign debt market.  However, as highlighted in section 
2.1.1, we are testing the efficiency of the market; hence, the EMH dictates that prices 
should incorporate all available information.  Therefore, in order to understand the reason 
why the market may or may not be efficient, there is a need to use the price to enable us to 
analyse the behaviour of volatility.  Since the spreads are a measure of risks, i.e. liquidity 
or credit; and hence do not explain the efficiency of a market as well as the price.  In 
essence, the yields are a derivative of the price. 
Although the empirical evidence certainly does illustrates the impact from spillover effects 
and co-integrations on the sovereign debt market see (Pericoli & Sbracia (2003), Abad et 
al (2010), Groba et al. (2013)).  Yet the efficient market hypothesis as proposed by Malkiel 
(1962) and Fama (1965, 1970) is inconsistent with co-integration and hence spillover 
effect.  Basically there are two key arguments: the first view, as argued by Baillie & 
Bollerslev (1989, 1994) and Masih & Masih (2001), states that co-integration in financial 
markets imply a violation of the efficient market hypothesis.  Another view, according to 
Granger (1992) and Diebold et al. (1994), is that there is an incompatibility between the 
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predictability of co-integration and unpredictability of the efficient market hypothesis.  
Therefore, we do not use the multivariate GARCH models to analyse the behaviour of 
volatility.  Since we want to understand what makes a market efficient or inefficient by 
analysing the information contained in the volatility.  In other words, we are not interested 
in the transmission of volatility between the markets, studied by numerous articles and 
papers since the advent of the crises. 
Of course, other univariate GARCH models can be of benefit in understanding the 
information contained in the volatility: GARCH-X, GARCH-Jump and spline-GARCH; 
however, these are usually complicated and involve coding because they have not been 
widely integrated into the econometrics packages.  As illustrated previously, the GARCH 
models we have selected each determines a factor of market participant behaviour and test 
different aspects of the market efficiency. 
Since the outbreak of the crises, most of the empirical evidence in the behaviour of 
volatility in the sovereign debt market has involved the GIPS nations with the German 
market as the benchmark e.g. Missio & Watzka (2011), Tamakoshi (2011) and Mohl & 
Sondermann (2013).  Since we are interested in how the crisis have affected the efficiency 
of the market in the aftermath of both the financial and sovereign debt crises, this means 
we must analyse the GIPS nations and the German market.  However, the American market 
is by far the biggest sovereign debt market and regarded as the benchmark risk free and 
liquid market, hence any possible default by the US federal government is likely to have 
an impact on the efficiency of the global financial market.  For these reasons, we 
concentrate our research on these six markets. 
In fairness, whichever you look at it, this is the influencing section underpinning the 
literature review.  The GARCH family of volatility models underpin our variance bound 
tests and analysis of the behaviour of volatility.  However, as we have illustrated during 
this section, as with the behaviour of market participants, there are many interpretations of 
the behaviour of volatility.  It would be impossible to analyse exactly the behaviour of 
volatility, which would involve many models.  The fact is some of the models are 
complicated and require high computing power, a problem we have witnessed with the use 
of the Switching GARCH models, which caused us to use the SWARCH models. 
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3.0  Methodology  
In essence, the key to our empirical evident is the behaviour of price volatility in the 
sovereign debt market over the period between 1st July 2002 and 31st March 2013,  In effect 
analysing the behaviour of price volatility in a changing global financial market 
environment.  The basic idea influencing the research is does the behaviour of price 
volatility suggest that markets are not efficient.  If so then what could be driving this 
deviation from market efficiency.  However, if the markets are efficient then what makes 
price volatility behave in such a way that the market is efficient.  The behavioural finance 
theory provides possible answers to these questions. 
In order to test the null of the efficient market hypothesis, we test the key assumption 
underpinning the hypothesis: efficient market.  To test the key assumption, we ask the 
question: does price volatility hint at inefficient markets? We also ask if the changing 
global financial market environment affects the efficiency of the market based on four 
fixed sub periods.  We use the variance bound test proposed by Shiller (1979, 1981a) in 
testing the assumption of efficient market using two GARCH models of volatility: 
• GARCH (1, 1) proposed by Bollerslev (1986) 
• GJR-GARCH (1, 1) proposed by Glosten et al. (1993) 
In analysing the deviation from the efficient market hypothesis, we look at the models of 
volatility in an attempt to interpret the behaviour of price volatility in the changing market 
environment.  The basis of the interpretation is the behavioural finance theory 
fundamentals such as the reactions to market shocks and volatility persistent, feedback, 
leverage and regime switching.  We use two GARCH models in interpreting these 
behavioural effects: 
• GARCH model (Bollerslev, 1986) for the reaction to market shocks and persistent 
of the price volatility in the market 
• EGARCH-M (p, q) model (Nelson, 1991) for the feedback and asymmetrical 
effects 
In concluding our analysis of the behavioural effects, we analyse for a possible regime 
structure.  We use a SWARCH model, a combination of the ARCH model (Engle, 1982) 
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and Markov Switching model (Hamilton, 1988), in analysing the regime structure of price 
volatility.  We opt to use the Cai (1994) SWARCH model, mainly due to the model fitting 
our datasets best. 
As this introductory illustrates, the methodology is divided into three sections.  Each 
explaining the model we use and our interpretation.  We also attempt to explain the theory 
and results influencing the models. 
3.1 Model Specification for the Variance bound test 
One of the main aims of this thesis is to test for the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) in 
the sovereign debt market.  Therefore, we lay the foundation for the rest of the empirical 
section in order to explain the behaviour of volatility in the sovereign debt market.  We opt 
to use an extended version of the test originally proposed by Shiller (1979, 1981a), the 
Shiller volatility or variance bound test 
Importantly, the variance bound test does not directly test the EMH, instead it tests the 
variance bound.  Therefore, in testing the null hypothesis of the market being too volatile 
to be efficient, we could either reject or accept the EMH.  At the heart of the Shiller 
volatility test, as stated by Shiller (1981a), is the key assumption that under the EMH prices 
incorporates the relevant market information efficiently, thus meaning excess volatility in 
the market is the result of inefficient markets as hinted by Bollerslev & Hodrick (1992) 
and Fama (1970).  Hence, it is essentially a test of the null hypothesis of excess volatility 
in the market. 
We test for the null of the EMH using both the 2002 and 2007 set of observed prices.  In 
order to analyse the different effects on the EMH of the crises and bull periods, we test for 
different periods within the 2002 and 2007 issues.  To test the EMH for these periods, we 
use four uniformed subsamples across all six markets and test them separately.  In other 
words, we test the EMH for the whole sample as well as for the subsamples. 
The interesting consequence of this is that if a subsample is efficient that does not 
necessarily mean that the entire sample is efficient.  We could have a scenario where over 
the whole period the market could be efficient but during the subsamples, the market is 
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inefficient.  This then leads to the interesting question: whether financial markets can be 
efficient, if in some periods, they are efficient and in others, they are inefficient. 
In essence, the influencing factor underpinning the variance bound test as highlighted by 
Shiller (1981a) is that on some occasions price volatility in the financial market exceeds 
that explained by the EMH.  Hence, the markets are not efficient.  Using the basis of the 
Shiller (1979) and LeRoy & Porter (1981) variance bound test methodology; we propose 
extending the test by using the GARCH and GJR-GARCH models in obtaining the key 
statistics.  Although the variance bound test as used by Shiller (1979, 1981a) and LeRoy 
& Porter (1981) depends on the fundamental value to test the efficient market hypothesis.  
By using the GARCH and GJR-GARCH models, we omit the need for an optimal price 
and use the 5% critical value F-statistics to test the efficient market hypothesis.  We then 
compare both sets of results. 
In essence, the Shiller (1979, 1981a) and LeRoy & Porter (1981) variance bound test is 
really a test of whether the fundamental value as given by the present value equation, see 
equation 3.1.1, does determines the behaviour of the price.  The basic argument, as put by 
Shiller (1992), is any excess volatility is evidence of inefficient markets.  However, as we 
will illustrate now there is a big issue regarding the use of the present value model within 
the bond market.  The present value model dictates that the price of a bond based on all 
coupons is as given by equation 3.1.1. 
(3.1.1)  𝑃𝑃 = ∑ 𝐶𝐶×𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
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Where C is the coupon rate, PV is the par value and r is the yield.  The problem with this 
is from all these variables; the only time-varying variable is the yield.  Whereas in the stock 
market the dividend is also time varying, hence the fundamental value of a stock is different 
from the price.  However, since the price derives the yield in the bond market, this means 
that the price does not differentiate a lot from the fundamental value.  So the problem in 
this model is that the price of the bond will always be approximating (if not equal to) the 
fundamental value.  By omitting the need to calculate the fundamental value and using any 
appropriate econometric model, we could overcome this issue.  Indeed Shiller does 
advocate this model specification to the volatility tests.  Although Shiller does not specify 
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a specific econometric model, yet he does set out a number of pre-requisite steps in the 
model specification of the test: 
1. As illustrated by Shiller (1981a), the key factor underlying any variance bound test 
is the variance calculation.  We model the datasets in our test as a time varying 
lagged variance of the price using equation 3.1.2. 
(3.1.2) lim
𝑡𝑡→𝑇𝑇
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡) = ∑ (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃−𝜇𝜇)2𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞=1 𝑄𝑄  
2. The first order autoregressive model estimates the residuals in the econometric 
model underpinning the test as illustrated by equation 3.1.3. 
(3.1.3) 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡) = 𝑣𝑣 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 
 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 = 𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 
We set 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 to be equal to the residuals of the autoregressive model.  Hence, the econometric 
model underpinning the test is estimated using equation 3.1.4. 
(3.1.4) 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥) = 𝑣𝑣 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 
We opt to use the GARCH and GJR-GARCH models in our tests.  In common with all our 
GARCH models, generally we use the t-student distribution.  An influencing factor in the 
GJR-GAARCH model is the asymmetrical order, which we set to one.  Hence, we estimate 
a t GARCH (1, 1) and t GJR-GARCH (1, 1) using the variance equations 3.1.5 and 3.1.6. 
(3.1.5) ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝜔𝜔 + 𝛼𝛼 1𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽 1ℎ𝑡𝑡−1 
(3.1.6) ℎ𝑗𝑗 𝑡𝑡 = 𝜔𝜔 + 𝛼𝛼 1𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽 1ℎ𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝐼𝐼�𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗 𝑡𝑡−1 < 0� 
An added and interesting factor with the GJR=GARCH is that we could see whether 
asymmetrical effect has any impact on the efficiency of the market.  The key is the 𝛾𝛾 
coefficient in equation 3.1.6 where 𝛾𝛾 ≠ 0 then there is an asymmetrical effect; if 𝛾𝛾 > 0 
then there is a leverage effect meaning negative shocks have greater effect than positive 
shocks 
Key to our model are the coefficients of the GARCH and GJR-GARCH models of 
volatility.  As mentioned earlier in this section, we derive our EMH test by using the f-
 86 
 
statistics; for our observed samples, the f-statistics at the 5% level is 1.96.  We calculate 
our test statistics using equation 3.1.7 
(3.1.7) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = ∑(𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐  𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐)−1
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐�𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥)�  
Since the market is efficient when the EMH test statistics is less than the F statistics, 
therefore by definition the market is efficient when the condition as set in equation 3.1.8 is 
true.  Theoretically, the market is only truly efficient when the EMH test statistics is equal 
to the f-statistic.  Hence, we reject the null hypothesis for the EMH if the condition in 
equation 3.1.8 is true but accept the null hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be 
efficient for anything else. 
(3.1.8) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ≤ 𝐹𝐹 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 
3.2 Model Specifications for the Univariate GARCH Models 
One key objective of this research is to analyse the behaviour of price volatility in our six 
observed sovereign debt markets.  Like many researches into volatility in the sovereign 
debt market, such as Bollerslev et al. (2000), Christiansen (2007) and Dotz & Fisher 
(2011), we use time varying conditional variance to identify volatility in the sovereign debt 
markets.  We obtain the conditional variance by using two alternatives GARCH models to 
find the best-fit estimation model for the observed prices of each market.  We use the 
GARCH (p, q) model proposed by Bollerslev (1986).  In addition, we use the EGARCH-
M (p, q) model proposed by Nelson (1991). 
In using the GARCH (p, q) and EGARCH-M (p, q), we could start to get an idea of the 
behaviour of volatility in the sovereign debt market.  Since a key use of the ARCH/GARCH 
group of econometrics models as intended by Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986) is to 
model volatility clustering.  We also analyse for leverage and feedback effects by using the 
EGARCH-M as noted by Brunner & Simon (1996). 
The previous paragraph is interesting on a number of levels, since it does illustrate the key 
point in the use of the GARCH family in this research.  As eluded previously, there are 
several features within an asset price bubble that can be picked up by the use of the GARCH 
models as pointed by Blanchard & Watson (1982) and Branch & Watson, (2011, 2013).  
Another point is according to Bollerslev & Hodrick (1992) there is evidence of seasonality 
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and volatility clustering issues affecting the fundamental and prices.  Hence, this implies 
the use of these GARCH models in order to understand the impact of bubbles on asset 
price.  Another key factor in the use of the GARCH models is that they could help interpret 
the reaction and behaviour of market participants to price volatility.  Indeed the reaction of 
market participants to market shocks and volatility persistent or the impact of feedback and 
asymmetrical effects could be analysed thru the use of the GARCH models. 
In a research paper, Engle (1982) states that in the past the convention in econometric was 
for the conditional variance not to depend on the past value of the asset.  Although it was 
widely assumed that the future value of an asset is dependent on the past value of the asset, 
therefore the conditional variance does depend on the past.  In essence, this means the 
conditional variance follows a clustering behaviour.  A standard approach for 
heteroskedasticity was to introduce an exogenous variable predicting the variance.  
However, the problem with this method is the requirement of specified causes of the 
changing variance rather than allowing the conditional mean and variance to evolve jointly 
over time.  Another approach was to use the bi-linear model introduced by Granger & 
Andersen (1978), however this gave an unconditional variance of either zero or infinity. 
Engle (1982) introduced a generalised model of the Granger & Andersen (1978) bi-linear 
model called autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity or ARCH to overcome these 
problems.  As defined by Engle (1982), at the heart of the specification of the ARCH model 
is the differentiation between conditional and unconditional variance; thus allowing the 
conditional variance to change over time as a function of past errors holding the 
unconditional variance constant.  The basis of the model is a lagged autoregressive process 
with a vector data structure.  However, mainly due to the problems with large number of 
lags, Engle (1982) specified the model to be arbitrary linearly declining lag length on an 
ARCH (4) thus restricting the number of parameters required to two rather than five.  As 
stated by Engle (2001), the ARCH model uses a weighted average of past variances where 
the observed dataset provides the estimates for the weights.  In essence, the ARCH model 
is a linear and stationary stochastic process with a fat tail distribution.  The calculation of 
the estimate for the ARCH model uses a maximum likelihood method. 
In another research into volatility clustering models, Bollerslev (1986) introduced the 
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity model; as the name suggests 
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the GARCH model is a generalization of the ARCH model.  As noted by Bollerslev (1986) 
a key different in the specification between an ARCH and GARCH model is the inclusion 
of a flexible lag structure and longer memory.  The GARCH (p, q) specification uses a two 
lags structure whereby the q is the lags of the squared errors and p is the conditional 
variance lags.  Thus meaning GARCH is a very parsimonious model allowing for an 
infinite number of past squared errors influencing the current conditional variance.  At the 
basic level, the GARCH (p, q) means that by setting p to zero reduces a GARCH to an 
ARCH model. 
A key assumption underpinning our conditional volatility models is that the error 
distribution follows a Student t distribution; otherwise known as a t-distribution, function 
where possible.  If the estimated model encounters issues then we use the normal 
distribution.  Thus, the basis of our univariate 1 lagged system is a t-distribution error 
distribution function.  This means we estimate the coefficients for our model using the 
conditional t log likelihood function in calculating the Marquandt or BHHH maximum 
likelihood estimation method of the prices in the sovereign debt market. 
The first order autoregressive model estimates the residuals in all our GARCH models as 
illustrated by equation 3.2.1. 
(3.2.1) Δ𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝜔𝜔 + 𝛼𝛼1Δ𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 
 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 = 𝜌𝜌𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 
We set 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 to be equal to the residuals of the autoregressive model.  Hence, all our GARCH 
models are estimated using equation 3.2.2. 
The first model of price volatility we use is the GARCH (p, q) model first purposed by 
Bollerslev (1986).  Due to the single time varying explanatory variable in our model, we 
use a univariate system to model the volatility.  The basis of our lagged system is the one-
day ahead volatility estimation, which means we use a one lagged GARCH (1, 1) model.  
This means we estimate the best fitting GARCH (p, q) model of the lagged time varying 
first order differentiated price volatility using equation 3.2.2. 
(3.2.2) Δ𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝑣𝑣 + ∑ 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗Δ𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 +  𝑃𝑃𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 
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In reality, the basis of the derivation of the GARCH model is two equations: the conditional 
variance and conditional mean.  We model conditional variance in the price of sovereign 
debt by the univariate GARCH (1, 1) model as specified in equations 3.2.3.  In equation 
3.2.3, we follow the standard definition used by many others by denoting conditional 
variance to be ℎ𝑡𝑡 as 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡2 and denoting 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 as 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡2 where 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 is the residual error term and derived 
from 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡 which is the product of the standard deviation and a stochastic variable.  The 
conditional mean is the second equation in the GARCH model, denoted by equation 3.2.4.  
We use the simplest form of the conditional mean equation. 
(3.2.3) ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝜔𝜔 + 𝛼𝛼 1𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽 1ℎ𝑡𝑡−1 
(3.2.4) ∆𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇 +  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 
(3.2.5) 𝜎𝜎�2 = 𝜔𝜔
1−(𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽) 
(3.2.6) 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 
(3.2.7) − 𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐(2)
𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽) 
As noted by Alexander (2008, p. 137) and Engle & Patton (2001), there is a story within 
any estimated GARCH (p, q) model influenced by the coefficients of the model.  Thus 
meaning the coefficients of equation 3.2.3 naturally interprets the reaction and means 
reversion to market shocks of volatility. 
• The conditional residual coefficient is a measure of the reaction of conditional 
volatility to market shocks, when α is relatively high (i.e. greater than 0.1) thus 
meaning volatility is very sensitive to market shocks. 
• The conditional variance coefficient is a measure of the persistence of the 
conditional volatility irrespective of market conditions and status, when β is 
relatively large (i.e. greater than 0.9) thus meaning volatility takes longer to recover 
after a crisis in the market. 
• Equation 3.2.5 measures the level of unconditional volatility in the GARCH model, 
otherwise known as the long-term average volatility, when it is relatively large thus 
meaning long term volatility in the market is relatively high. 
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• Equation 3.2.6 measures the convergence of the conditional volatility to the long-
term average volatility i.e. mean reversion, when it is large (i.e. greater than 0.99) 
thus meaning that current information has no impact on the long run forecast. 
• Equation 3.2.7 is the half-life of the volatility defined as the time it takes for the 
conditional volatility to move half way to the long-term average volatility.  Of 
cause if 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 > 1 then the volatility half-life is negative, thus the shock to 
volatility does not decay over time. 
However, both theoretically and practically in finance, high risk assets have a high 
premium return; one way to model this theory is by extending the GARCH models to let 
the return be partly dependant on the risk.  Sometimes referred to as the feedback effect 
where the higher the risk is the higher return is.  Thus the ARCH–M model, introduced by 
Engle et al. (1987) and extended to the GARCH--M model, extends the ARCH/GARCH 
to allow the conditional variance to become part of the conditional mean equation.  In 
modelling the potential feedback effect in the price volatility of each sovereign debt, we 
use a t GARCH-M (1, 1). 
As noted earlier, a key observation made primarily in stock markets, there is a negative 
correlation between returns and volatility.  In order to model the leverage or asymmetrical 
effect, Nelson (1991) proposed the EGARCH.  Unlike many other GARCH models, the 
EGARCH model uses the log of the conditional variance.  The key to understanding the 
EGARCH model is a leverage effect hints at negative shocks having a larger impact than 
positive shocks on the behaviour of volatility. 
As stated by Nelson (1991), the capture of the leverage and feedback effect by combining 
the EGARCH and GARCH-m could extend the EGARCH, thus deriving the EGARCH-
m.  Unlike the GJR-GARCH as proposed by Glosten et al. (1993), the GARCH-m model 
is not integrated into the EGARCH-m model and therefore derived from two separates 
models.  This is helpful in analysing the feedback and leverage effects due to the separation 
of the effects coefficients.  The model combines the conditional mean of the GARCH-M 
derived by Engle et al. (1987) in equation 3.2.9 with the EGARCH model derived by 
Nelson (1991) in equation 3.2.8.  We use a single lagged t EGARCH-M (1, 1) with a single 
asymmetrical order to analyse the leverage-feedback effect. 
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(3.2.8) 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(ℎ𝑡𝑡) = 𝜔𝜔 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(ℎ𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝛼𝛼1 �𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−1𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛾𝛾1 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−1𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1 
(3.2.9) ∆𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜆𝜆 1ℎ𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 
Note the conditional variance estimated from the logarithmic function in equation 3.2.8, 
thus implying that the leverage effect is estimated exponentially as oppose to the quadratic 
equation.  Like the EGARCH (1, 1), the key is the 𝛾𝛾 coefficient in equation 3.2.8 where 
𝛾𝛾 ≠ 0 then there is an asymmetrical effect on the sovereign debt prices; if 𝛾𝛾 > 0 then there 
is a leverage effect meaning negative shocks have greater effects than positive shocks on 
the sovereign debt prices.  In addition like the GARCH-M (1, 1), the key to interpreting 
the feedback effect is the λ coefficient in equation 3.2.9, thus meaning that a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient would suggest as risk increase the conditional return 
increases.  However, a negative coefficient would suggest as risk increases the conditional 
return decreases.  This means where both the leverage and feedback effect exist, the 
conditional volatility exhibit a risk/return relationship under an asymmetrical behaviour. 
Look at the basic model underpinning the GARCH family in equation 3.2.2.  The key factor 
in any GARCH model is that the coefficients must not be zero.  As the name suggests, the 
GARCH model is a generalised model of the ARCH model of volatility; this is important 
because of one key factor if the β reduces to zero then the GARCH becomes a simple 
ARCH model.  However, of more interest is if α reduces to zero thus resulting in equation 
3.2.10.  Of course, this means the unlikely probability that conditional volatility in our 
observed sovereign debt prices could follow a random walk model exemplified by equation 
3.2.10.  Essentially, in our case, this means that yesterday’s prices have no bearing in 
assessing the distribution of today’s prices as indicated by Fama (1970).  Noteworthy, that 
the random walk model does not imply that past information on prices is not relevant to 
future price changes.  Hence, this means that past volatility in the prices of sovereign debt 
can affect future volatility and therefore defining the behaviour of volatility.  However, the 
random walk effect does make it difficult to interpret the results from the GARCH models. 
(3.2.10) ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝜔𝜔 + 𝛽𝛽1ℎ𝑡𝑡−1 
Given our observed periods and datasets, it is highly unlikely that any random walk effect 
in the conditional volatility of the sovereign debt prices could be cause by the observed 
period of time influencing the observed datasets This is mainly due to our observed period 
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being over a long time scale incorporating episodes of constant high and low volatility.  
This means that any random walk effect in the conditional volatility is the product of an 
intentional split in the observed dataset into two observed periods due to an unprecedented 
hiked in the volatility rendering the period before and/or after meaningless, a possible 
scenario in the case of Greece or Portugal. 
3.3 Model Specifications for Markov Switching ARCH 
An interesting issue in the estimation of high frequency financial datasets is the apparent 
high persistence in the volatility as noted by Engle & Bollerslev (1986) resulting in the 
introduction of the Integrated GARCH (aka IGARCH) model by Engle & Bollerslev 
(1986).  As Cai (1994) states the central concept of the IGARCH model is that in certain 
time horizons current information effects the conditional variance for all future horizons.  
In essence, a test for IGARCH is a test for unit root in the variance.  However, as 
Lamoureux & Lastrapes (1990) argue allowing deterministic shifts in the conditional 
variance intercept in GARCH counters the effect of high persistence in volatility.  Diebold 
(1986) states that the inclusion of monetary-regime dummies in conditional variance 
intercept could explain the integrated-variance disturbances in interest rates.  The 
SWARCH model proposed by Cai (1994) integrates the Markov Switching model first 
proposed by Hamilton (1988) and the ARCH model introduced by Engle (1982).  The key 
to the Cai (1994) model is that the ARCH intercept is regime dependant, thus retaining 
volatility clustering and allowing the model to overcome spurious persistence.  We use the 
Cai (1994) model to model the regime-switching behaviour of the price volatility without 
the regime dependent spurious high persistence volatility. 
 An influencing factor in the use of the SWARCH model is that on some occasions there 
can be the appearance of periodic collapsing bubbles, which can be analysed thru the use 
of a Markov process as alluded by Blanchard & Watson (1982), Evans (1991) and more 
recently Branch & Evans (2011) as modelled by the Markov Switching models (Hamilton, 
1988).  Since as illustrated by Blanchard & Watson (1982), the correlation between the 
innovations and asset returns points to the use of the ARCH/GARCH models, so hinting 
at the use of the SWARCH (Hamilton & Susmel, 1994; Cai, 1994) to model the impact of 
the bubble on the behaviour of price volatility.  Another important factor is the assumption 
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that market participants change their behaviour with the changing market environment.  
This means that market participants react differently, to high and low volatility regimes. 
As stated by Hamilton (1989) a number of previous researches studying the relationship 
between the business cycle and GNP assume the observed data followed a linear stationary 
process.  However, as a number of studies have proved the assumption of linearity and 
stationary in key macroeconomic datasets is weak.  Hence, in an article on non-stationary 
time series and the business cycle, Hamilton (1989) introduced a regime-switching model 
based on an autoregression method using a discrete-state Markov process.  Hamilton 
(1989) researched the non-stationarity and non-linearity of observed datasets, especially 
the non-linearity arising from datasets with changes in the dynamic behaviour of the series. 
As a result of the research, Hamilton (1989) derives the Markov Switching Model 
(acknowledge as MSM hereafter) based on the Goldfield & Quandt (1973) Markov 
switching regression to characterized changes in the behaviour of the parameters of an 
autoregression process.  Using the Kalman linear filter idea in Cosslett & Lee (1985), the 
MSM extends the Kalman to a filter and smoother providing a non-linear discrete 
unobserved state vector using the maximum likelihood method to identify the optimal 
unobserved regimes.  However, as Hamilton (1990) hints a big problem with the previous 
specification was the maximizing of the likelihood method with respect to large number of 
parameters.  Hence, Hamilton (1990) extends the previous specification by including an 
expectation maximization method.  A key advantage of the expectation maximization 
method is the numerical robustness. 
There are three key univariate10 Markov regime-switching models: simple MSM (hereafter 
acknowledged as MS(s)), MSM autoregression model (hereafter acknowledge as MS(s)-
AR (k)) and MSM dynamic regression (hereafter acknowledge as MS(s)-DR).  Essentially, 
the bases of all three models are the four standard parameters organised in a vector 
structure.  As defined in Hamilton (1989, 1990), the model is based on the conditional 
mean as the underlying measurements.  Hamilton (2008), Piger (2011) and Guidolin (2012) 
provide a more descriptive analysis of the different Markov regime-switching models. 
                                                 
10 Although the MSM can be extended to a multivariate model, see Krolzig (1997, 1999, 2000) for a 
description. 
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The basis of the regime shifts are an unobserved first order Markov variable within a matrix 
of transition probabilities attached to each regime and although the number of regimes is 
“unrestricted” depending on the research; yet the optimal number of regimes are two or 
three depending on the research.  The optimal regimes are usually associated with periods 
of high, low and in some cases stable.  Essentially, there are three processes of updating 
the transition probability estimate influencing the regime switching: one-step (or period) 
ahead, filtering and smoothing.  The one-step ahead process is where the estimation method 
weighs the density function of each regime by the one-step ahead probability of being in 
that regime to update the estimated regime probabilities.  The filtering process adds to the 
one-step ahead by using the additional information provided by the dependant variable in 
a given period about the current regime to update the estimated regime probabilities.  The 
final process, smoothing updates the filtering process by using all of the information in the 
observed dataset to update the estimated regime probabilities.  Hence, the process uses 
information about all future realization of the dependant variable to update the estimate. 
Hamilton (1989) derived the MS(s)-AR (k) model from a combination of two or more first 
order autoregression models, each with a different intercept to highlight the change in the 
observed data at a certain time.  However, as indicated by Hamilton (2008) the problem 
with that was priori knowledge of abrupt changes in the observed data.  Hence, Hamilton 
(1989) introduced a multiple-state (i.e. two-state in this case) Markov chain with a system 
of probabilities attached to each state to model the changes in the observed data regime.  
The Markov Switching model as derived by Hamilton (1989), illustrated in equation 3.3.1. 
(3.3.1) 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝜔𝜔𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 
 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 = � = 1 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃= 2 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙ℎ 𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃 
As previously stated, the literature and empirical evident on the Markov switching model 
in the sovereign debt market in the last few years have been strong, see (Georgoutsos & 
Migiakis (2009, 2010 and 2012), Pozzi & Sadaba (2013) and Schuster & Uhrig-Homburg 
(2012)).  Although as Hamilton notes the long-time acknowledgement that volatility seem 
to be following a high-low switching model, there is a lack of evident to the SWARCH or 
SWGARCH models.  Given there is evident of changes in the volatility of sovereign debt 
prices over the past few years, hence a volatility switching model would help in identifying 
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the behaviour of price volatility.  Due to issues regarding the complexity, see (Cai, 1994) 
and (Guidolin, 2012), and the exaggerated high persistency in the volatility, see (Guidolin, 
2012); we follow Christiansen (2008) and Abdymomunov (2013) in using a SWARCH 
model instead of a SWGRACH (i.e. Switching GARCH), in effect using the ARCH model 
of Engle (1982) to derive the volatility.  Equation 3.3.2 uses a single lag ARCH model as 
proposed by Engle (1982). 
(3.3.2) ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝜔𝜔 + 𝛼𝛼1𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−12  𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃 ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡2 
The simplest method to estimate the integrated heteroskedasticity and switching effects in 
the volatility is by the use of a SWARCH model such as Hamilton & Susmel (1994) and 
Cai (1994).  We opt for the Cai (1994) implementation mainly due to initial tests with our 
observed data raising a few estimation issues with respect to the Hamilton & Susmel (1994) 
implementation.  In combining the Markov switching model as in equation 3.3.1 with the 
ARCH model in equation 3.3.2, it is easy to see how Cai (1994) integrated the two models.  
The Cai’s model is derived from two equations, illustrated by equations 3.3.3 and 3.3.4, 
with the first equation being the integrated model and the second being the model of 
regime-switching probabilities.  Analysing equation 3.3.3 closely reveals the beautiful 
simplicity in the construction of the model.  Yet the model is powerful in its ability to 
model the regime switching in the volatility of the underlining observed dataset and 
complicated to estimate.  The simplicity of the model is that it is a combination of the 
Hamilton (1989) Markov Switching model in equation 3.3.1 and ARCH model of Engle 
(1982) in equation 3.3.2 whereby the autoregression model in equation 3.3.1 substituted 
by the conditional heteroskedasticity model as derived by equation 3.3.2.  However, since 
Cai (1994) uses a two-lagged ARCH model, this implies that the SWARCH model follows 
equation 3.3.3. 
(3.3.3) ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝜔𝜔0 + 𝜔𝜔1𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−𝑃𝑃2𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃=1  
 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 = � 0 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑣𝑣𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦1 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙ℎ 𝑣𝑣𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦 
(3.3.4) 𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃|𝜍𝜍𝑇𝑇�) = ∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃, 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑗𝑗|𝜍𝜍𝑇𝑇�)𝑀𝑀=2𝑗𝑗=1  
(3.3.5) 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 = 11+𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝐸𝐸�𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛� 
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In the Cai (1994) model, the intercept for the low volatility regime is 𝜔𝜔0 and the high 
volatility regime calculated by multiplying 𝜔𝜔0 with the coefficient of the ARCH.  Since 
the SWARCH model was originally proposed to highlight the issue of spuriously high 
persistence in the volatility of other models due to regime switching. 
In a two-regime Markov switching model, we calculate the expected probabilities by using 
𝜃𝜃1,1 and 𝜃𝜃1,2 logistic indices.  Equation 3.4.5 illustrates the calculation; a key factor is that 
we substitute 𝜃𝜃1,1 and 𝜃𝜃1,2 into 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 for the low and high regimes’ probabilities 
respectively.  We opt for the smoothing effect to figure the probabilities.  This gives a more 
accurate figure of each probability, but requires extensive computing, due to the complex 
estimation method involving the entire history of filtered and predicted probabilities, see 
Hamilton (1994). 
There are three main functions to estimate any Markov switching model: maximum 
likelihood, expectation maximization and Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo.  The 
maximum likelihood is the simplest but it is most likely to be the slowest.  The method of 
estimation is key to any models successful estimation; there are essentially two key 
methods of estimating the ARCH component in the SWARCH: BHHH and BFGS. 
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4.0  Empirical Evidence 
This section aims to provide empirical evidence of the impact of the crises on the efficiency 
of the financial market.  The section will analyse six key sovereign debts markets over two 
10-year notes observed from 1st July 2002 to 31st December 2011 and from 1st July 2007 
to 31st March 2013.  The empirical section has two areas of interest, hence splitting this 
section into four subsections: 
• Data Definition 
• Statistical Analysis and Tests 
The two areas of interest are: 
• Testing the efficient market hypothesis 
• Analysis of the changing behaviour in price volatility 
In order to analyse the efficiency and behaviour of price volatility in the sovereign debt 
market under different global market conditions, we subdivide our observed markets into 
the following period: 
1. 2012 issues 
a. All the observed markets: 1st July 2002 to 30th December 2011 
b. Pre-Crisis period: 1st July 2002 to 29th June 2007 
c. Financial crisis of the late 2000s: 2nd July 2007 to 30th October 2009 
d. Sovereign debt crisis of the 2010s: 2nd November 2009 to 30th December 
2011 
2. 2017 Issues 
a. All the observed markets: 2nd July 2007 to 29th March 2013 
b. Financial crisis of the late 2000s: 2nd July 2007 to 30th October 2009 
c. Sovereign debt crisis of the 2010s: 2nd November 2009 to 29th March 2013 
With the exception of the Switching ARCH models, which used Estima WinRATS Pro 
8.3, we used EViews 8.0 for our econometric modelling and statistical analysis.  The 
reasoning being the comprehensive support for the econometric models we were using 
meant the use of two software packages. 
 98 
 
An influencing factor in the structure of this section was the publishing of papers from the 
thesis, therefore where possible we report the results from each country separately within 
the section.  Given this factor, we intend to conclude each section with a review of all the 
results.   
4.1 Data Definition 
As illustrated by Table 1, we use the daily 10-year sovereign debt, maturing in 201211, end 
of day bid prices for Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and US obtained from 
Bloomberg.  Importantly, the reference numbers are ISIN for all the markets, except the 
US, which uses CRSPID.  In order to capture the price volatility during the sovereign debt 
crisis without the maturity effect, we extend our data to obtain a second group of sovereign 
bonds for the above-mentioned countries with the exception of Greece maturing in 2017 
as illustrated in Table 2.  We follow the norm by defining our week as Monday to Friday.  
In order to make the observed data uniformed across all six observed datasets, we substitute 
all missing observations with the last known price.   
 Reference Number Download Date Issue Date Maturity Date 
German DE0001135192 16/07/2012 02/01/2002 31/12/2011 
Greece GR0124018525 17/12/2012 17/01/2002 18/05/2012 
Italy IT0003190912 16/07/2012 01/08/2001 01/02/2012 
Portugal PTOTEKOE0003 16/07/2012 12/06/2002 15/06/2012 
Spain ES0000012791  17/12/2012 14/05/2002 30/07/2012 
US 9128277L0 16/07/2012 15/02/2002 15/02/2012 
Table 1: The 10-Year Sovereign Debt Prices Data with maturity in 2012 
Mainly due to the last issue date, that of Portugal, and first maturity date, that of German, 
our observed sample is from 1st July 2002 to 30th December 2011.  Thus meaning our 
sample has a uniformed total 2480 daily observations for each sovereign debt market. 
  
                                                 
11 The exception is the German which matures at the end of 2011 
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 Reference Number Download Date Issue Date Maturity Date 
German DE0001135317 08/04/2013 17/11/2006 04/01/2017 
Italy IT0004164775 08/04/2013 01/08/2006 01/02/2017 
Portugal PTOTELOE0010 08/04/2013 18/06/2007 16/10/2017 
Spain ES00000120J8 08/04/2013 23/01/2007 31/01/2017 
US 912828GH7 08/04/2013 15/02/2007 15/02/2017 
Table 2: The 10-Year Sovereign Debt Prices Data with maturity in 2017 
In our second observed sample, we follow the same concept as before by using the 
Portuguese issue date to set the start.  This means our observed sample is from 1st July 
2007 to 31st March 2013, a total 1500 daily observations for each sovereign debt market. 
4.2 Statistical Analysis and Tests 
Since the basis of this research is the daily price in the six sovereign debt markets, we need 
to analyse the statistics and patterns of the prices of the eleven observed government bonds.  
This should tell us a lot about the behaviour of the prices.  In statistically analysing and 
testing the observed datasets, we analyse the pattern of the prices using various statistics 
(i.e. mean, median, maximum, minimum and standard deviation) for each sample period.  
We also use the par value to highlight the behavioural pattern; it is essential to note that in 
the bond market the par value acts as the long run equilibrium price.  This is because at 
maturity the bond issuer only pays the bondholder the par value.  In effect if the price is 
below the par value this means the market is oversupplied while the opposite means there 
is a high demand in the market. 
However, we also need to analyse the statistics of the main variable in our test of the 
efficient market hypothesis.  We calculate the daily variance in the price using equation 
3.1.2 from the methodology.  Two key factors influencing our choice of the lagged system 
in the calculation of the price variances were the uniformity across all observed datasets 
and the weekly (i.e. five day) increments limitation we imposed on the lagged system (i.e. 
5, 10, 15…).  We opted to use the 20-lagged system in our test of the efficient market 
hypothesis due to two reasons: the first is that in primarily tests we encountered problems 
with the GARCH models using a 5-lagged system in some of our observed datasets.  The 
second is that using a higher lagged system would have overlooked of the earlier part of 
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the dataset.  So we decided to use the four weekly (i.e. 20) lagged system, which is 
approximately a month. 
We also statistically test the price and lagged variance for: 
• Non-normality using the Jarque-Bera test proposed by Jarque & Bera 
(1980) 
• Structural breaks using the Global L Breaks vs None proposed by Bai & 
Perron (1998) 
• Stationarity using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test proposed by Dickey & 
Fuller (1979, 1981) and Lumsdaine-Papell test of stationarity with 
breakpoints as proposed by Lumsdaine & Papell (1997) 
• Random Walk using the Variance Ratio Test proposed by Lo & MacKinlay 
(1988), we opt to use the optimal z-statistics as derived by Chow & Denning 
(1993) 
4.2.1 Analysis of the Price 
Before we can continue with the analysis of the price, it is worth remembering that the 
bond market is governed by the par value which in practice is set to 100, although the 
actual par value can be 1,000.  This is important on a number of levels, firstly the price any 
bond isssuer pays the bond holder at maturity is the par value.  Hence, making it the long 
term equilibruium price.  And since theory dictate that the equilibrium price is governed 
by the demand and suplply curves, hence if the price falls below the par value than the 
market is over supplied and if the price rises above the par value then demand is high.  
Another key factor is that by definition the par value is when the yield is equal to the 
coupon rate, this makes any increase/decrease in the required yield  to above/below the 
coupon rate effectively a decrease/increase in the price to below/above the par value.   
In this section, we will analyse the general pattern and statistics of the price of  both the 
2012 and 2017 bonds.  The analysis will try to establish similarities and differences in the 
general pattern and statistis between the six sovereign debt markets.  This will allow us to 
establish whether the markets are integrating or diversifying.  It will also allow us to 
analyse the different impact on the markets during the crises. 
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Figure 1: US 2012 Price 
 
Figure 2: German 2012 Price 
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Figure 3: Greek 2012 Price 
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Figure 4: Italian 2012 Price 
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Figure 5: Portuguese 2012 Price 
 
Figure 6: Spanish 2012 Price 
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 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
 Mean  105.3247  106.2032  101.8065  105.4590  104.8485  106.0547 
 Median  105.6094  106.1945  105.4495  105.4310  105.4255  106.0650 
 Maximum  114.5156  113.3510  114.3290  112.9150  113.5220  113.8580 
 Minimum  98.26563  99.86200  34.50300  98.54900  89.35000  98.05300 
 Std. Dev.  3.277713  2.938535  12.98349  2.990753  4.423890  3.113044 
Table 3: Price of the 2012 Bond (01/07/2002-30/12/2011) 
 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
 Mean  104.3031  107.3011  107.9546  106.8508  106.9250  107.2933 
 Median  104.4844  106.7680  107.4250  106.3070  106.3740  106.7850 
 Maximum  114.5156  113.3510  114.3290  112.9150  113.5220  113.8580 
 Minimum  98.26563  99.86200  99.20000  98.54900  97.81700  98.05300 
 Std. Dev.  3.186893  2.801603  3.056214  2.917317  3.143961  3.087154 
Table 4: Price of the 2012 Bond (01/07/2002-29/06/2007) 
  US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
 Mean  107.6985  105.4924  104.0667  104.2072  104.6122  105.1643 
 Median  108.6172  105.2095  103.8380  103.7700  104.3360  104.9510 
 Maximum  112.7344  109.8080  107.9360  107.5090  108.3660  108.8610 
 Minimum  99.20313  100.6090  100.0970  99.59800  99.89000  100.1480 
 Std. Dev.  2.976343  2.578907  1.902827  2.145335  2.249338  2.444874 
Table 5: Price of the 2012 Bond (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
  US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
 Mean  105.1213  104.4349  85.16579  103.5959  100.3074  104.1552 
 Median  105.4219  104.6610  91.83500  103.1520  101.0650  103.4880 
 Maximum  109.0156  107.6220  107.2000  107.1950  107.9650  108.5780 
 Minimum  100.5625  100.0000  34.50300  99.31000  89.35000  99.47500 
 Std. Dev.  2.371351  2.481422  18.57523  2.239188  5.197018  2.466801 
 Table 6: Price of the 2012 Bond (02/11/2009-30/12/2011) 
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Overall, the six markets seem to be hinting at a changing underlying trend in the behaviour 
of market participants, which is inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis.  In 
general, the prices seem to be reacting to the financial and sovereign debt crises as 
illustrated by Figure 1 to Figure 6.  Not surprisingly, Table 3 is hinting at problems 
regarding the Greek and Portuguese market with both the standard deviation and minimum 
illustrating the issues underpinning these markets.  However, the mean statistics are above 
the par value meaning demand for all these markets was generally high.  This could be an 
indication that it was only during the sovereign debt crisis that demand fell in the Greek 
and Portuguese markets.  However, remember an influencing factor in the pricing of bonds 
is that prices tend to move towards the par value as maturity approaches.  Since the 
sovereign debt crisis occurred during the last part of these bonds lives, this could explain 
the fall in prices for the other four markets, especially the German and US markets. 
Analysing Figure 2 to Figure 6 and statistics from Table 4 illustrates a certain similarity in 
the pattern of the prices between the five Eurozone 2012 bonds during the pre-crisis period, 
which seem to be hinting at an integrated market.  Of course, this is a key policy in the 
introduction of the euro.  The advantage of having such an integrated market is that market 
participants can invest in any market and the risks and returns are broadly similar.  Given 
the Eurozone countries, fixed the coupon rate, this is not surprising.  However, close 
inspections of the US market seem to be suggesting that integration in the global financial 
market was not as strong as in the Eurozone.  As expected since the US and Eurozone 
markets are governed by different information.  The introduction of the euro had a different 
impact on the US market.  The problem is, as highlighted earlier, integration is not 
compatible with the random walk theory and hence the efficient market hypothesis. 
According to Figure 2 to Figure 6, the prices of the Eurozone markets remained above the 
par value during the asset price bubble.  This seems to be indicating that market participants 
in the Eurozone did not swap these “high quality” assets to high returns assets like CDOs 
or MBSs.  Part of the reason for this was the high coupon rate in the Eurozone in 
comparison with the US.  However, as illustrated by Figure 1, the US market did fall below 
the par value pointing towards a lack of demand in the market at the height of the asset 
price bubble.  As expected since the asset price bubble initiated in the US housing market, 
and even though the housing market bubble burst long before the asset price bubble 
collapsed, market participants were investing in mortgage-backed securities as a 
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consequence of the low rate of interests offered by high quality assets like US Treasuries.  
This leads to the bubble effecting the market, which is not consistent with the efficient 
market hypothesis.   
Another factor highlighted by figures Figure 1 to Figure 6 is that market participants seem 
to be reacting to events and not just fundamental information during the pre-crisis period.  
In essence news and information regarding other market and while these sources are forms 
of information, the fundamental issue is that it is the reaction of market participants and 
not the fundamental information that is driving the price.  This is the key explanation in 
some of the price changes in the markets illustrated by all the figures, especially in the US 
market, in the pre-crisis period.  There were a number of highly reactive events, examples 
are: 
• The “war on terror” with the Afghanistan and Iraq wars 
• The asset price bubble backed by the housing market bubble in the US 
• Introduction of the Euro 
The statistics in Table 4 are interesting in that not only do they illustrate the uniformity of 
the prices and risks in the Eurozone during the pre-crisis period.  The statistics also 
illustrate the interest of market participants in the GIPS nations bonds with the average 
prices similar to the German market and higher than the US market.  And the key factor is 
the highest price of the Greek and Portuguse markets which seem to suggst a high demand 
for these bonds.  However, the standard deviation, a key risk indicator seem to be 
suggesting that during the pre-crisis period the German market had the lowest risk factor.  
However, perhaps not surprisingly given the events duiring the pre-crisis period,  the US 
market had the highest risk factor.  This is illustrated by the movement of the price in the 
early stages of the pre-crisis period in Figure 1. 
As illustrated by appendix A1 and Figure 1 to Figure 6, flights to the sovereign debt market 
from market participants reacting to events in other markets (i.e. stock, corporate debt and 
asset-backed securities) drove the financial crisis period.  The asymmetrical information 
available on the financial assets compounded the problem, which were at the heart of the 
financial crisis (e.g. CDOs and MBSs).  This led market participants to assume the worst-
case scenario and fly from shares and debt issued by financial institutions to the safety of 
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sovereign debt markets.  This is reflected by the high statistics in Table 5, which illustrates 
the flight to the US market with a higher average and maximum, mainly due to the intensity 
of the financial crisis in the US.  Another issue is the response of the policy makers (i.e. 
Federal Reserve, ECB and central governments) during the crisis, which added to the 
confusions.   
However, Table 5 seems to be hinting at a decrease in the standard deviation and hence the 
risk factor in the sovereign debt market across all observed 2012 bonds.  The main factor 
is the low levels of the standard deviations for the Greek and Portuguese markets; this is 
mainly due to the low trading volume in these two markets.  Unlike the German and US 
markets that are high volume markets and under certain market conditions, like the ones 
during the financial crisis, market participants usual go to risk free liquid assets similar to 
the German and US markets.   
Another possible explanation for the behaviour of prices illustrated by the financial crisis 
period is that some market participants were short selling in order to survive, thus following 
the old Wall Street saying: “If you can’t sell what you want to sell, sell what you can sell”.  
This goes to the heart of the financial crisis because market participants were unable to sell 
these asset backed securities and forced to sell saleable assets, which could inevitably 
means sovereign debts.  Therein lays the problem if distressed market participants were 
selling these high quality liquid financial assets in order to survive then the market must 
have been facing huge systemic risks.  Moreover, these types of risks cannot be overcome 
using regular monetary policies, hence the introduction of the “non-standard” monetary 
policies such as quantitative easing by central banks.  This resulted in a distorted market 
because central banks like the Federal Reserve poured trillions of new money into the 
global financial market; keeping the prices artificially high.  This leads to a key question: 
were the markets efficient/inefficient due to the distorting of the price by the non-standard 
monetary policies? 
As stated previously, an influencing factor ia the price of any “plain valinlla” type bond 
tends towards the par value as it approaches maturity.  This is important due to the  timing 
of the sovereign debt crisis coming towards the maturity of these bonds.  The downwards 
trend in the price, as illustrated by figuresFigure 1 toFigure 6, could be influenced by the 
maturity effect, especially the US, German, Italian and Spanish markets.  This is evidence 
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in Table 6 with all four markets having minimums approaching the par value and 
unsurprisingly, the minimum price of the German bond which matures on 30/12/2012 was 
at par value.  Although the standard deviations of the Italian and Spanish markets did 
increase slightly from their levels during the financial crisis period, the evidence does not 
illustrate the true impact from the sovereign debt crisis.  However, on close inspection of 
figures Figure 4 andFigure 6, there is limited evidence of the impact of the sovereign debt 
crisis on the Italian and Spanish bonds.   
However, the key to the early stages of the sovereign debt crisis is the impact on the Greek 
and Portuguese markets.  Certainly these two markets were at the centre of the sovereign 
debt crisis in the early stages.  However, there is a diifferent in the impact on the two 
markets.  As illustrated by Figure 3,  in the aftermath of the Greek budget deficit revision 
the Greek market dipped below the par value for the first time since the initial stages of 
our observations.  This led to a short spell of recovery to over the par value.  As the crisis 
heated by the political indecision, the market participants became increasingly risk averse 
and the price of the Greek 2012 bond fell to a mininum of 34.50.  The problem was that 
the rescue plan meant the market participants would to take a hit.  Thus igniting a 
downwards trending spiral which dictates that when mmarket participants are faced with 
huge risks they tend to sell the asset, this increases the risk aversions further and hence the 
price keeps going down i.e. increases in risk aversion leads to decrease in the price.  The 
issue is that the political indecision within the Eurozone heightened the Greek problem  
and led to the spiral. 
The market participants reaction led to a loss of trust in the GIPS markets, this led to the 
domino or contagion effect as the crisis envoloped the Portuguese market.  However, as 
highlighted by Figure 5, the crisis did not impacted the Portuguese market as strongly as 
the Greek market.  This is mainly because the Portuguese economic issues were not as 
deep rooted as the Greek.  The second reason was the quick action by the IMF and 
European Community to the Portuguese crisis.  This means the price of these two bonds 
were reacting to the political environment and accounting for macroeconomic 
fundamentals during the crisis.  In short this raises an interestng question, does the fact that 
the price of these bonds seem to be incorporating the information immediately mean they 
were efficient during the sovereign debt crisis?  
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Figure 7: US 2017 Price 
 
Figure 8: German 2017 Price 
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Figure 9: Italian 2017 Price 
 
Figure 10: Portuguese 2017 Price 
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Figure 11: Spanish 2017 Price 
 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
 Mean  112.1776  106.4866  99.70470  90.12671  97.80271 
 Median  112.8281  106.4195  99.88400  97.39400  97.43350 
 Maximum  120.1719  115.8950  106.2640  106.4790  103.6990 
 Minimum  95.70313  93.08200  85.26000  43.96000  85.74000 
 Std. Dev.  5.464889  6.405270  4.041322  15.31369  3.343679 
Table 7: Price of the 2017 Bond (02/07/2007-29/03/2013) 
 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
 Mean  107.7516  100.2182  98.32063  100.3050  97.84217 
 Median  107.5938  98.91050  97.80950  100.0090  97.25700 
 Maximum  120.1719  106.9890  104.5770  106.1740  103.5240 
 Minimum  95.70313  93.08200  92.55500  95.06900  92.10600 
 Std. Dev.  5.042972  4.124867  3.020674  2.525288  2.903542 
Table 8: Price of the 2017 Bond (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
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 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
 Mean  115.2112  110.7829  100.6533  83.15055  97.77567 
 Median  116.2344  111.7225  101.1400  88.59850  97.53750 
 Maximum  119.6875  115.8950  106.2640  106.4790  103.6990 
 Minimum  107.7500  103.9150  85.26000  43.96000  85.74000 
 Std. Dev.  3.206333  3.476175  4.367258  16.46953  3.615878 
Table 9: Price of the 2017 Bond (02/11/2009-29/03/2013) 
In general, Figure 7 to Figure 11 and Table 7  illustrates the diverse impact of both crises 
on the observed markets.  This demonstrates the changing behaviour of market participants 
during a highly volatile period full of conflicting information.  It would seem that the early 
stages of the financial crisis did not have a significant impact on the Eurozone markets as 
it did on the US.  However, in general the sovereign debt crisis had a greater impact on the 
IPS12 markets.   
A key different between the 2012 and 2017 bonds is the maturity effect, which had a large 
impacted on the effect of the sovereign debt crisis in the 2012 bonds.  However, this 
introduced the “on-the-run” effect, which is likely to have affected the price during the 
financial crisis.  Another factor is the Eurozone markets do tend to exhibit some co-
movement in the 2017 bond prices hinting at an integrated Eurozone market during the 
financial crisis.  Conversely, the sovereign debt crisis period seems to suggest that in the 
aftermath of the initial Greek crisis, the Eurozone markets were beginning to disintegrate.   
Analysing Table 8 highlights the main issue in the global financial market during the crises, 
the wide dispersion and movement of the prices.  In particular the US and German markets 
with a minimum of below 96 and maximum of above 115 illustrating the increasing 
demand for these bonds during the crises.  However, regarded as high quality low risk 
assets these bonds were at the centre of a flight to safety during both crises were.  
Interestingly the German market only went above 100 in late 2008 acknowledging that 
demand was not high during the early parts of the financial crisis. However, the demand 
for the US market was high during both crises, backed by the higher statistics for the US 
                                                 
12 IPS refers to Italy, Portugal and Spain 
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market in Table 8.  A possible explanation is that the early stages of the financial crisis had 
a bigger effect on the US financial market than the Eurozone; hence, Figure 8 to Figure 11 
illustrating the price remained below 100 for much of the early stages of the financial crisis.   
Interestingly, the statistics of the IPS markets in Table 8 hints at the Portuguese market 
performing better than the other observed markets.  A possible explanation might be the 
size of the banking sector in Portugal, which means the government did not have to spend 
massive amounts bailing out the banking sector.  However, as a percentage of GDP, it had 
a bigger impact on the economy.  In reality, the financial crisis did not initially affect either 
Italy or Spain.  A key factor according to the statistics from Eurostat, obtained on 17th 
March 2014, is the financial crisis did not directly influence the three IPS economies until 
late 2008 or early 2009.  However, the Spanish economy suffered heavily when the crisis 
did hit with a total recapitalization cost of 13.67% of the debt as of 2008.  Although the 
statistics revealed that the financial crisis did not affect the Italian economy, yet they reveal 
that the Italian economy was in stagnation long before the financial crisis.  In a way, all the 
IPS nations had structural weaknesses in their economy long before the financial crisis, as 
indeed to a certain extent did the US according to the statistics obtained from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St Louis on 17th March 2014. 
As illustrated by Figure 7 to Figure 11 and Table 9, the sovereign debt crisis had a different 
impact on the IPS markets than both the US and German markets pointing to a flight to 
safety.  The key statistics are the minimum values with the Portuguese market falling to 
43.96 while the Italian and Spanish markets falling below 86, thus hinting at a crash in 
demand at the height of the crisis.  It is notable that the minimum values of the US and 
German markets remained above 100.00 for the duration of the sovereign debt crisis 
period, backed by the other statistics in Table 9, which seem to be hinting at market 
participants reacting to events.  Note the rise and fall in the standard deviation for the IPS 
markets and US/German markets respectively; this is a sign of a hiked in the risk factors 
of the IPS markets.  However, on close analysis of Figure 7 and Figure 8, both the US and 
German markets seem to have suffered a dip in the price during the early parts of the height 
of the sovereign debt crisis.  The timing of the dips of both set of observed prices provides 
a clue.  In the aftermath of the initial stages of the sovereign debt crisis, as flights to safety 
ensued with market participant overreacting this hiked up the prices of both markets.  This 
resulted in a downwards trend to correct the overpricing.  However, in the background 
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there were a few issues regarding these two markets: the size of the US debt was causing 
a few political and fiscal issues, which initiated the so-called fiscal cliff and debt ceiling 
crises.  The Eurozone crisis was giving rise to uncertainties about the future of the euro, 
which affected the German market.   
In concluding, both the 2012 and 2017 group of bonds seem to be illustrating a change in 
the behaviour of the prices during both crises.  It would seem to be the case that the market 
participants’ reaction to events is influencing the pricing of these assets.  However, this 
could results in efficient markets because of the immediate pricing of information.  The 
problem is can markets overreact and still be efficient? 
4.2.2 Test for Normality  
A normal distribution has a Jarque-Bera statistic of zero, this means that the skewness and 
excess kurtosis must be zero given the equation 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽 = 𝑐𝑐
6
�𝑆𝑆2 + 1
4
(𝐾𝐾 − 3)2�  as proposed by 
Jarque & Bera (1980) where S is the skewness and K is the kurtosis.  Hence, any deviation 
from the normal distribution in the price or price variance would mean the use of an 
alternative distribution in the estimation of the models.  The skewness can be negative 
where the left tail of the distribution is longer or positive where the right tail is longer.  A 
positive excess kurtosis means the distribution is a leptokurtosis hinting at a tall distribution 
while a negative kurtosis is a platykurtic distribution hinting at a flat distribution.   
 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
 Skewness  0.006672  0.114097 -3.155935  0.310764 -0.897185  0.247762 
 Kurtosis  2.229327  2.518666  14.25744  2.686866  4.263747  2.622968 
 Jarque-Bera  61.39190  29.32134  17212.21  50.04944  497.7379  40.06204 
Table 10: Price of the 2012 Bond (01/07/2002-30/12/2011) 
 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
 Skewness -0.682903 -0.365043 -0.428285 -1.133068 -0.193150 
 Kurtosis  2.740363  1.977850  2.784800  2.875984  2.396806 
 Jarque-Bera  120.8022  98.61347  48.75138  321.9222  32.06686 
Table 11: Price of the 2017 Bond (02/07/2007-29/03/2013) 
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As illustrated by both Table 10 and Table 11, the Jarque-Bera statistics seem to be hinting 
at non-normal distribution for the prices of the 2012 and 2017 bonds.  The statistics for 
both the Greek and Portuguese 2012 bonds hint at a negatively skewed leptokurtosis 
distribution.  Both markets seem to be suggesting that the crisis had a significant impact 
on the distribution of the prices.  However, the Greek market seems to be significantly 
rejecting normality.  This is due to the impact of the sovereign debt crisis on the prices, 
which caused a dramatic fall in the prices over a short period; a potential reason to explain 
the Portuguese market as well; however, the different is that the Portuguese market 
recovered some of the losses.  This means that the Portuguese market does not reject the 
normality as significantly as the Greek market.  Interestingly, the remaining 2012 bonds 
have a positive skew with a platykurtic distribution.  With regard to the 2017 bonds as 
illustrated by Table 11, all the markets seem to be suggesting a negatively skewed 
platykurtic distribution.  An interesting point is the increase in the Jarque-Bera statistic for 
the US and German market, this can be traced to the use of these two markets as safe 
havens in flights to safety episodes during both crises  
 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
 Skewness  3.640635  3.286359  7.39\9076  3.283223  5.935009  2.899094 
 Kurtosis  20.06116  19.00135  66.76459  18.68907  45.61009  15.65636 
 Jarque-Bera 35298.93  30697.44  439560.1  29673.78  200706.0  19880.89 
Table 12: Price Variance of the 2012 Bond (01/07/2002-30/12/2011) 
 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
 Skewness  4.599066  2.154140  2.902400  2.578960  2.906014 
 Kurtosis  31.82785  10.44338  11.81393  10.07871  12.86350 
 Jarque-Bera  56503.28  4564.272  6873.136  4733.786  8088.004 
Table 13: Price Variance of the 2017 Bond (02/07/2007-29/03/2013) 
The statistics given by both Table 12 and Table 13 are significantly rejecting normality 
with low Jarque Bera statistics of 19,880.89 and 4,564.2 for the 2012 and 2017 bonds 
respectively.  The skewness and kurtosis statistics for all the bonds point to a significantly 
leptokurtosis distribution with a large positive skew.  The statistics from Table 12 highlight 
the impact of the sovereign debt crisis on the distribution of the price variance from the 
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Greek and Portuguese markets.  This is mainly because of the hike in the price variance 
towards the end of the observations, which meant that the tail is sparsely populated.  This 
could occur during a highly volatile period, which has the properties of a sudden jump in 
the price variance to significantly high levels.  This is exactly what happened to the Greek 
and Portuguese 2012 bonds during the sovereign debt crisis.   
4.2.3  Test for Structural Breaks 
In many ways, the existence of structural breaks could have huge implications on any test 
or model due to the sudden and/or dramatic change in the observed market.  Hence, testing 
for the existence of breakpoints is essential, especially in a highly volatile environment as 
the past few years have been.  Chow (1960) introduced a framework, which tested changes 
given a priori known date using the F–statistics.  The problem was the requirement of priori 
knowledge of the break dates.  Quandt (1960) modified the Chow test to include unknown 
priori knowledge of the break date; Andrews (1993) derived the Quandt-Andrews test by 
extending the Quandt test.  The work of Bai (1997) and Bai & Perron (1998, 2003) 
extended the Quandt-Andrews test to include the detection of multiple unknown structural 
break dates.  We use the Bai & Perron (1998) Global L Breaks vs None test to identify a 
maximum of five break dates.  The test is a generalization of the Quandt-Andrews test, 
which allows for the identification of multiple break points.  For a more detailed overview 
of tests and models for multiple structural breaks, we refer you to Perron (2006). 
The Bai & Perron (1998) framework is essentially a repeated test of the observed market 
for the null of no further breakpoints up to a maximum number of breakpoints.  In common 
with all the previous tests for structural breaks, estimating an F-statistics for each 
breakpoint found.  The influencing factor is the critical value of each breakpoint found.  
We opt to use a maximum number of five breakpoints and report the scaled f-statistics. 
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Breaks Critical Value  
US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
1 11.47 23.95092 21.57173 13.57966 19.32178 15.06113 16.68173 
 2 9.75 18.10369 15.28463 12.63913 15.12658 13.28180 13.45311 
 3 8.36 13.78504 13.65211 8.983000 11.91132 11.62424 11.12479 
 4 7.19 12.96966 14.09152 7.121384 11.88558 10.46655 11.76886 
 5 5.85 10.18131 11.12317 5.568225 9.660592 8.495753 9.280339 
Table 14: 2012 Price Structural Breaks Statistics 
Breaks US German Greek Italian  Portuguese Spanish 
1 25/03/2004 22/04/2004  22/09/2005 29/07/2004 29/07/2004 22/04/2004 
 2 06/09/2005 23/09/2005  12/02/2008 09/01/2006 18/01/2006 23/09/2005 
 3  13/07/2007  15/03/2007  19/05/2010 09/07/2007 09/07/2007 15/03/2007 
 4  17/12/2008  23/09/2008 No Break 15/12/2008 10/12/2008 23/09/2008 
 5  21/05/2010  26/02/2010 No Break 19/05/2010 13/05/2010 19/04/2010 
Table 15: 2012 Price Structural Break Dates 
Breaks Critical Value  
US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
1 11.47 8.976054 17.10608 16.56933 35.03087 4.440264 
 2 9.75 8.979260 15.96320 12.61822 22.96561 8.681674 
 3 8.36 8.301646 15.55006 10.98181 16.87322 8.779958 
 4 7.19 6.847645 12.89369 9.715446 13.99067 6.861368 
 5 5.85 6.286869 10.04540 5.465509 11.33912 4.178000 
Table 16: 2017 Price Structural Breaks Statistics 
  
 118 
 
 
Breaks US German Italian  Portuguese Spanish 
1 No break 16/10/2008 05/11/2008 24/07/2008 No Break 
 2 No Break 16/10/2009 11/09/2009 12/06/2009 No Break 
 3 No Break  26/08/2010 28/07/2010 12/05/2010 No Break 
 4 No Break  06/07/2011 30/11/2011 22/03/2011 No Break 
 5 No Break  17/05/2012 No Break 31/01/2012 No Break 
Table 17: 2017 Price Structural Break Dates 
As illustrated by Table 14 to Table 17, the statistics seem to be hinting at the existence of 
five break points in all the markets for the 2012 bonds with the exception of the Greek 
market.  Interestingly, the evidence from Table 15 seem to be pointing at the acceptance 
of the null hypothesis of no further breaks during the sovereign debt crisis for the Greek 
2012 bond.  Yet in general, the evidence from the other 2012 bonds seems to be hinting at 
a break point before the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007.  The evidence also seem 
to be hinting at two break points during the financial and sovereign debt crisis hinting at a 
change in the market participants attitudes towards all the markets.  However, this does not 
lend itself to a change between the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, the evidence also 
suggest the existence of two structural breaks before 2007.  This hints at a change in the 
market structure during the “bubble” period.  Not surprisingly, with the exception of the 
Greek 2012 bond, the evidence is pointing at a break point in the aftermath of the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy.  However, there seem to be a delayed reaction to the initial stage of 
the sovereign debt crisis.   
Interestingly, Table 16 and Table 17 hint at the non-existence of structural breaks in both 
the US and Spanish markets.  The evidence also seems to be pointing at only four structural 
breaks in the Italian market.  Analysing the evidence for the German, Italian and 
Portuguese markets, there seem to be a similar trend of a break in each year.  This hints at 
a very volatile market in general with a high number of breaks during the sovereign debt 
crisis. 
The existence of breaks in the datasets means that we have to be very careful in analysing 
and interpreting the results.  As section 4.2.5 on the analysis of stationarity in the datasets 
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will demonstrate, there is a need to include structural breaks in any test of the dataset.  
Hence, omitting structural breaks in any test can lead to wrong conclusions.   
4.2.4 Variance Ratio Test of the Random Walk Model 
The interesting findings of the previous outcomes leads to a key question: could rational 
arbitrageurs take advantage of market conditions to make excess returns on the market? 
However, as Fama (1965) and Malkiel (2003) state an influencing factor is the efficient 
market hypothesis dictates that the price in the short run should follow a random walk 
model.  As Fama (1970) hints this means that prices are unpredictable in the short run.  
However, as pointed by Malkiel (2005) in the long run prices are partially predictable.  
Although the random walk model dictates that arbitrage opportunities do not exists for 
long.  However, as Fama (1965) indicates a key assumption of the efficient market 
hypothesis is the existence of well-informed wealthy rational arbitrageurs who push the 
prices back towards the fundamental value.  Nevertheless, as Abreu & Brunnermeier 
(2003) argue these rational arbitrageurs sometimes take advantage of the circumstances.  
Hence, market prices may not be random, if rational arbitrageurs could benefit from 
circumstances. 
In order to test if the market does follow a random walk model and is unpredictable, we 
use the variance ratio test proposed by Lo & MacKinlay (1988).  The variance ratio test is 
in essence a test of whether the distribution of the residuals in our sovereign debt markets 
follows a random walk model.  We use the multiple comparison test by Chow & Denning 
(1993) which essentially states that if the optimal z-statistics is significantly greater than 
one then we reject the null hypothesis of a random walk model in the observed sovereign 
debt market. 
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 01/07/2002 – 30/12/2011 
01/07/2002 – 
29/06/2007  
02/07/2007- 
30/10/2009 
02/11/2009- 
30/12/2011 
US 3.194503 1.654971 3.105259 2.136958 
German 1.602747 0.983499 1.045396 3.733599 
Greek 3.787044 0.867388 2.740936 1.763757 
Italian 1.618343 0.762173 1.176205 3.832282 
Portuguese 7.122426 1.236545 1.592191 5.700823 
Spanish 2.232194 0.744564 0.690423 4.669596 
Table 18: 2012 Price Variance Ratio Test of Random Walk Hypothesis  
 02/07/2007 – 29/03/2013 
02/07/2007- 
30/10/2009 
02/11/2009- 
29/03/2011 
US 3.399660 2.330855 1.898576 
German 2.608126 2.215527 1.220798 
Italian 6.512701 2.685879 5.495046 
Portuguese 9.934657 2.623884 8.094835 
Spanish 7.272041 1.208776 6.837078 
Table 19: 2017 Price Variance Ratio Test of Random Walk Hypothesis  
Table 18 and Table 19 illustrate the results and analysis of the Lo & MacKinlay (1988) 
variance ratio test of the random walk hypothesis for the price in the observed samples and 
subsamples.  The evidence is relatively conclusive in rejecting the null hypothesis of the 
existence of random walk in the markets.  Of cause the key word is relatively, there are 
arguably six subsample exceptions as listed below: 
• German 2012 subsample from 1st July 2002 to 29th June 2007 
• Greek 2012 subsample from 1st July 2002 to 29th June 2007 
• Italian 2012 subsample from 1st July 2002 to 29th June 2007 
• Spanish 2012 subsample from 1st July 2002 to 29th June 2007 
• German 2012 subsample from 2nd July 2007 to 30th October 2009 
• Spanish 2012 subsample from 2nd July 2007 to 30th October 2009 
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The evidence from Table 18 seem to be hinting that during the pre-crises period of 1st July 
2002 to 29th June 2007 with the exception of the Portuguese market,  the Eurozone markets 
all accepted the random walk hypothesis.  Therefore, giving rise to the question: does a 
crisis such as the recent financial and sovereign debt crises make the financial markets 
reject the random walk hypothesis? The evidence from the Spanish and to a certain extent 
German markets during the financial crisis period (i.e. 002/07/2007 – 30/10/2009) seem to 
be suggesting that is not the case.  The answer may lay in the reaction of the market 
participants to the events and information, a key factor in these two markets was the 
delayed impact of the financial crisis on their financial sector.  Remember these 2012 bonds 
were in the middle of their lives.  Hence, these two factors meant the German and Spanish 
markets gave the impression that the financial crisis did not influence them, mainly because 
of the continued economic and financial upturn during the early stages of the financial 
crisis.  Another key issue is does a market reject the random walk hypothesis even if there 
are periods of random walk.  The key is in the sample and subsample notation, the German 
and Spanish markets accept the random walk hypothesis in two subsamples; however, the 
whole sample rejects the random walk hypothesis.  Given that the weight of influence is 
with the sample then, we reject the random walk hypothesis.  Of course, in our case, if all 
the subsamples were to accept the random walk hypothesis then the outcome would have 
been different.   
The evidence from Table 19 seems to be backing our previous observation from Table 18 
that in general the market did change in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  All the 2017 
bonds seem to be rejecting the random walk hypothesis, remember that the issuance of the 
2017 bonds was just before the financial crisis.  So in essence, this seems to be suggesting 
that the markets do follow a pattern during a period of crisis.   
In concluding, the fact that four of the six 2012 bonds accepted the random walk hypothesis 
during the pre-crisis period means that the financial market can be random during “stable” 
times.  However, an interesting factor is that a crisis can change the behaviour of the 
financial market.  Conversely, although this means that there is a pattern during a crisis 
period, yet it does not mean that arbitrage opportunities exist regularly. 
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4.2.5 Stationarity Tests 
In essence, although GARCH models should be able to model the conditional variance 
using any observed markets; yet to be able to model the optimal conditional variance the 
data need to be stationary.  The test we chose to use is the augmented Dickey-Fuller or 
ADF test of stationarity as proposed by Dickey & Fuller (1979, 1981).  The key to 
understanding the ADF tests is in the test statistics, which must be lower than the test 
critical value at the chosen confidence level, which in our case is the 5% level.  Under most 
circumstances, the prices are likely to be non-stationary at level order difference; hence, 
the prices tend to be differentiated to first and in some cases second order.  However, as 
stated earlier we also use a 20-lag variance of the prices, hence these tend to be stationary 
at the level order. 
As illustrated in section 4.2.3, the markets do have structural break issues.  Therefore, the 
ADF test may not accurately reflect the stationarity of the markets.  In such cases, it is 
essential to test for the existence of stationarity in markets with one or more breakpoints in 
the structure.  We use the Lumsdaine-Papell test proposed by Lumsdaine & Papell (1997), 
which generalised the ADF test to account for two or more breakpoints at unknown dates.  
We restrict the breakpoint(s) in the test to occur in the trend.  Due to the amount of 
computing power required to run any test with more than two breakpoints, we restrict the 
tests to just two breakpoints.  It is worth remembering that the number of iterations of the 
unit root test required goes up exponentially with the number of breaks, so in a dataset with 
more than 1,400 observations as we have it is likely that we will have millions of iterations.  
One key point worth noting is that we use Estima RATS 8.3 to estimate both tests. 
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Critical 
Value 
5% Level 
Level 
Order 
1st Order 
US -2.866437 1.263962 -24.65435 
German -2.862506 -1.742036 -48.22283 
 Greek -2.862512 4.935023 -15.07865 
 Italian -2.862506 -1.996735 -48.20681 
Portuguese -2.862507 -1.744868 -29.79928 
Spanish -2.862506 -2.414818 -47.61661 
Table 20: 2012 Price ADF Unit Root Test Statistics 
 Critical Value 5% Level 
Level 
Order 
1st Order 
US -2.863265 -2.772514 -31.16835 
German -2.863262 -1.588765 -36.20650 
 Italian -2.863266 -2.325404 -24.30151 
Portuguese -2.863264 -1.269721 -29.80293 
Spanish -2.863264 -3.307542  
Table 21: 2017 Price ADF Unit Root Test Statistics 
 Critical Value 5% Level 
Level 
Order 
US -2.862516 -7.736530 
German -2.862525 -4.468008 
 Greek -2.862526 -4.985577 
 Italian -2.862525 -4.636672 
Portuguese -2.862525 -6.259515 
Spanish -2.862515 -11.07297 
Table 22: 2012 Price Variance ADF Unit Root Test Statistics 
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 Critical Value 5% Level 
Level Order 
US -2.863301 -4.876033 
German -2.863288 -9.479041 
 Italian -2.863291 -7.136924 
Portuguese -2.863299 -5.367470 
Spanish -2.863290 -7.135752 
Table 23: 2017 Price Variance ADF Unit Root Test Statistics 
Tables Table 20 to Table 23 illustrate the results from the ADF test of stationarity in the 
prices and price variances of the observed 2012 and 2017 government bonds.  As expected, 
the results seem to be different with tables Table 22 and Table 23 hinting at the price 
variances accepting the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at level order for the 5% critical 
level.  While with the exception of the Spanish 2017 dataset, the prices seem to be hinting 
at the acceptance of the null hypothesis at the first order level.  The Spanish 2012 prices 
seem to be indicating an acceptance of the null hypothesis at the level order.   
 
Critical 
 Value 
5% Level 
Level 
Order 
1st Order Break 
Date 1 
Break 
Date 2 
US -6.62 -5.68 -17.25 08/06/2006 19/10/2007 
German -6.62 -3.03 -17.35 28/12/2006 07/10/2008 
 Greek -6.62 -3.21 -16.46 03/03/2006 03/08/2010 
 Italian -6.62 -3.17 -17.54 04/04/2006 05/01/2009 
Portuguese -6.62 -3.76 -17.08 05/03/2009 03/08/2010 
Spanish -6.62 -3.21 -17.37 28/12/2006 23/10/2008 
Table 24: 2012 Price Lumsdaine-Papell Unit Root Test Statistics 
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Critical 
 Value 
5% Level 
Level 
Order 
1st Order Break 
Date 1 
Break 
Date 2 
US -6.62 -3.45 -14.75 27/05/2009 07/05/2010 
German -6.62 -2.94 -15.98 29/10/2010 05/09/2011 
 Italian -6.62 -4.38 -16.20 03/08/2009 26/11/2010 
Portuguese -6.62 -5.97 -13.57 07/07/2011 24/05/2012 
Spanish -6.62 -4.11 -15.96 13/11/2008 19/11/2010 
Table 25: 2017 Price Lumsdaine-Papell Unit Root Test Statistics 
 
Critical 
Value 
5% Level 
Level 
Order 
Break 
Date 1 
Break 
Date 2 
US -6.62 -10.88 10/01/2006 16/01/2008 
German -6.62 -13.15 19/11/2004 08/08/2008 
 Greek -6.62 -11.26 16/02/2009 03/08/2010 
 Italian -6.62 -12.87 31/12/2004 01/08/2008 
Portuguese -6.62 -8/19 31/12/2004 21/05/2009 
Spanish -6.62 -12.23 02/11/2004 08/06/2010 
Table 26: 2012 Price Variance Lumsdaine-Papell Unit Root Test Statistics 
 
Critical 
Value 
5% Level 
Level 
Order 
Break 
Date 1 
Break 
Date 2 
US -6.62 -14.75 27/05/2009 07/05/2010 
German -6.62 -15.98 29/10/2010 05/09/2011 
 Italian -6.62 -16.20 03/08/2009 26/11/2010 
Portuguese -6.62 -13.57 07/07/2011 24/05/2012 
Spanish -6.62 -15.96 13/11/2008 19/11/2010 
Table 27: 2017 Price Variance Lumsdaine-Papell Unit Root Test Statistics 
As with the ADF test, tables Table 24 to Table 27 illustrate the different results between 
the prices and price variances with respect to the Lumsdaine-Papell test of stationarity.  
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With the exception of the prices from the Spanish 2017 bond, the results seem to be 
confirming the ADF tests of first and level order acceptance of the null hypothesis in the 
prices and price variances respectively.  Accounting for non-stationarity in the prices 
means there is a significant different between the resulting break dates of the Bai-Perron 
(see section 4.2.3) and Lumsdaine-Papell structural breaks tests.  The only possible 
exception is the German 2012, which recorded a 14 days different.  Although using the 
Lumsdaine-Papell test, we did managed to find two break dates in the US and Spanish 
markets which previously resulted in no break points using the Bai-Perron test. 
In concluding, with the exception of the prices for the Spanish 2017 bond, both tests 
yielded similar results.  This means that the structural breaks do not have any impact on 
the tests in our case.  However, in accounting for non-stationarity, the structural break test 
did result in a significantly different set of result than the Bai-Perron test hinting at non-
stationarity having an impact on the structural breaks.   
4.3  Testing the Sovereign Debt Market for the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Since the influencing assumption of the efficient market hypothesis is that prices must 
reflect the relevant information efficiently, thus excess volatility points at inefficient 
markets as hinted by Fama (1970) and Bollerslev & Hodrick (1992).  Therefore, in testing 
for the efficient market hypothesis, we derive a test based on the volatility or variance 
bound test of Shiller (1979, 1981a).  As illustrated by the model specification of the test in 
section 3.1 of the methodology, Shiller does not dictate which model to use as the basis of 
the volatility test. 
We follow Shiller’s two basis pre-requisites by using a lagged variance system and a first 
order lagged autoregressive model to estimate the residuals.  In general, the summary of 
the results and tests of the estimated autoregression model hint at high serial correlations13 
and ARCH effects14 with a non-normal distributed15 residuals.  However, the high R2 and 
adjusted R2 for our observed markets seem to hint at both the lagged price variances and 
                                                 
 
13 Using the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test proposed by Breusch (1979) and Godfrey (1978) 
 
14 Using the ARCH LM test proposed by Engle (1982) 
 
15 Using the Jarque-Bera test  proposed by Jarque & Bera (1980) 
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autoregressive model being highly able to explain the movement in the price variance 
throughout our observed markets. 
As illustrated by the model specification in section 3.1 of the methodology, we opt to use 
the GARCH family of models as the basis of our tests in order to account for the ARCH 
effects.  The GARCH models allow us to test for excess volatility in the price variance 
from our observed markets.  We opt to use the GARCH (1, 1) and single asymmetrical 
order GJR-GARCH (1, 1) models to compare our results. 
As noted by Alexander (2008, p. 137) and Engle & Patton (2001), there is a story within 
any member of the GARCH family of volatility models influenced by the coefficients in 
the variance equation.  This means the reaction and mean reversion of the market shocks 
to volatility, naturally interpreted by the two key coefficients in equations 3.1.5 and 3.1.6 
in the methodology.  The α coefficient is a measure of the reaction of conditional volatility 
to market shocks, when α is relatively high (i.e. greater than 0.1) thus meaning volatility is 
very sensitive to market shocks.  The β coefficient is a measure of the persistence of the 
conditional volatility irrespective of market conditions and status, when β is relatively large 
(i.e. greater than 0.9) thus meaning volatility takes longer to recover after a crisis in the 
market.  However, due to the use of the variance of the price as the independent variable 
in the mean equation, we cannot use the true definition.  This means the use of the price 
variance had the impact of hiking the α coefficient leading to a massive increase in the 
volatility’s sensitivity to market shocks.  In contrast, the β coefficient decreased 
significantly leading to massive downgrade in the persistence of the volatility in the 
aftermath of a crisis in the market. 
As highlighted by section 3.1 of the methodology, the key to our variance bound test lies 
in the variance equation part of the GARCH model.  Remember equation 3.1.7 dictates 
that the basis of our EMH test is the coefficients of the GARCH and GJR-GARCH models 
and standard deviation of the price variance.  However, there is another important factor 
in section 4.3.2; by using the GJR-GARCH model, we could combine the EMH test results 
with the asymmetrical effect to see whether the asymmetrical effect has any impact on the 
efficiency of the market. 
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Four tests of the model are the basis of the statistical analysis.  The first is testing the 
goodness of the model using the R2 and adjusted R2.  The second is the normality test using 
the Jarque-Bera statistic proposed by Jarque & Bera (1980).  We then test for serial 
correlation using the Q-statistics of the correlogram as proposed by Ljung & Box (1979).  
The last type of test is for the heteroskedasticity, we opt for the ARCH LM test introduced 
by Engle (1982). 
4.3.1 Volatility Test of the EMH using GARCH 
As indicated by section 3.1 in the methodology, we implement the variance bound test to 
test the efficient market hypothesis in the sovereign debt market.  We use a GARCH (1, 1) 
in order to obtain the key variables for the test.  It is essential to remember that there are 
two parts for any GARCH model, the mean equation and variance equation: 
 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡) = 𝑣𝑣 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 
 ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝜔𝜔 + 𝛼𝛼 1𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽 1ℎ𝑡𝑡−1. 
 Our variance bound test uses the following equation: 
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ≤ 𝐹𝐹 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 
Where 
 F statistics = 1.96 
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = (𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽)−1
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐�𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥)� 
In essence, the key variables for the Shiller volatility test are the 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 coefficients in 
the variance equation of the GARCH model and the standard deviation of the price 
variance. 
Throughout the test, the model is a single lagged GARCH (1, 1) model with a Student t 
distribution estimated using the Maximum Likelihood method with a BHHH optimization 
algorithm where possible.  Although due to estimations errors in tables 34/35 for the Greek 
and Portuguese markets, we used a normal distribution with a Marquandt optimization 
algorithm. 
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Table 28 and Table 29 illustrate the statistical analysis and estimated models for the entire 
sample observation of the 2012 issued bonds.  This combines the impact on market 
efficiency from the three-subsample periods: pre-crisis, financial crisis and sovereign debt 
crisis.   
 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.987422  0.983304 0.987032 0.983508  0.987587  0.982010  
Adjusted R2 0.987412  0.983291 0.987022  0.983495  0.987577 0.981995 
Jarque-Bera  4324.66 5702.64 5545.99 26818.10 2561.71 9767.13 
Q-Statistics  (Correlogram) 611.65 730.76 803.94 651.94 745.49 692.07 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 2.216885 3.088917  3.473037 0.727817 2.030977 0.421659 
Table 28: 2012 Bond GARCH EMH Residuals Statistics (01/07/2002-30/12/2011) 
As illustrated by the estimated models in Table 28, a key factor to note is the high R2 and 
adjusted R2.  The R2 is above 0.98 through all the estimated GARCH models hinting at the 
lagged price variance with the estimated residuals being highly able to explain the 
movement in the price variance.  Another factor is the high adjusted R2 pointing at the 
estimated GARCH model being a good fit to the dependent variable across all the markets.  
These two statistics partly illustrates our GARCH model is correctly specified to test the 
null hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be efficient in all the markets.   
The Jarque-Bera test for all the markets seem to be hinting at an acceptance of the null 
hypothesis of non-normality in the distribution of the residuals.  We found all our markets 
seem to follow a leptokurtic distribution, which hints at the Student t distribution model.  
However, the Jarque-Bera statistics seem to be hinting at a varied set of results with the 
Italian and Spanish being significantly greater than the other markets.  Conversely, the 
Portuguese market is significantly lower than all the others are.  Under certain 
circumstances, we can consider the existence of non-normal residuals as an indicator for 
non-efficient markets. 
With regard to the serial correlation, the Q-statistics of the correlogram seem to be hinting 
at a high correlation.  At the single lagged level, the Q-statistic for all our markets does not 
drop below 611.65 as observed by the US.  Considering that, ideally the Q-statistics should 
be zero, the importance of these statistics for the estimated models highlighted in Table 28.  
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Hence, these statistics hint at a significant amount of serial correlation in the residuals.  The 
existence of autocorrelated residuals usually implies the omission of important variables 
from the regression.  In the current framework, the fact that other variables may be 
important to determine bond prices seems to be indicating inefficient markets. 
In essence, the test for the heteroskedasticity is a test for remaining ARCH effect in the 
residuals.  Therefore, the lower the F-statistic, the lower the remaining ARCH effect in the 
residuals.  The F-statistics seem to be wielding very widely between approaching no 
ARCH effect to a significant ARCH effect remaining.  In essence, the two lowest are the 
Italian and Spanish markets with F-statistics below one, thus meaning a significantly low 
ARCH effect remaining.  The highest is the Greek market hinting at a significant ARCH 
effect remaining. 
 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
 
0.004720 
(4.24E-05) 
 
0.001963 
(2.46E-05) 
 
0.015070 
(0.000256) 
 
0.002078 
(3.64E-05) 
 
0.005322 
(0.000151) 
 
0.002763 
(8.80E-05) 
b 0.981295 (0.000642) 
0.990089 
(0.000685) 
1.001164 
(0.000728) 
0.991657 
(0.000793) 
0.984827 
(0.000740) 
0.991356 
(0.000858) 
ϵ 0.714328 (0.006116) 
0.710886 
(0.006884) 
0.752249 
(0.006803) 
0.729164 
(0.006826) 
0.760523 
(0.006955) 
0.742471 
(0.007016) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
 
3.23E-08 
(9.73E-09) 
 
3.25E-08 
(8.60E-09) 
 
1.45E-05 
(1.83E-06) 
 
1.42E-07 
(3.62E-08) 
 
5.70E-06 
(7.77E-07) 
 
1.17E-06 
(1.95E-07) 
α  1.609716 (0.124186) 
1.68348 
(0.113878) 
1.673333 
(0.116096) 
1.861907 
(0.145773) 
1.780045 
(0.131446) 
1.803619 
(0.135187) 
β 0.282801 (0.015724) 
0.23705 
(0.014322) 
0.131313 
(0.013700) 
0.214033 
(0.013940) 
0.150484 
(0.013768) 
0.189778 
(0.014138) 
Statistics 
Log Likelihood 
 
7556.608 
 
8507.083 
 
5101.819 
 
8145.527 
 
6369.352 
 
7120.501 
Standard Deviation 0.560344 0.216199 5.963928 0.202834 0.806295 0.235362 
EMH Test 
EMH Test Statistics 
 
1.592802 
 
4.25779 
 
0.134919 
 
5.304535 
 
1.15408 
 
4.22072 
Efficiency Accept Reject Accept Reject Accept Reject 
Table 29: GARCH EMH Test Statistics of the 2012 Bond (01/07/2002-30/12/2011) 
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As illustrated by Table 29, the b coefficients and residuals, ϵ dictates the mean equation.  
Since we use a simple single lagged autoregressive model, we use the interpretation of 
Alexander (2008, p. 203).  With all our b coefficients being greater than 0.98 with a 
standard error of less than 0.0009, thus hinting at the price variance taking longer to revert 
back to the unconditional mean after a shock.  However, the white noise dictated by ϵ is 
high with all the markets standing in the low to mid 0.7s with a low standard error.  It is 
worth remembering the mean equation is not the focal point of our research. 
In essence, the variance equation reflects the impact from the use of the price variance in 
the estimation of the GARCH model using the full 2012 sample observations.  Conversely, 
due to the use of the price variance both coefficients are not within normal GARCH 
bounds.  Therefore, we cannot use the full coefficients’ interpretation of Alexander (2008, 
p. 137) and Engle & Patton (2001).  Therefore, we concentrate on the analysis of the α and 
β coefficients relative to the other observed markets. 
The α coefficients hint at a relatively high level of sensitivity to market shocks in the 
volatility of the markets, this could be due to the over- and underreaction of the markets to 
news, which if the markets were efficient should not happen.  However, analysing the α 
coefficients closely would suggest a split in the observed markets with the Italian, 
Portuguese and Spanish markets having relatively high levels of sensitivity to market 
shocks with a higher standard error.  While the other observed markets seem to have lower 
sensitivity to market shocks and standard errors.  However, the α coefficients hint at a 
closer levels of sensitivity among the observed markets than most subsequent observational 
periods suggesting that the markets were similar in their reactions to market shocks.  This 
hints at the obvious different reactions to the shocks during the two crises periods between 
the markets levelling out over the duration of the dataset. 
In terms of the volatility persistence in the markets, the β coefficients seem to be suggesting 
that shocks in the US market are relatively persistence in the aftermath of a crisis.  In fact, 
it is the highest level of persistence observed in all the samples estimated using the GARCH 
model.  The German and Italian volatility also seem to be relatively persistence.  However, 
considering the Greek and Portuguese markets were at the heart of the early stages of the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, their β coefficients seem to be hinting at a relatively low 
level of persistence.  A possible explanation is the persistence in the volatility seems to be 
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low throughout the early part of the observational period in these two markets.  This seems 
to be suggesting persisting crisis does not affect these two markets.  Another possible 
explanation is the relatively small size and liquidity of the Greek and Portuguese markets. 
In essence, the standard deviation is a measure of how volatile the observed markets are.  
Consequently, the standard deviation seem to be suggesting that generally, with the 
exception of the Greek market, the  sovereign debt market was stable with the observed 
price variances disperse close to the expected price variance.  However, the significant 
standard deviation of the Greek market seems to be hinting that the impact from the 
sovereign debt crisis towards the end of the observational period was large.  This creates 
the appearance of a large dispersion in the Greek market due to the collapse of the price 
towards the end of the observation.  In a way, this also explains the high standard deviation 
in the Portuguese market relative to the other observed markets.  The US market is 
interesting due to the opposite effect on the price illustrating that a market does not need 
downwards pressures on the price to have an impact on the standard deviation.  Certainly 
the upwards pressures from both crises had the same effect of increasing the dispersion of 
the price variance. 
It is worth noting that the test of the market efficiency states that we accept the null 
hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be efficient, if the EMH test statistic is greater 
than 1.96.  Thus meaning we accept the efficient market hypothesis for anything else.  
When considering this, picture is confused, with three markets accepting market efficiency: 
US, Greek and Portuguese markets.  However, what is surprising is that the three markets 
are the same ones, which had the largest standard deviation and thus dispersion from the 
expected price variance.  In contrast, the significant EMH test statistics of the German, 
Italian and Spanish markets seem to be strongly accepting the null hypothesis of the market 
being too volatile to be efficient.  These results seem to be suggesting that the dispersion 
of the price variances has a role in the acceptance of the efficient market hypothesis, which 
was accepted because of the equation underpinning the EMH test statistics.  However, 
another explanation is since the efficient market hypothesis dictates that in order for 
markets to be efficient they need to be random and unpredictable.  Therefore, the standard 
deviation has to be constant even in the presence of shocks. 
 133 
 
Table 30 and Table 31 illustrate the statistical analysis and estimated model for the pre-
crisis period.  Two different issues highlighted the period; the first issue being the highly 
volatile period of the early parts which was the combination of a number of events as hinted 
in sections 2.4.4 and 4.2.1.  The evidence seems to suggest two different impacts influenced 
the period.  The first impact occurred during the early parts of the pre-crisis subsample and 
was mainly due to the introduction of the euro and extreme events, which lead to Knightian 
uncertainty such as the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.  The second impact occurred 
during the later stages of the pre-crisis subsample and was mainly due to the asset price 
bubble.  The different between these two impacts on the sovereign debt market is the first 
impact had the impression of a highly volatile market whereas during the asset price bubble 
the impression was of low volatility and prices in the sovereign debt market. 
 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.985536 0.979538 0.979487 0.980571 0.980036 0.980981 
Adjusted R2 0.985513 0.979506 0.979455 0.980541 0.980005 0.980951 
Jarque-Bera  844.25 525.97 769/99 1001.30 1087.33 724.11 
Q-Statistics (Correlogram) 355.85 479.46 491.55 429.90 451.85 440.35 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 0.445786 2.844207 2.638146 2.975284 2.062553 1.714021 
Table 30: 2012 Bond GARCH EMH Residuals Statistics (01/07/2002–29/06/2007) 
In essence, as illustrated by Table 28 previously, the high R2 and adjusted R2 through all 
the estimated GARCH models hint at all the models being a good fit to the dependent 
variable.  Although the Jarque-Bera tests seem to be significantly lower, yet the statistics 
still accept the null hypothesis of non-normality in the distribution.  Conversely, the Q-
statistics are also lower but similarly seem to be hinting at a significant serial correlation.  
With the exception of the US market, the F-statistics are hinting at highly significant 
ARCH effect. 
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  US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
0.002192 
(0.000432) 
 
0.001080 
(0.000333) 
 
0.014016 
(0.000421) 
 
0.001452 
(0.000320) 
 
0.005095 
(0.000365) 
 
0.002972 
(0.000388) 
b 1.002683 (0.001139) 
1.010122 
(0.001977) 
0.992232 
(0.001909) 
1.006916 
(0.001861) 
0.990671 
(0.001888) 
0.985159 
(0.001778) 
ϵ 0.749997 (0.007591) 
0.729650 
(0.011164) 
0.683685 
(0.011067) 
0.773139 
(0.010820) 
0.748951 
(0.010518) 
0.777070 
(0.010728) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
2.68E-05 
(5.19E-06) 
 
1.03E-05 
(1.72E-06) 
 
1.22E-05 
(2.09E-06) 
 
9.35E-06 
(1.76E-06) 
 
1.28E-05 
(2.13E-06) 
 
1.73E-05 
(2.60E-06) 
α  1.517380 (0.145895) 
1.355465 
(0.129580) 
1.370290 
(0.124556) 
1.309422 
(0.144706) 
1.376901 
(0.130443) 
1.346987 
(0.131897) 
β 0.168458 (0.022045) 
0.171189 
(0.025036) 
0.166205 
(0.023499) 
0.209803 
(0.028309) 
0.171778 
(0.022900) 
0.165501 
(0.024569) 
Statistics 
Log Likelihood 2716.990 3435.158 3329.469 3475.344 3331.977 3296.506 
Standard Deviation 0.699244 0.257346 0.260240 0.243392 0.260696 0.273801 
EMH Test 
EMH Test Statistics 0.98 2.05 2.06 2.13 2.10 1.87 
Efficiency Accept Reject Reject Reject Reject Accept 
Table 31: GARCH EMH Test Statistics of the 2012 Bond 01/07/2002–29/06/2007) 
Table 31 hints at a high b coefficients during the pre-crisis period, with the exception of 
the Portuguese and Spanish markets, this seem to be suggesting that the observed markets 
do not revert back to the unconditional mean after a shock to the price variance.  These 
markets all have b coefficients greater than 1.0 with a standard error of greater than 0.0011.  
However, the Portuguese and Spanish markets with b coefficients of less than 1.0 and 
standard errors of higher than 0.0017 do slowly revert back to the unconditional mean.  The 
residuals seem to be hinting at a significant amount of white noise with ϵ coefficients of 
greater than 0.7 and standard errors greater than 0.01 thru all the market except for the US.   
Despite this period being governed by some highly volatile events, the α coefficients hint 
at relatively low levels of sensitivity to market shocks throughout the observed markets in 
general.  More specifically with α coefficients not higher than 1.38, the Eurozone markets 
seem to be illustrating the stability of the euro effect on the market.  While the US is 
 135 
 
markedly higher, the assumption is the consideration that the US market is the “risk free” 
market; hence, it observed some flights to safety during the period.  A possible explanation 
for the low α coefficients is that the stability of the asset price bubble countered the earlier 
effects of the introduction of the euro and the highly volatile events like the Iraq war.  Since 
during any period of sustained economic upturn, market participants are likely to opt for 
high earning risky assets such as asset-backed securities, i.e. MBS or CDO, or the equity 
market. 
With the exception of the Italian market, the β coefficients are hinting at relatively 
moderate levels of volatility persistence in the aftermath of a crisis.  This is not surprising 
since in general highly persisting events did not affect this period, of course, the moderate 
levels accounted for some persisting events like the “war on terror”.  At first glance, the 
persistence level in the Italian market is rather interesting, however it must be remembered 
that until 2004 Italy had the biggest debt to GDP ratio of all the observed markets and 
problems adjusting economically to the introduction of the euro.  It could be said that 
Greece had the same problems but remember the size and liquidity of the Italian market 
far outweighs the Greek market.   
The standard deviation, which does not go above 0.28, provides further evidence of the 
stability in the Eurozone markets.  As stated previously, initially the introduction of the 
euro caused markets to be highly volatile.  However, in the longer-term market participants 
began to adjust to the introduction of the euro.  Over time, the stability within the Eurozone 
markets as hinted by the standard deviations highlighted by Table 31.  However, as 
previously stated, the US market regarded as the risk free market and therefore any news 
or information would heightened volatility.  Another explanation for the high standard 
deviation is that many of the highly volatile events such as the “war on terror” and the 
accountancy problems of WorldCom and Enron were largely associated with the US 
market.   
Interestingly only two markets, the US and Spanish, accept the efficient market hypothesis.  
However, what is interesting about the EMH test statistics of all other markets is not that 
they accept the null hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be efficient but that their 
statistics are close to accepting the efficient market hypothesis.  Furthermore, these markets 
are closer to the f-statistics of 1.96 than the US market.  However, the Spanish market is 
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the closest to true efficiency in that it is the closest to the key statistic.  A possible 
explanation for the result is the market was efficient for large parts of the pre-crisis period, 
given that the Spanish banking sector was in the first instance not involved in the US sub-
prime mortgage market.  Interestingly it is the Eurozone markets that are closer to the key 
f-statistics, so the difference between being efficient and not is maybe the reaction to a 
certain event or events.  Although the US market is further away from the key statistic, yet 
it is efficient.  A key explanation for this is the standard deviation, which is higher than all 
the other markets.  As explained earlier the larger the standard deviation is the more 
unpredictable the market, hence the US market was the most unpredictable during the pre-
crisis period.  Since one of the key assumptions of the efficient market hypothesis is that 
markets are unpredictable that means that the US market had satisfied one of the key 
assumptions.   
Table 33 are associated with the financial crisis of the late 2000s.  Although the first hint 
of the end of the bubble in the housing market came long before the financial crisis. Yet 
the financial markets continued riding the bubble until mid-2007 when a number of 
international banks (e.g. Bear Stearns and BNP Paribas) recorded losses on their off-
balance sheet activities associated with the MBS or CDO, which resulted in flights to 
liquidity and quality.  In essence, this meant an increase in market activities in the observed 
markets as market participants sought the safety of the sovereign debt market. 
 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.979268 0.979426 0.976536 0.980445 0.978760 0.978049 
Adjusted R2 0.979200 0.979358 0.976459 0.980381 0.978690 0.977977 
Jarque-Bera  1311.57 97.56 83.44 354.28 84.28 2376.50 
Q-Statistics (Correlogram) 92.106 218.51 229.71 179.20 198.04 147.00 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 0.082282 3.249124 4.975770 0.157189 1.287693 0.025320 
Table 32: 2012 Bond GARCH EMH Residuals Statistics (02/07/2007–30/10/2009) 
The financial crisis seems to have had the impact of lowering the R2 and adjusted R2 
through all the estimated models hinting at the model being less of a good fit in comparison 
with the pre-crisis period as illustrated by Table 30; however, both statistics are still highly 
significant at above 0.97.  With the exception of the US and Spanish markets, the financial 
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crisis seem to have reduced the Jarque-Bera statistic hinting at the residuals approaching 
normality during the period.  Conversely, the Q-statistics also reduced hint at a lower serial 
correlation for all the observed markets.  Additionally, with the exception of the German 
and Greek markets, the F-statistics are hinting at a reduced ARCH effect.   
 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
 
0.004776 
(0.000202) 
 
0.002287 
(0.000271) 
 
0.015968 
(0.000477) 
0.001986 
(0.000252) 
 
0.005228 
(0.000394) 
 
0.002256 
(0.000248) 
b 0.975373 (0.001567) 
0.973174 
(0.001752) 
0.998039 
(0.001763) 
0.997611 
(0.001729) 
0.991573 
(0.001812) 
1.000609 
(0.001605) 
ϵ 0.702917 (0.011493) 
0.741932 
(0.015975) 
0.781440 
(0.012187) 
0.799874 
(0.011807) 
0.818953 
(0.013470) 
0.715137 
(0.013922) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
 
1.73E-06 
(7.57E-07) 
3.71E-06 
(8.48E-07) 
1.49E-05 
(2.93E-06) 
4.52E-06 
(9.01E-07) 
1.50E-05 
(2.52E-06) 
4.33E-06 
(1.10E-06) 
α  2.739762 (0.722247) 
1.314567 
(0.175964) 
1.540484 
(0.199140) 
1.787047 
(0.256983) 
1.416167 
(0.202024) 
2.169304 
(1.10E-06) 
β 0.191036 (0.031928) 
0.198202 
(0.037437) 
0.089209 
(0.026096) 
0.060629 
(0.023431) 
0.073715 
(0.023395) 
0.096187 
(0.027979) 
Statistics 
Log Likelihood 1621.194 1908.073 1675.784 2016.488 1817.379 1794.027 
Standard Deviation 0.223842 0.133095 0.189977 0.116066 0.157186 0.141228 
EMH Test 
EMH Test Statistics 
 
8.625718 
 
3.852654 
 
3.314575 
 
7.303396 
 
3.116575 
 
8.960624 
Efficiency Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject 
Table 33: GARCH EMH Test Statistics of the 2012 Bond (02/07/2007–30/10/2009) 
Table 33 hints at a mixed picture regarding the b coefficients during the financial crisis 
period.  Although the b coefficients seem to be suggesting mean reversion throughout the 
observed markets, yet the GIPS markets seem to be approaching perfect mean reversion.  
Interestingly these are the markets with an increasing b coefficient.  Furthermore, the 
Spanish market with a b coefficient of 1.0 is hinting at a perfect mean reversion.  The 
impact from the financial crisis on the b coefficients of the German and US markets seem 
to be hinting at the crisis having a positive effect with respect to mean reversion.  The b 
coefficients seem to be confirming the split between these two groups.  Conversely, the 
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standard errors for the b coefficients are between 0.0016 and 0.0019 thru all the observed 
markets.  The residuals seem to be hinting at a significant amount of white noise with ϵ 
coefficients of greater than 0.7 and standard errors greater than 0.02 thru all the markets.   
As the α coefficients hint, the onslaught of the financial crisis led to an increase in the 
sensitivity levels to market shocks.  Especially in the US and Spanish markets where the 
impact from the financial crisis was felt most among the observed markets.  However, with 
the possible exception of the Italian market, the sensitivity levels of the remaining markets 
did not increase significantly.  As explained previously, the Greek and Portuguese markets 
are not as liquid as the other observed markets.  To a certain extent the German market was 
not affect by the financial crisis, which may explain the relatively low α coefficients. 
The β coefficients seem to be pointing at a high level of persistence in the US and German 
markets while all the GIPS markets have a low level of persistence.  As expected since the 
US and German markets were regarded as high quality and liquid markets, hence during 
the financial crisis these markets experienced a constant flight to safety.  This leads to high 
levels of persistence since the volatility is consistently high.  In contrast the GIPS nations 
were not only perceived to be of a lower quality or liquid but also due to the German market 
being the key market in the Eurozone, this meant many Eurozone market participants were 
likely to go to the German market. 
The standard deviation does reflect a significant decrease in the volatile market during the 
financial crisis in comparison with the pre-crisis period.  This seems to be stating that the 
observed markets were not highly volatile during a period of highly volatile global 
financial markets.  In essence, this is not surprising since the prices of these assets were 
generally following an upwards trend due to the global financial crisis and this does not 
make them volatile but this does make them predictable. 
The key to understanding the rejection of the efficient market hypothesis is to consider 
what the EMH test really implies.  The EMH test implies that the market is deviating from 
the fundamental value.  Since the financial crisis meant that market participants were 
engaging in flights to liquidity or quality, this meant that prices were trending upwards 
faster than the fundamental value.  This meant that the EMH test statistics significantly 
rejected the efficient market hypothesis for all the observed markets.  A key factor in the 
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deviation from the fundamental value was that market participants were reacting to events 
instead of the fundamentals.  Furthermore as explained in the previous paragraph the 
continued upwards trend meant that in essence the markets were predictable to a certain 
extent. 
Table 34 and Table 35 are associated with the Eurozone sovereign debt and US fiscal cliff 
crises.  In order to provide liquidity and boost the economy, many central banks embarked 
on non-standard monetary policies.  However, it became clear that monetary policy alone 
was not going to be enough save the banking system and avert a deep recession turning 
into a full-scale depression.  Essentially, the sovereign debt crises was the product of the 
governments providing much needed capital for the banking system and following a fiscal 
stimulus policy to support the economy after the financial crisis.  This added a substantial 
amount to the total debt.  However, it is worth remembering that these assets are fixed term 
contacts, which mature at a certain date, hence an influencing factor to bear in mind is the 
maturity effect.   
 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.984793 0.985310 0.985119 0.983549 0.986188 0.984302 
Adjusted R2 0.984739 0.985257 0.985066 0.983491 0.986138 0.984246 
Jarque-Bera  105.76 416.19 3391.42 167.13 203.66 196.36 
Q-Statistics (Correlogram) 182.89 203.53 44.41 189.04 214.28 157.03 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 2.601891 5.379326 0.340019 5.855812 6.982726 0.277941 
Table 34: 2012 Bond GARCH EMH Residuals Statistics (02/11/2009–30/12/2011) 
The sovereign debt crisis seems to have had the impact of raising the R2 and adjusted R2 
through all the estimated models.  This hints at the model being a good fit in comparison 
with the financial crisis period, as illustrated by Table 32, with both statistics above 0.98.  
With the exception of the US and Spanish markets, the sovereign debt crisis seem to have 
increased the Jarque-Bera statistic hinting at the residuals accepting the null hypothesis of 
non-normality.  Interestingly, although the reductions for the US and Spanish markets were 
significantly large, they still seem to be accepting the null hypothesis of a non-normal 
distribution.  Conversely, with the exception of the US and Greek markets, the Q-statistics 
are hinting at a relatively limited change in serial correlation between the financial and 
 140 
 
sovereign debt crisis periods.  However, with the exception of the Greek market, the F-
statistics are hinting at a significant increase in the ARCH effect. 
 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
 
0.004641 
(0.000122) 
 
0.002091 
(5.53E-05) 
 
0.022285 
(0.001814) 
 
0.002514 
(4.28E-05) 
 
0.005038 
(0.000144) 
 
0.003195 
(7.74E-05) 
b 0.981840 (0.003607) 
0.993474 
(0.001796) 
0.981985 
(0.001511) 
0.969182 
(0.001580) 
0.982596 
(0.000598) 
1.001468 
(0.001531) 
ϵ 0.702702 (0.018872) 
0.763513 
(0.019155) 
1.276555 
(0.002463) 
0.829925 
(0.012519) 
0.744887 
(0.012284) 
0.857096 
(0.012099) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
 
1.57E-08 
(8.68E-09) 
4.53E-08 
(9.45E-09) 
0.000860 
(6.27E-05) 
1.51E-07 
(3.32E-08) 
5.75E-07 
(2.44E-07) 
4.33E-07 
(1.49E-07) 
α  0.991745 (0.148589) 
1.383852 
(0.193950) 
2.526172 
(0.119999) 
1.869897 
(0.243632) 
1.74503 
(0.135819) 
2.316483 
(0.437554) 
β 0.243627 (0.047824) 
0.113232 
(0.029609) 
0.140287 
(0.016319) 
0.04853 
(0.025347) 
0.251716 
(0.014035) 
0.099802 
(0.022945) 
Statistics 
Log Likelihood 3305.380 3233.428 -37.37380 2731.215 1224.056 2077.784 
Standard Deviation 0.01774 0.013194 11.4855 0.064861 1.51737 0.190863 
EMH Test 
EMH Test Statistics 13.26787 37.675 0.145092 14.15993 0.656891 7.420427 
Efficiency Reject Reject Accept Reject Accept Reject 
Table 35: GARCH EMH Test Statistics of the 2012 Bond (02/11/2009–30/12/2011) 
With the possible exception of the Spanish market, the markets are hinting at strong mean 
reversion during the sovereign debt crisis.  Although the b coefficient of the Italian market 
is pointing at a weak mean reversion in comparison.  As with the financial crisis, the 
Spanish b coefficient is above 1.0, however it is slightly greater than 1.0 in comparison 
with table 33.  Conversely, the standard errors for the b coefficients vary widely from 
approximately 0.0006 for the Portuguese market to approximately 0.0036 for the US 
market.  The residuals seem to be hinting at a significant amount of white noise especially 
for the Greek and Portuguese markets with ϵ coefficients of greater than 0.7.  However, 
again the standard errors vary widely, although not as widely as the standard errors of b 
coefficients.   
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The α coefficients seem to be reflecting the diverse impact of the sovereign debt crisis on 
the observed markets.  In essence, the US and to a lesser extent German markets were not 
effect by the early stages of the crisis, hence the low levels of sensitivity to market shocks.  
Remember that both markets at the time were seen as safe haven from the crisis.  However, 
the significant α coefficients of the Greek and Spanish markets are hinting at high levels 
of sensitivity to market shocks.  Notably the Greek market was at the centre of the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.  Although the Spanish market did not feel the impact of 
the sovereign debt crisis until the later parts, yet a combination of a weakening economy, 
continuation of the financial crisis and weak local government finance at a time when the 
spotlight was on government spending did make the Spanish market highly sensitivity to 
market shocks.  Even before the financial crisis, the Italian debt to GDP ratio was the 
highest in the Eurozone, hence with such a high ratio the Italian market was highly sensitive 
to market shocks.  Although the α coefficients of the Portuguese market were high, 
however they are not that high.  As previously suggested, a possible explanation is size and 
liquidity of the market.  Another explanation is the quick reaction of the Portuguese 
government, IMF and European Community to the Portuguese crisis.   
The β coefficients seem to be hinting at mixed picture underpinning the level of volatility 
persistence.  The US and Portuguese markets seem to be interesting due to the high 
volatility persistence providing a further explanation as to why the sensitivity to market 
shocks were  relatively low.  However, with the exception of the German and Greek 
markets, all the remaining observed markets seem to be hinting at a low level of volatility 
persistence.  A possible explanation is mainly due to the indecision of the politicians both 
within Greece and the Eurozone, the Greek market was a highly reactive to every decision 
and statement by the politicians.  As illustrated in the financial crisis period, the German 
market was the safe haven for all Eurozone market participants. 
The standard deviations seem to be hinting at a split market with the US, German and 
Italian markets pointing at a stable market.  However, the Greek and Portuguese markets 
are highly volatile.  Interestingly the Greek market seems to be very significantly volatile, 
as expected since the Greek market was at the centre of the sovereign debt crisis in the 
Eurozone.  Although the Spanish market does seem to suggest stability in comparison to 
some of the observed standard deviations, yet it also suggests a volatile market relative to 
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other standard deviations.  Hence, the Spanish market, seem to be suggesting indecision 
on the part of market participants. 
As hinted previously, during the financial crisis the market participants were reacting to 
events instead of the fundamentals.  Interestingly, the fundamentals of the sovereign debt 
markets were already highlighting many issues such as high longer-term unemployment 
and high debt/deficit.  However, hindsight is a lovely tool to have but unfortunately; during 
any crisis, human nature dictates that market participant react to events rather than the 
fundamentals of the asset, which was the case during the financial crisis and to a certain 
extent the sovereign debt crisis.  This is the key to understanding the significant acceptance 
of the null hypothesis of the markets being too volatile to be efficient with regards to the 
US, German, Italian and to a lesser extent the Spanish markets.  During the early stages of 
the sovereign debt crisis, these markets were seen as risk free and liquid markets, hence 
the upwards trend continued making them more predictable.  However, of greater interest 
is the Greek and Portuguese markets acceptance of the efficient market hypothesis.  A 
possible explanation is that market participants had no option other than to accept the price 
as given by the fundamentals because the market was no longer dictating the price.  In 
other words, the market participants were increasingly reacting to the fundamental 
information rather than events, which especially in the case of Greece shows that market 
participants obviously were not aware or did not take into account the reliability of the 
Greek national accounts. 
Table 36 and Table 37 illustrate the statistical analysis and estimated model of the entire 
observation for the 2017 issued bonds.  In essence, these government bonds were issued 
just before the financial broke out which mean we analyse the full influences from both 
crises on the efficiency of the observed markets.  Additionally, with the exception of the 
Portuguese market, the impact from the sovereign debt crisis did not hit some of the 
observed markets until the later stages.  However, although this helps overcome the 
maturity effect on the analysis of the sovereign debt crisis.  Yet it does introduce another 
issue in the form of the “on-the-run” effect during the financial crisis.  In a way, the 
combination of the financial and sovereign debt crisis should make the market highly 
volatile and reactive. 
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 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.987786 0.981807 0.985123 0.984973 0.982754 
Adjusted R2 0.987769 0.981783 0.985103 0.984953 0.982731 
Jarque-Bera  16546.91 1392.45 1351.47 1438.45 1711.09 
Q-Statistics (Correlogram) 287.04 468.74 456.76 417.17 433.94 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 0.000144 1.382685 2.704764 0.731502 2.040020 
Table 36: 2017 Bond GARCH EMH Residuals Statistics (02/07/2007–29/03/2013) 
As illustrated by the estimated models in Table 36, a key factor of note is the high R2 and 
adjusted R2.  The R2 is significantly high and approaching one, above 0.98, through all the 
estimated GARCH models hinting at the lagged price variance with the estimated residuals 
being highly able to explain the movement in the price variance.  Another factor is the 
significantly high adjusted R2 pointing at the estimated GARCH model being a good fit to 
the dependent variable across all the markets.  These two statistics partly illustrates our 
GARCH model is correctly specified to test all the markets for the null hypothesis of the 
market being too volatile to be efficient.   
The Jarque-Bera test for all the markets seem to be hinting at a significant acceptance of 
the null hypothesis of non-normality in the distribution of the residuals.  We found all our 
markets seem to follow a leptokurtic distribution, which hints at the Student t distribution 
model.  However, apart from the US, the Jarque-Bera statistics seem to be hinting at 
uniformed results across all the observed markets.  Although the Spanish statistic is higher, 
yet it is within the range of the other Eurozone markets.  Conversely, the US statistic is 
significantly higher than all the others are; in fact, it is higher by a factor of approximately 
10 from the Spanish statistics, hinting at a significant acceptance of the null hypothesis of 
non-normality.  Remember under certain circumstances the consideration of the existence 
of non-normal residuals as an indicator for non-efficient markets.   
With regard to the serial correlation, the Q-statistics of the correlogram seem to be hinting 
at a high serial correlation in the residuals.  At the single lagged level, the Q-statistic for 
all our samples does not drop below 287.04 as observed by the US.  Remember the 
existence of autocorrelated residuals usually imply the omission of important variables 
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from the regression.  In the current framework, the fact that other variables may be 
important to determine bond prices seems to be indicating inefficient markets. 
The F-statistics seem to be wielding very widely between approaching no ARCH effect to 
a relatively significant ARCH effect remaining.  In essence, the two lowest F-statistics are 
the US and Portuguese markets with an F-statistics below one, thus meaning a significantly 
low ARCH effect remaining.  The highest F-statistic is that of the Italian market hinting at 
a relatively significant ARCH effect remaining. 
 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
 
0.009329 
(0.000173) 
 
0.004452 
(0.000380) 
0.009859 
(0.000336) 
0.042697 
(0.000791) 
0.008246 
(0.000496) 
b 0.993947 (0.000883) 
1.003136 
(0.001126) 
0.995940 
(0.000783) 
0.974538 
(0.000623) 
0.993566 
(0.000937) 
ϵ 0.717657 (0.007993) 
0.747491 
(0.010197) 
0.742892 
(0.008919) 
0.838409 
(0.009546) 
0.717486 
(0.009254) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
 
1.38E-06 
(4.27E-07) 
2.05E-05 
(3.46E-06) 
2.01E-05 
(3.51E-06) 
0.000124 
(2.21E-05) 
5.78E-05 
(9.13E-06) 
α  1.933987 (0.224059) 
1.52365 
(0.154555) 
1.764853 
(0.164880) 
1.876973 
(0.182783) 
1.898960 
(0.195272) 
β 0.246653 (0.224059) 
0.179062 
(0.021962) 
0.140782 
(0.018864) 
0.131443 
(0.017092) 
0.113456 
(0.017045) 
Statistics 
Log Likelihood 2926.421 3350.473 2840.106 1037.013 2494.552 
Standard Deviation 1.067295 0.344854 1.070745 4.984212 1.102358 
EMH Test 
EMH Test Statistics 1.106198 2.037709 0.845799 0.202322 0.918409 
Efficiency Accept Reject Accept Accept Accept 
Table 37: GARCH EMH Test Statistics of the 2017 Bond (02/07/2007–29/03/2013) 
Table 37 hints at a high b coefficients; with the exception of the German market, this seem 
to be suggesting that the observed markets do revert to the unconditional mean after a shock 
to the price variance.  These markets all have b coefficients greater than 0.97 with a 
standard error of less than 0.00095.  However, the German market with b coefficient 
greater than 1.0 and standard errors higher than 0.0011 does not revert back to the 
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unconditional mean.  The residuals seem to be hinting at a significant amount of white 
noise with ϵ coefficients of greater than 0.7 and standard errors greater than 0.0075 thru all 
the market except for the US.  Conversely, the Portuguese market has the highest amount 
of white noise. 
With the exception of the German market, the α coefficients seem to be hinting at high 
levels of sensitivity to market shocks.  Although the Italian market is lower than the others 
are, yet it is high.  However, the German market seem to be portraying a stable market 
throughout as also observed by Table 39 and Table 41, explained by the fact that German 
debt is largely held domestically.  Moreover, the crises did not really affect the German 
market, as German government bonds were a safe haven.  In contrast, the US market has a 
high level of sensitivity to shocks; this could be due the use of the US market as a safe 
haven during both crises.  Another plausible explanation is the on-going fiscal-cliff and 
debt ceiling crises.  Interestingly, the IPS markets range between 1.76 for the Italian market 
and 1.89 for the Spanish market.  A plausible explanation is the impact of both crisis on 
the markets.  Although the Spanish market did not feel the impact of the sovereign debt 
crisis until the later stages of the crisis, yet it banking system was the biggest problem 
throughout the observed period.  There were signs of the weakness in the Italian economy 
before the advent of any crisis but the full extent of the sovereign debt crisis did not affect 
the Italian market until the later stages.  This along with the limited impact from the 
financial crisis meant that the sensitivity to market shocks was lower than the remaining 
IPS markets.  The Portuguese market is a tale of two crises while the impact from the 
financial crisis was limited. However, the sovereign debt crisis was highly damaging, and 
as a result, the sensitivity to market shocks is high.   
The β coefficient illustrates the difference in the volatility persistence between the IPS and 
US/German markets.  As stated previously mainly due to flights during both the financial 
and sovereign debt crises, the US and German markets had high levels of volatility 
persistence in the aftermath of events during both crises.  However, another explanation 
with respect to the US market is the on-going US fiscal cliff and debt ceiling crises.  In 
contrast, the impact on the IPS markets was usually short shocks hiking the volatility. 
Again mainly due to both crises not having an impact on the German market, the standard 
deviation did not increase in the German market as it did in the remaining observed 
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markets.  The standard deviation seems to be hinting at highly volatile IPS markets, 
especially the Portuguese.  As expected since the sovereign debt crisis did directly affect 
these markets.  As mentioned earlier, mainly due to flights during both crises in addition 
to the impact from the two crises, the US market had high volatility throughout the 
observed period.  Whereas to a certain extent the strongest influence the German market 
came from flights. 
Interestingly, the EMH test statistics seem to be hinting at the acceptance of the efficient 
market hypothesis.  However, the German market narrowly accepted the null hypothesis 
of the market being too volatile to be efficient.  Of more interest are the Portuguese and 
Spanish markets, the reason being that these two 2017 government bonds seem to be 
accepting the efficient market hypothesis in all observed periods.  As previously hinted, 
both crises made the environment too volatile that market participants had no option other 
than to accept the price as given because the market was no longer dictating the price.  In 
other words, the market participants were accepting the fundamental information. 
Tables 38 and 39 are associated with the financial crisis of the late 2000s.  As stated 
previously, the main impact was the flight to safety from the risky assets at the heart of the 
financial crisis to the sovereign debt market.  In essence the sovereign debt market, 
especially the US and German, were considered safe haven from the financial crisis.  
However, of more interest is the impact from the on-the-run effect, since the 2017 bonds 
were issued just before the financial crisis heated up.  With this in mind, we will compare 
the statistics in these two tables with the statistic from tables 32 and 33. 
 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.984827 0.976877 0.974911 0.979995 0.979447 
Adjusted R2 0.984775 0.976798 0.974825 0.979927 0.979377 
Jarque-Bera  75.00 198.89 378.23 212.48 36.11 
Q-Statistics  (Correlogram) 180.94 203.72 196.13 178.77 236.10 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 2.027137 1.025226 1.773055 0.224477 6.305451 
Table 38: 2017 Bond GARCH EMH Residuals Statistics (02/07/2007–30/10/2009) 
In comparison both tables 38 and 32 seem to be hinting at the R2 and adjusted R2 being 
significant.  This means that the estimated models are good fit for both the observed 
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datasets.  Although there are slight differences between both observed datasets, the 
differences do not have any significant impact.  With the exception of the US and Spanish 
markets, the 2017 bonds seem to have larger Jarque-Bera statistic hinting at the residuals 
moving away from normality.  Interestingly, the Jarque-Bera statistics of the US and 
especially Spanish markets are approaching normality.  Conversely, with the exception of 
the German and Portuguese markets, the increase of Q-statistics hints at a higher serial 
correlation.  Additionally, only the German and Portuguese markets have reduced F-
statistics hinting at low ARCH effects.  The Spanish market is interesting in that from 
approaching zero to significantly large ARCH effects this has dramatically hiked up the F-
statistic. 
 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
-0.000564 
(0.003340) 
0.006665 
(0.001545) 
0.011000 
(0.000833) 
0.042407 
(0.001197) 
0.006207 
(0.000926) 
b 1.006598 (0.003128) 
1.005106 
(0.002573) 
0.995054 
(0.002496) 
0.971872 
(0.001474) 
1.007520 
(0.002517) 
ϵ 0.703845 (0.014809) 
0.789827 
(0.018080) 
0.744826 
(0.014066) 
0.811311 
(0.013325) 
0.707078 
(0.017994) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
0.000763 
(0.000151) 
0.000143 
(2.52E-05) 
5.28E-05 
(1.13E-05) 
0.000203 
(3.45E-05) 
5.81E-05 
(1.11E-05) 
α  1.238184 (0.181054) 
1.379988 
(0.224340) 
1.636521 
(0.228196) 
1.461788 
(0.206918) 
1.352788 
(0.192634) 
β 0.126311 (0.045353) 
0.097725 
(0.034010) 
0.060077 
(0.025787) 
0.003933 
(0.023586) 
0.105089 
(0.027438) 
Statistics 
Log Likelihood 633.739 1083.302 1299.831 1110.215 1231.439 
Standard Deviation 1.444623 0.397085 0.308165 0.552783 0.461169 
EMH Test 
EMH Test Statistics 0.252312 1.20305 2.260471 0.842502 0.992862 
Efficiency Accept Accept Reject Accept Accept 
Table 39: GARCH EMH Test Statistics of the 2017 Bond (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
Table 39 is hinting at a split picture, with the exception of the Italian and Portuguese 
markets, the b coefficients seem to be increasing on those in table 33.  This is interesting 
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because these three markets also seem to be hinting at a change from displaying strong to 
no mean reversion to the unconditional mean.  The standard errors for all the observed 
markets are significantly higher.  However, with the exception of the German and 
Portuguese markets, the residuals seem to be hinting at a reduction in the white noise.   
With the exception of the Italian and Portuguese markets, the financial crisis does not 
appear to have impacted on the α coefficients of the observed markets.  In comparison with 
table 33, the level of sensitivity to market shocks was higher in table 33 with the exception 
of the Portuguese and German markets.  Interestingly, the US had the lowest α coefficients 
whereas the Italian had the highest.  This is a complete reversal of the α coefficients for 
these two markets from those sensitivity levels reported in table 33.   
Although the β coefficients point towards a low volatility persistence in all the observed 
markets; yet there seem to be a different in the persistence of volatility.  While the Italian 
and Portuguese markets seem to have very low levels of persistence, the US market does 
hint at a relatively higher level of persistence.  Contrasting with table 33, which seems to 
be hinting at higher levels of persistence for all 2012 bonds during the financial crisis. 
There seems to be a differentiation between the US market and the Eurozone markets with 
the US hinting at a high standard deviation and therefore a highly volatile market.  As 
expected, this is due to the financial crisis having the biggest impact on the US financial 
market.  However, this does not explain why the Eurozone markets, especially the Spanish 
market, seem to be low.  One possible explanation is unlike the US the financial crisis did 
not really affect the observed Eurozone markets, especially the Spanish, until the later 
stages.  Obviously, given these government bonds were issued just before the financial 
crisis and hence they react to events quicker than bonds in the middle of their lives, these 
bonds, especially the US, seem to be more volatile than the 2012 bonds as illustrated by 
table 33. 
Interestingly, the EMH test statistics seem to be hinting at the observed markets accepting 
the efficient market hypothesis during the financial crisis.  The exception is the Italian 
market, which accepts the null hypothesis of markets being too volatile to be efficient.  
Conversely, in contrast to table 31 with exception of the German and Portuguese markets, 
the efficiency status of the other observed markets remained unchanged.  This seems to be 
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suggesting that during the financial crisis the “on-the-run” effect did have the impact of 
increasing the efficiency. 
Tables 40 and 41 are associated with the Eurozone sovereign debt and US fiscal cliff crises.  
One influencing factor to bear in mind is that the 2012 bonds did not cover the later stages 
of the sovereign debt crisis while the 2017 bonds do cover the majority of the crisis.  
However, another factor worth remembering is that the 2012 bonds were at the end of their 
lives during the sovereign debt crisis; hence, an influencing factor to bear in mind is the 
maturity effect.  Conversely, the 2017 bonds were in mid-life during the crisis, hence it is 
interesting to see what impact the maturity effect had on the markets during the sovereign 
debt crisis.   
 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.984020 0.982091 0.984568 0.981909 0.981416 
Adjusted R2 0.983984 0.982051 0.984533 0.981868 0.981374 
Jarque-Bera  11650.69 108.16 159.90 699.10 2219.34 
Q-Statistics (Correlogram) 172.50 315.52 302.62 259.33 254.70 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 0.003594 5.054297 7.962822 0.662548 0.511039 
Table 40: 2017 Bond GARCH EMH Residuals Statistics (02/11/2009 –29/03/2013) 
In comparison both tables 40 and 34 seem to be hinting at the R2 and adjusted R2 being 
significant.  This means that the estimated models are good fit for the 2017 observed 
datasets.  Although there are slight differences between both observed datasets, the 
differences do not have any significant impact.  With the exception of the German and 
Italian markets, the 2017 bonds seem to have larger Jarque-Bera statistic hinting at the 
residuals moving away from normality.  Interestingly, the Jarque-Bera statistics of the US 
and Spanish markets are significantly larger.  Conversely, with the exception of the US 
market, the increase in Q-statistics hints at a higher serial correlation.  Additionally, only 
the Italian market has greater F-statistics and with the exception of the German and Italian 
markets, the F-statistics are hinting at low ARCH effects.  The US market is interesting in 
that the reduction of the F-statistic means ARCH effects of effectively zero. 
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 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
0.009385 
(0.000177) 
0.005924 
(0.000346) 
0.010160 
(0.000367) 
0.042367 
(0.001466) 
0.008436 
(0.000639) 
b 0.987676 (0.000946) 
0.975723 
(0.001524) 
0.989713 
(0.001113) 
0.974749 
(0.000795) 
0.983830 
(0.001460) 
ϵ 0.707102 (0.010624) 
0.739618 
(0.012980) 
0.746453 
(0.011486) 
0.855308 
(0.012212) 
0.698492 
(0.012982) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
1.61E-06 
(4.73E-07) 
7.84E-06 
(1.84E-06) 
9.32E-06 
(2.43E-06) 
0.000163 
(5.02E-05) 
3.62E-05 
(8.56E-06) 
α  2.317501 (0.354558) 
1.321697 
(0.152443) 
1.673335 
(0.205084) 
1.982929 
(0.244304) 
2.023975 
(0.263779) 
β 0.164934 (0.021917) 
0.238089 
(0.027270) 
0.192224 
(0.023514) 
0.153943 
(0.021813) 
0.140932 
(0.022178) 
Statistics 
Log Likelihood 2335.037 2307.666 1557.962 -61.15424 1275.555 
Standard Deviation 0.41962 0.257374 1.312213 5.824118 1.320804 
EMH Test 
EMH Test Statistics 3.532803 2.17499 0.659618 0.195201 0.881968 
Efficiency Reject Reject Accept Accept Accept 
Table 41: GARCH EMH Test Statistics of the 2017 Bond (02/11/2009-29/03/2013) 
Table 41 is hinting at a split picture, with the exception of the US and Italian markets, the 
b coefficients seem to be decreasing on those in table 35.  The Spanish market is interesting 
due to the reduction meaning a change from no mean reversion to strong mean reversion.  
The standard errors for all the observed markets are lower with the exception of the 
Portuguese market.  Additionally with the exception of the Portuguese market, the 
residuals seem to be hinting at a reduction in the white noise.   
With the exception of the German and Italian markets, the α coefficients seem to be 
pointing at a significantly high level of sensitivity during the sovereign debt crisis.  
Although the Italian market is also displaying a relatively high level of sensitivity, however 
it is not as significant as the other observed markets.  As with all previous observations 
concerning the 2017 bonds, the German market continues to display a low level of 
sensitivity in comparison to the other observed markets.  However, in contrast to table 35, 
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it seem that the maturity effect had a varying impact on the levels of sensitivity, with the 
US and Portuguese markets hinting at an increase while the others are pointing towards a 
decrease.  The hike in the US market is significant; a possible explanation is that the fiscal 
cliff and debt ceiling crises did not fully affect the US market until the later stages.   
Interestingly, the volatility persistence levels seem to be displaying the reverse impact on 
the observed markets with the German and Italian markets displaying high levels of 
volatility persistence.  In contrast, the remaining observed markets seem to be pointing at 
relatively low volatility persistence levels.  This would point at a fast changing 
environment in the observed markets during the sovereign debt crisis.  However, 
contrasting with table 35 seem to be suggesting that the maturity effect had a varying 
impact on the level of volatility persistence with the US and Portuguese markets hinting at 
a decrease, while the others pointing towards an increase.  An interesting point is the 
significant increase in the German and Italian markets pointing to the main impact of the 
sovereign debt crisis coming in the latter stages.  In a way, this would explain the decrease 
in the β coefficient of the Portuguese market, since as the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis 
continued the Portuguese market became relatively susceptible to shocks rather than 
persisting volatility.   
With the exception of the US and German markets, the standard deviations seem to be 
hinting at a highly volatile market.  The Portuguese market seems to be significantly 
volatile.  This seems to be hinting at a different impact during the sovereign debt crisis on 
the GIPS markets.  As expected, this is due to the emphasis of the sovereign debt crisis on 
the GIPS markets.  Conversely, in comparison with table 35, it would seem that the later 
stage of the sovereign debt crisis was significantly more volatile with all the observed 
markets recording a higher standard deviation.   
The EMH tests seem to be hinting at the acceptance of the efficient market hypothesis for 
all observed markets with the exception of the US and German markets.  The other key 
factor is once again the huge impact of the maturity effect makes on the observed markets.  
As illustrated by the fact that the EMH test accepted the null hypothesis of the market being 
too volatile to be efficient in all but the Portuguese and Greek markets in table 35.  Another 
explanation is that not until the later stages of the crisis were the full impact of the 
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sovereign debt crisis observed, hence the different in the market efficiency of the Italian 
and Spanish markets. 
4.3.2 An Alternative Volatility Test of the EMH using GJR-GARCH 
As indicated earlier, the keys to the EMH test statistic are the coefficients and standard 
deviation of the model of volatility.  Hence, in essence, the model used determines the 
EMH test statistic; in the previous section, we used a GARCH (1, 1) model.  In this section, 
we propose an alternative model to estimate the coefficients and standard errors, the GJR-
GARCH model.  An influencing factor in the used of the GJR-GARCH is the use of the 
asymmetrical effect to analyse whether our EMH test responses differently to negative and 
positive shocks. 
We use a single lagged GJR-GARCH model with a single asymmetrical order.  As stated 
earlier in section 5.3.1, the estimation of any GARCH model is from two equations, namely 
the mean and variance equations.  In essence, for any EMH test the mean equation does 
not change, hence we use the same equation as the one used in the 5.3.1 section.  However, 
the variance equation is as following: 
 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡) = 𝑣𝑣 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 
 ℎ𝑗𝑗 𝑡𝑡 = 𝜔𝜔 + 𝛼𝛼 1𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽 1ℎ𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝐼𝐼�𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗 𝑡𝑡−1 < 0� 
As explained in the methodology section 3.1, the key to the asymmetrical effect is the γ 
coefficient when it is positive any shock to the market has an impact on the EMH test.  
However, of more importance, a negative γ coefficients means a negative shock has a 
greater impact than a positive shock on the EMH test.  This has great implications, if the 
efficient market hypothesis does follow a certain asymmetrical effect in any market.  Does 
this mean that the sign of the market shock determines the efficiency of the market? Hence, 
this means the test of the efficient market hypothesis then becomes: 
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = (𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽+𝛾𝛾)−1
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐�𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥)� 
A key part of the analysis of the test is a comparison with the test of efficiency used 
previously.  Since the only different is the model underpinning the test, hence this 
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essentially is a test of the goodness of the GARCH and GJR-GARCH models.  In essence, 
we use the following reported statistics in our comparison: 
• Akaike information criterion (AIC) introduced by Akaike (1974) 
• Hannan–Quinn information criterion (HQC) proposed by Hannan & Quinn (1979) 
• Bayesian information criterion or Schwarz criterion (SBC) derived by Schwarz 
(1978)   
With three exceptions, the model is a single lagged and asymmetrical order GJR-GARCH 
model with a student t distribution estimated using the Maximum Likelihood method with 
a BHHH optimization algorithm.  However, due to errors in three markets with the 
estimation we used the following: 
• In tables 42/43, we used normal distribution and Marquandt optimization for the 
Greek market and Marquandt optimization for the Spanish market. 
• In tables 54/55, we used normal distribution and Marquandt optimization for the 
Portuguese market.   
Tables 42 and 43 illustrate the statistics analysis of the estimated model for the entire 2012 
issued bonds sample observations.  As mentioned previously, the observational period 
combines the impact from the pre-crisis, financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis periods 
on the efficiency of the market.  The interesting addition is the asymmetrical effect; could 
a positive or negative asymmetrical effect have an impact on the efficiency of the market?   
 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.987427 0.983318 0.986942 0.983489 0.987577 0.982004 
Adjusted R2 0.987417 0.983305 0.986932 0.983475 0.987567 0.981989 
Jarque-Bera  4142.43 5272.05 782.52 27601.75 2557.55 12.92 
Q-Statistics (Correlogram) 616.39 742.50 1097.04 660.91 755.28 706.95 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 2.151315 2.842148 39.26778 0.546006 1.980954 0.472439 
Table 42: 2012 Bond GJR-GARCH EMH Residuals Statistics (01/07/2002-30/12/2011) 
As illustrated by the estimated models in table 42, a key factor of note is the high R2 and 
adjusted R2.  The R2 is above 0.98 through all the estimated GJR-GARCH models hinting 
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at the lagged price variance with the estimated residuals being highly able to explain the 
movement in the price variance.  Another factor is the high adjusted R2 pointing at the 
estimated GJR-GARCH model being a good fit to the dependent variable across all the 
markets.  These two statistics partly illustrates our GJR-GARCH model is correctly 
specified to test all the markets for the null hypothesis of the market being too volatile to 
be efficient.  Interestingly, with the exception of the US and German markets the R2 and 
adjusted R2 seem to favour the GARCH model as illustrated by table 28.  This is interesting 
due to the GIPS countries favouring one model and the benchmark countries, i.e. the US 
and Germany, favouring another model.   
The Jarque-Bera test for all the markets seem to be hinting at an acceptance of the null 
hypothesis of non-normality in the distribution of the residuals.  We found all our markets 
seem to follow a leptokurtic distribution, which hints at the Student t distribution model.  
However, the Jarque-Bera statistics seem to be hinting at a varied set of results with the 
Italian being significantly greater than the other countries.  Conversely, the Spanish is 
significantly lower than all the others are.  However, the evidence seem to be suggesting 
with the exception of the Italian, the Jarque Bera statistics are lower than those for the 
GARCH model in table 28.  Interestingly the Spanish and to a lesser extent Greek markets 
seem to have decreased the most.  As noted earlier, under certain circumstances one can 
consider the existence of non-normal residuals is an indicator for non-efficient markets. 
With regard to the serial correlation, the Q-statistics of the correlogram seem to be hinting 
at a high correlation.  At the single lagged level, the Q-statistic for all our samples does not 
drop below 616.39 as observed by the US.  Considering that, ideally the Q-statistics should 
be zero, the importance of these statistics for the estimated models highlighted in Table 42.  
Hence, the statistics hint at a significant amount of serial correlation in the residuals.  The 
interesting factor is that these statistics highlight a rise in the series correlation from the 
GARCH model in table 28.  As previously stated, the existence of autocorrelated residuals 
usually implies the omission of important variables from the regression.  In the current 
framework, the fact that other variables may be important to determine bond prices seems 
to be indicating inefficient markets. 
In essence, the test for the heteroskedasticity is a test for remaining ARCH effect in the 
residuals.  The F-statistics seem to be wielding very widely between approaching no 
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ARCH effect to a significant ARCH effect remaining.  In essence, the two lowest are the 
Italian and Spanish markets with F-statistics below one, thus meaning a significantly low 
ARCH effect remaining.  The highest is the Greek market hinting at a significant ARCH 
effect remaining.  The increases in the Greek and to a certain extent then Spanish markets 
on the results from table 28 seem to be hinting that a large percentage of the ARCH effect 
is due to the GJR-GARCH model.  However, all the other observed markets are hinting at 
a reduction in the ARCH effect. 
 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
 
0.004718 
(4.28E-05) 
 
0.001971 
(2.46E-05) 
 
0.014725 
(0.000252) 
 
0.002074 
(3.59E-05) 
 
0.005314 
(0.000153) 
 
0.002776 
(8.83E-05) 
b 0.981760 (0.000756) 
0.990280 
(0.000788) 
0.991871 
(0.000796) 
0.992199 
(0.000878) 
0.985286 
(0.000837) 
0.991562 
(0.000925) 
ϵ 0.713804 (0.006172) 
0.712868 
(0.006878) 
0.717175 
(0.004099) 
0.727280 
(0.006702) 
0.757204 
(0.006929) 
0.742174 
(0.006981) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
3.13E-08 
(9.68E-09) 
3.11E-08 
(8.33E-09) 
1.47E-05 
(1.00E-06) 
1.31E-07 
(3.40E-08) 
5.42E-06 
(7.46E-07) 
1.13E-06 
(1.87E-07) 
α  1.796321 (0.167025) 
1.878929 
(0.156243) 
1.481097 
(0.086233) 
2.078245 
(0.194462) 
1.987364 
(0.181877) 
2.025392 
(0.181242) 
β 0.29755 (0.016376) 
0.247206 
(0.014669) 
0.235425 
(0.008610) 
0.220256 
(0.014229) 
0.158464 
(0.014091) 
0.197475 
(0.014350) 
γ -0.47366 (0.173375) 
-0.46492 
(0.178392) 
-0.41363 
(0.111463) 
-0.47485 
(0.202053) 
-0.46603 
(0.200808) 
-0.50504 
(0.195955) 
Statistics 
Log Likelihood 7562.003 8512.469 5023.944 8149.936 6373.905 7125.949 
Standard Deviation 0.560344 0.216199 5.963928 0.202834 0.806295 0.235362 
EMH Test 
EMH Test Statistics 1.106845 3.058381 0.050788 4.060725 0.843117 3.049893 
Efficiency Accept Reject Accept Reject Accept Reject 
Table 43: GJR-GARCH EMH Test Statistics of the 2012 Bond (01/07/2002-30/12/2011) 
As illustrated by table 43, all our b coefficients are greater than 0.98 with a standard error 
of less than 0.0009, thus hinting at the price variance taking longer to revert to the 
unconditional mean after a shock to the market.  However, the white noise dictated by ϵ is 
high with all the markets standing in the low to mid 0.7s with a low standard error.  It is 
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worth remembering the mean equation is not the focal point to this part.  In comparison 
with table 29, the b coefficients seem to be hinting at the price variance taking longer to 
revert to the unconditional mean with the GJR-GARCH in all but the Greek market.  
However, this means a reduction in the white noise with the exception of the German 
market. 
As illustrated by table 43, all the markets have an advantage effect hinting at negative 
shocks having a greater impact than positive shocks.  With the exception of the Greek and 
Spanish markets, the evidence on the individual markets seems to be suggesting a 
uniformed leverage effect among the markets.  Interestingly, the Greek market has a lower 
asymmetrical coefficient than the others do.  A possible explanation is the size and liquidity 
of the Greek market may have an impact, since the market is relatively small, the reaction 
to events affecting the sovereign debt market is not likely to be large.  In contrast to the 
Greek market, the Spanish market has a higher asymmetrical coefficient than the others 
do.  Table 55 portrays a possible explanation for the leverage effect underpinning the GIPS 
markets, since this observational period encapsulates the sovereign debt crisis period.  
Additionally, the financial and sovereign debt crises could also explain the high 
asymmetrical coefficient of the US as illustrated by tables 51 and 55.  However, subsequent 
observational periods do not explain the relatively high asymmetrical coefficient of the 
German market. 
With the exception of the Greek market, the α coefficients seem to be hinting at relatively 
high levels of sensitivity to market shocks.  Furthermore, the remaining observed Eurozone 
markets have a higher sensitivity levels than the US market.  Interestingly, with the 
exception of the Greek market the inclusion of the asymmetrical effect had the impact of 
raising the sensitivity levels as illustrated by table 29.  The Greek market is interesting 
because it would seem that the asymmetrical effect had made the market less reactive to 
market shocks, even though the asymmetrical effect is a leverage effect like all the other 
observed markets.  This seems to be suggesting the asymmetrical effect can account for 
some of the shocks to the volatility.   
Apart from the Portuguese and Spanish markets, the β coefficients seem to be hinting at 
relatively high levels of persisting volatility in the market and moreover the US market has 
the highest persisting volatility among the observe markets.  As illustrated by table 29, to 
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a certain extent, the impact from the inclusion of the asymmetrical effect has not increased 
the persistence of the volatility in the aftermath of a shock to the market by much.  
Interestingly, this statement does not apply to the Greek and, to a lesser extent, Portuguese 
markets where the impact from the inclusion of the asymmetrical effect certainly made the 
volatility increasingly persistence in the aftermath of a crisis.  Hence, like the α coefficient 
for the Greek market, the β coefficient seems to be illustrating the affinity of the Greek 
market to the impact from the asymmetrical effect with a sharp increase.   
It is worth noticing that three markets do accept the efficient market hypothesis: US, Greek 
and Portuguese markets.  In contrast, the significant EMH test statistics of the German, 
Italian and Spanish markets seem to be strongly accepting the null hypothesis of the market 
being too volatile to be efficient.  However, rather interestingly the inclusion of the 
asymmetrical effect has decreased the EMH test statistics for all the observed markets.  Yet 
despite this reduction, the efficiency of the observed markets remains the same as 
illustrated by table 29. 
 US German Greek* Italian Portuguese Spanish 
AIC -6.137893 -6.910637 -4.142129 -6.616689 -5.172644 -5.783334 
SBC -6.121366 -6.894110 -4.125603 -6.600162 -5.156118 -5.766807 
HQC -6.131888 -6.904632 -4.136125 -6.610684 -5.166639 -5.777329 
Table 44: 2012 Bond GARCH (EMH) Model Analysis (01/07/2002-30/12/2011) 
 US* German* Greek Italian* Portuguese* Spanish* 
AIC -6.141466 -6.914203 -4.078816 -6.619460 -5.175532 -5.786951 
SBC -6.122578 -6.895315 -4.062290 -6.600572 -5.156645 -5.768063 
HQC -6.134603 -6.907340 -4.072811 -6.612597 -5.168669 -5.780088 
Table 45: 2012 Bond GJR-GARCH (EMH) Model Analysis (01/07/2002-30/12/2011) 
According to tables 44 and 45, the information criterions seem to be hinting at the best 
model to explain the information contained within the price variance is the GJR-GARCH 
model with the exception of the Greek market.  This means that the addition of the 
asymmetrical effect has the advantage of the GJR-GARCH model fully explaining the 
information contained in the five observed markets and since we are testing the efficiency 
of the market, it is important that the model does reflect the information contained.  
 158 
 
However, the Greek market is hinting at the GARCH model being able to explain the 
information contained in the price variance. 
Tables 46 and 47 illustrate the statistical analysis and estimated model for the pre-crisis 
period.  Two different issues highlighted the period: the first issue being the highly volatile 
period of the early parts, which was the combination of a number of events as hinted in 
sections 2.4.4 and 4.2.1.  The evidence seems to suggest two different impacts influenced 
the period.  The first impact occurred during the early parts of the pre-crisis subsample and 
was mainly due to the introduction of the euro and extreme events, which lead to Knightian 
uncertainty such as the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.  The second impact occurred 
during the later stages of the pre-crisis subsample and was mainly due to the asset price 
bubble.  The different between these two impacts on the sovereign debt market is the first 
impact had the impression of a highly volatile market whereas during the asset price bubble 
the impression was of low volatility and prices in the sovereign debt market.   
 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.985531 0.979528 0.979454 0.980530 0.979993 0.980953 
Adjusted R2 0.985508 0.979496 0.979422 0.980500 0.979961 0.980923 
Jarque-Bera  899.84 548.97 766.72 1112.87 1225.63 765.16 
Q-Statistics (Correlogram) 355.03 479.30 495.56 432.50 450.94 442.92 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 0.384849 2.237703 2.447778 2.465125 1.620070 1.712269 
Table 46: 2012 Bond GJR-GARCH EMH Residuals Statistics (01/07/2002-29/06/2007) 
As illustrated by tables 46 and 30, the R2 and adjusted R2 remain relatively unchanged 
hinting at all the models being a good fit to the dependent variable.  With the exception of 
the Greek market, the Jarque-Bera tests seem to be pointing at a slight increase hinting at 
the statistics still accepting the null hypothesis of non-normality.  Conversely, the Q-
statistics also seem to be hinting at a significant serial correlation.  Although there is a 
significant reduction in the F-statistics of the Portuguese and Spanish markets, yet with the 
exception of the US market, the F-statistics remain high. 
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 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
0.002250 
(0.000434) 
 
0.001103 
(0.000327) 
 
0.013936 
(0.000417) 
 
0.001479 
(0.000317) 
 
0.005014 
(0.000363) 
 
0.002960 
(0.000388) 
b 1.002679 (0.001199) 
1.010206 
(0.002170) 
0.992984 
(0.002117) 
1.006970 
(0.002011) 
0.992200 
(0.002003) 
0.985914 
(0.001873) 
ϵ 0.749415 (0.007641) 
0.729584 
(0.011159) 
0.679615 
(0.011011) 
0.768757 
(0.010708) 
0.745118 
(0.010372) 
0.772916 
(0.010728) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
2.61E-05 
(5.13E-06) 
 
9.50E-06 
(1.65E-06) 
 
1.15E-05 
(2.02E-06) 
8.60E-06 
(1.68E-06) 
 
1.20E-05 
(2.03E-06) 
 
1.64E-05 
(2.52E-06) 
α 1.617939 (0.207861) 
1.519302 
(0.191128) 
1.516549 
(0.186904) 
1.477531 
(0.205162) 
1.519331 
(0.197461) 
1.458529 
(0.189148) 
β 0.171466  (0.022344) 
0.178823 
(0.025907) 
0.171924 
(0.023894) 
0.217932 
(0.028624) 
0.178277 
(0.023354) 
0.172782 
(0.025086) 
γ -0.189597  (0.243610) 
-0.301126 
(0.226530) 
-0.298920 
(0.226349) 
-0.316765 
(0.220031) 
-0.282134 
(0.225726) 
-0.236220 
(0.220606) 
Statistics 
Log Likelihood 2717.475 3436.803 3331.135 3477.286 3333.378 3297.518 
Standard Deviation 0.699244 0.257346 0.260240 0.243392 0.260696 0.273801 
EMH Test 
EMH Test Statistics 0.857795 1.542666 1.496899 1.555912 1.593711 1.442986 
Efficiency Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept 
Table 47: GJR-GARCH EMH Test Statistics of the 2012 Bond (01/07/2002-29/06/2007) 
As with Table 31, table 47 hints at high b coefficients during the pre-crisis period.  With 
the exception of the Greek, Portuguese and Spanish markets, this seem to be suggesting 
that the observed markets do not revert to the unconditional mean after a shock to the price 
variance.  These markets all have b coefficients greater than 1.0 with a standard error of 
greater than 0.0011.  However, the three remaining markets with b coefficients of less than 
1.0 and standard errors of higher than 0.0017 do slowly revert back to the unconditional 
mean.  Also like table 31, the residuals seem to be hinting at a significant amount of white 
noise with ϵ coefficients of greater than 0.7 and standard errors greater than 0.01 thru all 
the market except for the US.   
As illustrated by table 47, the asymmetrical coefficients for the entire observed markets 
hint at a negative asymmetrical or leverage effect meaning negative shocks have a greater 
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impact on the market than positive shocks of the same magnitude.  It is worth noting that 
a key factor underpinning the impact of an asymmetrical or leverage effect is the decision 
of the market participants on whether information has a positive or negative impact on the 
asset.  Hence, a possible explanation for the negative asymmetrical coefficients is the 
indecision of the market participants with respect to the major event of the time; in essence, 
the introduction of the euro caused a lot of confusion among the market participants.  It is 
worth remembering high volatility blighted the early part of this period and although there 
were many highly volatile factors, influencing the early parts of this period.  Nonetheless, 
the main factor was the introduction of the euro.  Another influencing factor is the asset 
price bubble in the later stages of the period associated with the stable sovereign debt 
markets and low prices towards the end of the pre-crisis period; hence any negative event 
amplifies the reaction of the market participants due to their perspectives.   
With the exception of the US market, the α coefficients are hinting at relatively low levels 
of sensitivity to market shocks.  In truth, the US market does not hint at a high level of 
sensitivity to market shocks.  However, the five Eurozone markets do seem to be hinting 
at relatively low sensitivity levels.  Although on the face of it, the asymmetrical effect does 
not seem to have had an impact on the α coefficient, yet on closer inspection as illustrated 
by table 31, the asymmetrical effect seem to have had a decreasing impact on the sensitivity 
levels of all the markets. 
The β coefficients seem to be hinting at relatively low volatility persistence in the aftermath 
of a crisis in the market, especially the US, Greek and Spanish markets.  Although in 
comparison, the persistence in the Italian market does seem to be large.  Yet the Italian 
market does hint at a low persistence level.  As pointed by table 31, the addition of the 
asymmetrical effect does seem to have affected the levels of persistence in the observed 
markets.  Essentially, the asymmetrical effect had increased the persistent levels thru all 
the observed markets. 
It is worth noticing that all the observed markets accept the efficient market hypothesis.  
However, interestingly the inclusion of the asymmetrical effect has decreased the EMH 
test statistics for all the observed markets as pointed by table 31.  Conversely, this reduction 
led to the acceptance of the efficient market hypothesis by all the markets.  This is due to 
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the Eurozone markets with the exception of the Spanish narrowly rejecting the efficient 
market hypothesis in table 31. 
 US* German* Greek* Italian* Portuguese* Spanish* 
AIC -4.217883 -5.335655 -5.171159 -5.398201 -5.175061 -5.119853 
SBC -4.189782 -5.307554 -5.143058 -5.370100 -5.146960 -5.091752 
HQC -4.207334 -5.325105 -5.160609 -5.387652 -5.164511 -5.109303 
Table 48: 2012 Bond GARCH (EMH) Model Analysis (01/07/2002-29/06/2007) 
 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
AIC -4.217081 -5.336659 -5.172195 -5.399667 -5.175686 -5.119872 
SBC -4.184966 -5.304544 -5.140080 -5.367552 -5.143571 -5.087757 
HQC -4.205025 -5.324602 -5.160139 -5.387611 -5.163629 -5.107815 
Table 49: 2012 Bond GJR-GARCH (EMH) Model Analysis (01/07/2002-29/06/2007) 
According to tables 48 and 49, the information criterions seem to be hinting at the best 
model to explain the information contained within the price variance is the GARCH model 
for all observed markets.  This means that the omission of the asymmetrical effect has the 
advantage of the GARCH model fully explaining the information contained in the all the 
observed markets.  This is interesting due to the GJR-GARCH model being able to accept 
the efficient market hypothesis for all observed markets.  However, another interesting 
factor is that the AIC seem to be accepting the GJR-GARCH for all the observed markets 
in contrast to the SBC and HQC. 
Tables 50 and 51 illustrate the impact from the financial crisis of the late 2000s.  In mid-
2007 a number of international banks (e.g. Bear Stearns and BNP Paribas) recorded losses 
on their off-balance sheet activities associated with the MBS or CDO, which resulted in 
flights to liquidity and quality.  As the financial crisis spread, the credit market froze 
therefore non-financial corporations could not find the money required and hence the crisis 
spread to the equity and corporate bonds market.  In essence, this meant an increase in 
market activities in the observed markets as market participants sought the safety of the 
sovereign debt market.   
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 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.979223 0.979485 0.976535 0.980444 0.978762 0.978033 
Adjusted R2 0.979155 0.979418 0.976458 0.980379 0.978692 0.977961 
Jarque-Bera  1745.37 473.09 81.05 333.76 77.13 2278.62 
Q-Statistics  (Correlogram) 89.31 208.20 230.11 179.79 199.75 148.57 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 0.106963 0.884602 4.926133 0.156402 1.488080 0.019445 
Table 50: 2012 Bond GJR-GARCH EMH Residuals Statistics (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
As illustrated by tables 50 and 32, the R2 and adjusted R2 remain relatively unchanged 
hinting at all the models being a good fit to the dependent variable.  And with the exception 
of the increases in the US and German markets, the Jarque-Bera tests seem to be pointing 
at a relatively slight increase hinting at the markets still accepting the null hypothesis of 
non-normality.  Conversely, with the exception of the decreases in the US and German 
markets, the Q-statistics seem to be hinting at a slight increase.  Yet all of the observed 
markets hint at significant serial correlation.  Although there is a slight increase in the F-
statistics of the Portuguese and Spanish markets, however, with the obvious exception of 
the Greek market, the F-statistics are low hinting at a very low ARCH effect.  The German 
market is interesting because the F-statistic is much lower using the GJR-GARCH than the 
GARCH model. 
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 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
0.004796 
(0.000204) 
0.001772 
(0.000190) 
0.015970 
(0.000487) 
0.001989 
(0.000257) 
0.005261 
(0.000405) 
0.002262 
(0.000248) 
b 0.974958 (0.001581) 
0.987673 
(0.001896) 
0.998053 
(0.001793) 
0.997661 
(0.001765) 
0.991626 
(0.001820) 
1.000558 
(0.001707) 
ϵ 0.699719 (0.011537) 
0.683483 
(0.015206) 
0.781356 
(0.012194) 
0.799973 
(0.011800) 
0.819527 
(0.013501) 
0.713470 
(0.013905) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
1.63E-06 
(7.11E-07) 
1.30E-06 
(4.37E-07) 
1.49E-05 
(2.94E-06) 
4.49E-06 
(9.00E-07) 
1.49E-05 
(2.50E-06) 
4.19E-06 
(1.08E-06) 
α  3.361139 (0.941532) 
1.682167 
(0.305531) 
1.56118 
(0.245778) 
1.844676 
(0.335691) 
1.51262 
(0.275942) 
2.257028 
(0.462730) 
β 0.205077 (0.033263) 
0.208921 
(0.034590) 
0.089461 
(0.026248) 
0.061464 
(0.023683) 
0.075603 
(0.023654) 
0.098107 
(0.027931) 
γ -1.334381 (0.712667) 
-0.324735 
(0.358297) 
-0.044722 
(0.368074) 
-0.113284 
(0.430284) 
-0.209147 
(0.331943) 
-0.177109 
(0.520074) 
Statistics 
Log Likelihood 1624.479 1912.030 1675.797 2016.549 1817.726 1794.128 
Standard Deviation 0.223842 0.133095 0.189977 0.116066 0.157186 0.141228 
EMH Test 
EMH Test Statistics 
 
5.503145 
 
4.255254 
 
3.189433 
 
6.831079 
 
2.41164 
 
8.341306 
Efficiency Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject 
Table 51: GJR-GARCH EMH Test Statistics of the 2012 Bond (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
As with table 33, table 51 hints at relatively high b coefficients during the financial crisis 
period.  With the exception of the Spanish market, this seem to be suggesting that the 
observed markets do revert to the unconditional mean after a shock to the price variance.  
These markets all have b coefficients greater than 0.97 with a standard error of less than 
0.0019.  However, the Spanish market with a b coefficients of greater than 1.0 and standard 
errors of higher than 0.0017 does not revert to the unconditional mean.  Also like table 33, 
the residuals seem to be hinting at a significant amount of white noise with ϵ coefficients 
of greater than 0.7 and standard errors greater than 0.01 thru all the markets except for the 
US and German.  The US and German markets are hinting at a reduction to below 0.7 in 
comparison with table 33.   
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During the financial crisis period, the asymmetrical coefficients were hinting at a leverage 
effect for all the observed markets as illustrated by table 51.  With the exception of the 
Greek market, the effect seems to be significant.  However, the asymmetrical coefficient 
of the US market is significantly high hinting at a large movement in the market volatility 
following a negative shock to the market.  Given that during the financial crisis the prices 
of sovereign debt did consistently deviate from the expected price due to market 
participants engaging in flight to safety from risky assets such as MBS, CDO and shares 
and bonds of financial firms.  It is worth remembering that the prices of these assets 
plummeted, especially in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on 15th 
September 2008, an example is the Dow Jones Average index, which fell from 13,950 on 
16th July 2007 to 6,547 on 9th March 2009.  This partly explains the high leverage effect in 
the US market and to a lesser extent the German market that as stated previously is the risk 
free market in the Eurozone.  It must be noted that as previously stated the size and liquidity 
of the Greek market meant that the impact from any event during the financial crisis did 
not have a large impact on the asymmetrical coefficient which meant a near zero leverage 
effect. 
The α coefficients are interesting because they truly reflect the different impact of the 
financial crisis on the observed sovereign debt markets, and whereas the α coefficient seem 
to be illustrating the obviously high levels of sensitivity to market shocks in the US market 
during the financial crisis.  What is more interesting with the α coefficient of the US market 
is that it is the highest of all the observations.  This points to a huge impact on the levels 
of sensitivity to market shocks.  Equally interesting is the Spanish market, which was to a 
certain degree the most affected country by the financial crisis within the Eurozone, does 
point to a significantly large level of sensitivity to market shocks.  The remaining observed 
markets seem to be hinting at a limited impact from the financial crisis.  However, as 
illustrated by table 33, certainly the asymmetrical effect had the impact of raising the levels 
of sensitivity to shocks in all the observed markets. 
With the exception of the US and German markets, the β coefficients hints at a low level 
of volatility persistence in the observed markets during the financial crisis.  In contrast the 
US and German markets seem to be confirming the high levels of volatility persistence in 
the advent of the financial crisis.  Not surprisingly during the financial crisis as illustrated 
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by table 33, the asymmetrical effect had the impact of rising the β coefficients of all the 
observed markets and hence the levels of persistence in the markets. 
The EMH test statistics seem to be hinting at the acceptance of the null hypothesis of the 
market being too volatile to be efficient in all the observed markets.  With the exception of 
the Portuguese market, the EMH test statistics are significantly greater than the F-statistic.  
As table 33 hints, the inclusion of the asymmetrical effect did not have a significant impact 
on the EMH test statistics.  Having said that, the EMH test statistic for the German market 
seem to be going against the norm for this period in deviating further from the efficient 
market. 
 US German Greek* Italian* Portuguese* Spanish* 
AIC -5.292438 -6.233026 -5.471423 -6.588486 -5.935669 -5.859106 
SBC -5.241792 -6.182380 -5.420776 -6.537840 -5.885023 -5.808460 
HQC -5.272737 -6.213325 -5.451722 -6.568785 -5.915968 -5.839405 
Table 52: 2012 Bond GARCH (EMH) Model Analysis (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
 US* German* Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
AIC -5.299932 -6.242723 -5.468187 -6.585406 -5.933527 -5.856157 
SBC -5.242050 -6.184841 -5.410305 -6.527525 -5.875645 -5.798276 
HQC -5.277417 -6.220207 -5.445671 -6.562891 -5.911011 -5.833642 
Table 53: 2012 Bond GJR-GARCH (EMH) Model Analysis (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
According to tables 52 and 53, the information criterions seem to be hinting at the best 
model to explain the information contained within the price variance is the GARCH model 
with the exception of the US and German markets.  This means that the addition of the 
asymmetrical effect has the advantage of the GJR-GARCH model fully explaining the 
information contained in the US and German markets and since we are testing the 
efficiency of the market, it is important that the model does reflect the information 
contained.  However, the remaining observed markets are hinting at the GARCH model 
being able to explain the information contained in the market. 
Tables 54 and 55 are associated with the Eurozone sovereign debt and US fiscal cliff crises.  
Essentially, the sovereign debt crises was the product of the governments providing much 
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needed capital for the banking system and following a fiscal stimulus policy to support the 
economy after the financial crisis.  This added a substantial amount to an already large total 
debt.  However, as previously explained an influencing factor to bear in mind is the 
maturity effect.  Another influencing factor is in order to provide liquidity and boost the 
economy, many central banks embarked on a quantitative easing policy; this helped 
maintain the artificially high prices and more importantly low yields in some markets 
especially the US. 
 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.984772 0.985281 0.985480 0.983567 0.986223 0.984275 
Adjusted R2 0.984718 0.985229 0.985428 0.983509 0.986174 0.984219 
Jarque-Bera  86.41 347.59 1069.56 143.20 212.12 238.64 
Q-Statistics (Correlogram) 184.91 207.21 217.15 192.05 215.62 161.11 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 2.223018 4.788012 110.0445 5.560962 7.049023 0.131579 
Table 54: 2012 Bond GJR-GARCH EMH Residuals Statistics (02/11/2009-30/12/2011) 
As illustrated by tables 54 and 34, the R2 and adjusted R2 remain relatively unchanged 
hinting at all the models being a good fit to the dependent variable.  With the exception of 
the increase in the Portuguese and Spanish markets, the Jarque-Bera tests seem to be 
pointing at a reduction.  Interestingly the GJR-GARCH model seems to be hinting at a 
significant reduction to the Greek Jarque-Bera statistics.  Nevertheless, the test is still 
hinting at the acceptance of the null hypothesis of non-normality for all observed markets.  
Conversely, the Q-statistics for all the observed markets seem to be hinting at an increase 
especially the Greek market meaning all the observed markets hint at significant serial 
correlation.  Although with the exception of the Greek and Portuguese markets, there is a 
reduction in the F-statistics.  However, with the exception of the Spanish market, the F-
statistics are hinting at a high ARCH effect.  The Greek market is interesting because the 
F-statistic is much higher using the GJR-GARCH than the GARCH model. 
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 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
0.004611 
(0.000125) 
0.002081 
(5.62E-05) 
0.034489 
(0.100328) 
0.002517 
(4.29E-05) 
0.005097 
(0.000137) 
0.003162 
(8.54E-05) 
b 0.982766 (0.003688) 
0.993686 
(0.001894) 
0.982734 
(0.004985) 
0.969560 
(0.001634) 
0.984177 
(0.000865) 
0.999832 
(0.001766) 
ϵ 0.698886 (0.019263) 
0.759687 
(0.019821) 
1.138810 
(0.038076) 
0.829390 
(0.012387) 
0.745970 
(0.012060) 
0.836750 
(0.012703) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
3.43E-08 
(8.72E-09) 
4.38E-08 
(9.19E-09) 
0.697604 
(0.104858) 
1.46E-07 
(3.20E-08) 
4.42E-07 
(2.02E-07) 
5.17E-07 
(1.55E-07) 
α  1.104164 (0.198694) 
1.548027 
(0.270511) 
0.711551 
(0.179001) 
2.093871 
(0.318346) 
2.195565 
(0.236310) 
2.775620 
(0.592585) 
β 0.256096 (0.048658) 
0.120869 
(0.029296) 
-0.00614 
(0.000157) 
0.055148 
(0.026693) 
0.267627 
(0.014937) 
0.094363 
(0.024345) 
γ -0.25853 (0.223850) 
-0.34541 
(0.328236) 
-0.02664 
(0.256421) 
-0.50411 
(0.423612) 
-0.95724 
(0.285304) 
-1.00184 
(0.551071) 
Statistics 
Log Likelihood 3306.247 3234.314 -581.148 2732.289 1230.006 2080.447 
Standard Deviation 0.017740 0.013194 11.48550 0.064861 1.517370 0.190863 
EMH Test 
EMH Test Statistics 5.734724 24.51766 -0.02797 9.942986 0.333442 4.548493 
Efficiency Reject Reject Accept Reject Accept Reject 
Table 55: GJR-GARCH EMH Test Statistics of the 2012 Bond (02/11/2009-30/12/2011) 
As with table 35, table 55 hints at relatively high b coefficients during the sovereign debt 
crisis period.  This seem to be suggesting that the observed markets do revert to the 
unconditional mean after a shock to the price variance.  These markets all have b 
coefficients greater than 0.97 (except for the Greek market) with a standard error of less 
than 0.0019 (except for the US market).  However, the Spanish market, with a b coefficient 
of greater than 1.0 in table 35, does now revert to the unconditional mean.  Like table 35, 
the residuals seem to be hinting at a significant amount of white noise with ϵ coefficients 
of greater than 0.7 and standard errors greater than 0.01 thru all the markets except for the 
US market.  The US markets is hinting at a reduction to below 0.7 in comparison with table 
35.  Interestingly, the increase in the white noise of the Greek market is significant   
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The asymmetrical coefficients in table 55 are indicating a leverage effect during the period 
accounting for the sovereign debt crisis.  With the exception of the Greek market, the 
evidence seems to be pointing at a significant leverage effect.  Interestingly, the 
asymmetrical coefficient of the Greek market is insignificantly low considering the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis.  As highlighted on numerous times previously, the size and liquidity 
of the Greek market may provide a partial explanation.  However, the asymmetrical 
coefficients for the remaining observed markets hint at a mixed picture with the Portuguese 
and Spanish markets hinting at a highly significant leverage effect.  The argument is as 
discussed earlier the Portuguese market is of a similar in size and liquidity to the Greek 
market and therefore should response to events in similar fashion.  The answer probably 
lays in the timing of the crises in both markets while the Greek crisis occurred at the start 
of the subsample period, the impact of the crisis did not spread to the Portuguese market 
until mid-2010.  It is worth noting that the price of the Portuguese bond was not 
consistently below 100 until end of March 2011 while the price of the Greek bond was 
consistently below 100 from the end of January 2010.  Another key factor is since for the 
asymmetrical coefficient to be insignificant, the market has to be indifferent between the 
positive and negative impact.  This is the key issue underpinning the Greek market over 
the duration of this period; the impact on the volatility from the Greek crisis was short and 
had sharp negative and positive impacts.  Although a hike in volatility affected the 
Portuguese market, it was not as sharp and short as the Greek market; hence, the estimated 
GJR-GARCH model was able to observe a high leverage effect in the Portuguese market.  
However, another key explanation as to the significant of the asymmetrical coefficient in 
the Portuguese market is in the estimation model, due to an error in the estimation we had 
to use the BHHH optimization.  This had a bigger impact on the asymmetrical coefficient. 
Not surprisingly, the α coefficients seem to be split along the impact of the sovereign debt 
crisis with the US and German markets hinting at a relative low levels of sensitivity to 
market shocks.  However, with the exception of the Greek market, the GIPS nations are 
pointing at a high level of sensitivity to market shocks.  Conversely, the interesting factor 
is the significantly low α coefficient of the Greek market, which seems to be contradicting 
table 35.  The Greek α coefficient seems to be suggesting the lowest level of sensitivity to 
market shocks observed in both models thru all observations.  The other key statistics 
observed in the Greek market provide a clue, which seem to be pointing at an insignificant 
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impact throughout table 55.  Hence, the impact from the inclusion of the asymmetrical 
effect seems to have rendered all coefficients of the Greek market insignificant during the 
sovereign debt crisis.  However, the asymmetrical effect did have an impact on the α 
coefficients for the remaining markets raising the levels of sensitivity to market shocks. 
Since all the coefficients of the Greek market rendered insignificant by the GJR-GARCH 
model, the β coefficients for the remaining observed markets seem to be painting a rather 
mixed picture.  While the US and Portuguese markets seem to be suggesting a high level 
of persistence in the market.  The Italian and Spanish markets are hinting at insignificant 
β coefficients.  Interestingly this means that three of the four GIPS markets have 
insignificant levels of persistence.  As illustrated by table 35, with the exception of the 
Spanish market, the inclusion asymmetrical effect seems to have increased the volatility 
persistence of the observed markets in the aftermath of a shock. 
With the exception of the Greek and Portuguese markets, the EMH test statistics seem to 
be hinting at the acceptance of the null hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be 
efficient.  All the observed inefficient markets have EMH test statistics that are 
significantly greater than the F-statistic.  Interestingly the Greek market is the only market 
with a negative EMH test statistic; however, the negative EMH test statistic is still within 
the range of acceptance.  Hence, the Greek market rejects the null hypothesis.  Although 
the inclusion of the asymmetrical effect did not have an impact on the resulting efficiency 
of the market, however it did decrease the EMH test statistics.  Conversely, the EMH test 
statistic for the German market is still significantly higher than the observed markets, with 
the inclusion of the asymmetrical effect hinting at a large deviation from the efficient 
market. 
 US* German* Greek* Italia* Portuguese Spanish 
AIC -11.67568 -11.42098 0.153536 -9.643240 -4.311702 -7.330210 
SBC -11.62195 -11.36725 0.199590 -9.589509 -4.265647 -7.276480 
HQC -11.65471 -11.40001 0.171512 -9.622268 -4.293726 -7.309238 
Table 56: 2012 Bond GARCH (EMH) Model Analysis (02/11/2009-30/12/2011) 
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 US German Greek Italian Portuguese* Spanish* 
AIC -11.67521 -11.42058 2.085480 -9.643500 -4.329227 -7.336095 
SBC -11.61380 -11.35917 2.146886 -9.582094 -4.275496 -7.274689 
HQC -11.65124 -11.39661 2.109448 -9.619532 -4.308254 -7.312127 
Table 57: 2012 Bond GJR-GARCH (EMH) Model Analysis (02/11/2009-30/12/2011) 
According to tables 56 and 57, the information criterions seem to be hinting at the best 
model to explain the information contained within the price variance is the GARCH model, 
with the exception of the Portuguese and Spanish markets.  This means that the addition of 
the asymmetrical effect has the advantage of the GJR-GARCH model fully explaining the 
information contained in the Portuguese and Spanish markets and since we are testing the 
efficiency of the market, it is important that the model does reflect the information 
contained.   
Tables 58 and 59 illustrates the full impact from both crises on the efficiency of the 
observed sovereign debt markets.  As hinted previously, the extended observations allow 
us to analyse the fuller impact of the sovereign debt crisis.  Conversely, as stated earlier it 
also allows us to overcome the maturity effect, yet it also introduces the “on-the-run” 
effect.  In a way, the combination of the financial and sovereign debt crises should make 
the market highly volatile and reactive meaning the asymmetrical effect is interesting. 
 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.987775 0.981802 0.985126 0.984982 0.982759 
Adjusted R2 0.987758 0.981778 0.985106 0.984961 0.982736 
Jarque-Bera  16412.36 1387.75 1137.92 1555.60 1697.91 
Q-Statistics (Correlogram) 294.54 468.83 416.13 418.10 435.88 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 5.14E-05 1.396875 2.706063 0.582979 1.791602 
Table 58: 2017 Bond GJR-GARCH EMH Residuals Statistics (02//07/2007-29/03/2013) 
As illustrated by table 58, a key factor is the high R2 and adjusted R2.  The R2 is above 0.98 
through all the estimated GJR-GARCH models hinting at the lagged price variance with 
the estimated residuals being highly able to explain the movement in the price variance.  In 
addition, the significantly high-adjusted R2 seem to be pointing at the estimated GJR-
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GARCH model being a good fit to the dependent variable across all the markets.  These 
two statistics partly illustrates our GJR-GARCH model is correctly specified to test all the 
markets for the null hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be efficient.  
Interestingly, with the exception of the US and German markets, the R2 and adjusted R2 
seem to have increased in comparison with table 36.  This is interesting due to the GIPS 
countries favouring one model and the benchmark countries, i.e. the US and Germany, 
favouring another model.   
The Jarque-Bera test for all the markets seem to be hinting at a significant acceptance of 
the null hypothesis of non-normality in the distribution of the residuals.  Additionally, the 
Jarque-Bera statistics seem to be hinting at the US market being significantly greater than 
the other countries.  Conversely, the Italian market is lower than all the other markets.  
However, the evidence seem to be suggesting with the exception of the Portuguese market, 
the Jarque Bera statistics are lower than those for the GARCH model in table 36.  
Remember under certain circumstances the consideration of existence of non-normal 
residuals as an indicator for non-efficient markets. 
With regard to the serial correlation, the Q-statistics of the correlogram seem to be hinting 
at a high correlation.  At the single lagged level, the Q-statistic for all our samples does not 
drop below 294.54 as observed by the USA.  The interesting factor is that with the 
exception of the Italian these statistics highlight a rise in the series correlation from the 
GARCH model in table 36.  Remember the existence of autocorrelated residuals usually 
implies the omission of important variables from the regression.  In the current framework, 
the fact that other variables may be important to determine bond prices seems to be 
indicating inefficient markets. 
The F-statistics seem to be wielding very widely between approaching no ARCH effect to 
significant ARCH effect remaining.  In essence, the two lowest F-statistics are the US and 
Portuguese markets with an F-statistics below one, thus meaning significantly low ARCH 
effect remaining.  The highest F-statistic is that of the Italian market hinting at a significant 
ARCH effect remaining.  In comparison with table 36, the observed markets hint at a 
reduction in the ARCH effect except for the German and Italia markets. 
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 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
0.009322 
(0.000173) 
0.004464 
(0.000382) 
0.009899 
(0.000344) 
0.042894 
(0.000805) 
0.008362 
(0.000509) 
b 0.994000 (0.000985) 
1.003184 
(0.001175) 
0.996090 
(0.000819) 
0.974679 
(0.000633) 
0.993579 
(0.000973) 
ϵ 0.715953 (0.008007) 
0.747434 
(0.010223) 
0.743969 
(0.008990) 
0.838783 
(0.009540) 
0.718223 
(0.009307) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
1.34E-06 
(4.20E-07) 
2.02E-05 
(3.47E-06) 
2.00E-05 
(3.46E-06) 
0.000123 
(2.20E-05) 
5.80E-05 
(9.09E-06) 
α  2.100291 (0.272322) 
1.558723 
(0.200247) 
1.936111 
(0.212740) 
2.122838 
(0.249824) 
2.088818 
(0.255098) 
β 0.251858 (0.020892) 
0.180358 
(0.022155) 
0.144515 
(0.019124) 
0.13376 
(0.017633) 
0.115353 
(0.017244) 
γ -0.39551 (0.267432) 
-0.06761 
(0.225540) 
-0.36191 
(0.248899) 
-0.51457 
(0.266990) 
-0.41596 
(0.275646) 
Statistics 
Log Likelihood 2927.945 3350.545 2841.688 1040.093 2496.294 
Standard Deviation 1.067295 0.344854 1.070745 4.984212 1.102358 
EMH Test 
EMH Test Statistics 0.896326 1.947123 0.671234 0.148875 0.715023 
Efficiency Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept 
Table 59: GJR-GARCH EMH Test Statistics of the 2017 Bond (02/07/2007-29/03/2013) 
As with table 37, table 59 hints at relatively high b coefficients which seem to be suggesting 
that with the exception of the German market the observed markets do revert back to the 
unconditional mean after a shock to the price variance.  These markets all have b 
coefficients greater than 0.99 (except for the Portuguese market) with a standard error of 
less than 0.001 (except for the US market).  However, the German market with b 
coefficients of greater than 1.0 does not revert to the unconditional mean.  An interesting 
factor in tables 37 and 59 is that in general the b coefficients remain relatively similar.  
Also like table 35, the residuals seem to be hinting at a significant amount of white noise 
with ϵ coefficients of greater than 0.7 and standard errors greater than 0.0089 thru all the 
markets except for the US market.   
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The asymmetrical coefficients in table 59 are indicating a leverage effect in markets.  It 
must be noted that the observed period only cover the financial and sovereign debt crises.  
This is essential because what it is mean is during the period covering both crises negative 
shocks had a greater impact than positive shocks.  However, although the German market 
is hinting at a leverage effect, the asymmetrical coefficients seem to be hinting at an 
indifferent reaction to a shock to the market.  Analysing the impact from both crises on the 
German market provides an explanation; the asymmetrical coefficients in tables 63 and 67 
seem to be hinting at both the financial and sovereign debt crises periods acting as counter 
balance.  This would suggest in the German market, the cancellation of the strong leverage 
effect during the sovereign debt crisis by the asymmetrical effect of the financial crisis.  
Although the German sovereign debt was downgraded during the Eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis, an influencing factor is the financial and sovereign debt crises did not really have a 
negative impact on the German market.  The reason is the strength of the German economy 
and industrial output, which at the time was mainly responsible for holding the value of 
the euro.  In contrast, the GIPS markets had a triple impact from the crises: a weak economy 
including a huge issue with respect to the industrial output, an increasing total debt and 
political upheaval.  Although, the financial crises had a large negative impact on the US 
economy but it did not have a significantly negative impact on the US Treasuries market.  
The main reason why the US market held its value well despite the huge increase in the 
total debt was its position as a safe haven asset.  However, the fiscal cliff crisis and hence 
disagreements in federal government leading to the near shutdown of the federal 
government16 meant the US market increasingly experienced a negative impact.  These 
factors meant that behavioural theories dictated any negative shock to the market from 
news or information has a greater impact than positive shocks. 
With the exception of the German market, the α coefficients seem to be hinting at high 
levels of sensitivity to market shocks.  Although the Italian market is lower than the others 
are, yet it is significantly high.  However, the German market seem to be portraying a stable 
market throughout as also observed by tables 63 and 67, as expected and illustrated earlier 
due to the German market not really being effect by the crises.  It must be noted that the 
inclusion of the asymmetrical effect had the impact of increasing the levels of sensitivity 
                                                 
16 Although the US federal government did shutdown from 1st October 2013 to 16th October 2013, the 
shutdown came after our observational period. 
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to market shocks in all observed markets, therefore making the US, Portuguese and Spanish 
markets increasingly sensitivity to shocks in the market as illustrated by table 37. 
The β coefficients illustrate the difference in the volatility persistence between the GIPS 
and US/German markets.  As stated previously mainly due to flights during both the 
financial and sovereign debt crises, the US and German markets had high levels of 
volatility persistence in the aftermath of shocks during both crises.  However, the impact 
on the GIPS markets was usually short shocks hiking the volatility.  Nevertheless, the 
asymmetrical effect seems to have had the impact of increasing the volatility persistence 
of all the observed markets as illustrated by table 37. 
Interestingly, the EMH test statistics seem to be hinting at the acceptance of the efficient 
market hypothesis.  However, only the German market may be close to being truly efficient 
as it is approximately equal to the F-statistics.  Since, the inclusion of the asymmetrical 
effect had a decreasing impact on the EMH test statistics of all the observed markets see 
table 37.  Considering that using the GARCH model, the German market narrowly 
accepted the null hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be efficient.  This illustrates 
a key point in testing the hypothesis of any economic model; the acceptance of the model 
could depend on the slightest differences within the tests.  In essence, this means that one 
test could narrowly reject the model while the other test could accept the model.  Another 
point of interest concerning the German market is that the German 2017 government bond 
seems to be accepting the efficient market hypothesis under the GJR-GARCH model thru 
all observed periods.  Of more interest are the Portuguese and Spanish markets, the reason 
being that these two 2017 government bonds seem to be accepting the efficient market 
hypothesis under both models in all observational periods. 
 US* German* Italian* Portuguese* Spanish* 
AIC -3.947830 -4.521262 -3.831110 -1.392850 -3.363830 
SBC -3.922750 -4.496182 -3.806029 -1.367770 -3.338750 
HQC -3.938480 -4.511912 -3.821760 -1.383500 -3.354480 
Table 60: 2017 Bond GARCH (EMH) Model Analysis (02/07/2007-29/03/2013) 
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 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
AIC -3.948540 -4.520007 -3.831897 -1.395663 -3.364833 
SBC -3.919876 -4.491344 -3.803234 -1.367000 -3.336169 
HQC -3.937854 -4.509322 -3.821211 -1.384977 -3.354147 
Table 61: 2017 Bond GJR-GARCH (EMH) Model Analysis (02/07/2007-29/03/2013) 
According to tables 60 and 61, the information criterions seem to be hinting at the GARCH 
model being the best model to explain the information contained within the price variance 
for all observed markets.  This means that the omission of the asymmetrical effect has the 
advantage of the GARCH model fully explaining the information contained in the all the 
observed markets.  This is interesting due to the GJR-GARCH model being able to accept 
the efficient market hypothesis for all observed markets.  However, another interesting 
factor is that with the exception of the German market, the AIC seem to be accepting the 
GJR-GARCH for all the observed markets in contrast to the SBC and HQC.  Interestingly 
in the 2012 bonds, the same markets accepted the GJR-GARCH model. 
Tables 62 and 63 are associated with the financial crisis of the late 2000s.  As stated 
previously, the main impact was the flight from the risky assets at the heart of the financial 
crisis to the sovereign debt market.  In essence the sovereign debt market, especially the 
US and German, were considered safe haven from the financial crisis.  However, a relevant 
factor, as previously discussed, is the impact of the on-the-run effect, since the 2017 bonds 
were issued just before the financial crisis heated up.   
 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.984815 0.976944 0.974909 0.979897 0.979443 
Adjusted R2 0.984763 0.976865 0.974824 0.979828 0.979373 
Jarque-Bera  68.16 181.78 375.73 184.59 35.57 
Q-Statistics (Correlogram) 182.84 204.96 196.09 180.20 236.08 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 2.429012 1.014540 1.762716 0.407571 6.037451 
Table 62: 2017 Bond GJR-GARCH EMH Residuals Statistics (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
As illustrated by tables 62 and 38, the R2 and adjusted R2 remain relatively unchanged 
hinting at all the models being a good fit to the dependent variable.  The Jarque-Bera tests 
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seem to be pointing at a reduction, however still hinting at an acceptance of the null 
hypothesis of non-normality for all observed markets.  Conversely, with the exception of 
the Italian and Spanish markets, the Q-statistics seem to be hinting at an increase in serial 
correlation.  Although with the exception of the US and Portuguese markets, there is a 
reduction in the F-statistics, yet the Italian and certainly Spanish markets are hinting at a 
high ARCH effect.   
 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
-0.000445 
(0.003378) 
0.006568 
(0.001563) 
0.011004 
(0.000836) 
0.042020 
(0.001229) 
0.006134 
(0.000923) 
b 1.006716 (0.003380) 
1.004785 
(0.002627) 
0.995071 
(0.002625) 
0.970640 
(0.001307) 
1.007695 
(0.002630) 
ϵ 0.703304 (0.015093) 
0.791480 
(0.017962) 
0.744794 
(0.014088) 
0.808195 
(0.011742) 
0.707212 
(0.018087) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
0.000742 
(0.000150) 
0.000146 
(2.55E-05) 
5.29E-05 
(1.13E-05) 
0.000252 
(3.81E-05) 
5.82E-05 
(1.11E-05) 
α 1.32636 (0.251253) 
1.222606 
(0.282780) 
1.654902 
(0.313631) 
1.59663 
(0.279844) 
1.316892 
(0.251679) 
β 0.136396 (0.047082) 
0.09753 
(0.033691) 
0.059969 
(0.025826) 
-0.036693 
(0.019637) 
0.10437 
(0.027778) 
γ -0.198894 (0.299086) 
0.261166 
(0.340134) 
-0.035996 
(0.412166) 
-0.330976 
(0.363664) 
0.070649 
(0.316510) 
Statistics 
Log Likelihood 634.068 1083.834 1299.838 1111.013 1231.482 
Standard Deviation 1.444623 0.397085 0.308165 0.552783 0.461169 
EMH Test 
EMH Test Statistics 0.182651 1.463923 2.202959 0.414197 1.066661 
Efficiency Accept Accept Reject Accept Accept 
Table 63: GJR-GARCH EMH Test Statistics of the 2017 Bond (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
As with table 39, table 63 hints at relatively high b coefficients during the financial crisis.  
This seems to be suggesting that with the exception of the Italian and Portuguese markets 
the observed markets do not revert to the unconditional mean after a shock to the price 
variance.  These markets all have b coefficients greater than 1.0 with a standard error of 
greater than 0.002.  However, the Italian and Portuguese markets with b coefficients of less 
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than 1.0 do revert to the unconditional mean.  An interesting factor in tables 39 and 63 is 
that in general the b coefficients remain relatively similar.  Also like table 39, the residuals 
seem to be hinting at a significant amount of white noise with ϵ coefficients of greater than 
0.7 and standard errors greater than 0.01 thru all the markets.   
It is worth noting that, as previously stated, this observational period is associated with the 
financial crisis.  Hence, the period give us the opportunity to compare the impact of a 
highly volatile financial market on the efficiency of two governments bonds at different 
stages in their life given the inclusion of asymmetrical effects.  Although the asymmetrical 
coefficients in table 63 seem to be suggesting a split picture with the German and Spanish 
markets pointing towards an asymmetrical effect while the other observed markets are 
hinting at a leverage effect.  In reality, the asymmetrical coefficients paints a rather mixed 
picture, on close inspections the Italian and Spanish markets seem to have insignificant 
asymmetrical coefficients.  In contrast, the Portuguese market has a relatively high 
asymmetrical coefficient and the two remaining observed markets have a relatively low 
asymmetrical coefficient.  Thus signalling the different impact the financial crisis had on 
the sovereign debt market.  As illustrated by tables 51 and 63, the rather interesting factor 
is the differentiation of the asymmetrical effect on the 2012 and 2017 government bonds 
during this period.  One of the fundamental rules of the bond market can provide an 
explanation for the difference: any information or news has varying impact on the bond 
over the duration of its life.  This means an asymmetrical effect could have a varying 
impact throughout the life of a bond.  Given both the 2012 and 2017 bonds were at different 
stages of their life, the different in the age is likely to have had an impact on the 
asymmetrical effect.  Another explanation is the “on-the-run” effect, which is due to the 
high number of transactions until the next issue is released.  A key factor in these 
explanations is that the 2017 bonds were issued just before the financial crisis.  This made 
the bonds highly reactive to changes in the market leading to different asymmetrical effects 
among the observed markets. 
With the exception of the Italian and Portuguese markets, the financial crisis does not 
appear to have impacted on the α coefficients of the observed markets.  Even the Italian 
and Portuguese markets do not appear to have a relatively high level of sensitivity to market 
shocks.  Interestingly as eluded to previously, the German market had the lowest α 
coefficients.  Of course, the inclusion of the asymmetrical effect did have a relatively 
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significant impact on the markets with the possible exceptions of the Italian and Spanish 
markets.  The asymmetrical effect did decrease the α coefficients of the German and 
Spanish markets, while increasing them to the other observed markets as illustrated by 
table 39. 
Although the β coefficients point towards a low volatility persistence in all the observed 
markets, yet there seem to be a different in the persistence of volatility while the Italian 
and Portuguese markets seem to have very low levels of persistence, the US market does 
hint at a relatively higher level of persistence.  Contrasting with table 39, the inclusion of 
the asymmetrical effect did influence the levels of volatility persistence.  With the 
exception of the US market, the level of volatility persistence seems to have decreased.  
Interestingly, the β coefficient of the Portuguese market is negative. 
Interestingly, the EMH test statistics seem to be hinting at the observed markets accepting 
the efficient market hypothesis during the financial crisis.  The exception, as with the 
GARCH model, is the Italian market, which accepts the null hypothesis of markets being 
too volatile to be efficient.  Essentially, the results from the efficiency tests seem to be 
reflecting the results in table 39.  Although the inclusion of the asymmetrical effect does 
influence the EMH test statistics with the German and Spanish markets having an 
increasing effects while the other observed markets had a decreasing effect.   
 US* German* Italian* Portuguese* Spanish* 
AIC -2.128145 -3.654676 -4.389920 -3.746060 -4.157687 
SBC -2.076109 -3.602640 -4.337884 -3.694024 -4.105652 
HQC -2.107872 -3.634402 -4.369646 -3.725787 -4.137414 
Table 64: 2017 Bond GARCH (EMH) Model Analysis (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
AIC -2.125867 -3.653085 -4.386548 -3.745376 -4.154437 
SBC -2.066398 -3.593616 -4.327079 -3.685907 -4.094967 
HQC -2.102698 -3.629916 -4.363379 -3.722207 -4.131267 
Table 65: 2017 Bond GJR-GARCH (EMH) Model Analysis (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
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According to tables 64 and 65, the information criterions seem to be hinting at the best 
model to explain the information contained within the price variance is the GARCH model 
for all observed markets.  This means that the omission of the asymmetrical effect has the 
advantage of the GARCH model fully explaining the information contained in the all the 
observed markets.  This is interesting due to the GJR-GARCH model being able to accept 
the efficient market hypothesis for all observed markets with the exception of the Italian 
market; however, it is also true for the GARCH model.   
Tables 66 and 67 are associated with the Eurozone sovereign debt and US fiscal cliff crises.  
One influencing factor is that the 2017 bonds do cover the majority of the crisis.  However, 
another factor worth remembering is that the 2012 bonds were at the end of their lives 
during the sovereign debt crisis; hence, an influencing factor to bear in mind is the maturity 
effect.  Conversely, the 2017 bonds were in mid-life during the crisis, hence it is interesting 
to see what impact the maturity effect had on the markets during the sovereign debt crisis.   
 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.984000 0.982162 0.984607 0.981901 0.981474 
Adjusted R2 0.983963 0.982122 0.984572 0.981860 0.981432 
Jarque-Bera  10229.62 104.65 113.80 798.51 2306.60 
Q-Statistics (Correlogram) 178.16 317.68 312.26 258.50 255.03 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 0.008930 5.078602 6.785071 0.474670 0.269662 
Table 66: 2017 Bond GJR-GARCH EMH Residuals Statistics (02/11/2009-29/03/2013) 
As illustrated by tables 66 and 40, the R2 and adjusted R2 remain relatively unchanged 
hinting at all the models being a good fit to the dependent variable.  With the exception of 
the Portuguese and Spanish markets, the Jarque-Bera tests seem to be pointing at a 
reduction.  However, all the markets are still hinting at an acceptance of the null hypothesis 
of non-normality.  Conversely, with the exception of the Portuguese market, the Q-
statistics seem to be hinting at an increase in the serial correlation.  Although with the 
exception of the US and German markets, there is a reduction in the F-statistics.  Yet the 
ARCH effect of the Greek and Italian markets remains high.  However, the US market is 
hinting at an ARCH effect-approaching zero. 
 180 
 
 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
0.009374 
(0.000176) 
0.005949 
(0.000346) 
0.010297 
(0.000373) 
0.042438 
(0.001450) 
0.008533 
(0.000653) 
b 0.987700 (0.001009) 
0.976898 
(0.001641) 
0.989804 
(0.001197) 
0.974871 
(0.000807) 
0.984917 
(0.001467) 
ϵ 0.704801 (0.010476) 
0.742831 
(0.012988) 
0.752617 
(0.011471) 
0.852081 
(0.012345) 
0.702770 
(0.012874) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
1.57E-06 
(4.61E-07) 
7.32E-06 
(1.78E-06) 
9.36E-06 
(2.32E-06) 
0.000152 
(4.91E-05) 
3.68E-05 
(8.63E-06) 
α  2.564097 (0.435636) 
1.462187 
(0.208775) 
1.931614 
(0.257805) 
2.275183 
(0.337703) 
2.391783 
(0.361685) 
β 0.166534 (0.022048) 
0.250852 
(0.028026) 
0.206225 
(0.023736) 
0.158652 
(0.022781) 
0.145523 
(0.022969) 
γ -0.56507 (0.426030) 
-0.3394 
(0.226951) 
-0.64715 
(0.279677) 
-0.61827 
(0.356660) 
-0.81629 
(0.363280) 
Statistics 
Log Likelihood 2336.351 2309.224 1561.647 -58.637 1279.294 
Standard Deviation 0.419620 0.257374 1.312213 5.824118 1.320804 
EMH Test 
EMH Test Statistics 2.777668 1.451747 0.373942 0.140033 0.545891 
Efficiency Reject Accept Accept Accept Accept 
Table 67: GJR-GARCH EMH Test Statistics of the 2017 Bond (02/11/2009-29/03/2013) 
As with table 41, table 67 hints at relatively high b coefficients during the sovereign debt 
crisis.  The b coefficients seem to be suggesting that the observed markets do revert to the 
unconditional mean after a shock to the price variance.  These markets all have b 
coefficients greater than 0.97 with a standard error of greater than 0.0016.  An interesting 
factor in tables 41 and 67 is that in general the b coefficients remained relatively similar.  
Also like table 41, the residuals seem to be hinting at a significant amount of white noise 
with ϵ coefficients of greater than 0.7 and standard errors greater than 0.01 thru all the 
markets.   
Remember table 67 is associated with the sovereign debt crisis and covers more of the 
crisis timeline than table 55.  Hence, this period give us the opportunity of not only 
analysing the full impact of the sovereign debt crisis on the efficient market hypothesis but 
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also whether the maturity effect can have a changing influence on the results.  The 
asymmetrical coefficients in table 67 certainly hint at a leverage effect influencing all the 
observed markets.  While this observation is similar to table 55, however one noticeable 
different is the leverage effect in both the US and Italian markets have increased whereas 
it had decrease in the remaining observed markets.  It is hard not to notice the changes in 
the asymmetrical coefficient of the Portuguese and Spanish markets.  One possible 
explanation is the impact of the maturity effect but this does not explain the dissimilar 
impact on the other observed markets.  A key factor in any crisis is that market participants 
tend to overreact during the initial stage.  Notably the end date to the observed 2012 bonds 
is 31st December 2011; in contrast, the end date to the observed 2017 bond is 31st March 
2013.  Hence, a more plausible explanation is that at the start of the crisis Portuguese and 
Spanish markets’ participants were responding with greater intensity to negative shocks.  
However, the continuation of the crisis had the effect of balancing out the impact.  This 
could also explain the differences in the leverage effect of the US and Italian markets, since 
in essence, the crisis did not hit the US and Italian markets until the later stages of the 
sovereign debt crisis, not observed by the 2012 bonds.  The leverage effect for the German 
market hints at an insignificant change between tables 55 and 67, suggesting that as the 
sovereign debt crisis continued the market participants did not act differently in response 
to negative shocks in the German market. 
With the exception of the German and Italian markets, the α coefficients seem to be 
pointing at a significantly high sensitivity levels for the observed markets during the 
sovereign debt crisis.  Although the Italian market is also displaying a relatively high 
sensitivity level, however it is not as significant as the other observed markets.  As with all 
previous observations concerning the 2017 bond, the German market continues to display 
a low sensitivity level in comparison to the other observed markets.  The results from table 
41 seem to be suggesting that the inclusion of the asymmetrical effect seem to have 
increased the sensitivity levels to market shock for all the observed markets.  However, a 
more mixed picture is emerging in comparison with table 55.  It seem that the maturity 
effect had a varying impact on the sensitivity levels with the US and Portuguese markets 
hinting at an increase, while the others are pointing towards a decrease. 
Interestingly, the volatility persistence levels seem to be displaying the reverse impact on 
the observed markets with the German and Italian markets displaying high levels of 
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volatility persistence.  In contrast, the remaining observed markets seem to be pointing at 
relatively low volatility persistence kevels.  This would point at a fast changing 
environment in the remaining observed markets during the sovereign debt crisis.  The 
results from table 41 seem to be suggesting that the inclusion of the asymmetrical effect 
seem to have slightly increased the level of volatility persistence for all the observed 
markets.  However, a more mixed picture is emerging in comparison with table 55.  It seem 
that the maturity effect had a varying impact on the level of volatility persistence with the 
US and Portuguese markets hinting at a decrease, while the others are pointing towards an 
increase. 
As hinted by table 67, the EMH tests seem to be pointing at the acceptance of the efficient 
market hypothesis for all observed markets but the US market.  Interestingly table 41 seem 
to be hinting at the inclusion of the asymmetrical effect lowering the EMH test statistics, 
which enabled the German market to accept the efficient market hypothesis.  The other key 
factor is once again the huge different the maturity effect makes on the EMH test statistics, 
illustrated by the fact that the EMH test significantly accepted the null hypothesis of the 
market being too volatile to be efficient in all but the Portuguese and Greek markets in 
table 55. 
 US* German* Italian Portuguese Spanish 
AIC -5.231544 -5.170036 -3.485307 0.153156 -2.850686 
SBC -5.193860 -5.132352 -3.447623 0.190839 -2.813002 
HQC -5.217140 -5.155632 -3.470904 0.167559 -2.836283 
Table 68: 2017 Bond GARCH (EMH) Model Analysis (02/11/2009-29/03/2013) 
 US German Italian* Portuguese* Spanish* 
AIC -5.232250 -5.171289 -3.491341 0.149745 -2.856841 
SBC -5.189183 -5.128222 -3.448274 0.192813 -2.813774 
HQC -5.215790 -5.154828 -3.474880 0.166206 -2.840380 
Table 69: 2017 Bond GJR-GARCH (EMH) Model Analysis (02/11/2009-29/03/2013) 
According to tables 68 and 69 the information criterions seem to be hinting at the best 
model to explain the information contained within the price variance for the US and 
German markets is the GARCH model.  This means that the addition of the asymmetrical 
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effect has the advantage of the GJR-GARCH model fully explaining the information 
contained in the IPS markets.  Since we are testing the efficiency of the market, it is 
important that the model does reflect the information contained.   
4.3.3 Concluding Review 
In concluding, the EMH tests do hint at a mixed result regarding the efficiency of the 
observed sovereign debt markets.  Notably the observed period and/or estimated model 
influenced the efficiency of the market.  In essence, there are only two observed bonds, 
both issued in 2017, that fully reject the null hypothesis of the market being too volatile to 
be efficient: the Portuguese and Spanish.  And while the German 2017 bond does accepts 
the efficient market hypothesis under the GJR-GARCH model, the Portuguese and Spanish 
government bonds accept the efficient market hypothesis under both estimated models.  
Interestingly none of the sample observations seems to be accepting the efficient market 
hypothesis through all the observed markets under both models.  There are only two sample 
observations that seem to be accepting the efficient market hypothesis thru all observed 
market as illustrated by tables 47 and 59.  Conversely, both only accept the efficient market 
hypothesis under the GJR-GARCH model.   
An influencing factor is that all 2012 government bonds seem to be accepting the null 
hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be efficient in both models during the 
financial crisis period.  This does seem to be suggesting that the market is more likely to 
accept the efficient market hypothesis at the initial stage of a bond’s life than at any other 
stage.  It is important to remember that the research used a strict strategy of fixed 
observational periods to analyse the behaviour of volatility in the sovereign debt market.  
Conversely, it could be argued that a more relax strategy of varying observational periods 
could find that more markets accept the efficient market hypothesis. 
A relevant factor raised by our empirical evidence regarding the efficient market 
hypothesis is that during some highly volatile periods some markets seem to be rejecting 
the null hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be efficient.  As hinted by Kirchler 
(2009), the underreaction hypothesis provides one possible explanation, which suggests 
that market participants’ reaction leads to overvaluation or undervaluation during bulls or 
bears market respectively.  Hence, a highly volatile period with instances of both a bear 
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and bull market would give the impression of an efficient market.  This is what seems to 
have happened during these periods as market participants reacted to the information and 
news. 
The interesting factor is our evidence seems to suggest that the use of different models of 
volatility could produce varying results of efficiency, highlighted in several periods where 
one or more markets accept the efficient market hypothesis under the GJR-GARCH model 
but reject it under the GARCH model.  It seems that the GARCH model is more likely to 
accept the null hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be efficient than the GJR-
GARCH model.  Therefore, in theory it could be possible to find a model of volatility that 
would suit whichever side of the argument you are on.  Interestingly although the GJR-
GARCH model seems more likely to accept the efficient market hypothesis, the evidence 
from the information criterion seem to suggest that the GARCH is more likely to be 
selected, due to the model being highly able to explain the information contained in the 
dependent variable.  However, as is always the case, it is dangerous to say that therefore 
the GARCH model is the best model for the EMH test because under certain periods and 
markets the GJR-GARCH seems to perform better.  The choice of model is dependent on 
the dataset and observed periods.   
In the end the acceptance of the efficient market hypothesis could depend on various 
factors, e.g. EMH test, dataset, model and observed period.  However, this would overlook 
the essential fact that in general the market does accept the null hypothesis of being too 
volatile to be efficient.  This is true as based on one or more observational periods the 
market may not be partly efficient.  In addition, the market cannot be efficient just because 
one asset is efficient.  Hence, it is either wholly efficient or not efficient at all.  Therefore, 
the observed sovereign debt markets seem to be suggesting they are too volatile to be 
efficient. 
If the observed sovereign debt markets seem to be accepting the null hypothesis of being 
too volatile to be efficient then what could be explaining the behaviour of volatility in these 
markets.  An explanation already hinted at previously in this section is the changing 
reaction of market participant to information and news in different market environments 
over time.  This leads to the use of the behavioural finance theory to be able to explain the 
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behaviour of price volatility in the sovereign debt market given a changing market 
environment. 
4.4 The Behaviour of Price Volatility in the Sovereign Debt Market 
Behavioural finance dictates that market participants’ reaction to news and information 
influences the price and since in general each market participant interprets the information 
individually, hence the price deviates from the fundamental value.  A possible method of 
understanding the reactions of market participants to any news or information is to analyse 
the behaviour of volatility in the market.  Since the behaviour of volatility is in essence the 
reaction of the market participants to events such as news and information announcements.  
Therefore, the use of the figures and interpretations of the volatility in the observed markets 
explains the reaction of market participants to events in a changing environment. 
The empirical evidence of both volatility tests in the previous section points to the use of 
the behavioural finance theory in explaining the price volatility in the sovereign debt 
market.  As pointed by Blanchard & Watson (1982) and Branch & Evans (2011, 2013), a 
possible method of interpreting behavioural finance is using the GARCH family.  Firstly, 
we use the GARCH as devised by Bollerslev (1986) to interpret the volatility clustering 
effect.  In addition, we use the EGARCH-m as proposed by Nelson (1991) to interpret the 
feedback and asymmetrical effects.  We also use the SWARCH model of Cai (1994) to 
interpret the regime-switching effect. 
Mainly due to the estimated GARCH and EGARCH-m models providing a better fit and 
explaining the movement better, we follow Shiller’s advice in using a first order single 
lagged autoregressive model to estimate the residuals.  In general, the summary of the 
results and tests of the estimated autoregression model hint at high serial correlations17 and 
ARCH effects18 with a non-normal distributed19 residuals.  Although some may have a 
low serial correlation while others may have a low ARCH effect.  However, the low R2 
and adjusted R2 for our observed markets seem to hint at both the lagged first order 
                                                 
 
17 Using the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test proposed by Breusch (1979) and Godfrey (1978) 
 
18 Using the ARCH LM test proposed by Engle (1982) 
 
19 Using the Jarque-Bera test proposed by Jarque & Bera (1980) 
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differentiated price and autoregressive model being unable to explain the movement in the 
price throughout our observed markets. 
As illustrated by the model specification in section 3.2 of the methodology, we opt to use 
the GARCH family of models as the basis of our tests in order to account for the ARCH 
effects.  The GARCH models allow us to interpret the behaviour of volatility in the prices 
from our observed markets.  We opt to use the GARCH (1, 1) and single asymmetrical 
order EGARCH-m (1, 1) model specifications. 
With regard to the SWARCH model after testing for the optimal model specification, we 
opted for a single lagged, single ARCH effect, dual regime model.  Where possible, we 
use the maximum likelihood BFGS estimation method with a normal distribution.  
However, we may be forced to use another estimation method like the maximum likelihood 
BHHH method in some estimations due to incompatibility issues concerning our markets. 
It is worth remembering that equation 3.2.3 in the methodology gives the GARCH model.  
The key to the interpretation of the GARCH model is in the coefficients of the model of 
conditional variance.  As illustrated in section 3.2 of the methodology, we will concentrate 
on just the four, which allow us to determining the behaviour of the market participants: 
market shocks sensitivity, volatility persistence, long term volatility and volatility 
convergence to the long term volatility.  Remember as Alexander (2008, p. 137) notes an 
ARCH effect coefficient of greater than 0.1 is interpreted as a high level of sensitivity to 
market events or shocks, while a GARCH coefficient of greater than 0.9 means volatility 
is highly persistence following a crisis in the market.  We also calculate the volatility half 
life expectancy. 
In essence as illustrated by equations 3.2.6 and 3.2.7 in the methodology, the two models: 
EGARCH and GARCH-m derive the EGARCH-m.  Essentially, this means that equation 
3.2.6 gives the asymmetrical effect and equation 3.2.7 gives the feedback effect.  The key 
to the interpretation of the asymmetrical effect in our model is in the γ coefficient of 
equation 3.2.7.  The key to the interpretation of the feedback effect in our model is in the 
λ coefficient of equation 3.2.7. 
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The basis of the statistical analysis is the same five statistics used to test the models in 
section 4.3: 
• R2 
• adjusted R2 
• Jarque-Bera statistic proposed by Jarque & Bera (1980) 
• ARCH LM test introduced by Engle (982) 
• Q-statistics of the correlogram as proposed by Ljung & Box (1979) 
4.4.1 The GARCH Model of Price Volatility 
As indicated by section 3.2 in the methodology, we use a simple GARCH model of 
volatility to analyse the behaviour of volatility in the sovereign debt market. We use a 
GARCH (1, 1) to estimate the conditional variance of the first order-differentiated price.  
It is essential to remember the conditional variance equation of the GARCH model: 
 ∆𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝑣𝑣 + ∑ 𝑏𝑏j∆𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−j𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 
 ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝜔𝜔 + 𝛼𝛼 1𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽 1ℎ𝑡𝑡−1. 
We analyse for market shocks and volatility persistent by using the α and β coefficients as 
stated in the methodology section 3.2.  We use the 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 to analyse the convergence or 
mean reversion of the volatility to the long-term average volatility.  Finally, we analyse the 
half-life of the volatility using− 𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐(2)
𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐(𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽). 
With the exception of a number of observations, the model is a single lagged GARCH (1, 
1) model with a student t distribution estimated using the Maximum Likelihood method 
with a BHHH optimization algorithm.  However, due to an error with the optimization 
algorithm, we used the Marquandt rather than the BHHH to estimate the US period 2 and 
German 2012 period 3 observations.  We also encountered errors regarding the distribution 
of the residuals in the model; hence, we used the normal distribution to estimate the 
German 2012 period 3 and the 2012 period 2 for the Greek, Portuguese and Spanish.  We 
also encountered errors with the lagged system, which mean the use of two lags in the 
estimation model with respect to all the US 2012 and Italian market and sample periods. 
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 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.999899 0.999331 0.999999 0.999639 0.999990 0.999906 
Adjusted R2 0.999899 0.999331 0.999999 0.999639 0.999990 0.999906 
Jarque-Bera  226.41 135.04 1509.64 8794.87 694.85 378.69 
Q-Statistics  (Correlogram) 0.0196 0.0243 1.2662 1.4406 0.7944 0.0182 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 1.402221 0.010843 0.409324 0.009807 1.588620 2.820865 
Table 70: 2012 Bond GARCH Residuals Statistics (01/07/2002-30/12/2011) 
As illustrated by table 70, a key factor of note is the high R2 and adjusted R2.  The R2 is 
above 0.99 through all the estimated GARCH models, thus hinting at the lagged price 
differential with the estimated residuals being highly able to explain the movement in the 
price differential.  Another factor is the significantly high adjusted R2 pointing at the 
estimated GARCH models being a good fit to the dependent variable across all the markets.   
The Jarque-Bera test for all the markets seem to be hinting at an acceptance of the null 
hypothesis of non-normality in the distribution of the residuals.  We found all our markets 
seem to follow a leptokurtic distribution, which hints at the Student t distribution model.  
However, the Jarque-Bera statistics seem to be hinting at a varied set of results with the 
Greek and Italian being significantly greater than the other markets.  Conversely, the 
German is significantly lower than all the other markets.   
With regard to the serial correlation, the Q-statistics seem to be hinting at a significantly 
low correlation.  At the single lagged level, the Q-statistic for all our samples does not rise 
above 1.4406 as observed by the Italian.  Considering that, the Q-statistics must be 
approximately zero, the importance of these statistics for the estimated models highlighted 
by table 70.  With the exception of the Greek and Italian, the Q-statistics seem to be 
approaching zero. 
The F-statistics seem to split between approaching no ARCH effect and low ARCH effect 
remaining.  In essence, the three lowest F-statistics are the German, Greek and Italian with 
an F-statistics below one, thus meaning approximately no ARCH effect remaining.  The 
highest F-statistic is that of the Spanish hinting at a relatively low amount of ARCH effect 
remaining. 
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 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
7.03E-05 
(1.18E-05) 
-0.000545 
(2.99E-05) 
-0.023059 
(4.94E-06) 
0.000228 
(4.00E-05) 
-0.000431 
(1.26E-05) 
0.000944 
(3.11E-05) 
b1 
-0.054232 
(0.000190) 
0.033025 
(0.000481) 
0.075436 
(1.74E-05) 
0.032879 
(0.000312) 
0.145161 
(5.40E-05) 
0.045026 
(0.000172) 
b2 -0.042572 (0.000191)  
 
    
ϵ 1.000174 (0.000194) 
0.998966 
(0.000494) 
1.000017 
(1.88E-05) 
0.999406 
(0.000300) 
1.000014 
(5.50E-05) 
0.999813 
(0.000166) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
-4.34E-11 
(9.22E-11) 
-9.12E-10 
(6.25E-10) 
5.43E-09 
(1.01E-09) 
6.20E-09 
(5.70E-09) 
1.72E-08 
(4.37E-09) 
1.87E-08 
(8.66E-09) 
α 0.041664 (0.006897) 
0.034731 
(0.005779) 
0.178422 
(0.021970) 
0.032879 
(0.008580) 
0.108132 
(0.014886) 
0.084401 
(0.011024) 
β 0.957897 (0.005939) 
0.964909 
(0.005122) 
0.805469 
(0.014884) 
0.999406 
(0.007213) 
0.87876 
(0.013736) 
0.918665 
(0.009532) 
𝜔𝜔1 − (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) -9.89E-08 -2.53E-06 3.37E-07 -7.06E-03 1.31E-06 -6.10E-06 
𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 0.999561 0.99964 0.983891 1.032285 0.986892 1.003066 
−
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(2)
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) 1579 1925 43 -22 53 -226 
Log Likelihood 11960.16 10428.95 16382.07 10816.12 14265.95 11934.73 
Table 71: GARCH Statistics of the 2012 Bond (01/07/2002-30/12/2011) 
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Figure 12: US 2012 (GARCH) 
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Figure 13: German 2012 (GARCH) 
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Figure 14: Greek 2012 (GARCH) 
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Figure 15: Greek 2012 w/o Sovereign Debt Crisis (GARCH) 
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Figure 16: Italian 2012 (GARCH) 
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Figure 17: Portuguese 2012 (GARCH) 
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Figure 18: Portuguese 2012 w/o Sovereign Debt Crisis (GARCH) 
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Figure 19: Spanish 2012 (GARCH) 
Since unlike the efficient market hypothesis tests, we use the price differential to estimate 
our GARCH models we could use the full coefficients’ interpretation of Alexander (2008, 
p. 137) and Engle & Patton (2001).   
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It is worth remembering table 71 covers the period between 1st July 2002 and 31st 
December 2011 for the 2012 bonds, thus meaning it illustrates the behaviour of volatility 
during a period of changing market environment.  In essence, this observed period included 
the two crises and an extended period of economic upturn, which led to the asset price 
bubble of the mid-2000s.  Essentially, the statistics in table 71 are the generalised pointers 
to the behaviour of volatility in the observed 2012 government bonds.  It must be noted 
that as illustrated by table 29 the GARCH variant of our EMH test accepted the market 
efficiency for the observed US, Greek and Portuguese markets.  However, it did also 
significantly accept the null hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be efficient for 
the remaining markets.   
The level of sensitivity to market shocks seems to be hinting at a differentiated picture.  
Thus, meaning with the exception of the Greek and Portuguese markets, the observed 
markets seems to be hinting at a low level of sensitivity to market shocks.  However, the α 
coefficient for the Spanish market seems to be relatively high suggesting that a relatively 
high shock to the market was observed at some point.  The Greek and Portuguese markets 
are pointing at a significant level of sensitivity to market shocks.  Looking at figures 14, 
17 and 19 would suggest the shock in the Greek, Portuguese and Spanish markets came 
during the sovereign debt crisis.  And although the Italian market as illustrated by figure 
16 seem to be also pointing at a hike in the price volatility during the sovereign debt crisis, 
yet the evidence from the figure and table seem to be suggesting that it was not significant.  
In fact, the α coefficients hints at the Italian market having the lowest level of sensitivity 
to market shocks of all the observed markets.  The US and German markets seem to be 
pointing at a low level of sensitivity to market shocks, however as illustrated by figures 12 
and 13 there seem to be some evidence of market shocks. 
With the exception of the Greek and Portuguese markets, the β coefficients are pointing at 
highly persistence levels of volatility in the aftermath of a shock in the observed markets.  
Conversely, the Spanish market seems to be hinting at a relatively lower persistence level 
of volatility than the remaining markets.  Figures 14 and 17 seem to be illustrating the 
reason why the Greek and Portuguese markets seem to have a low level of volatility 
persistence.  As illustrated previously, significant hikes in the volatility blighted the Greek 
and Portuguese markets during the sovereign debt crisis, which hint at a reactive market.  
However, as illustrated by figures 15 and 18 when the sovereign debt crisis is taken out of 
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the equation, both the Greek and Portuguese markets look to be more persistence.  A known 
factor is that when the market is highly reactive to market shocks, the levels of persistence 
is relatively low and the opposite is equally true.  This is important because it explains the 
other observed markets, since as previously illustrated these market are not reactive.  
Therefore, they are persistent and with the possible exception of the Spanish market, the β 
coefficients seem to be hinting at highly persistence volatility in the aftermath of any shock 
to the market.  The Italian market seems to be displaying the highest persistence level. 
With the exception of the US and Italian markets, the unconditional volatility seems to be 
relatively low, however it is worth considering the subsequent levels.  A glance at tables 
73, 75 and 77 seem to be confirming our initial suspicions.  Conversely, the unconditional 
volatility for the US market is significantly low and the Italian market seems to be 
significantly high.  It is important to know if the volatility from our observed markets does 
revert to the long-term mean volatility after a rise or fall.  The evidence seems to be 
suggesting that with the exception of the Italian and Spanish markets, the observed markets 
do revert to the unconditional volatility in the aftermath of a crisis.  Interestingly, given 
that the Italian and Spanish markets had the highest unconditional volatility, the statistics 
seem to be hinting at these two markets not reverting to the unconditional volatility.  
However, the volatility half-life seem to be suggesting that the volatility in the Greek and 
Portuguese markets does tend to decay to half their levels quicker in the aftermath of a 
shock to the market than any of the other observed markets.  In contrast, the US and 
German markets seem to be hinting at a very long duration for the volatility to decay to 
half its value in the aftermath of a shock to the market.  Moreover, the negative half-life of 
the Italian and Spanish markets seems to be hinting that volatility does not decay over time. 
As pointed earlier, the EMH test statistics in table 29 hint at the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of the markets being too volatile to be efficient for the US, Greek and 
Portuguese markets.  However, interestingly according to table 71, the Greek and 
Portuguese markets seem to be very reactive to market shocks and exhibit low volatility 
persistence in aftermath of a crisis with a low half-life.  In contrast, the US market seems 
to be very phlegmatic to market shocks and highly persistence with a high half-life.  
However, both the US and Greek markets seem to exhibit a relatively low expected long-
term volatility as does the Portuguese to a certain extent.   
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 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.998056 0.999334 0.999999 0.999639 0.999990 0.999906 
Adjusted R2 0.998053 0.999333 0.999999 0.999639 0.999990 0.999906 
Jarque-Bera  56.24 34.23 38.47 45.67 42.41 32.75 
Q-Statistics  (Correlogram) 63.19 0.15 0.22 0.19 0.24 0.22 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 0.087923 1.051006 1.117249 1.028082 1.578360 1.349344 
Table 72: 2012 Bond GARCH Residuals Statistics (01/07/2002-29/06/2007) 
In essence, as illustrated by table 70 previously, the high R2 and adjusted R2 hint at all the 
models being a good fit to the dependent variable through all the estimated GARCH 
models.  Although the Jarque-Bera tests seem to be significantly lower, yet the statistics 
accept the null hypothesis of non-normality in the distribution.  However, the Q-statistics  
seem to be suggesting that with the significant exception of the US, the observed markets 
have a very low serial correlation.  With the exception of the US market, the F-statistics 
are hinting at a relatively low ARCH effect.  Conversely, the US market is hinting at the 
ARCH effect-approaching zero. 
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 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
0.000108 
(0.000344) 
 
-0.000348 
(0.000138) 
 
-0.023063 
(6.51E-06) 
 
0.000298 
(0.000101) 
 
-0.000440 
(1.81E-05) 
 
0.000939 
(5.64E-05) 
b 
-0.053343 
(0.001193) 
0.032485 
(0.000702) 
0.075351 
(3.11E-05) 
0.032450 
(0.000508) 
0.145021 
(8.82E-05) 
0.044426 
(0.000265) 
ϵ 1.000856 (0.001151) 
0.999128 
(0.000699) 
0.999983 
(3.11E-05) 
0.999384 
(0.000509) 
0.999957 
(8.74E-05) 
0.999872 
(0.000261) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
1.81E-07 
(2.27E-07) 
 
2.36E-08 
(4.62E-08) 
 
8.11E-11 
(1.19E-10) 
 
3.42E-08 
(3.62E-08) 
 
6.26E-10 
(9.07E-10) 
 
5.59E-09 
(8.60E-09) 
α 0.020376 (0.006254) 
0.023517 
(0.006845) 
0.024717 
(0.007077) 
0.027906 
(0.008255) 
0.023590 
(0.006908) 
0.024142 
(0.006939) 
β 0.977578 (0.006273) 
0.974707 
(0.006830) 
0.973301 
(0.007174) 
0.969251 
(0.008423) 
0.974321 
(0.007009) 
0.973883 
(0.006980) 
𝜔𝜔1 − (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) 8.85E-05 1.33E-05 4.09E-08 1.20E-05 3.00E-07 2.83E-06 
𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 0.997954 0.998224 0.998018 0.997157 0.997911 0.998025 
−
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(2)
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) 338 390 349 243 331 351 
Log Likelihood 3615.632 4869.476 8872.661 5274.899 7535.686 6056.229 
Table 73: GARCH Statistics of the 2012 Bond (01/07/2002-29/06/2007) 
Remember that table 73 covers the pre-crisis period between 1st July 2002 and 29th June 
2007.  Highly volatile events and a prolonged period of stability in the sovereign debt 
market blighted the period.  Looking at the section of figures 12 to 19 marked “Pre-Crisis 
period” would seem to suggest that this is the case.  The pre-crisis period came in the 
aftermath of a period of highly volatile events like the introduction of the Euro and the 11 
September 2001 terrorists’ attacks.  However, notably the period also saw a prolonged 
economic upturn, which initiated the asset price bubble of the mid-2000s.  Conversely, it 
must be noted that as illustrated by table 31 the GARCH variant of our EMH test accepted 
the market efficiency for the observed US and Spanish markets.  However, it did also 
insignificantly accept the null hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be efficient for 
the remaining markets. 
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The α coefficients seem to be hinting at a very low level of sensitivity to market shocks 
throughout.  On close analysis, the US market seems to be pointing at a lower level of 
sensitivity to market shocks.  In contrast, the Italian market seems to be hinting at a slightly 
higher level of sensitivity to market shocks. 
The β coefficients seem to be pointing at low levels of volatility persistence in the aftermath 
of a shock in the observed markets, although the US market seems to be indicating a 
slightly higher persistence level of volatility than the other markets.  Conversely, the Italian 
market seems to be suggesting a lower level of persistence in the aftermath of a shock to 
the market. 
With the exception of the Greek and Portuguese markets, the unconditional volatility seems 
to be relatively high.  Conversely, the unconditional volatility for the Greek and Portuguese 
is significantly low.  The statistics seems to be suggesting that all the observed markets do 
revert to the unconditional volatility in the aftermath of a crisis.  However, the volatility 
half-life seems to be suggesting that the volatility in all the observed markets do tend to 
decay to half their levels relatively slowly in the aftermath of a shock.  The German market 
in particular seems to be hinting at a long duration for the volatility to decay to half its 
value.  Moreover, the Italian market seems to be hinting that volatility decays quicker over 
time. 
As pointed earlier, the EMH test statistics in table 31 hint at the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of the markets being too volatile for the US and Spanish markets during the 
pre-crisis period.  However, interestingly according to table 73,  the US and Spanish as 
with all the observed markets seem to be very phlegmatic to market shocks but exhibit high 
volatility persistence in aftermath of a crisis with a relatively high half-life.  Conversely, 
both markets seem to exhibit high-expected long-term volatility but this is true to all the 
remaining markets with the exception of the Greek. 
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 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.999902 0.999337 0.999999 0.999641 0.999990 0.999907 
Adjusted R2 0.999902 0.999335 0.999999 0.999640 0.999990 0.999906 
Jarque-Bera  215.20 64.15 130.90 40.62 38.26 35.61 
Q-Statistics  (Correlogram) 0.0201 0.0480 0.0129 0.2316 0.1806 0.1233 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 0.010680 0.018199 0.032501 0.005342 0.003746 0.155048 
Table 74: 2012 Bond GARCH Residuals Statistics (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
As illustrated by table 74, the high R2 and adjusted R2 through all the estimated GARCH 
models hint at all the models being a good fit to the dependent variable.  Although with the 
exception of the US and possibly Greek markets, the Jarque-Bera tests seem to be slightly 
higher indicating a slightly significant acceptance of the null hypothesis of non-normality 
in the distribution.  Yet the Jarque-Bera statistics of the US and to a certain extent Greek 
market seem to be indicating a significantly higher acceptance of the null hypothesis.  
However, the Q-statistics seem to be hinting at significantly low serial correlations thru all 
markets.  Of course, the Q-statistics of the Italian market is higher than in table 72.  
Conversely, the US market is significantly lower.  The F-statistics are hinting at 
significantly lower ARCH effect with all the markets pointing at the ARCH effect-
approaching zero.   
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 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
-0.000127 
(9.67E-05) 
-1.66E-05 
(0.000166) 
-0.023049 
(8.64E-06) 
0.000538 
(0.000115) 
-0.000393 
(2.31E-05) 
0.001103 
(7.17E-05) 
b1 
-0.054001 
(0.000374) 
0.032834 
(0.000928) 
0.075420 
(4.06E-05) 
0.032899 
(0.000689) 
0.145090 
(0.000117) 
0.044436 
(0.000346) 
b2 
-0.042549 
(0.000372)      
ϵ 0.999498 (0.000384) 
0.999313 
(0.000970) 
1.000048 
(4.20E-05) 
1.000148 
(0.000712) 
1.000099 
(0.000120) 
0.999859 
(0.000366) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
1.95E-08 
(4.02E-08) 
-2.80E-08 
(8.23E-08) 
4.53E-10 
(5.54E-10) 
-2.23E-08 
(3.51E-08) 
-5.77E-10 
(1.83E-09) 
-9.87E-09 
(1.51E-08) 
α 0.061735 (0.018886) 
0.035012 
(0.011952) 
0.031907 
(0.013695) 
0.036275 
(0.012664) 
0.032787 
(0.012117) 
0.032688 
(0.011630) 
β 0.93849 (0.018154) 
0.966376 
(0.012133) 
0.961225 
(0.017336) 
0.9659 
(0.012603) 
0.968648 
(0.012990) 
0.969625 
(0.012139) 
𝜔𝜔1 − (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) -8.67E-05 2.02E-05 6.60E-08 1.03E-05 4.02E-07 4.27E-06 
𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 1.000225 1.001388 0.993132 1.002175 1.001435 1.002313 
−
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(2)
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) -3081 -500 101 -319 -483 -300 
Log Likelihood 2702.523 2389.583 4221.184 2622.947 3608.588 2914.310 
Table 75: GARCH Statistics of the 2012 Bond (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
It is worth noting that table 75 is associated with the financial crisis and hence some 
markets may have experienced flights to them.  In essence, the statistics in table 75 are 
reflecting the mixed reaction associated with such a crisis.  Looking at the section of figures 
12 to 19 marked “Financial Crisis Late 2000s” would seem to suggest that although there 
was a uniformed hike in volatility, the levels of the volatility seem to be telling.  Remember 
the GARGH variant of our EMH test hints at the significant acceptance of the null 
hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be efficient for all the observed markets 
during the financial crisis as illustrated by table 33.   
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The α coefficients seem to be hinting at a slightly increasing but still low level of sensitivity 
to market shocks.  Unsurprisingly the US market seems to be pointing at a significantly 
higher level of sensitivity to market shocks than the other observed markets.  The Greek, 
Portuguese and Spanish markets are pointing at a relatively low level of sensitivity to 
market shocks.  In contrast, the German and Italian markets seem to be suggesting a higher 
level of sensitivity to market shocks. 
The β coefficients seem to be pointing at a reduction in the already low levels of volatility 
persistence in the aftermath of a shock thru all the observed markets.  Yet the US market 
seems to be indicating a significantly lower persistence level of volatility than the other 
markets.  In addition, the Greek market is pointing at a relatively lower level of volatility 
persistence.  In contrast, the Portuguese and Spanish markets seem to be suggesting a 
slightly higher level of persistence in the aftermath of a shock to the market. 
With the exception of the US and Italian markets, the unconditional volatility seems to 
have been slightly increased.  Conversely, the unconditional volatility for the Greek and 
Portuguese markets remains significantly low.  With the exception of the Greek market, 
the mean reversion statistics seem to have increased hinting at the observed markets not 
reverting to the unconditional volatility in the aftermath of a crisis.  However, the Greek 
market is pointing at a slight reduction hinting at the market reverting to the unconditional 
volatility.  Conversely, with the exception of the Greek market, the volatility in all the 
observed markets does not decay to half their levels in the aftermath of a shock.  Moreover, 
the Greek market seems to be hinting that volatility decays quicker over time in comparison 
with table 73. 
As pointed earlier, the EMH test statistics in table 33 hint at the acceptance of the null 
hypothesis of the markets being too volatile for all the observed markets during the 
financial crisis period.  However, interestingly according to table 75, all the observed 
markets seem to be very phlegmatic to market shocks but exhibit relatively low volatility 
persistence in the aftermath of a crisis with a negative half-life with the exception of  the 
Greek market.  Conversely, with the exception of the Greek and Portuguese markets, all 
the other markets seem to exhibit relatively high-expected long-term volatility. 
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 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.999892 0.999323 0.999999 0.999650 0.999990 0.999910 
Adjusted R2 0.999891 0.999321 0.999999 0.999648 0.999990 0.999910 
Jarque-Bera  9.95 85.04 435.82 10034.14 467.63 427.76 
Q-Statistics  (Correlogram) 0.0054 0.9895 5.0920 0.2818 0.0782 0.0007 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 0.596262 8.710481 0.262242 0.125176 0.688975 0.845092 
Table 76: 2012 Bond GARCH Residuals Statistics (02/11/2009-30/12/2011) 
As illustrated by the previous tables, the high R2 and adjusted R2 through all the estimated 
GARCH models hint at all the models being a good fit to the dependent variable.  Although 
with the exception of the US market, the Jarque-Bera tests seem to be higher indicating a 
significant acceptance of the null hypothesis of non-normality in the distribution especially 
for the Italian market.  Yet the Jarque-Bera statistic of the US market seems to be indicating 
a significantly lower acceptance of the null hypothesis.  However, with the exception of 
the Greek and to a certain extent German markets, the Q-statistics seem to be hinting at the 
serial correlations remaining significantly low through all markets.  Of course, the Q-
statistics of the Greek market is significantly higher than in table 74.  Conversely, the US 
and Spanish markets are significantly low.  Moreover, the F-statistics are hinting at high 
ARCH effect with all the markets pointing at increases in the ARCH effect, especially the 
German market.   
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 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
0.000148 
(1.55E-05) 
-0.000564 
(3.29E-05) 
-0.023090 
(1.88E-05) 
0.000213 
(4.02E-05) 
-0.000467 
(2.77E-05) 
0.000912 
(3.91E-05) 
b1 
-0.053207 
(0.000431) 
0.033556 
(0.000949) 
0.075427 
(1.71E-05) 
0.034483 
(0.000519) 
0.145640 
(7.88E-05) 
0.046724 
(0.000294) 
b2 
-0.041162 
(0.000413)      
ϵ 1.001457 (0.000434) 
0.998025 
(0.001017) 
1.000176 
(2.10E-05) 
0.999474 
(0.000481) 
1.000000 
(8.83E-05) 
0.999129 
(0.000269) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
1.86E-10 
(1.17E-10) 
4.81E-10 
(1.12E-09) 
4.30E-08 
(9.52E-09) 
1.64E-07 
(6.97E-08) 
5.03E-08 
(1.26E-08) 
1.06E-07 
(3.22E-08) 
α 0.036449 (0.013434) 
0.030325 
(0.012292) 
0.478738 
(0.069965) 
0.26082 
(0.087970) 
0.185152 
(0.032247) 
0.136323 
(0.032971) 
β 0.952777 (0.013183) 
0.964401 
(0.010887) 
0.410825 
(0.046510) 
0.749416 
(0.052414) 
0.714817 
(0.036883) 
0.770618 
(0.044902) 
𝜔𝜔1 − (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) 1.73E-08 9.12E-08 3.89E-07 -1.60E-05 5.03E-07 1.14E-06 
𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 0.989226 0.994726 0.889563 1.010236 0.899969 0.906941 
−
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(2)
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) 64 131 6 -68 7 7 
Log Likelihood 3738.922 3185.039 3352.444 2979.818 3158.551 3025.912 
Table 77: GARCH Statistics of the 2012 Bond (02/11/2009-30/12/2011) 
It is worth noting that table 77 is associated with the sovereign debt crisis and hence as 
expected, there is a difference between the GIPS group of markets and the other two.  In 
essence, the statistics in table 77 and the section of the figures 50 to 57 marked “Sovereign 
Debt Crisis Early 2010s” seem to be reflecting this different.  Interestingly table 35 
illustrates the GARCH variant of our EMH test accepted the market efficiency for the 
observed Greek and Portuguese markets.  However, it did also significantly accept the null 
hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be efficient for the remaining markets.   
The observed markets seem to be hinting at a significantly higher level of sensitivity to 
market shocks in all observed GIPS markets.  The Greek and Italian markets, in particular, 
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seem to be pointing at significantly higher levels of sensitivity to market shocks than other 
observed markets.  Additionally, the α coefficients of the Portuguese and Spanish markets 
are also pointing at a high level of sensitivity to market shocks.  In contrast, the US and 
German markets seem to be lower suggesting a significantly low level of sensitivity to 
market shocks,, in fact both markets are approaching zero. 
The β coefficients seem to be pointing at significantly lower levels of volatility persistence 
in the aftermath of a shock in the observed GIPS markets.  Yet the Greek market seems to 
be indicating a significantly lower persistence level of volatility than the other GIPS 
markets.  However, as expected the US and German markets are pointing at relatively high 
levels of volatility persistence in the aftermath of a shock to the market.  Conversely, the 
US and German markets are slightly higher and lower respectively than previously 
indicated in table 75.   
With the exception of the Spanish market, the unconditional volatility seems increased for 
all the GIPS markets.  Conversely, the unconditional volatility for the US and German 
markets is lower.  The evidence from the statistics seems to be painting a weak picture with 
respect to the mean reversion among the GIPS markets.  However, the US and German 
markets seem to be suggesting that in the long run volatility does reverts to the average 
long term volatility after a positive or negative shock to the market.  Interestingly, the 
Italian market’s statistic for the mean reversion is greater than one hinting at a negative 
half-life suggesting that volatility does not decay over time.  However, the other GIPS 
markets seem to be hinting at a significant change in the volatility half-life to 6 or 7 
working days.  In contrast, the US and German markets seem to be also hinting at change 
but  with volatility half-lives of 64 and 131 working days respectively,  they remain high. 
As noted earlier rather surprisingly, the EMH test statistics in table 35 hint at the rejection 
of the null hypothesis of the markets being too volatile for the Greek and Portuguese 
markets during the sovereign debt crisis period.  However, interestingly according to table 
77, the Greek and to lesser extent Portuguese markets seem to be very reactive to market 
shocks and exhibit a low volatility persistence in aftermath of a crisis with a significantly 
low half-life.  Conversely, both markets seem to exhibit a relatively low expected long-
term volatility.  However, notably that to a certain extent this is true of a number of other 
GIPS markets.   
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 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.999999 0.999999 0.990780 0.999976 0.999918 
Adjusted R2 0.999999 0.999999 0.990761 0.999976 0.999918 
Jarque-Bera  96.87 26.84 2264.50 4681.58 1552.97 
Q-Statistics  (Correlogram) 0.0010 0.0948 0.2811 0.3268 0.1235 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 0.566707 0.950073 0.744441 0.905307 1.254261 
Table 78: 2017 Bond GARCH Residuals Statistics (02/07/2007-29/03/2013) 
As illustrated by table 78, a key factor to note is the high R2 and adjusted R2.  The R2 is 
above 0.99 through all the estimated GARCH models, thus hinting at the lagged price 
differential with the estimated residuals being highly able to explain the movement in the 
price differential.  Another factor is the significantly high adjusted R2 pointing at the 
estimated GARCH model being a good fit to the dependent variable across all the markets.  
An interesting point to note is the R2 and adjusted R2 of the IPS20 markets are lower than 
the US and German markets 
The Jarque-Bera test for all the markets seem to be hinting at a significant acceptance of 
the null hypothesis of non-normality in the distribution of the residuals.  We found all our 
samples seem to follow a leptokurtic distribution, which hints at the Student t distribution 
model.  However, the Jarque-Bera tests for the IPS markets seem to be excessively high, 
especially the Portuguese market.  Yet the Jarque-Bera statistic of the US and German 
markets seem to be indicating a significantly lower acceptance of the null hypothesis in 
comparison with the observed IPS markets.   
With regard to the serial correlation, the Q-statistics of the correlogram seem to be hinting 
at low serial correlations thru all markets.  Of course the Q-statistics of the US and German 
markets are significantly lower than the other observed markets.   
In essence, with the possible exception of the Spanish, the F-statistics are hinting at low 
ARCH effect in all the markets.  However, the observed Eurozone markets seem to be 
hinting at a higher ARCH effect. 
                                                 
20 Italy, Portugal and Spain 
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 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
0.013447 
(6.04E-06) 
0.012487 
(7.86E-06) 
0.005179 
(0.000702) 
0.000288 
(5.47E-05) 
0.004129 
(8.14E-05) 
b1 
-0.060876 
(2.15E-05) 
0.067354 
(2.67E-05) 
0.175965 
(0.001926) 
0.255124 
(7.69E-05) 
0.190727 
(0.000208) 
b2   
-0.069594 
(0.002063)   
ϵ 1.000047 (2.31E-05) 
1.000030 
(2.85E-05) 
0.994172 
(0.001839) 
0.999879 
(8.58E-05) 
1.000336 
(0.000200) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
-3.28E-11 
(5.58E-11) 
8.80E-11 
(2.16E-10) 
4.10E-05 
(1.21E-05) 
7.09E-07 
(1.42E-07) 
6.20E-07 
(1.85E-07) 
α 0.047406 (0.008881) 
0.0467 
(0.009079) 
0.117162 
(0.021872) 
0.206489 
(0.030734) 
0.105298 
(0.019833) 
β 0.953587 (0.007923) 
0.953682 
(0.008871) 
0.867571 
(0.018727) 
0.716505 
(0.031543) 
0.859003 
(0.022424) 
𝜔𝜔1 − (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) 3.30E-08 -2.30E-07 2.69E-03 9.21E-06 1.74E-05 
𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 1.000993 1.000382 0.984733 0.922994 0.964301 
−
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(2)
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) -698 -1815 45 9 19 
Log Likelihood 9781.492 9820.607 2948.889 6771.308 6295.678 
Table 79: GARCH Statistics of the 2017 Bond (02/07/2007-29/03/2013) 
 207 
 
 
.0000000
.0000002
.0000004
.0000006
.0000008
.0000010
.0000012
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Financial Crisis Sovereign Debt Crisis
 
Figure 20: US 2017 (GARCH) 
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Figure 21: German 2017 (GARCH) 
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Figure 22: Italian 2017 (GARCH) 
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Figure 23: Portuguese 2017 (GARCH) 
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Figure 24: Spanish 2017 (GARCH) 
It is worth remembering that the 2017 bonds cover the period between 1st July 2007 and 
31st March 2013, thus meaning they illustrate the behaviour of volatility in a highly volatile 
market environment based on the financial and sovereign debt crises.  In essence, the 
statistics in table 79 are the generalised pointers to the behaviour of volatility during the 
crises period.  As figures 20 to 24 seem to be illustrating, the observed markets are 
generally, subdivided into the IPS markets, which were at the heart of the sovereign debt 
crises and the US, and Germany markets.  An influencing factor is by analysing the 
behaviour of volatility in these 2017 bonds, we could overcome the maturity effect and 
thus extend our analysis of the sovereign debt crisis.  Remember the GARGH variant of 
our EMH test hints at the rejection of the null hypothesis of the market being too volatile 
to be efficient for all the observed markets except for the German as illustrated by table 37. 
The level of sensitivity to market shocks seems to be pointing at a differentiated picture 
with the IPS markets hinting at a high level of sensitivity to market shocks.  As illustrated 
by figures 22 to 24, more than two significant hikes in the volatility dominate the IPS 
markets.  However, the α coefficient for the Portuguese market seem to be hinting at a 
significantly higher level of sensitivity to market shocks than the other observed IPS 
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markets.  In contrast, the US and German markets seem to be hinting at significantly low 
levels of sensitivity to market shocks.   
Like the α coefficients, the β coefficients also seem to be pointing at a differentiated picture 
with the IPS markets hinting at a significantly low level of volatility persistence in the 
aftermath of market shocks.  However, the Portuguese market seems to be hinting at a 
lower level of volatility persistency than the other observed IPS markets.  In contrast, the 
US and German markets seem to be hinting at a significantly high level of volatility 
persistence in the aftermath of a market shock. 
The differentiated picture continues with the IPS markets demonstrating a high 
unconditional volatility.  Conversely, the unconditional volatility for the Italian market is 
significantly high.  In contrast, both the US and German markets have low unconditional 
volatility.  The evidence from the statistics seems to be painting a weak picture with respect 
to the mean reversion among the IPS markets.  Interestingly, both the US and German 
markets’ statistics for the mean reversion are greater than one meaning that both markets 
do not revert to the unconditional volatility.  These high statistics seems to be suggesting 
that volatility does not decay over time.  However, the IPS markets seem to be hinting at a 
low volatility half-life with the Portuguese market having a low volatility half-life of only 
9 working days. 
As pointed earlier, the EMH test statistics in table 37 hint at the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of the markets being too volatile for all the observed markets except for the 
German.  However, interestingly according to table 79, the IPS markets seem to be very 
reactive to market shocks but exhibit low volatility persistence in aftermath of a crisis with 
a low half-life (except to a certain extent for the Italian).  The US market hints at a 
phlegmatic market shock but exhibit relatively high volatility persistence in aftermath of a 
crisis with a negative half-life.  Conversely, all the IPS markets seem to exhibit relatively 
high-expected long-term volatility but the US has a low unconditional volatility.   
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 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.999999 0.999999 0.990621 0.999975 0.999916 
Adjusted R2 0.999999 0.999999 0.990574 0.999975 0.999915 
Jarque-Bera  90.21 3.82 7.66 3.66 0.73 
Q-Statistics  (Correlogram) 0.0512 0.0129 0.0319 0.0425 0.0204 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 0.008514 0.093090 0.264138 0.005975 0.006336 
Table 80: 2017 Bond GARCH Residuals Statistics (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
The high R2 and adjusted R2 through all the estimated GARCH models hint at all the 
models being a good fit to the dependent variable.  Like table 78, there is a split between 
the IPS and US/German markets with the IPS markets hinting at lower R2 and adjusted R2.  
Although the Jarque-Bera tests, for the US market seem to be excessively high in 
comparison with the Eurozone markets indicating a significant acceptance of the null 
hypothesis of non-normality in the distribution, yet the Eurozone markets, especially the 
Spanish, seem to be significantly low hinting at a distribution approaching normality.  
Additionally, the Q-statistics seem to be pointing at significantly low serial correlation for 
all the observed markets.  Conversely, the F-statistics are hinting at an ARCH effect-
approaching zero with all the markets. 
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 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
0.013419 
(2.26E-05) 
0.012478 
(1.66E-05) 
0.004676 
(0.001163) 
0.000192 
(6.83E-05) 
0.004016 
(0.000122) 
b1 
-0.060859 
(3.49E-05) 
0.067302 
(4.49E-05) 
0.169176 
(0.003771) 
0.255791 
(0.000198) 
0.191675 
(0.000372) 
b2   
-0.062907 
(0.003837)   
ϵ 1.000119 (3.75E-05) 
1.000051 
(4.93E-05) 
0.991894 
(0.003730) 
0.999880 
(0.000198) 
0.999988 
(0.000394) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
4.83E-09 
(3.69E-09) 
8.14E-09 
(5.37E-09) 
1.32E-05 
(1.16E-05) 
3.51E-08 
(3.42E-08) 
8.11E-08 
(9.00E-08) 
α 0.043325 (0.016580) 
0.044572 
(0.019666) 
0.034996 
(0.016369) 
0.032077 
(0.014663) 
0.025297 
(0.012058) 
β 0.943928 (0.021698) 
0.912228 
(0.041023) 
0.952196 
(0.023159) 
0.957466 
(0.020752) 
0.966583 
(0.017502) 
𝜔𝜔1 − (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) 3.79E-07 1.88E-07 1.03E-03 3.36E-06 9.99E-06 
𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 0.987253 0.9568 0.987192 0.989543 0.99188 
−
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(2)
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) 54 16 54 66 85 
Log Likelihood 3660.356 3848.062 1257.029 2984.073 2636.353 
Table 81: GARCH Statistics of the 2017 Bond (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
It is worth noting that this subsample is associated with the financial crisis and hence some 
markets may have experienced flights to them.  In essence, the statistics in table 81 are 
reflecting the mixed reaction associated with such a crisis.  Looking at the section of figures 
20 to 24 marked “Financial Crisis Late 2000s” it would seem to be giving the impression 
that the US/German market are more volatile than the IPS markets.  However, this seems 
to be an illusion with the high levels of volatility during the sovereign debt crisis effecting 
the IPS markets.  Remember the GARGH variant of our EMH test hints at the rejection of 
the null hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be efficient for all the observed 
markets except for the Italian as illustrated by table 39. 
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The observed markets seem to be hinting at a low level of sensitivity to market shocks.  
Moreover, the α coefficients of the IPS markets are pointing at a lower level of sensitivity 
to market shocks.  Additionally, the Spanish market seems to be pointing at significantly 
low level of sensitivity to market shocks.  In contrast, the US and German markets seem 
to be suggesting a higher level of sensitivity to market shocks. 
The β coefficients seem to be pointing at relatively low levels of volatility persistence in 
the aftermath of a shock in the observed markets.  Yet the German market seems to be 
indicating at a significantly lower persistence level of volatility than the other markets.  
The US market is pointing at a relatively low level of volatility persistence.  However, the 
IPS markets, especially the Spanish, have higher β coefficients suggesting a relatively high 
level of volatility persistence.   
The differentiated picture continues with the IPS markets demonstrating a high 
unconditional volatility.  Conversely, the unconditional volatility for the Italian is 
significantly high.  In contrast both the US and German markets have low unconditional 
volatility.  The evidence from the statistics seems to be painting a more coherent picture 
with respect to the mean reversion among the markets with the exception of the German 
market.  However, the Spanish market seem to be suggesting that in the long run volatility 
does reverts to the average long term volatility after a shock to the market.  Interestingly, 
the German market’s statistic for the mean reversion is significantly below 0.99.  This 
means the German market has the lowest volatility half-life of 16 working days.  However, 
the other markets seem to be hinting at a relatively high volatility half-life with the Spanish 
market hinting at a volatility half-life of 85 working days. 
As pointed earlier, the EMH test statistics in table 39 hint at the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of the markets being too volatile for all the observed markets except for the 
Italian.  However, interestingly according to table 81, all the markets seem to be very 
reactive to market shocks but exhibit low volatility persistence in aftermath of a crisis with 
a low half-life with the exception to a certain extent of the German market.  Conversely, 
all the markets seem to exhibit relatively low expected long-term volatility.   
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 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.999999 0.999999 0.990868 0.999977 0.999919 
Adjusted R2 0.999999 0.999999 0.990837 0.999976 0.999919 
Jarque-Bera  27.75 32.79 3394.59 1048.06 1822.18 
Q-Statistics  (Correlogram) 0.1404 0.1574 0.1542 0.0001 0.1081 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 1.436519 0.269539 1.020956 2.844755 0.930503 
Table 82: 2017 Bond GARCH Residuals Statistics (02/11/2009-29/03/2013) 
The high R2 and adjusted R2 through all the estimated GARCH models hint at all the 
models being a good fit to the dependent variable.  Like tables 78 and 80, there is a split 
between the IPS and US/German markets with the IPS markets hinting at lower R2 and 
adjusted R2.  These splits continue with the Jarque-Bera test, the IPS markets seem to be 
excessively high indicating a significant acceptance of the null hypothesis of non-normality 
in the distribution.  Yet the US and German markets seem to be hinting at a relatively low 
acceptance of the null hypothesis.  Additionally, the Q-statistics seem to be pointing at 
significantly low serial correlation for all the observed markets with the Portuguese 
market-approaching zero.  Conversely, the F-statistics are hinting at a relatively low ARCH 
effect in all the observed markets with the possible exception of the Portuguese and 
possibly German markets.  While the German market is approaching zero arch effect, the 
Portuguese market seems to be hinting at a high ARCH effect in comparison.   
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 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
a 
 
0.013447 
(6.21E-06) 
0.012489 
(8.96E-06) 
0.005548 
(0.000861) 
0.000428 
(8.21E-05) 
0.004218 
(0.000118) 
b1 
-0.060881 
(2.77E-05) 
0.067377 
(3.40E-05) 
0.180145 
(0.002265) 
0.254807 
(9.54E-05) 
0.190026 
(0.000267) 
b2   
-0.074069 
(0.002350)   
ϵ 0.999998 (2.99E-05) 
1.000018 
(3.58E-05) 
0.994877 
(0.002076) 
0.999958 
(0.000101) 
1.000908 
(0.000205) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
-6.42E-13 
(7.44E-11) 
3.92E-10 
(3.65E-10) 
7.82E-05 
(2.79E-05) 
2.63E-06 
(9.23E-07) 
4.95E-07 
(1.37E-07) 
α 0.052876 (0.012626) 
0.068465 
(0.015843) 
0.252176 
(0.061072) 
0.46313 
(0.142701) 
0.127816 
(0.015907) 
β 0.94665 (0.011165) 
0.929266 
(0.015319) 
0.771994 
(0.032014) 
0.586524 
(0.063846) 
0.844498 
(0.014821) 
𝜔𝜔1 − (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) -1.35E-09 1.73E-07 -3.24E-03 -5.30E-05 1.79E-05 
𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 0.999526 0.997731 1.02417 1.049654 0.972314 
−
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(2)
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) 1462 305 -29 -14 25 
Log Likelihood 6127.453 5973.276 1707.772 3826.701 3653.535 
Table 83: GARCH Statistics of the 2017 Bond (02/11/2009-29/03/2013) 
It is worth noting that table 83 is associated with the sovereign debt crisis and hence as 
expected, there is a difference between the IPS markets and US/German markets.  In 
essence, the statistics in table 83 and the section of the figures 58 to 62 marked “Sovereign 
Debt Crisis Early 2010s” seems to be reflecting this different.  The 2017 bonds allow us 
to extend the period of analysis in the sovereign debt crisis and to overcome the maturity 
effect of the 2012 bonds in table 77.  Interestingly the GARGH variant of our EMH test 
hints at the rejection of the null hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be efficient 
for all the IPS markets as demonstrated by table 41. 
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The α coefficients of the IPS markets seem to be pointing at high level of sensitivity to 
market shocks.  However, the Portuguese market seems to be hinting at a higher level of 
sensitivity to market shocks than the other observed IPS markets.  In contrast, the US and 
German markets seem to be hinting at relatively low levels of sensitivity to market shocks. 
The β coefficients also seem to be hinting seem to be pointing at a differentiated picture 
with the IPS markets hinting at a significantly low level of volatility persistence in the 
aftermath of market shocks.  However, the Portuguese market seems to be hinting at a 
lower level of volatility persistency than the other observed IPS markets.  In contrast, the 
US and German markets seem to be hinting at a significantly high level of volatility 
persistence in the aftermath of a market shock. 
The differentiated picture continues with the IPS markets demonstrating a high 
unconditional volatility.  Conversely, the unconditional volatility for the Italian is 
significantly high.  In contrast both the US and German markets have low unconditional 
volatility with the US market significantly low.  With the exception of the Spanish market, 
the evidence seems to be painting a weak picture with respect to the mean reversion among 
the IPS markets.  However, the US and German markets seem to be suggesting that in the 
very long run volatility does reverts to the average long term volatility after a shock to the 
market.  Interestingly, both the Italian and Portuguese markets’ statistic for the mean 
reversion is greater than one meaning both market do not revert to the unconditional 
volatility.  These high statistics results in a negative half-life of the volatility, which 
suggests that volatility does not decay over time,  however, the Spanish market seem to be 
hinting at a relatively low volatility half-life.  In comparison, the US and to a lesser extent 
German markets seem to pointing at a significantly high volatility half-life. 
As pointed earlier, the EMH test statistics in table 41 hint at the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of the markets being too volatile for all the observed IPS markets.  However, 
interestingly according to table 83, all the IPS markets seem to be very reactive to market 
shocks but exhibit low volatility persistence in aftermath of a crisis with no half-life (except 
for the Spanish market which  has a low half-life).  Conversely, all the markets seem to 
exhibit relatively high-expected long-term volatility.   
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4.4.2 The EGARCH-m Model of Volatility 
We use an EGARCH–m model of volatility to analyse the feedback and asymmetrical 
effects on the behaviour of price volatility in our observed sovereign debt markets.  In 
essence, the basis of the EGARCH-m is the integration of two models: the asymmetrical 
effect obtained by the EGARCH, which is the first equation, and the feedback effect 
obtained by the GARCH-m, which is the second equation.  The key coefficients are the γ 
in the EGARCH portion of the model and the λ in the GARCH-m portion of the model: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(ℎ𝑡𝑡) = 𝜔𝜔 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(ℎ𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝛼𝛼1 �𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−1𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛾𝛾1 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−1𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1 
∆𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆𝜆1ℎ𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣 + �𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
Δ𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 
With the exception of a number of observations, the model is a single lagged EGARCH –
m (1, 1) model with a student t distribution estimated using the Maximum Likelihood 
method with a Marquandt optimization algorithm.  However, due to an error with the 
optimization algorithm, which meant we used the BHHH rather than the Marquandt to 
estimate the US period 2 and German 2012 period 3 observations.  We also encountered 
errors with respect to the distribution of the residuals in the model; hence, we used the 
normal distribution to estimate four of the sample periods21 and the Generalized Errors 
Distribution for the US 2012 period 4.  Just like the GARCH model in section 4.4.1, we 
encountered errors with the single lagged system, which meant the use of two lags in the 
estimation model with respect to all the US 2012 with the exception of the pre-crisis period 
and Italian 2017 sample periods.  However, looking at the German and Portuguese markets 
during the financial crisis closely, the statistics seem to be suggesting an error in the 
estimation of the β coefficients for both markets.  We tried to use different estimation 
settings but could not get the correct estimation.  Conversely, the use of new settings 
introduced in EViews 9 could solve these issues.  However, we did not have time to test 
                                                 
21 German 2012 Period 3, Greek 2012 Period 2, Greek 2012 Period 4 and Spanish 2017 
period 3 
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the new settings, hence we just display the German and Portuguese estimated statistics 
obtained thru the use of EViews 8.1.   
 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.999900 0.999331 0.999999 0.999638 0.999990 0.999906 
Adjusted R2 0.999899 0.999330 0.999999 0.999638 0.999990 0.999906 
Jarque-Bera  241.92 164.05 1377.57 12622.57 783.95 524.20 
Q-Statistics  (Correlogram) 0.0005 0.0637 2.2926 0.2546 1.3633 0.0472 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 0.198796 0.187648 3.221562 0.028781 0.018891 1.515810 
Table 84: 2012 Bond EGARCH-M Residuals Statistics (01/07/2002-30/12/2011) 
As illustrated by table 70, a key factor of note is the high R2, which are above 0.99 through 
all the estimated EGARCH-M models, thus hinting at the lagged price differential with the 
estimated residuals being highly able to explain the movement in the price differential.  
Another factor is the significantly high adjusted R2 pointing at the estimated EGARCH-M 
model being a good fit to the dependent variable across all the markets.   
The Jarque-Bera test for all the samples seem to be hinting at a significant acceptance of 
the null hypothesis of non-normality in the distribution of the residuals.  We found all our 
samples seem to follow a leptokurtic distribution, which hints at the Student t distribution 
model.  However, the Jarque-Bera statistics seem to be hinting at a varied set of results 
with the Greek and Italian markets being significantly greater than the other markets.  
Conversely, the German market is significantly lower than all the other markets.   
With regard to the serial correlation, the Q-statistics of the correlogram seem to be hinting 
at a significantly low correlation.  At the single lagged level, the Q-statistic for all our 
samples does not rise above 2.2926 as observed by the Greek.  With the exception of the 
Greek and Portuguese, the Q-statistics seem to be approaching zero, especially the US.   
The F-statistics seems split between approaching no ARCH effect and low ARCH effect 
remaining.  In essence, the two highest F-statistics are the Greek and Spanish markets.  
However, the other observed markets all have F-statistics lower than one, thus meaning 
approximately no ARCH effect remaining.  Of note is the F-statistic of the Portuguese 
market, which seems to be hinting at near zero ARCH effect remaining. 
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 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
λ 
 
-19.48992 
(5.659459) 
16.55045 
(3.578849) 
-19.56909 
(37.60378) 
16.83725 
(4.911288) 
33.60185 
(28.79731) 
29.39833 
(10.80412) 
a 0.000073 (9.97E-06) 
-0.0005740 
(2.68E-05) 
-0.0230610 
(5.85E-06) 
0.000163 
(4.36E-05) 
-0.000452 
(1.95E-05) 
0.000859 
(4.38E-05) 
b1 -0.054230 (0.000189) 
0.0328620 
(0.000475) 
0.0754340 
(1.74E-05) 
0.033158 
(0.000310) 
0.145163 
(5.34E-05) 
0.044967 
(0.000169) 
b2 
-0.042543 
(0.000187)      
ϵ 1.000150 (0.000192) 
0.9987240 
(0.000490) 
1.0000150 
(1.86E-05) 
0.999563 
(0.000301) 
1.000006 
(5.48E-05) 
0.999751 
(0.000167) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
-0.064846 
(0.014351) 
-0.048553 
(0.011806) 
-0.572891 
(0.078216) 
-0.116668 
(0.022977) 
-0.420401 
(0.082646) 
-0.210595 
(0.042733) 
α 0.090640 (0.014472) 
0.076715 
(0.011699) 
0.243006 
(0.024986) 
0.139255 
(0.015247) 
0.187736 
(0.022564) 
0.161352 
(0.017858) 
γ -0.005809 (0.007984) 
0.012944 
(0.006829) 
-0.067240 
(0.016017) 
-0.021769 
(0.011059) 
-0.033638 
(0.014437) 
-0.029898 
(0.012182) 
β 1.000578 (0.000634) 
1.001075 
(0.000621) 
0.974899 
(0.004581) 
0.998887 
(0.001615) 
0.979996 
(0.005318) 
0.992713 
(0.002990) 
𝜔𝜔1 − (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) 0.710890 0.6241548 2.6290861 0.8445513 2.5063852 1.3669231 
𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 1.091218 1.0777900 1.2179050 1.1381420 1.1677320 1.1540650 
−
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(2)
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) 8 9 4 5 4 5 
Log Likelihood 11962.04 10441.59 16408.25 10840.49 14287.56 11950.83 
Table 85: EGARCH-M Statistics of the 2012 Bond (01/07/2002-30/12/2011) 
It is worth remembering table 85 covers the period between 1st July 2002 and 31st 
December 2011 for the 2012 bonds, thus meaning it illustrates the behaviour of volatility 
during a period of changing market environment.  In essence, the statistics in table 85 are 
the generalised pointers to the behaviour of volatility in the observed 2012 government 
bonds.  It must be noted that as illustrated by table 29, the GARCH variant of our EMH 
test accepted the market efficiency for the observed US, Greek and Portuguese markets.  
However, it did also significantly accept the null hypothesis of the market being too volatile 
to be efficient for the remaining markets.   
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With the exception of the US and Greek markets, the λ coefficients seem to be hinting at a 
positive feedback effect.  Remember a positive feedback hints at the returns increase with 
the risks; given that for long periods the risks in these markets were low, this does suggest 
that the returns were low.  However, the opposite also holds true, when the risks are 
decreasing the returns are also decreasing.  This may be the key to understanding the crises, 
especially the sovereign debt crisis, in the later part of the observational period.  However, 
the US and Greek market have a negative feedback effect meaning as risk increases 
(decreases) returns decrease (increase).  During the economic upturn/asset price bubble the 
risk on these bonds decreased, this meant that returns increased.  Conversely, this may have 
continued during the financial crisis.  However, during the sovereign debt crisis, the risk 
increased and hence the returns decreased, especially in the Greek market.   
With the exception of the German market, the γ coefficients seem to be hinting at a leverage 
effect.  This means that a negative shock carry greater impact than a positive shock to the 
market.  This seems to be hinting at a number of influential events causing negative shocks 
in the observed markets.  As will be illustrated later, this means the sovereign debt crisis 
conveys more weight with the GIPS markets while the pre-crisis period seem to be more 
influential with the US market.  Since the financial and sovereign debt crisis did not have 
a significant negative impact on the US market during the observation.  Since theory dictate 
that some markets, mainly risk free markets like the German market, experience an 
increase in the volatility from a positive shock to the pricing during a crisis.  Thus, a 
possible explanation for the positive asymmetrical effect in the German market is both 
crises increased the price and thus made the market highly volatile.   
The level of sensitivity to market shocks seems to be hinting at a differentiated picture.  
Thus meaning with the exception of the US and German markets, the observed markets 
seem to be hinting at a relatively high level of sensitivity to market shocks.  As previously 
hinted the shock to the price volatility in the GIPS markets came during the sovereign debt 
crisis.  The α coefficients of the US and German markets are pointing at a low level of 
sensitivity to market shocks.  As illustrated previously, we assume much of the shock to 
the US and German markets came from individual events causing Knightian uncertainty.   
With the exception of the Greek and Portuguese markets, the β coefficients are pointing at 
highly persistence levels of volatility in the aftermath of a shock in the observed markets.  
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As illustrated previously, significant hikes in the volatility blighted the Greek and 
Portuguese markets during the sovereign debt crisis hinting at a reactive market.  However, 
by the omission of the sovereign debt crisis from the equation, both the Greek and 
Portuguese markets look to be more persistence.  A known factor is that when the market 
is highly reactive as in high sensitivity to market shocks, the levels of persistence is 
relatively low and the opposite is equally true.  This is importance because it explains the 
other observed markets, since as previously illustrated these market are not as reactive as 
the Greek or Portuguese markets.  Therefore, the β coefficients seem to be hinting at highly 
persistence volatility in the aftermath of any shock to the market.  In particular, the US and 
German markets seems to be displaying the highest persistence levels. 
The unconditional volatility seems to be hinting at a divided picture with regard to the 
observed markets.  Whereas the US, German and Italian markets have relatively low 
unconditional volatility; the remaining observed markets seem to be pointing at significant 
levels of unconditional volatility.  However, the unconditional volatility is significantly 
high for all the observed market.  An explanation could be find in the ω coefficient, which 
is significantly higher than previously observed.  Conversely, all the observed markets do 
not revert to the unconditional volatility after a rise or fall.  The evidence seems to be 
suggesting that with the exception of the US and German markets, the statistics are 
significantly higher than previously observed.  However, the volatility half-life seem to be 
suggesting that the volatility in all observed markets tend to decay to half their levels 
significantly fast in the aftermath of a shock to the market. 
It would seem to be that the negative feedback effect influenced the efficiency of both the 
US and Greek markets.  However, if this is the case then, why did not the Portuguese 
market accept the null hypothesis, after all it is hinting at a highly positive feedback effect.  
The explanation is not with the asymmetrical or feedback effect, it is to do with the 
behaviour of market participants during the observation.  It is obvious that the highly 
volatile events of the sovereign debt crisis in the later part of the observation played an 
influential part in the overall picture of the Greek and Portuguese markets.  Conversely, 
the high volatility of the later stages of the observation did counter the effect of the low 
volatility in the rest of the observations.  Since volatility is essentially the movement of the 
price, this would suggest that these two counter balances were significant enough to make 
the prices of these two markets accept the EMH.  This could also explain the acceptance 
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of the EMH by the US market, since the high volatility of the earlier period and the 
financial crisis counter balanced the low volatility during the asset price bubble and the 
maturity effect.  The other observed markets may have been too volatile at some point of 
the observation to be efficient.  This would hint at the overreaction/underreaction 
hypothesis playing a role in the efficiency of the market. 
 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.998055 0.999333 0.999999 0.999638 0.999990 0.999906 
Adjusted R2 0.998051 0.999331 0.999999 0.999637 0.999990 0.999906 
Jarque-Bera  55.86 40.86 44.05 47.36 48.98 38.27 
Q-Statistics  (Correlogram) 60.63 0.16 0.11 0.20 0.20 0.19 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 0.041863 0.258298 0.348886 0.136401 0.552330 0.371671 
Table 86: 2012 Bond EGARCH-M Residuals Statistics (01/07/2002-29/06/2007) 
In essence, as illustrated by table 86, the high R2 and adjusted R2 through all the estimated 
EGARCH-M models hint at all the models being a good fit to the dependent variable.  
Although the Jarque-Bera tests seem to be low, yet the statistics accept the null hypothesis 
of non-normality in the distribution.  However, the Q-statistics seem to be suggesting that 
with the significant exception of the US, the observed markets have a very low serial 
correlation.  The F-statistics are hinting at a very low ARCH effect.  Conversely, the US 
market is hinting at the ARCH effect-approaching zero. 
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 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
λ 
 
-3.149173 
(2.210038) 
 
18.98865 
(6.997839) 
 
427.4147 
(163.1040) 
 
28.22693 
(9.840331) 
 
163.5715 
(58.79183) 
 
49.10407 
(18.64287) 
a 0.000548 (0.000502) 
-0.000827 
(0.000232) 
-0.023086 
(1.15E-05) 
-9.09E-05 
(0.000175) 
-0.000510 
(3.25E-05) 
0.000736 
(9.96E-05) 
b -0.053412 (0.001175) 
0.032208 
(0.000695) 
0.075342 
(3.09E-05) 
0.032224 
(0.000507) 
0.144987 
(8.74E-05) 
0.044319 
(0.000262) 
ϵ 1.000703 (0.001157) 
0.999143 
(0.000695) 
0.999985 
(3.10E-05) 
0.999407 
(0.000510) 
0.999957 
(8.66E-05) 
0.999861 
(0.000260) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
-0.036435 
(0.016058) 
 
-0.029680 
(0.018290) 
 
-0.030912 
(0.030303) 
 
-0.030242 
(0.020236) 
 
-0.031741 
(0.026106) 
 
-0.031495 
(0.022706) 
α 0.044060 (0.013495) 
0.043634 
(0.012487) 
0.045550 
(0.013406) 
0.043850 
(0.012861) 
0.043774 
(0.013049) 
0.043995 
(0.012837) 
γ -0.010118 (0.007872) 
0.012498 
(0.008243) 
0.014311 
(0.008381) 
0.013259 
(0.008170) 
0.012619 
(0.008415) 
0.014061 
(0.008274) 
β 0.999847 (0.001146) 
1.000527 
(0.001409) 
1.000327 
(0.001631) 
1.000448 
(0.001515) 
1.000221 
(0.001570) 
1.000315 
(0.001585) 
𝜔𝜔1 − (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) 0.829822 0.672086 0.673802 0.682694 0.721468 0.710788 
𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 1.043907 1.044161 1.045877 1.044298 1.043995 1.04431 
−
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(2)
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) -16 -16 -15 -16 -16 -16 
Log Likelihood 3617.665 4871.735 8875.005 5277.896 7538.044 6058.830 
Table 87: EGARCH-M Statistics of the 2012 Bond (01/07/2002-29/06/2007) 
Remember that table 87 covers the pre-crisis period between 1st July 2002 and 29th June 
2007.  Highly volatile events and a prolonged period of stability in the sovereign debt 
market blighted the period.  The pre-crisis period came in the aftermath of a period of 
highly volatile events like the introduction of the Euro and the 11 September 2001 
terrorists’ attacks.  However, notably the period also saw a prolonged economic upturn, 
which initiated the asset price bubble of the mid-2000s.  Conversely, it must be noted that 
as illustrated by table 31 the GARCH variant of our EMH test accepted the market 
efficiency for the observed US and Spanish markets.  However, it did also accept the null 
hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be efficient for the remaining markets. 
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With the exception of the US market, the λ coefficients seem to be hinting at a positive 
feedback effect.  Notably that a positive feedback hints at the returns increasing with the 
risks; given that for long periods, the risks in these markets were low, this does suggest 
that the returns were low.  In many ways, the positive feedback effect was inherent due to 
the factors influencing the Eurozone economy and financial market.  An important factor 
to note is that the high risks of the aftermath of the introduction of the euro influenced the 
early stage of the pre-crisis period.  The implications were that market participants were 
unsure about the euro and did not want to invest in other Eurozone markets; this caused 
the prices to increase as risk increase.  Another factor is that a prolonged economic upturn 
highlighted the later stages of the pre-crisis period, which led to an asset price bubble in 
some Eurozone markets.  During prolonged economic upturns, market participants tend to 
go after high returns increasing their risk holdings and “safe” assets like sovereign debts 
tend to have low returns in comparison.  A key factor to remember is the positive feedback 
effect also implies that the prices decrease as risks decrease.   
However, the λ coefficient hints at the US market having a negative feedback effect 
meaning as risk increases (decreases) returns decrease (increase).  Rather surprisingly, this 
implies that during the economic upturn and hence asset price bubble of the mid 2000s risk 
on these bonds decreased, this meant that returns increased or to put it another way, risk 
increased and hence returns decreased.  Whichever way you put it; this means that an 
illogical behaviour in the price blighted the asset price bubble during the pre-crisis period.  
Since, theory would suggest that during a prolonged economic upturn or asset price bubble, 
prices and risks of so-called “safe” assets like sovereign debt would decrease.  Of course, 
a possible explanation is that highly volatile events blighted the pre-crisis period, which 
led to increased risk in the US, and global financial market, thus decreasing risk and 
increasing prices in the observed US market.  The overreaction/underreaction theory then 
dictates that a period of correction occurs, which decreases the price and increases the risk.   
With the exception of the US market, the γ coefficients seem to be hinting at a positive 
asymmetrical effect.  Essentially, this hints at a positive shock to the market having an 
impact on the volatility, hence increasing the volatility.  As hinted previously this seems 
to be the result of a number of factors influencing the Eurozone market.  Essentially the 
aftermath of the introduction of the Euro and a number of highly volatile events like the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks and following “war on terror” created Knightian 
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uncertainty which made some market participants go on flight to safety to the five observed 
Eurozone markets.  This also may explain the negative asymmetrical effect in the US 
market, the highly volatile events and asset price bubble during the pre-crisis period led to 
the market participants leaving the US Treasuries market, which led to a negative shock to 
the market.   
As illustrated by the GARCH model in table 73, the α coefficients seem to be hinting at 
uniformly low levels of sensitivity to market shocks across the observed markets.  
Although there were some highly volatile events inducing Knightian uncertainty, yet the 
levels of sensitivity to market shocks were low throughout the observed markets.  A key 
issue is how these statistics account for the aftershocks of some highly volatile events like 
the introduction of the Euro and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.  The behaviour 
of homo-sapiens to news with respect to time provides a possible explanation; the initial 
event causes shock but subsequent events decrease the level of sensitivity with time.  Since 
both key sources of shocks to the market during the early parts of the decade occurred 
before our observational period i.e. the 1999 introduction of the Euro and 2001 terrorist 
attacks.  While the aftershocks of these events, like “the war on terror” or the highly volatile 
financial markets in the aftermath of the euro, continued to provide volatility to the market.  
Yet the levels of sensitivity to these shocks were decreasing with time because market 
participants were accounting for them.   
With the possible exception of the US market, the β coefficients are pointing at highly 
persistence levels of volatility in the aftermath of a shock in the observed markets.  As 
already explained in the previous paragraph, with time the market participants were 
accounting for the aftershocks of both highly volatile events in the early part of the 21st 
century.  This meant that the volatility was highly persistent in the aftermath of these two 
events.  Of course looking at the pre-crisis period in figures 12 to 19 would tell us the 
persistent in the volatility eventually died during the asset price bubble/economic upturn. 
The unconditional volatility is relatively low during the pre-crisis period.  This does mean 
that the sovereign debt market was stable.  Although the US market seems to be higher 
than the observed Eurozone markets, yet it is still lower than all the observed periods in 
our EGARCH-m model.  However, the unconditional volatility is still significantly high 
for all the observed market.  As explained previously, the ω coefficient, which is still 
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significantly higher than, previously observed in the GARCH model.  Conversely, all the 
observed markets do not revert to the unconditional volatility after a rise or fall.  This does 
seem to be suggesting that the volatility in all observed markets do not decay to half their 
levels in the aftermath of a shock to the market. 
Interestingly, table 31 seems to be hinting at the acceptance of the null hypothesis of the 
market being too volatile to be efficient for all the markets except the US and Spanish.  
However, the EMH test statistics of the markets that accept the null hypothesis seem to be 
suggesting that the different between the acceptance and rejection is significantly small.  
Conversely, table 47; seem to be hinting at the GJR-GARCH variant of the EMH test 
rejecting the null hypothesis thru all the observed markets.  This would suggest that the 
reaction of the market participants to the events influenced the efficiency of the market 
during the pre-crisis period.  As stated earlier the key to understanding the behaviour of 
market participants is the reaction to the aftershocks of the two most influential events: the 
introduction of the euro and 2001 terrorist attacks.  These seem to be consistent with the 
addition of the asymmetrical effect and hint at the overreaction/underreaction hypothesis, 
since as time goes by the overreaction to these aftershocks seem to be morphing into an 
underreaction.  This would suggest that the efficiency of the market depends on a simple 
different between the over- and under-reaction of the market participants.   
 US German Greek Italian Po0rtuguese Spanish 
R2 0.999902 0.999347 0.999999 0.999641 0.999990 0.999907 
Adjusted R2 0.999901 0.999344 0.999999 0.999639 0.999990 0.999906 
Jarque-Bera  190.09 90.86 394.60 35.91 62.40 34.2620 
Q-Statistics  
(Correlogram) 0.0033 0.0073 0.2284 0.1782 0.0021 0.0685 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 1.302303 0.006349 0.173096 0.001792 0.001125 0.20583 
Table 88: 2012 Bond EGARCH-M Residuals Statistics (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
As illustrated by table 88, the high R2 and adjusted R2 through all the estimated EGARCH-
M models hint at all the models being a good fit to the dependent variable.  Although with 
the exception of the US and Greek markets, the Jarque-Bera tests seem to be slightly high 
indicating a slightly significant acceptance of the null hypothesis of non-normality in the 
distribution.  Yet the Jarque-Bera statistics of the US and Greek markets seem to be 
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indicating a significantly higher acceptance of the null hypothesis.  However, the Q-
statistics seem to be hinting at significantly low serial correlations thru all the markets.  Of 
course, the Q-statistic of the Italian market is higher than the other observed markets.  
Conversely, the US market is significantly lower.  The F-statistics are hinting at 
significantly low ARCH effect with the German Italian and Portuguese markets pointing 
at the ARCH effect-approaching zero. 
 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
λ 
 
-22.288 
(18.96065) 
-322.1832 
(140.12960) 
-2191.51 
(1713.178) 
16.63086 
(22.10678) 
-2264.027 
(5473.716) 
46.85389 
(38.53333) 
a -0.000059 (0.000153) 
0.008639 
(0.003613) 
-0.02291 
(1.10E-04) 
0.000404 
(0.000239) 
0.00073 
(2.72E-03) 
0.000948 
(0.000159) 
b1 
-0.054030 
(0.000383) 
0.035436 
(0.000896) 
0.075404 
(3.84E-05) 
0.032793 
(0.000691) 
0.14504 
(0.000111) 
0.044377 
(0.000348) 
b2 
-0.042537 
(0.000369)      
ϵ 0.999494 (0.000392) 
0.998562 
(0.000889) 
1.000039 
(4.01E-05) 
1.00006 
(0.000712) 
1.000153 
(0.000114) 
0.999791 
(0.000368) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
-0.0940 
(0.072465) 
-15.667860 
(1.838161) 
-4.789022 
(9.88E-01) 
-0.063721 
(0.07376) 
-18.360070 
(8.383459) 
-0.039629 
(0.074717) 
α 0.089066 (0.03107) 
0.092854 
(0.043000) 
0.110245 
(7.08E-02) 
0.088110 
(0.027815) 
0.045862 
(0.099951) 
0.076519 
(0.025648) 
γ -0.042200 (0.019978) 
0.065322 
(0.027464) 
0.008634 
(0.035056) 
-0.000977 
(0.018781) 
-0.001888 
(0.021283) 
-0.003653 
(0.019013) 
β 0.997937 (0.005467) 
-0.480180 
(0.175129) 
0.715590 
(0.059910) 
1.000418 
(0.005652) 
-0.262267 
(0.578161) 
1.001584 
(0.005378) 
𝜔𝜔1 − (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) 1.080101 -11.293568 -27.497 0.719784 -15.093715 0.507394 
𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 1.087003 -0.387326 0.825835 1.088528 -0.216405 1.078103 
−
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(2)
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) 8 Error -4 8 Error 9 
Log Likelihood 2704.064 2348.729 4215.287 2623.282 3593.078 2915.544 
Table 89: EGARCH-M Statistics of the 2012 Bond (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
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It is worth noting that table 89 is associated with the financial crisis and hence some 
markets may have experienced flights to them.  In essence, the statistics are reflecting the 
mixed reaction associated with such a crisis.  The crisis seems to suggest that although 
there was a uniformed hike in volatility, the levels of the volatility seem to be telling.  
Remember the GARGH variant of our EMH test hints at the significant acceptance of the 
null hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be efficient for all the observed markets 
during the financial crisis as demonstrated by table 33.  As pointed earlier there was 
problem with the estimation of the German and Portuguese markets, which meant that the 
statistics displayed in table 89 did not paint the full picture.   
With the exception of the Italian and Spanish markets, the λ coefficients seem to be hinting 
at a negative feedback effect.  This means that during the financial crisis the observed 
markets were displaying decreasing risks and increasing returns.  As demonstrated earlier, 
the financial crisis meant that market participants went on a flight to safety from the risky 
assets (such as equities, corporate bonds and asset-backed securities i.e. MBS and CDO) 
to presumed “risk free” assets such as sovereign debt and commodities i.e. Gold and Oil.  
This increased the price leading to a decrease in the yield in the sovereign debt market.  
However, more interestingly is the US Federal Reserves’ response to the financial crisis, 
which came in the shape of Quantitative Easing.  This had the impact of further increasing 
the price of the US Treasury and decreasing the yields.  This is important because the yields 
are a key measure of risk in the bond market.  The ECB did not introduce quantitative 
easing until the later stages of the sovereign debt crisis but did introduce a number of 
monetary easing policies.  Conversely, it was obvious that monetary policy on its own was 
never going to be enough to counter the huge systemic issues in the economy.  Hence, 
many central governments introduced fiscal stimulus policies, which increased the supply 
dramatically.  Under the circumstances of the financial crisis, there was a huge demand for 
these assets, so the increase in supply matched the increase in demand.   
In general, the Italian and Spanish markets seem to be hinting at risks increasing with the 
returns during the financial crisis.  This is due to deep-rooted problems in their economies, 
according to statistics from the European Central Bank and Eurostat obtained on 17 March 
2014, both had structural problems in their economies before the financial crisis, in 
particular the Italian economy, which was weak and highly indebted for a long period 
before the financial crisis.  Although the Spanish economy was performing much better 
 229 
 
than most of the Eurozone economies, yet it had grown at a faster rate than was sustainable 
and was relying on the financial sector more heavily than usual.  Hence, with the advent of 
the financial crisis, these issues highlighted in table 89.  However, although the risks 
increased the prices continued to increase during this period, this is mainly due to market 
participants fleeing other financial markets.  The sad thing is that the financial crisis left 
many market participants in such a state of freight that they could not see the obvious 
weakness of the fundamentals underpinning the sovereign debt market in general.  This 
seem to be pointing at the underreaction theory, it is important to note that due to the 
financial crisis many market participants underreacted to the fundamentals in the sovereign 
debt market in general with the possible exception of the German market. 
Rather surprisingly with the exception of the German and Greek markets, the γ coefficients 
are pointing at a negative asymmetrical effect during the financial crisis.  This would 
suggest a negative shock to the market would increase volatility, which seems to be hinting 
at a move away from the market.  However, during the financial crisis market participants 
were reacting to events influencing other markets, which would hint at a positive shock to 
the market influencing the volatility consistent with the German and Greek markets.  A 
possible explanation as hinted previously is since a key behavioural factor influencing 
market participants as with any homo-sapiens dictates that shock levels in the aftermath of 
a major event decrease with time.  This means that as time goes by the market participants 
seem to overlook any associated event mainly due to accounting to risk factors.  This would 
suggest that at some stage the fundamentals became more important in the sovereign debt 
market.  Since these fundamentals are the economic indicators in the sovereign debt 
market, hence towards the end of the financial crisis period attention turned to the 
economic recession and large debts of the countries.  The German and Greek markets 
displayed a positive asymmetrical effect because the market participants were either 
already accounting for the weakness of the economy as in the Greek market or were assured 
by the strength of German economy.  Another issue is with the financial sector and many 
corporations in need of huge capital injection to survive, the governments of the observed 
markets were forced to follow a capital inject policy.  This did not have a significant impact 
on the German economy as illustrated by statistics from the Competition division of the 
European Commission.   
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With the exception of the Greek market, the α coefficients seem to be hinting at a low level 
of sensitivity to market shocks.  However, the coefficients of the US, German and Italian 
markets seem to be hinting at a higher level of sensitivity to market shocks than the Spanish 
and certainly the Portuguese markets.  Although the German and Portuguese market have 
estimation issues which discounts them.  The other observed markets are interesting 
because they seem to be backing the earlier findings in the GARCH model that in general 
the sovereign debt market was not sensitive to the financial crisis.  As previously explained, 
this could be due to market participants becoming accustomed and accounting for the 
events during the financial crisis with time.  Although the α coefficients still seem to be 
hinting at market participants reacting to major events, such as the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy, during the financial crisis.  This could be hinting at a weakening in the 
aftermath of these major events with respect to time.  However, the Greek market is 
surprising; nevertheless, a look at the recapitalization statistics from the Competition 
division of the European Commission would illustrate the extent of the impact on the Greek 
financial sector. 
The influencing factor to bear in mind is that the statistics for the German and Portuguese 
markets were estimations that seem to contain errors.  The β coefficients of the remaining 
markets are hinting at a significantly high level of persistent in the aftermath of a shock in 
all the remaining observed markets except for the Greek market.  As explained previously, 
the sovereign debt markets were the subjects of a flight to safety and in the case of the US 
market quantitative easing policy in the later stages.  These made volatility highly 
persistent in the aftermath of crises such as the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the near 
collapse of the global banking system.  The long lasting recession in the economies of the 
observed markets made the impact on the persisting volatility worse.  This is the key to 
understanding the persisting volatility an unprecedented cocktail of three crises in a short 
period: Financial crisis, freezing of credit and economic downturn.  As illustrated by the α 
coefficient, the Greek market was highly reactive to market shocks hence the low volatility 
persistent in the aftermath of a crisis.   
As previously explained, we omit the German and Portuguese markets.  However, the 
Greek market also seems to be hinting at a negative unconditional volatility, which is 
inconsistent with both practice and theory.  Looking at the unconditional variance equation, 
there is a combination of two factors leading to the negative unconditional variance: the 
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negative intercept ω and a low β coefficient.  Conversely, the remaining observed markets 
seem to be hinting at a low unconditional volatility during the financial crisis except for 
the US market.  This does mean that these two sovereign debt markets were stable during 
the financial crisis.  A key factor influencing the high volatility in the US market is the 
significant ω coefficient.  Conversely, all the observed markets do not revert to the 
unconditional volatility after a rise or fall.  However, the statistics seem to be suggesting 
that the volatility in all these markets tend to decay to half their levels rather quicker than 
expected under the circumstances in the aftermath of a shock to the market. 
A key factor during the financial crisis is the significant acceptance of the null hypothesis 
of the markets being too volatile to be efficient throughout the observed markets using both 
GJR-GARCH and GARCH models.  This would suggest that market participants were 
reacting to events like the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy hinting at flights to safety being 
the paramount movement of the price volatility.  However, as we discovered that earlier 
the problem is that with the exception of the Greek market, the sensitivity to market shock 
was relatively low.  This seems to be pointing to the persistent as the main source of the 
high volatility in the markets.  The assumption that during deep crisis market participants 
start accounting provides a clue for the worst-case scenario.  This means that they become 
less willing to take risks and hence persist with their strategy of investing in “risk-free” 
assets, which push prices further from the fundamental value.  The influencing factor is 
that market participants are reacting to event rather than information, which is not 
consistent with the efficient market hypothesis.  Another influencing factor is that the 
fundamentals by the policies of the central banks and governments such as quantitative 
easing distorted markets, especially the US. 
 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.999874 0.999329 0.999999 0.99966 0.999990 0.99991 
Adjusted R2 0.999873 0.999326 0.999999 0.999658 0.999990 0.99991 
Jarque-Bera 6.94 88.12 95.84 3901.59 295.16 304.55 
Q-Statistics (Correlogram) 1.3116 0.1691 4.8436 0.6149 1.4748 0.039 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 0.425887 6.171794 0.099635 0.077604 0.708057 1.897639 
Table 90: 2012 Bond EGARCH-M Residuals Statistics (02/11/2009-30/12/2011) 
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As illustrated by the previous tables, the high R2 and adjusted R2 through all the estimated 
EGARCH-M models hint at all the models being a good fit to the dependent variable.  
Although with the exception of the US market, the Jarque-Bera tests seem to be indicating 
a significant acceptance of the null hypothesis of non-normality in the distribution 
especially for the Italian market.  Yet the Jarque-Bera statistic of the US market seems to 
be indicating a significantly lower acceptance of the null hypothesis.  However, with the 
exception of the Greek market, the Q-statistics seem to be hinting at the serial correlations 
being significantly low thru all markets.  Of course, the Q-statistics of the Greek market is 
significantly higher.  Conversely, the Spanish market is significantly low.  The F-statistics 
are hinting at a mixed picture with the German market pointing at a highly significant 
ARCH effect.  The remaining markets hinting at low ARCH effects, especially the Greek 
and Italian markets with F-statistics approaching zero.   
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 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
λ 
378.5658 
(79.34670) 
31.6328 
(42.03145) 
0.517743 
(18.04759) 
42.19234 
(25.50394) 
6.055649 
(16.24672) 
1.167815 
(28.53369) 
a 0.000127 (1.69E-05) 
-0.000575 
(0.000039) 
-0.02311 
(1.47E-05) 
0.000104 
(5.34E-05) 
-0.000477 
(2.69E-05) 
0.000897 
(5.05E-05) 
b1 
-0.053556 
(0.000399) 
0.033785 
(0.000947) 
0.075498 
(1.89E-05) 
0.034393 
(0.000561) 
0.145388 
(8.28E-05) 
0.046627 
(0.0003) 
b2 
-0.041101 
(0.000385)      
ϵ 1.001373 (0.000416) 
0.997818 
(0.001033) 
1.000305 
(1.71E-05) 
0.998909 
(0.000518) 
1.000004 
(9.16E-05) 
0.999325 
(0.000301) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
-0.042546 
(0.071134) 
-0.088817 
(0.045426) 
-1.709489 
(1.91E-01) 
-0.494382 
(0.156981) 
-0.971962 
(0.261689) 
-1.077196 
(0.342525) 
α 0.063626 (0.024713) 
0.080527 
(0.027834) 
0.836698 
(6.18E-02) 
0.115269 
(0.043459) 
0.526789 
(0.171264) 
0.355526 
(0.085266) 
γ 0.041296 (0.017134) 
0.013751 
(0.015021) 
-0.055593 
(4.33E-02) 
-0.188233 
(0.037287) 
-0.130850 
(0.069734) 
-0.142718 
(0.046638) 
β 1.000725 (0.003537) 
0.998406 
(0.002739) 
0.923878 
(0.012182) 
0.969247 
(0.011095) 
0.947865 
(0.017802) 
0.937737 
(0.023615) 
𝜔𝜔1 − (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) 0.661155 1.125220 2.247624 5.849567 2.047727 3.673140 
𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 1.064351 1.078933 1.760576 1.084516 1.474654 1.293263 
−
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(2)
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) -11 9 1 9 2 3 
Log Likelihood 3717.960 3188.029 3337.761 2996.474 3193.632 3040.268 
Table 91: EGARCH-M Statistics of the 2012 Bond (02/11/2009-30/12/2011) 
It is worth noting that table 91 is associated with the sovereign debt crisis and hence as 
expected, there is a difference in general between the Eurozone markets and US.  In 
essence, the statistics seem to be reflecting this different.  Interestingly table 35 illustrates 
the GARCH variant of our EMH test accepted the market efficiency for the observed Greek 
and Portuguese markets.  However, it did also significantly accept the null hypothesis of 
the market being too volatile to be efficient for the remaining markets.   
 234 
 
The λ coefficients seem to be hinting at a positive feedback effect for all the observed 
markets.  Unlike the financial crisis period, this means that all observed markets were 
hinting at the return increasing with the risks during the sovereign debt crisis, with the 
increase in debt due to the recapitalization programs and fiscal stimulus policies in the 
advent of the financial crisis and economic recession.  In the aftermath of the Greek 
revision market participants became increasingly aware of the weaknesses in the economy 
of many of the observed markets.  This heightened the risk aversion to sovereign debt 
markets as fear spread of the quality and more importantly ability of many of these 
countries to service the debt.  Against this background, the feedback effect observed in the 
markets seems to be suggesting market participants were reacting to news as well as the 
fundamentals.  Yet surprisingly, the λ coefficients seem to be pointing at a positive 
feedback effect in the GIPS markets.  There are two explanations for this and both are 
linked with the timing of the observed period, the first is as explained earlier the maturity 
effect which dictates as any plain vanilla type bond approaches maturity the price 
approaches par value.  The second is the 2012 bond matured in 2012 and thus ignoring the 
full impact of the sovereign debt crisis, since the crisis did not affect the Italian and Spanish 
markets until the later stages.  Although the Greek and to a lesser extent Portuguese markets 
seem to be hinting at a positive feedback effect, the coefficient is insignificantly low.  This 
seem to be hinting at indifferent and hence uncertainty underpinning the Greek and 
Portuguese markets.   
In essence, the positive feedback effect in the US and German markets seem to be 
consistent with a flight, as demand increased the price increased and hence volatility 
increases since as explained previously volatility is the movement of the price.  However, 
the US market was at the centre of a deepening crisis with the high and increasing federal 
debt and deepest recession for over 80years, market participants were concerned about the 
high ratings.  Of course, an influencing factor mentioned previously is the continuation of 
the quantitative easing policy by the Federal Reserve, which may have distorted the market 
by decreasing supply.  In addition, the weakness of the global financial market and 
economy meant that not until later were these concerns illustrated.  Conversely, the 
maturity effect meant that prices move towards par value by default towards the end and 
hence volatility was falling, although as the statistics from Eurostat on 17 March 2014 
would illustrate the German sovereign debt was the highest in the Eurozone.  Yet the 
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strength of the German economy and the relatively insignificant impact of the financial 
crisis on the German economy meant the visualisation of the Bund market as the risk-free 
asset in the Eurozone financial market. 
With the exception of the German and US markets, the γ coefficients seem to be hinting at 
a leverage effect.  This would suggest a negative shock to the market would increase 
volatility, which hints at a move away from the GIPS markets.  In essence, construed as 
what actually happened in the GIPS markets during the sovereign debt crisis.  As hinted 
previously, the Greek crisis of late autumn 2009 made market participants increasingly 
aware of the systemic issues underpinning the economies of the GIPS markets.  However, 
there was another factor influencing the behaviour of market participants in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis, Kimball (1993) states that market participants bearing one risk are 
less likely to bear another risk.  Hence, as Diamond & Stiglitz (1974) argue increasing risks 
leads to an upward shift in risk aversion.  This would suggest that market participants who 
already had a heightened risk aversion from the financial crisis reacted to the sovereign 
debt crisis strongly.  There is a hint of the overreaction hypothesis in that market participant 
were overreacting due to the events of the financial crisis.  However, the fundamentals 
would suggest this is not the case, since as mentioned earlier the economies of the GIPS 
nations were systematically weak and their debt had increased causing the market 
participant to doubt whether they would be able to pay it.  In the end, it is a combination 
of the two factors that gave rise to the sovereign debt crisis and hence the domino effect.   
Theoretically, the positive asymmetrical effect of the US and German markets seem to be 
reflecting the norm.  In essence, the presumption is these two markets being risk-free and 
hence as theory dictate that during a crisis market participants usually invest in risk free 
assets.  However, at the time the US economy was weak and the total debt high and 
increasing according to statistic from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis.  So the 
fundamental information underpinning the US market was hinting at a weak market.  
Essentially, this goes back to the upward shift in the risk aversion to the financial market 
and especially the Eurozone sovereign debts.  This highlights the market participants’ 
reaction to the fundamental information at the centre of the US market, which points at the 
underreaction hypothesis.  Conversely, the action of the market participants seems to 
suggest that the Eurozone crisis was of greater concern than the US economy.  Essentially, 
the US Fiscal Cliff crisis did not affect the US market until the later stages and hence it did 
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not affect the observed US 2012 bond.  Since the sovereign debt crisis did not affect the 
German market and the economy remained strong throughout the observed period despite 
some concerns about the size of the debt.  This seems to be hinting the market participants 
saw the German market as the risk free asset of the Eurozone.  Hence, the positive 
asymmetrical effect during the sovereign debt crisis seem to be a reaction to the hike in the 
risk factors of the GIPS markets, in short a flight to the safety of the German market.   
The level of sensitivity to market shocks seems to be hinting at a differentiated picture.  
Thus meaning with the exception of the US and German markets, the observed markets 
seem to be hinting at a significantly high level of sensitivity to market shocks.  As 
previously hinted the shock to the price volatility in the GIPS markets came during the 
sovereign debt crisis.  The α coefficients of the US and German markets is pointing at a 
low level of sensitivity to market shocks.  As illustrated previously, we assume much of 
the shock to the US and German markets came from individual events causing Knightian 
uncertainty in other markets such as the GIPS markets.  The resulting shocks from the 
flight to safety to the US and German markets were low because as already illustrated the 
markets were already high from the financial crisis.   
With the exception of the US and German markets, the β coefficients are pointing at low 
persistence levels of volatility in the aftermath of a shock in the observed markets.  As 
illustrated previously, significant hikes in the volatility blighted the GIPS markets 
throughout the sovereign debt crisis hinting at a highly reactive market.  Essentially, the 
GIPS markets were at the centre of the Sovereign debt crisis, so they are more likely to be 
reactive as each event lead to an increase in the volatility.  Hence, as explained previously, 
a highly reactive market means the levels of persistence is relatively low and the opposite 
is true.  Conversely, this explains the persistent levels in the US and German markets, since 
as previously illustrated these markets were not reactive.  Hence, their β coefficients seem 
to be hinting at highly persistence levels of volatility in the aftermath of any shock to the 
market.  A possible explanation is that market participants tend to hold these assets for the 
longer periods during a long lasting crisis.  Of course, another possible explanation, 
especially with the US market, is the distortion of the monetary policy.   
The unconditional volatility seems to be hinting at a divided picture with regard to the 
observed markets.  Whereas the US and to a lesser extent German markets have relatively 
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low unconditional volatility; the observed GIPS markets seem to be pointing at significant 
levels of unconditional volatility.  Conversely, all the observed markets do not revert to the 
unconditional volatility after a rise or fall.  However, with the exception of the US market, 
the volatility half-life seem to be suggesting that the volatility in the observed markets tend 
to decay to half their levels significantly fast in the aftermath of a shock to the market, 
especially the Greek and Portuguese markets.  The negative half-life of the US market is 
pointing at a very persisting volatility, which does not revert to half–life.   
As noted earlier rather surprisingly, the EMH test statistics in table 35 and 55 hint at the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of the markets being too volatile for the Greek and 
Portuguese markets during the sovereign debt crisis period.  However, table 91 seem to be 
backing the evident found using the GARCH model, as illustrated by table 77, which the 
Greek and Portuguese markets seem to be very reactive to market shocks and exhibit a low 
volatility persistence in aftermath of a crisis with a significantly low half-life.  However, 
to a certain extent this is true of the other GIPS markets.  The efficiency test seem to be 
hinting that during the sovereign debt crisis, the high reaction of the market participants to 
the crisis in the observed Greek and Portuguese markets may have played a role in the 
efficiency.  This would seem to be plausible since at the basic level the market participants 
were reacting to the fundamental information. 
 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.999999 0.999999 0.990836 0.999976 0.999918 
Adjusted R2 0.999999 0.999999 0.990811 0.999976 0.999918 
Jarque-Bera 101.24 21.09 932.62 18710.23 601.13 
Q-Statistics  (Correlogram) 0.1433 0.0758 0.2582 1.5301 0.0183 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 1.439902 1.299904 0.430832 0.76054 0.252997 
Table 92: 2017 Bond EGARCH-M Residuals Statistics (02/07/2007-29/03/2013) 
As illustrated by table 92, a key factor of note is the high R2 and adjusted R2.  The R2 is 
above 0.99 through all the estimated EGARCH-M models, thus hinting at the lagged price 
differential with the estimated residuals being highly able to explain the movement in the 
price differential.  The significantly high adjusted R2 seem to be pointing at the estimated 
EGARCH-M model being a good fit to the dependent variable across all the samples.  An 
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interesting point to note is that the R2 and adjusted R2 of the IPS markets are lower than the 
US and German markets. 
The Jarque-Bera test for all the markets seem to be hinting at an acceptance of the null 
hypothesis of non-normality in the distribution of the residuals.  We found all our samples 
seem to follow a leptokurtic distribution, which hints at the Student t distribution model.  
However, the Jarque-Bera tests for the IPS markets seem to be excessively high indicating 
a significant acceptance of the null hypothesis of non-normality in the distribution 
especially for the Portuguese market.  Yet the Jarque-Bera statistic of the US and German 
markets seem to be indicating a significantly lower acceptance of the null hypothesis in 
comparison with the observed IPS markets.   
With regard to the serial correlation, the Q-statistics of the correlogram seem to be hinting 
at low serial correlations thru all markets.  Of course, the Q-statistics of the German and 
Spanish markets are lower than the other observed markets.   
The F-statistics are diverting between approaching no ARCH effect and low ARCH effect 
remaining.  In essence, the F-statistics are approaching zero ARCH effect with all the IPS 
markets. 
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 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
λ 
 
-84.018 
(63.56287) 
 
-93.06015 
(128.28010) 
 
-1.288607 
(0.783721) 
 
-1.586273 
(8.039033) 
 
-15.68134 
(10.39978) 
a 0.013452 (6.63E-06) 
0.012495 
(1.53E-05) 
0.007147 
(0.001016) 
0.000307 
(7.57E-05) 
0.004415 
(1.40E-04) 
b1 
-0.060865 
(2.12E-05) 
0.067351 
(2.68E-05) 
0.175976 
(0.002000) 
0.255225 
(8.24E-05) 
0.190713 
(0.000211) 
b2   
-0.069482 
(0.002097)   
ϵ 1.000047 (2.29E-05) 
1.000034 
(2.85E-05) 
0.994131 
(0.001885) 
0.99985 
(8.90E-05) 
1.000358 
(0.000206) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
-0.1008 
(0.035905) 
 
-0.141980 
(0.062205) 
 
-0.268611 
(0.051102) 
 
-0.783723 
(0.156946) 
 
-0.314152 
(0.081069) 
α 0.115993 (0.020021) 
0.093484 
(0.018273) 
0.161890 
(0.028096) 
0.287761 
(0.041443) 
0.115877 
(0.022235) 
γ -0.003760 (1.30E-02) 
-0.019726 
(0.012436) 
0.102326 
(0.019389) 
0.060384 
(0.023675) 
0.104314 
(0.01639) 
β 0.999443 (0.001796) 
0.995706 
(0.003470) 
0.977291 
(0.006321) 
0.949239 
(0.012393) 
0.979625 
(0.006749) 
𝜔𝜔1 − (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) 0.873125 1.591882 1.929940 3.306848 3.289481 
𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 1.115436 1.089190 1.139181 1.237000 1.095502 
−
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(2)
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) 6 8 5 3 8 
Log Likelihood 9781.605 9818.658 2965.985 6783.002 6319.375 
Table 93: EGARCH-M Statistics of the 2017 Bond (02/07/2007-29/03/2013) 
It is worth remembering that the 2017 bonds cover the period between 1st July 2007 and 
31st March 2013, thus meaning it illustrates the behaviour of volatility during a highly 
volatile market environment based on the financial and sovereign debt crises.  In essence, 
the statistics in table 93 are the generalised pointers to the behaviour of volatility in the 
observed 2017 sovereign debt markets during the crises period.  As previously hinted, there 
was a division in the observed markets between the IPS markets, which were at the heart 
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of the sovereign debt crises, and the US/Germany markets.  An influencing factor is by 
analysing the behaviour of volatility of these 2017 bonds, we could overcome the maturity 
effect and thus extend our analysis of the sovereign debt crisis.  Remember the GARGH 
variant of our EMH test hints at the rejection of the null hypothesis of the market being too 
volatile to be efficient for all the observed markets except for the German as demonstrated 
by table 37. 
As illustrated by tables 85 and 93, the λ coefficients are hinting at a change in the feedback 
effect of the observed Eurozone markets from positive to negative during the crisis.  There 
are a number of explanations for the change, chief among these is the 2017 bonds were 
issued just before the 2007/2008 financial crisis and do not mature until 2017.  In other 
words, the maturity effect will not distort the results; however, this does introduce the “on 
the run” effect, which even under normal market conditions heightens volatility.  
Conversely, the 2017 bonds cover more of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the 
impact on the Italian and Spanish markets.  Not surprisingly, the US market remains 
negative; the key to this is the expansion of the period to cover a major part of the fiscal 
cliff crisis.   
As illustrated by tables 85 and 93, the points highlighted by the previous paragraph also 
changed the γ coefficients thru all the observed Eurozone markets with the US market 
remaining negative.  This seem to be suggesting that with the exception of the German 
market, the full impact of the crisis did make market participants react more to negative 
shock than positive shocks.  This in reality is more in common with human nature; homo-
sapiens always overreact more to negatives events than to positive events.  In fact, they 
seem to underreact to positive events.  Coincidentally, for reason explained earlier, the 
German market did not have any significant negative impact during the crises period. 
With the exception of the Spanish market, the crises period also saw an increase in the 
level of sensitivity to market shocks observed by the markets.  However, the levels of 
sensitivity in the German market remained insignificant.  Notably the Spanish market did 
not feel the impact until the later stages of the crises as explained earlier.  This means 
during the on the run stage of the Spanish 2017 bond, the market was under normal 
condition and since the on the run stage of the 2012 bond came in the aftermath of the 
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introduction of the Euro, this may have played a part in the different levels of sensitivity 
observed in the Spanish market.   
The β coefficients are pointing at the reduction of persistence levels of volatility in the 
aftermath of a shock in all observed markets.  This hints at the market participants in the 
IPS markets exhibiting an increasingly reactive behaviour during the crisis period.  
Although the persistence levels of the US and German markets were reduce, yet they are 
still significant.  This is due to these two markets acting as safe havens from the financial 
and to a certain extent the sovereign debt crisis.  The reduction in the sensitivity was mainly 
due to the extended period of the sovereign debt crisis.  In essence, with the possible 
exception of the Portuguese market, the impact from the worse stage of the sovereign debt 
crisis did not hit the observed markets until the later stages especially the US, Italian and 
Spanish markets.   
The unconditional volatility seems to be hinting at an increase in all observed markets.  
Although with the exception of the US market, the increased does signify a significantly 
more volatile market in the long term.  This is mainly due to the indecision and 
communication issues by the politicians during the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone.  
Unsurprisingly all the observed markets still do not revert to the unconditional volatility 
after a rise or fall.  Although, the volatility half-life seem to be suggesting that the volatility 
in all observed markets tend to decay to half their levels significantly fast in the aftermath 
of a shock to the market.  However, the Spanish market did show an increase in the half-
life. 
According to table 37, with the exception of the German market, the EMH test statistics 
seem to be pointing at the acceptance of the EMH under the GARCH model.  However, 
even the German market only narrowly rejects the EMH.  Yet according to table 59, all 
observed markets accept the EMH under the GJR-GARCH Model.  As explained earlier, 
the key to understanding the reaction lays with the behaviour of market participants during 
the observation.  It is obvious that the highly events volatile of the later stages in the 
sovereign debt crisis played an influential part in the overall picture of the markets.  In 
general, psychological behavioural theories dictates that homo-sapiens take one of two 
routes when faced with uncertainty; either they accept the information or reject the 
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information.  For reasons explained previously, during the crises period, the market 
participants took the first option, which led to an efficient market.   
 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.999999 0.999999 0.990702 0.999975 0.999916 
Adjusted R2 0.999999 0.999999 0.99064 0.999975 0.999915 
Jarque-Bera 122.07 11.49 16.10 9.18 0.8 
Q-Statistics  (Correlogram) 0.0593 0.0474 0.2373 0.3428 0.0003 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 0.44949 0.405597 0.031952 0.034316 0.004194 
Table 94: 2017 Bond EGARCH-M Residuals Statistics (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
The high R2 and adjusted R2 hint at all the models being a good fit to the dependent variable 
through all the estimated EGARCH-M models.  Although the Jarque-Bera tests for the US 
market, seems to be high in comparison with the Eurozone markets indicating a significant 
acceptance of the null hypothesis of non-normality in the distribution.  Yet the Eurozone 
markets, especially the Spanish, seem to be low hinting at a distribution approaching 
normality.  Additionally, the Q-statistics seem to be pointing at significantly low serial 
correlation for all the observed markets.  Conversely, the F-statistics are hinting at an 
ARCH effect-approaching zero with all the markets, especially the IPS markets. 
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 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
λ 
 
1514.000 
(1078.532) 
-264.5028 
(843.95850) 
-8.761215 
(4.504204) 
392.3102 
(283.82) 
-14.54099 
(51.0342) 
[a 0.012870 (3.84E-04) 
0.01252 
(1.57E-04) 
0.013265 
(0.004255) 
-0.001086 
(9.43E-04) 
0.004183 
(5.10E-04) 
b1 
-0.060832 
(3.28E-05) 
0.06731 
(4.31E-05) 
0.167389 
(0.003780) 
0.255873 
(1.91E-04) 
0.191746 
(3.80E-04) 
b2   
-0.063313 
(0.003842)   
ϵ 1.000097 (3.53E-05) 
1.000056 
(4.56E-05) 
0.990627 
(0.003685) 
0.999906 
(1.95E-04) 
1.00002 
(3.94E-04) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
 
-21.6580 
(3.268085) 
-23.291120 
(6.718371) 
-0.381878 
(0.180604) 
-2.036129 
(0.04983) 
-0.140734 
(0.111448) 
α 0.143334 (0.083335) 
0.154669 
(0.111639) 
0.080846 
(0.038253) 
0.087042 
(0.052679) 
0.056298 
(0.026393) 
γ 0.063527 (0.041879) 
-0.007164 
(0.057158) 
0.070786 
(0.034224) 
0.019270 
(0.026072) 
0.004552 
(0.019458) 
β -0.452525 (0.221569) 
-0.495539 
(0.434989) 
0.953762 
(0.0245) 
0.844046 
(0.005432) 
0.991611 
(0.008789) 
𝜔𝜔1 − (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) -16.543010 -17.370155 11.034385 -29.546799 2.937527 
𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 -0.309191 -0.340870 1.034608 0.931088 1.047909 
−
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(2)
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) Error Error 20 -10 15 
Log Likelihood 3649.347 3845.962 1259.379 2974.306 2635.723 
Table 95: EGARCH-M Statistics of the 2017 Bond (02/07/2007-30/10/2009) 
It is worth noting that this period is associated with the financial crisis and hence some 
markets may have experienced flights to them.  In essence, the statistics in table 95 are 
reflecting the mixed reaction associated with such a crisis.  The crisis seems to be giving 
the impression that the US/German markets are more volatile than the IPS markets.  
However, this seems to be an illusion with the high levels of volatility during the sovereign 
debt crisis affected IPS markets.  Remember the GARGH variant of our EMH test hints at 
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the rejection of the null hypothesis of the market being too volatile to be efficient for all 
the observed markets except for the Italian as demonstrated by table 39.  The Influencing 
factor is the impact of the “on the run” effect on the observed markets during the financial 
crisis.  And as noted by tables 89 and 95 whereas the German and Portuguese  markets 
were not stable in the observed 2012 bonds, the 2017 bonds seem to be hinting at the US 
and German markets being unstable.  So in essence, the EGARCH-M estimated model 
seems to be hinting at the inclusion of the asymmetrical effect making the German market 
too unstable during the financial crisis.   
Tables 89 and 95 are hinting that apart from Germany, the λ coefficients seem to be 
pointing at a change in the feedback effect with the US and Portuguese markets changing 
to a positive feedback.  In contrast, the Italian and Spanish markets now exhibit a negative 
feedback effect.  Since the period is the same, a possible explanation is that the “on the 
run” effect may have affected the markets during the financial crisis.   
With the exception of the German market, the γ coefficients are pointing at a change to a 
positive asymmetrical effect in table 95 from a negative in table 89.  Interestingly the 
German market changed from a positive to a negative effect.  However, during the financial 
crisis market participants were reacting to events influencing other markets, which would 
hint at a positive shock to the market influencing the volatility consistent with all the 
observed markets except for the German.  A possible explanation as hinted previously is 
the financial crisis occurred during the early stages of the observation and hence the on the 
run effect must account for the majority of the change.   
With the exception of the Italian and Spanish markets, the α coefficients are hinting at an 
increase in the levels of sensitivity.  Since the US and German markets are benchmark 
markets, in essence this means during the on the run stage the markets are highly reactive 
and during the initial stages of a financial crisis there was a high amount of uncertainties.  
This means that during the financial crisis market participants were going on flights to 
safety by investing in these highly liquid markets.  Notably these markets are highly liquid 
when new as time goes by they become less liquid.  As previously stated, the IPS markets 
are more risky, hence although they are highly liquid during the “on the run” stage relative 
to other stages.  Yet the financial crisis meant that they were not as reactive as the US and 
German markets. 
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Although one would suspect that the persistent levels as hinted by the β coefficients for the 
US and German markets would be low given the high sensitivity levels.  However, the 
insignificant β coefficients of these two markets seem to be the result of an error in the 
estimation of the models as hinted at previously.  Conversely, the Portuguese market seems 
to have overcome the estimation error in the 2012 bond.  The Italian and Spanish markets 
are hinting at a reduction in the persistent levels, yet both the Italian and Spanish markets 
are still highly persistent, especially the Spanish.   
As previously explained, we omit the US and German markets.  However, as with the 
Greek market in table 89, the unconditional volatility in the Portuguese market is 
inconsistent with both practice and theory.  Conversely, the two remaining observed 
markets seem to be hinting at a high unconditional volatility during the financial crisis.  
This does mean that these two sovereign debt markets were highly volatile during the 
financial crisis.  Conversely, like table 89 both markets do not revert to the unconditional 
volatility after a rise or fall.  However, the statistics seem to be suggesting that the volatility 
in both markets tend to decay to half their levels rather longer than illustrated in table 89 
in the aftermath of a shock to the market. 
A key factor during the financial crisis is the significant rejection of the null hypothesis of 
the markets being too volatile to be efficient throughout the observed markets except the 
Italian market using both GJR-GARCH and GARCH models.  This would suggest that 
market participants react differently to on the run bonds than off the run bonds.  Since the 
basis of these bonds, being more liquid and the financial crisis is illiquidity issues within 
the major financial firms.  Notably these firms are also the key market participants in the 
sovereign debt market22.  Another influencing factor is that the fundamentals by the 
policies of the central banks and governments such as quantitative easing and fiscal 
stimulus distorted these markets, especially the US.  This may have made them efficient.  
However, the Italian market accepted the null hypothesis.  A possible explanation is that 
unlike the other markets, the financial crisis did not affect the Italian market.  This means 
that the Italian financial sector remained unaffected and the Italian market not was the 
subject of flight to safety.  In fact the statistics on government aid to the financial sector 
                                                 
22 Sovereign wealth funds such as the Chinese and governmental departments such as the social security 
departments tend to hold these bonds until they mature likewise many insurance firms. 
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obtained from the European Commission on 21st April 2014 points to this, the Italian 
financial sector had the lowest state aid of all the observed countries in our research.   
 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
R2 0.999999 0.999999 0.990919 0.999977 0.99992 
Adjusted R2 0.999999 0.999999 0.990878 0.999976 0.99992 
Jarque-Bera 28 27.29 1242.22 1873.52 613.82 
Q-Statistics  (Correlogram) 0.4432 0.1514 0.6138 0.0119 0.0801 
F-Statistics (ARCH Test) 1.628148 0.522260 1.067903 3.795833 0.383171 
Table 96: 2017 Bond EGARCH-M Residuals Statistics (02/11/2009-29/03/2013) 
The high R2 and adjusted R2 through all the estimated GARCH models hint at all the 
models being a good fit to the dependent variable.  Like table 94, there is a split between 
the IPS and US/German markets with the IPS markets hinting at lower R2 and adjusted R2.  
These splits continue with the Jarque-Bera test, the IPS markets seem to be excessively 
high indicating a significant acceptance of the null hypothesis of non-normality in the 
distribution.  Yet the US and German markets seem to be hinting at a relatively low 
acceptance of the null hypothesis.  Additionally, the Q-statistics seem to be pointing at 
significantly low serial correlation for all the observed markets with the Portuguese and 
Spanish markets approaching zero.  Conversely, the F-statistics are hinting at a relatively 
low ARCH effect in all the observed markets with the exception of the Portuguese. 
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 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
λ 
 
-191.734 
(127.999) 
-97.94969 
(183.56640) 
-0.682855 
(0.702502) 
-5.610844 
(6.64732) 
-11.78626 
(9.43112) 
a 0.013456 (7.28E-06) 
0.012498 
(1.65E-05) 
0.006974 
(0.001115) 
0.000512 
(1.15E-04) 
0.004504 
(1.56E-04) 
b1 
-0.060869 
(2.76E-05) 
0.067374 
(3.35E-05) 
0.180347 
(0.002385) 
0.254856 
(9.67E-05) 
0.190259 
(2.48E-04) 
b2   
-0.072917 
(0.002504)   
ϵ 1 (2.95E-05) 
1.000018 
(3.54E-05) 
0.994986 
(0.002193) 
0.999969 
(1.02E-04) 
1.000654 
(2.52E-04) 
Variance Equation 
ω 
-0.1412 
(6.28E-02) 
-0.326749 
(0.136113) 
-0.360104 
(0.07546) 
-1.565741 
(0.373943) 
-0.223885 
(0.081842) 
α 0.129854 (0.028087) 
0.149947 
(0.031578) 
0.246714 
(0.047805) 
0.521541 
(0.094207) 
0.099157 
(0.025453) 
γ 0.012500 (0.019126) 
-0.005638 
(0.021434) 
0.121808 
(0.029254) 
0.031044 
(0.045657) 
0.143802 
(0.021689) 
β 0.997778 (0.003155) 
0.987174 
(0.007611) 
0.970829 
(0.009338) 
0.886332 
(0.031595) 
0.986141 
(0.00695) 
𝜔𝜔1 − (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) 1.106078 2.382925 1.655323 3.838795 2.624739 
𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 1.127632 1.137121 1.217543 1.407873 1.085298 
−
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(2)
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) 6 5 4 2 8 
Log Likelihood 6129.576 5972.090 1720.483 3830.002 3702.262 
Table 97: EGARCH-M Statistics of the 2017 Bond (02/11/2009-29/03/2013) 
It is worth noting that table 97 is associated with the sovereign debt crisis and hence as 
expected, there is a difference between the IPS group of markets and the other two observed 
markets.  In essence, the statistics in table 97 seems to be reflecting this differenced.  The 
2017 bonds allow us to extend the period of analysis in the sovereign debt crisis and to 
overcome the maturity effect of the 2012 bonds in table 91.  Interestingly the GARGH 
variant of our EMH test hints at the rejection of the null hypothesis of the market being too 
volatile to be efficient for all the IPS markets as demonstrated by table 41. 
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As illustrated by tables 91 and 97, the λ coefficients seem to be pointing at a change from 
a positive feedback effect to a negative feedback effect for all the observed market.  One 
could presume that a plausible explanation would be the maturity effect on the estimations 
from table 91.  However, another influential explanation is that the 2012 observation end 
in December 2011, hence the impact from the sovereign debt crisis on the observed markets 
was at the initial stage.  In the case of the US market, this means that not until the later 
stages of the sovereign debt crisis period was the full impact fiscal cliff and debt ceiling 
crises felt.  With the possible exception of the Portuguese market, the full impact from the 
Eurozone crisis did not affect the observed Eurozone markets until the later stages.  In fact, 
the combinations of both may have affected the feedback effect in the markets.   
With the exception of the US market, the γ coefficients are pointing at a change in the 
asymmetrical effect with the IPS markets changing to positive asymmetrical effects.  
Interestingly the German market changed from a positive to a negative effect.  However, 
during the later stages of the sovereign debt crisis, the uncertainty within the Eurozone 
spread to the German market.  At the heart of this issue was the question should Germany 
contribute more to avert the euro from collapsing given that the German economy was by 
far the biggest in the Eurozone.  The political environment in Italy and to a certain extent 
Spain did not help either.  In addition, the Italian economy was weak even before the crisis 
and the Spanish financial sector still required government aid in the form of recapitalization 
as late as autumn 2012.  These factors made the market participants generally nervous 
about the euro and Eurozone markets.  Conversely, although the fiscal cliff and debt ceiling 
crises affected the US market, yet the weakness of the financial market and the Eurozone 
crisis overshadowed the American problems until late 2013 when the US federal 
government came close to a default on its interest payment.  This meant that the US market 
continued to act as the risk free market and as explained previously many market 
participants23 held onto these assets for the long term. 
Although, with the exception of the Spanish and Portuguese markets, the α coefficients are 
hinting at an increase in the levels of sensitivity; however, it does seem to be that both the 
maturity and observation effect did not have a large impact on the level of sensitivity in 
                                                 
23 For example: US Local and Federal Governments, US Federal Reserve, Insurance and Pensions firms and 
Sovereign Wealth Funds e.g. Chinese. 
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the Portuguese market.  This is mainly due to the Portuguese crisis coming early in the 
sovereign debt crisis; hence, table 91 accounts for much of the impact.  Interestingly the 
Spanish market seems to be hinting at a low level of sensitivity given that the full impact 
from the financial and sovereign debt crisis came in the later stages.  A key note is that the 
financial crisis did not fully effect Spain until the later parts of the sovereign debt crisis 
and hence may have overshadowed the impact from the sovereign debt crisis.  However, 
this does not explain the high levels of sensitivity in table 91.  A possible explanation is 
contrary to our earlier statement, the observation did have larger impact than initially 
thought.  Only until the later stages were the full impact of the Spanish financial crisis felt, 
the effect did not appear in the 2012 Spanish bond.  Conversely, as explained earlier the 
delayed impact of the sovereign debt crisis on the remaining observed markets seem to 
have affect the level of sensitivity making these market increasingly reactive. 
With the exception of the Italian and Spanish markets, the β coefficients seem to be hinting 
at a reduction in the market persistence.  This would point towards the extension of 
observation making these markets less persistence because of the events, pointed to 
previously, in the later stages of the sovereign debt crisis making the markets increasingly 
reactive.  However, with respect to the Italian and Spanish markets, the increase in the 
persistence levels seem to be suggesting that the delayed influence of the crises may have 
made these markets increasingly persistence.  Certainly both markets seem to have had a 
delayed reaction to the sovereign debt crisis, however as hinted earlier the Spanish market 
also experienced a delayed reaction to the financial crisis.  This would suggest a longer 
spell of high volatility in these two markets.   
Except for the Italian and Spanish markets, table 97 seem to be hinting at an increase in 
the unconditional volatility on table 91.  This would suggest that the inclusion of the later 
stages of the crisis raise the expected long term volatility and as previously stated there are 
influencing factors explaining this increase.  Conversely, as previously stated the extension 
of the observed period did decrease the long-term expected volatility in the Italian and 
Spanish markets due to the delayed impact of the crises.  Like table 89 all our observed 
markets do not revert to the unconditional volatility after a rise or fall.  However, the 
statistics seem to be suggesting that with the exception of the Spanish and Portuguese 
markets, the volatility in the markets tend to decay to half their levels faster than illustrated 
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in table 91 in the aftermath of a shock to the market.  Interestingly the Portuguese market 
seems to be pointing to an indifferent in the half-life.   
Interestingly, during the sovereign debt crisis the IPS markets significantly rejected the 
null hypothesis of the markets being too volatile to be efficient using both the GJR-
GARCH and GARCH based variance bound tests.  This would suggest that the extension 
of the observation period to cover the later stages of the sovereign debt crisis made the IPS 
markets efficient.  This would further strengthen the argument that market participants 
were increasingly reacting to the fundamental information during the crisis.  This would 
also suggest that under extreme market uncertainty, market participants in certain 
sovereign debt market would react to the fundamental information.  Conversely, the 
German market only accepts the EMH under the GJR-GARCH model suggesting that the 
asymmetrical effect made the market efficient.  This seems to be hinting at the direction of 
the volatility seemingly important to the EMH.   
4.4.3  The SWARCH Model of Volatility Switching 
We use the variant of the SWARCH model proposed by Cai (1994) as indicated by section 
3.3 in the methodology to analyse the regime-switching behaviour of volatility in the 
sovereign debt market.  We derive a single lagged two states SWARCH to model the 
switching conditional variance of the first order-differentiated price.  The SWARCH model 
is below: 
 ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝜔𝜔0 + 𝜔𝜔1𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−𝑃𝑃2𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃=1  
 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 = � 1 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑣𝑣𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦2 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙ℎ 𝑣𝑣𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦 
It is worth remembering that the key to the Cai (1994) SWARCH model is the ARCH 
intercept.  By analysing the ARCH intercept for each of the regimes, we could get an idea 
of the volatility in each regime.  However, a more revealing factor is the probabilities of 
each regime. 
In estimating our SWARCH model, we use the maximum likelihood with normal 
distribution.  With the exception of the US and German 2017 datasets, we use the BHHH 
method.  However, due to errors in the estimation with these two datasets, we opted to use 
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the BFGS method in the estimation.  Due to errors with the estimations, we used various 
sample periods. 
 US German Greek Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
Μ 
 
-1.58E-02 
(1.06E-03) 
-1.33E-02 
(1.60E-03) 
4.93E-03 
(4.82E-03) 
-9.22E-03 
(2.19E-03) 
2.38E-03 
(4.22E-03) 
-7.25E-03 
(3.50E-03) 
Variance Equation 
𝜔𝜔0 
 
5.01E-04 
(4.15E-05) 
8.29E-04 
(1.31E-04) 
3.74E-02 
(1.96E-03) 
4.21E-03 
(3.24E-04) 
3.64E-02 
(1.79E-03) 
9.20E-03 
(8.39E-04) 
𝜔𝜔𝑐𝑐=1 
0.293810 
(0.021568) 
0.253356 
(0.035551) 
0.335285 
(0.043909) 
0.158109 
(0.032121) 
0.033347 
(0.020498) 
0.085378 
(0.026087) 
𝜔𝜔𝑐𝑐=2 
0.314870 
(0.029868) 
0.092030 
(0.021645) 
0.105865 
(0.022795) 
0.092066 
(0.021929) 
-0.002624 
(0.001148) 
0.113403 
(0.022369) 
𝛼𝛼 166.038529 (13.727654) 
48.809924 
(7.388534) 
43.495632 
(9.503578) 
11.191042 
(0.851123) 
10.619878 
(1.049327) 
6.523605 
(0.550924) 
𝜃𝜃(1.1) 7.018339 (1.062313) 4.815815 (0.679569) 4.380112 (0.272185) 4.840678 (0.453747) 3.846200 (0.274914) 4.530508 (0.429168) 
𝜃𝜃(1.2) -7.752714 (0.592539) -5.930005 (0.607668) -1.846393 (0.311306) -5.598055 (0.456174) -2.164589 (0.314784) -5.352082 (0.440106) 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐=1 8.95E-04 8.04E-03 1.24E-02 7.84E-03 2.09E-02 1.07E-02 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐=2 0.99957 0.99735 0.8637 0.99631 0.89702 0.99528 
Log Likelihood 187.0060 1097.1737 -530.0750 837.6236 -91.3807 362.2630 
Table 98: SWARCH Statistics of the 2012 Bond 
 
Figure 25: US 2012 High Volatility Regime  
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Figure 26: German 2012 High Volatility Regime 
 
Figure 27: Greek 2012 High Volatility Regime 
 
Figure 28: Italian 2012 High Volatility Regime 
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Figure 29: Portuguese 2012 High Volatility Regime 
 
Figure 30: Spanish 2012 High Volatility Regime 
 
In essence, the 2012 bonds were associated with a period of changing market environment 
in the global financial market.  Of course the later stages of the period were associated with 
the financial and sovereign debt crises, yet it was also governed by a number of events 
which changed the market environment during the earlier stages such as the asset price 
bubble and accountancy issues leading to the bankruptcy of Enron and WorldCom.  
However, two events, which had an influential impact during the early stages, were the 
introduction of the euro and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 leading to a number 
of wars.  Although these two events occurred before the observed period, yet the 
persistency in their aftermath had a big impact on the behaviour of market participant.   
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The evidence from figures 25 to 30 certainly points towards the existence of a regime-
switching behaviour influencing the pattern of price volatility in the sovereign debt market.  
While the figures illustrate the extent to which the sovereign debt market in general is 
highly volatile within the 2012 bonds, further illustrated by analysing the probabilities of 
the high volatility regime in table 98, in essence regime 2.  Surprisingly for our observed 
markets, this is highly significant with a minimum probability of 0.8637 as observed by 
the Greek market, backed by the probability for the low volatility regime, which is regime 
1, with a maximum probability of 0.0209 for the Portuguese market.  This would suggest 
it is more likely that the next regime will be highly volatile.  With the exception of the 
Greek and Portuguese markets, the probabilities are in the high 0.90s, which are hinting at 
the other observed markets being more volatile.  Notably the Greek and Portuguese markets 
also point to a significant probability of a high volatility regime. 
In general, the ARCH intercepts seem to be hinting at a three way split in the markets.  This 
is consistent with our previous observation of the behaviour of volatility in the sovereign 
debt market.  The ARCH intercepts in both regimes for the Italian and Spanish markets 
seem to be hinting at very low levels of volatility, understandable as the high volatility 
until the later stages as illustrated by figures 28 and 30 affected neither market.  Both these 
figures also illustrate that the highly volatile period of the early 2000s did not really 
influence the volatility levels.  An influencing factor is that the early stages of the crises 
did not affect either the Italian or the Spanish markets.  Arguably, the financial crisis did 
not affect the Spanish market until later on and the Italian market remained unaffected.   
The US and German markets seem to be portraying a more volatile market than the other 
observed markets.  However, as illustrated by figures 25 and 26, at the highest level their 
volatility levels are below the Greek and Portuguese markets.  A counter argument is 
during some spells the level of volatility for the German and especially the US markets 
seem to be higher than the Greek and Portuguese markets.  As mentioned previously, a 
possible explanation is the quality and liquidity factors of the US and German markets 
making them the benchmark markets for both the dollar and euro currencies.  This makes 
them prime markets for flights to safety during crises or extreme events i.e. Knightian 
uncertainty.  Another influencing factor with respect to both markets is that the Basel II 
regulations to hold sovereign debt on their balance sheets as capital are a requirement of 
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many financial institutions.  Hence, many of these organizations choose to hold either US 
or German sovereign debt depending on their “home” currency.   
The Greek and to a lesser extent Portuguese markets were in the “eye of the hurricane” 
during the sovereign debt crisis, hence the high levels of volatility, as illustrated by figures 
27 and 28, which had an impact on the regime 2 ARCH intercepts.  However, as the figures 
also illustrates there are long periods of low volatility in both the Greek and Portuguese 
markets.  As highlighted previously an influencing factor is that both these markets are not 
liquid and more importantly are not large markets.  Hence, as illustrated by the figures, 
during “normal” market environment these markets do not have a high number of 
transactions, which gives the appearance of stable markets. 
 US German Italian Portuguese Spanish 
Mean Equation 
μ 
 
-7.64E-04 
(6.83E-03) 
1.18E-02 
(7.39E-03) 
5.38E-03 
(8.20E-03) 
-1.46E-02 
(1.15E-02) 
-1.68E-03 
(8.93E-03) 
Variance Equation 
𝜔𝜔0 
 
1.95E-02 
(2.02E-03) 
 
2.88E-02 
(7.77E-03) 
 
6.68E-02 
(3.95E-03) 
 
1.34E-01 
(9.01E-03) 
 
1.04E-01 
(4.93E-03) 
𝜔𝜔𝑐𝑐=1 
0.135506 
(3.18E-02) 
0.0897424 
(4.07E-02) 
0.0063287 
(1.69E-02) 
0.014309 
(3.30E-02) 
0.076919 
(3.42E-02) 
𝜔𝜔𝑐𝑐=2 
0.071336 
(3.46E-02) 
-0.0269799 
(4.62E-03) 
0.0710576 
(3.13E-02) 
0.096304 
(3.28E-02) 
-0.006101 
(5.47E-04) 
𝛼𝛼 12.987887 (1.250402) 
4.5921499 
(0.839103) 
10.1028920 
(1.137037) 
16.841144 
(2.236902) 
7.764033 
(0.977439) 
𝜃𝜃(1.1) 6.571102 (1.492712) 3.2786740 (0.393502) 3.7757628 (0.274308) 3.331685 (0.257237) 4.512419 (0.402756) 
𝜃𝜃(1.2) -7.203025 (1.235778) -4.0878472 (0.570678) -2.2659541 (0.283508) -1.738651 (0.351140) -2.670022 (0.382444) 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐=1 1.40E-03 3.63E-02 2.24E-02 3.45E-02 1.09E-02 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐=2 0.99926 0.98350 0.90602 0.85052 0.93523 
Log Likelihood -761.8270 -352.5236 -590.8467 -1242.7689 -749.8844 
Table 99: SWARCH Statistics of the 2017 Bond 
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Figure 31: US 2017 High Volatility Regime 
 
Figure 32: German 2017 High Volatility Regime 
 
Figure 33: Italian 2017 High Volatility Regime 
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Figure 34: Portuguese 2017 High Volatility Regime 
 
Figure 35: Spanish 2017 High Volatility Regime 
In essence, the 2017 bonds are associated with a highly volatile period in the global 
financial market mainly due to the financial and ensuing sovereign debt crises.  Although, 
this in itself is interesting, mainly due to the differing impact on the observed markets of 
each crisis; however, as hinted previously, another influencing factor is the different impact 
from the on the run and maturity effects on the financial and sovereign debt crises 
respectively.  The final factor is the extended observed period; therefore allowing us to 
analyse the full impact of the sovereign debt crisis.  These factors may have had an effect 
on the SWARCH model. 
The evidence from table 99 is pointing at a mixed picture with respect to the probabilities.  
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next regime is highly volatile.  With the US and German markets approaching 1.0, this 
seem to be indicating that the US and German markets were highly volatile throughout the 
observed period, although the probabilities of both the Italian and Spanish markets were 
also significantly high.   
Like the probabilities, the ARCH intercept for regimes 1 and 2, points at a rather mixed 
picture in terms of the level of volatility in the observed markets.  As illustrated by figures 
31 to 34, it would seem that the German market had the lowest level of volatility in both 
regimes.  An influencing factor is that both crises did not really affect the German economy 
or financial market, despite the downgrade of the German sovereign debt ratings.  
However, the evidence from figure 32 seems to suggest that the market was highly volatile 
and backed by the probability of regime 2 as hinted earlier.  A possible explanation is due 
to the status of the German market as the benchmark market for the Eurozone; hence, the 
persistency of the high volatility regime is the result of flights to safety during both crises.  
Similarly, the persistency of the high volatility regime during the early stages of the US 
market observations was the result of a flight from the financial assets to the US market 
during the financial crisis.  Since the financial crisis had its origin in the US; hence, these 
flights to safety as illustrated by figure 31 significantly affected the US market.  However, 
the timings of the two hikes in volatility during the sovereign debt crisis period seem to be 
hinting at the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, hence a plausible explanation is that the US 
market was at the centre of a flight from the euro to the US dollar.  It must be remembered 
that due to problems with the estimation of the SWARCH model, we had to limit our 
observed dataset to 1st October 2012, which meant the full impact of the US fiscal cliff, 
and debt-ceiling crises on the US market was not captured.   
To a certain extent figures 33 to 35 seem to be hinting at the limited impact of the financial 
crisis on the IPS markets.  Although there is some evidence of high volatility regimes 
during the financial crisis period, yet this evidence seems to be telling.  Certainly, the 
evidence seems to be pointing at jumps rather than changes in the volatility regime 
effecting the markets during the financial crisis, especially around the period of the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy.  This seems to be hinting at a period of reactive behaviour by the 
market participants to events during the financial crisis period.  However, during the 
sovereign debt crisis, the regime changes became increasingly persistence and frequent.  
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An interesting factor is the lag between the Greek deficit revision and the reaction of the 
market participants leading to the contagion in the IPS markets.   
4.4.4 Concluding Review 
Summarising the results, we find low levels of sensitivity to market shocks using the 
GARCH model in general throughout all the observed markets during the pre-crisis and 
financial crisis periods.  However, as expected, the GIPS markets were highly sensitive to 
market shocks during the sovereign debt crisis with the US and German markets pointing 
to low levels of sensitivity, reversed when accounting for the levels of persistence in the 
aftermath of a shock.  With the exception of the GIPS markets during the sovereign debt 
crisis, the levels of persistence were high.   
Although in general, the statistics from the EGARCH-m do confirm the sensitivity and 
persistence levels throughout the observed markets.  Yet it is the feedback and 
asymmetrical effects, which are of importance in the EGARCH-m.  In general the observed 
markets seem to be hinting at a positive feedback effect throughout the pre-crisis period 
with exception of the US market.  However, during the financial crisis the majority of the 
observed markets were pointing towards a negative feedback effect.  Conversely, there is 
a split picture during the sovereign debt crisis, with the 2012 bonds registering a positive 
feedback and 2017 bonds pointing towards a negative feedback effect.  The asymmetrical 
effect is rather interesting; in general, it signifies the change in the reaction from a positive 
asymmetrical effect during the pre-crisis period to a negative asymmetrical effect during 
both crises.  However, rather surprisingly in the 2017 bonds, the generality was for positive 
asymmetrical effect during both crises. 
Certainly, the SWARCH model seems to point to a regime-switching behaviour in the price 
volatility of the sovereign debt market.  In general, the high volatility regime in both the 
2012 and 2017 bonds governed the SWARCH model.  The SWARCH model also seems 
to highlight an interesting factor in the 2012 bonds, the observed markets seem to be 
generally divided into three groups depending on the pattern of the volatility and regimes: 
the US and German markets, Greek and Portuguese markets and Italian and Spanish 
markets.  Another factor observed in the patterns of volatility in the 2017 bonds is that IPS 
markets do follow a similar pattern of volatility while the US and German markets seem 
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to be dictated by individual pattern of volatility.  A relevant factor in our research is that 
SWARCH model seems to be picking on the changing environment for each of the 
observed markets.  Since each of the markets was effected by a number of different factors.   
The interesting factor is that all the estimated models had various issues with the observed 
datasets, some serious.  Some of these issues led to changes in the estimation methods and 
distributions systems.  Additionally with the SWARCH, the issue was that the full-
observed datasets of certain markets were incompatible with the SWARCH model, so we 
had to re-estimate the model using a reduced datasets.   
However, not all the issues were because of the dataset or estimated model, the two key 
issues were the result of the fundamental structure of the sovereign debt market.  In essence 
the 2012 bonds were affected by the maturity effect while the 2017 bonds were affected 
by the on the run effect.  Theory dictates that when bonds approaches maturity the price 
approaches the par value, this generally leads to low volatility, as the market participants 
tend to hold these bonds until they mature.  In contrast, when the bond is issued, it is said 
to be on the run until another similar bond is issued.  Theoretically, the expectation is these 
on the run sovereign debts are benchmark bonds, which means they are seen as liquid assets 
and to a certain extent risk free.  This makes them very volatile since they have a high 
volume of trading at the initial stage.  Another important issue is the policies of the 
governments and central banks during the resulting recession in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis.  Essentially, this links to the fiscal stimulus policies which increase and 
quantitative easing policies, which decrease the supply in the sovereign debt market, thus 
distorting the markets from their true value.  Another issue is that the high volatility 
exhibited in the Greek and Portuguese markets during the sovereign debt crisis distorted 
the rest of the observations so much that it reduced the volatility in the rest of the 
observation to insignificance levels.   
The events of the last few years led to a fast changing and highly volatile market 
environment increasing uncertainty in the global financial market.  Our empirical evidence 
highlights the fact that the fast changing market environment had a big impact on the 
observed sovereign debt markets.  The evidence seems to suggest that the behaviour of 
price volatility changed significantly in the aftermath of both the financial and sovereign 
debt crises.  As illustrated by the GARCH and SWARCH graphs of the 2012 bonds, the 
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pre-crisis period is evidence of how external events could change the market environment.  
The early stages of the pre-crisis period were highly volatile due to a number of events not 
directly linked to the sovereign debt market, although debatably the introduction of the 
euro did change the fundamentals in the observed Eurozone markets.  However, the 
economic upturn and asset price bubble during the later stages of the pre-crisis period did 
change the market environment and as illustrated by the graphs this reduced the volatility 
towards the end of the pre-crisis period in the observed market.   
Coincidentally, the high risk taking and leverage during the asset price bubble of the later 
years in the pre-crisis period meant that the problems were a combination of deleveraged 
and re-pricing of risk.  This combination caused the financial crisis, which led to massive 
upheavals in the global financial market environment and changed the behaviour of price 
volatility in the observed markets.  In general, the observed markets witnessed a flight to 
safety from other markets, which pushed the prices higher as market participants sought 
more liquidity and risk free assets, obviously reflected in the behaviour of price volatility 
during the financial crisis period in both 2012 and 2017 bonds.   
In the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers crisis and with a deepening economic downturn 
turning into a possible depression, many countries were force to recapitalise their banking 
systems and implement a fiscal stimulus policy, which led to a dramatic increase in the 
total sovereign debt.  However, mainly due to the uncertainty in the global financial market 
the observed markets were still seen as safe risk free assets, even though the fundamental 
information (i.e. economic indicators) underpinning these markets were hinting at a 
weakening market.  On the face of it, it was the Greek fiscal deficit revision, which caused 
market participants to reassess the fundamental information underpinning the sovereign 
debt market.  However, as already stated this market was already showing signs of 
weakness in the fundamentals long before the Greek revision.  The financial crisis not only 
raised the expenditure but also reduced the revenue as a result even before the advent of 
the fiscal stimulus the fundamentals were showing signs of a weakness.  This made market 
participants less confident in the observed GIPS market as time went by and thus resulting 
in flights from these markets to the US and German markets as illustrated by the statistics.  
Although the sovereign debt crisis did affect the US market in the form of the fiscal cliff 
and debt ceiling crises, yet not until the later stages of the sovereign debt crisis was the true 
impact felt. 
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In general, the market environment can be an influential factor on the market participants 
in the global financial market.  However, in a fast changing and highly volatile market 
environment, the interesting factor is the behaviour of market participants.  Our empirical 
evidence seems to be suggesting that market participants tend to overreact or underreact to 
information and events depending on the general market environment.  In general, market 
participants tend to overreact during a crisis period and underreact during a bubble period.  
Although this is not technical true under all circumstances, yet the evident during the early 
stages of the pre-crisis period is highlighting an overreaction to the uncertainty in the 
market due to a number of events not least the introduction of the euro and the accountancy 
issues of 2002/2003.  In contrast, the underpricing of sovereign debts reflected the 
underreaction of the market participants during the asset price bubble of the later stages of 
the pre-crisis period meant that the inflated prices of the stocks and securitizations markets, 
indicated by the low volatility in the observed markets towards the end of the pre-crisis 
period. 
Eventually the asset price bubble of the mid-2000s did burst in the summer of 2007 with 
the Bear Stearns and BNP Paribas loses.  Since in general market participants tend to 
overreact to negative news, this led to a flight from the securitized assets at the centre of 
the crisis and financial sector to safe havens like the observed sovereign debt markets.  As 
illustrated by the asymmetrical effect, in general the negative impact on the global financial 
market, seen as risk free liquid assets, transmitted to a positive impact on the 2017 bonds.  
An influencing factor to note during the financial crisis is the liquidity issue at the heart of 
the problems facing the market participant, therein lays the different in the asymmetrical 
effect between the 2012 and 2017 bonds.   
However, as the financial crises worsened, it became clear that many market participants 
needed an injection of capital and the resulting economic recession was getting deeper.  
Hence, in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, many central governments 
did invest in their banking system in order to inject much needed capital.  The thing is that 
by investing capital in their banking system and implementing huge fiscal stimulus policy, 
they were increasing the total debt at a time when the recession was already increasing 
their debt.  In addition, in theory, the increase in supply would decrease the price of an 
asset but the financial crisis meant that these assets were in high demand.  However, 
another distorting factor is the policies of the central banks, in providing short term 
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liquidity they did exchange liquidity for assets like sovereign debts.  Some central banks, 
such as the Federal Reserve, also implemented a large quantitative easing policy of buying 
assets like sovereign debts in the attempt of boasting their economy.  This further distorted 
the price from the fundamental value by decreasing supply; however, although the ECB 
was not allowed to implement such a policy until the later stages of the sovereign debt 
crisis.  This did not stop the ECB providing liquidity for the market participants, who were 
the banks, in the shape of short-term asset backed loans, which were usually Eurozone 
sovereign debts. 
The issues with the economy and size of the total debt relative to the GDP in many of the 
observed markets, especially the GIPS nations were a cause for concern long before the 
onslaught of the sovereign debt crisis.  However, the financial crisis had overshadowed 
these issues.  As previously stated, mainly due to the requirement of the market participants 
for liquid and risk free assets during the financial crisis the prices went up in the observed 
markets.  The Greek deficit revision in autumn 2009 did make market participants highly 
reactive to the issues in the economy and sovereign debt market.  This led to a contagion 
in the GIPS markets as market participants fled these markets to the safe haven of the 
German and US markets during the sovereign debt crisis, illustrated by the high prices of 
the US and German markets.  Yet to a certain extent, the US market was suffering from a 
similar issue with the fiscal cliff and debt ceiling crises.  A key factor is the assumption 
that the US government would not risk the consequences; another influencing factor is the 
crisis in the Eurozone overshadowed the US crises.  Of course the crises did eventual effect 
the US market with the closure of the US government, however this was out of observation.  
During the financial crisis, a possible explanation is available as to why the US market did 
not suffer from any negative effect on the price volatility.  The Federal Reserve was 
implementing a huge quantitative easing policy, which distorted the market to a certain 
extent.  However, the main factor was the overreaction to the Eurozone crises and 
underreaction to the US crises.  Coincidentally, the overreaction to the GIPS crises also 
made market participants overlook the economic weakness and credit rating downgrade of 
the German market.  However, an influencing behavioural factor is that during a crisis, 
market participants are highly reactive; this is the crucial factor influencing the markets 
responses to the policy communication by many influential politicians. 
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Theoretically, the efficiency of a market depends only on the market participants’ 
accessibility and analysis of information.  However, in this part of the empirical evidence, 
we considered and analysed the possibility of the reaction of the market participants 
making the markets efficient.  A possible explanation is available in the 
overreaction/underreaction hypothesis.  As hinted by our empirical evidence, generally 
market participants were over- or under-reaction to information or events.  This leads to 
the overreaction/underreaction cancelation states.  Where there are periods of 
underreaction and other periods of overreaction from the market participants, these two 
periods could cancel each other out and the resulting steady state in the market seems to 
suggest to participants that the market is efficient.  This could explain why during a highly 
volatile period such as the financial and sovereign debt crises, a number of the observed 
markets seem to accept the efficient market hypothesis.  It could also explain why during 
a period of low volatility the markets seem to accept the null hypothesis of the market 
being too volatile to be efficient.  The key is if market participants overreact (underreact) 
more than they underreact (overreact) then the market is deemed to be too volatile to be 
efficient.  Of course, another explanation is the correction to the over- or under-reaction 
error.  Nevertheless, this also seems to point at the overreaction/underreaction state since 
in the aftermath of a reaction from the market participants the market always readjusts 
cancelling out the reaction.  This correction pushes the reaction towards the 
overreaction/underreaction steady state and hence makes the markets efficient.   
In concluding, it is hard to capture the impact from the behaviour of volatility in a dynamic 
and highly volatile environment using one model.  While this is true for any market, not 
just the sovereign debt market, yet what is interesting is the possible distortion of the 
sovereign debt market by factors other than market participants.  Hence, the price may not 
be determined by the reaction of the market participants to information or news, it could 
be determined by supply side players like the central banks and governments implementing 
extenuating policies such as quantitative easing or fiscal stimulus.  In truth, these are rare 
and need special environmental circumstances like the recent financial crisis and following 
deep recession.  Interestingly, it is these distortions that could provide one possible 
explanation to the efficiency of the market during the highly volatile environment of the 
financial and sovereign debt crises.  However, another more intruding explanation is the 
idea of the overreaction/underreaction state whereby the market efficiency is determined 
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by the reaction of the market participants cancelling each other out during any period.  
Essentially, this means that market participants reactions to information is the key factor 
whether the market is efficient or not.   
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5.0  Conclusions 
The efficient market hypothesis has been the mainstream of finance for nearly 50 years.  
However, as highlighted in the review, there are many issues with this theory and it does 
throw up a basic flawed idea.  The concept is that the price always incorporates all the 
information at the time and hence the price reflects the given information.  This idea is at 
the centre of the debate surrounding the efficient market hypothesis in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis.  The other key issue is that it relies on key assumptions made in 
neoclassical economics, which do not always hold in the real world, i.e. the existence of 
rational market participants and perfectly competitive markets.  In truth, both the efficient 
market hypothesis and neoclassical economics view which underpins it are essentially just 
models of the financial market and are therefore best used as benchmarks and not 
observations of the real world. 
The key issue of this thesis is that does a crisis such as the financial and sovereign debt 
crises change the efficiency of a financial market.  We do know the crisis did change the 
environment within the global financial market is operating.  However, did the change in 
the market environment lead to a change in the efficiency of the market?  Effectively, does 
new information spread efficiently and do market participants react rationally to new 
information or events during a highly volatile period?  In analysing the impact of a 
changing environment, on the efficiency of the sovereign debt market; we extended the 
variance bound test of Shiller (1979) to include the GARCH models of volatility; proposing 
a GJR-GARCH based variance bound test to analyse the impact of different asymmetrical 
effects in a changing market environment on the efficiency of the sovereign debt market. 
In essence, the evidence seems to point at over- or under-reaction of market participants to 
new information and new events, considered (rightly or wrongly) to play an influential role 
in the pricing of financial assets.  This leads to behavioural finance theories to explain the 
pricing of assets.  At the centre of the behavioural finance theory is the idea that in order 
to understand the movement in the price, we need to understand the reaction of the market 
participants to all the information in the market, since as stated many times previously 
market participants are homo-sapiens and not homo economics.  This leads to different 
interpretations on the information, made worse by the existence of asymmetrical 
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information, which leads to different reactions.  This can sometimes lead to underreaction 
while on other occasions it could lead to overreaction.   
The problem is this could lead to a deviation in the price from its markedly efficient value, 
which in the long run could lead to fads such as rational price bubbles.  As a bubble by 
nature is unpredictable, regulators who act too fast could cause a market crash.  On the 
other hand, acting too slow could lead to a crisis just like the recent financial crisis and 
market participants could lose billions.  A problem with the behavioural finance theory is 
the limited number of tested models, unlike the efficient market hypothesis.  Hence, until 
such models become widely available the theory will be need to be continued to be tested 
as there is still few empirical evidence for the behavioural finance theory. 
In the conclusion, we will review our literature and empirical findings.  This includes a 
brief overview of our findings in the key areas of efficient market hypothesis, behavioural 
finance theory and models of volatility.  We will review the objectives. We follow this by 
looking at the contributions and recent developments in the field of research.  We then look 
at the limitations of the research and suggest areas of extension and ideas for future 
research resulting from our research.  We conclude a reflection on the thesis statement. 
5.1 A Review of the Research Objectives 
The research objectives were: 
1. Objective (1) was to test the efficient market hypothesis using the variance bound 
test during the pre-crisis, financial crisis and sovereign debt crises periods. 
a. This meant researching the efficient market hypothesis and behavioural 
finance theory 
b. Researching the tests of the efficient market hypothesis 
c. Deriving the tests: 
i. The first test was a GARCH variant of the variance bound test 
ii. We also wanted to analyse the impact of a negative or positive 
asymmetrical effect on the efficiency tests, hence we proposed a 
GJR-GARCH variant of the variance bound test 
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2. The second objective: to identify the changing behaviour of volatility in the 
sovereign debt market using the GARCH family of volatility models as described 
above 
In essence the key objectives to research the impact of the crises on the efficient market 
hypothesis and behaviour of volatility remained.  However, focussing the research on the 
efficiency of the sovereign debt market during the crises makes the impact of the crises on 
the efficiency of the market the focal point of the thesis.     
5.2 A Summary of the Findings 
We find theoretical and empirical evidence to support both the efficient market hypothesis 
and behavioural finance theory.   
Although there are many tests of market efficiency like the cointegration test, variance 
ratio test and variance bound test; we opted to base our empirical evidence on the variance 
bound test as a more modern version of an EHM test.  Simply put the variance bound test, 
as argued by Shiller (1992), dictates that if the information does not explain the markets 
then the prices exhibit persistent excess volatility.  Therefore, the markets are deemed too 
volatile to be efficient.  This is the key to our empirical evidence section. 
We initially use a GARCH based variance bound test to test the efficiency of the market.  
However, since theory dictates that volatility behaves differently to negative than to 
positive news, we extend our variance bound test to account for the asymmetrical effect by 
using the GJR-GARCH.  Our empirical evidence is suggesting in general, the six sovereign 
debt markets are inefficient because they are too volatile to fulfil the efficient market 
hypothesis.  However, the key to our thesis is that the market environment does affect the 
efficiency of the sovereign debt market as indicated by the changing market environment 
during the financial and sovereign debt crises, which have influenced the efficiency of the 
market. 
In general, the GJR-GARCH variant of our variance bound test did hint at the inclusion of 
the asymmetrical effect making the test more susceptible to accepting the efficient market 
hypothesis.  Although the test of the models using the information criterions methods 
showed that, the GARCH model is able to explain the information contained in the 
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dependent variable better.  In the end as previously argued the acceptance of the efficient 
market hypothesis could depend on various factors and not just on whether the market is 
too volatile to be efficient.  However, we accept the null hypothesis of the market being 
too volatile to be efficient because the market has to efficient throughout the sample and 
not just for a few numbers of observational periods. 
Since the markets were in general accepting the null hypothesis of the market being too 
volatile to be efficient.  The alternative theory is the behavioural finance theory, which 
dictates that movement in asset prices is mainly due to the reaction of market participants 
to the information or events.  Interestingly, this leads to the underreaction or overreaction 
hypotheses, which indicate that market participants sometimes underreact or overreact to 
information or events.  Perhaps the biggest issues in the efficient market hypothesis are the 
lack of a plausible explanation for an asset price bubble like the US asset bubble of the 
mid-2000s.  The behavioural finance theory provides an elegant explanation as to the 
mechanics of any asset bubble in the overreaction/underreaction hypotheses.  The 
hypotheses also seem to provide an explanation for the behaviour of price volatility in the 
sovereign debt market during the pre-crisis period as well as the financial and sovereign 
debt crises.  This was the key for our empirical study into the behaviour of price volatility 
in the sovereign debt market.   
Since as argued by Mandelbrot (1963), a key observation made frequently in the field of 
financial economics is the existence of volatility clustering in asset pricing.  Another 
observation often made is the existence of feedback and asymmetrical effects as indicated 
by Engle et al. (1987) and Black (1976) respectively.  This leads to the GARCH family to 
model the volatility in the market and there is certainly a large and growing literature base 
on the use of the GARCH family to explain the behaviour of volatility during the financial 
and sovereign debt crises over the past few years.   
Using the GARCH and EGARCH-m to model the clustering and asymmetrical/feedback 
effects, we certainly found evidence of volatility clustering in the market.  This seems to 
be backing our earlier observation that the changing market environment affected the 
efficiency of the market.  The results of our empirical evidence seem to be pointing at the 
existence of changing feedback and asymmetrical effects in the markets.  These factors 
seem to be hinting at the changing reaction of market participants to the events and 
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information during the three periods: pre-crisis, financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis.  
The evidence certainly seems to be hinting at the existence of the over or under reaction 
hypotheses.   
Perhaps the key finding is that the overreaction/underreaction may cancel each other out 
so that the market seems to be efficient.  This means where there are periods of overreaction 
and other periods of underreaction by the market participant, this leads to the 
overreaction/underreaction cancelation state.  However, a market deemed too volatile to 
be efficient, is a market where there is still over- or under-reaction remaining after the 
cancellation state.   
An interesting finding for policy makers such as the central banks and governments is that 
supply side factors such as quantitative easing or fiscal stimulus policies could affect the 
behaviour of price volatility and hence the market efficiency, where quantitative easing 
policies seem to reduce and fiscal stimulus policies tend to increase, the supply of 
sovereign debts.  Interestingly, this seems to be providing an explanation to the behaviour 
of price volatility and market efficiency in the US sovereign debt market in particular 
during the financial and sovereign debt crises.   
In general, our findings seem to be hinting at many factors during a crisis, which determine 
the market efficiency and the behaviour of price volatility.  However, the key factor is the 
market environment, which is backed by the results from the SWARCH models, since as 
hinted by Cai (1994) and Hamilton & Susmel (1994) financial markets go through alternate 
periods characterized by high and low volatility.  Certainly, the past empirical evidence 
seems to hint at a link between the general market environment and the regime switches in 
high and low volatility.  Our results are pointing at is these volatility switches being linked 
with the changes in the general market environment with respect to each market.   
5.3  A Review of the Limitations 
Hindsight is a lovely tool; unfortunately, there are some limitations, which became 
glaringly obvious by the end of the research.  Although we tried to accommodate these 
issues by changing some of the objectives as already illustrated in section 5.1, we still 
believe there are a few limiting issues.  Below we list these issues. 
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Perhaps the biggest limitation is the data used to test the efficient market hypothesis and 
model the volatility in the sovereign debt market.  The problem is by using the prices we 
were restricted with the issue and maturity dates.  Therefore, we had to use two bonds to 
cover the period we wanted to observe.  This was partly because we know how the prices 
behave in the benchmark bonds, which were the 10 years government bonds.  However, 
the other problem was the non-existence of a longer duration bond across all the observed 
markets.  As an example, the US had a 20-year bond but the Eurozone markets do not 
extend to this duration.   
Part of the reason why we limited the number of markets we observed was due to the use 
of a second bond to overcome the maturity effect during the sovereign debt crisis.  
Although the thesis would have benefited from the inclusion of other markets, especially 
the Japanese, British and French market, the reason being that each would have added a 
different angle to the research. Certainly, the inclusion of the Japanese market would have 
been interesting because of the similar problems the Japanese financial sector and economy 
went through in the 1990s and early part of the 2000s, which would only have extended 
the volume of this thesis, but would not have added to the crises’ countries.   
A key limitation is the omission of a section to define the characteristic of the market.  This 
section is important because it provides some background information on the market and 
the type of market participants.  However, we could not obtain the data required for this. 
While our choice of data limited our ability to research the true extent of the crisis effect 
on the market efficiency and behaviour of market volatility, a key problem was the 
interpretation the SWARCH model. This was the restriction of the regime switching to the 
intercepts only.  This meant that that we could not distinguish between the sensitivity levels 
to market shocks of high and low volatility regimes.  An associated issue with the 
SWARCH model in general is that they do not account for the persistent levels.  It would 
have been nice to know, how the regime changes in the volatility, affected the sensitivity 
and persistent levels in markets, during a period of changing market environment. 
5.4 A Review of Recent Developments 
There were a number of developments during the later stages of the thesis, which had an 
effect on the sovereign debt market.  These developments could have implications on our 
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research, especially on the efficiency and behaviour of volatility in our observed markets.  
Therefore, it will be interesting to widen our research to the impact of these developments:   
• The shutdown and near default of the US government see Nippani & Smith (2014): 
we previously discussed the debt-ceiling crisis in section 2.3.2.  The problem here 
was that both sides of the US federal government could not agree to a compromise 
plan to raise the debt ceiling before the next payment was due which could have 
resulted in them defaulting.  Hence, the US federal government effectively ran out 
of money and had to shut down from 1st October 2013 to 13th October 2013.  The 
crisis saw the credit rating and hence price of US sovereign debt fall sharply to 
below 100 at one point.  Importantly the price has since recovered.  We suspect that 
mainly due to the overreaction/underreaction steady state the market could be 
efficient at present.  However, in the immediate aftermath of the crisis we suspect 
that the market is likely to have suffered from overreaction making the market 
inefficient. 
 
• The continuation of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis see De Grauwe & Yi (2015) 
and Cornett et al. (2015), the central issue here is the Greek sovereign debt crisis.  
As of 26 June 2015, there was no agreement to prevent the Greek government from 
defaulting on its debt.  The fear is that if Greece was to default then it could lead to 
an exit from the Eurozone.  This could lead to added pressures on the Eurozone 
markets in general but more specifically the sovereign debt market.  The market 
participants are already overreacting to the news as is evident in markets across 
Europe.  This could have the impact of pushing the markets away from efficiency.  
However, given that these crises do have a tendency for last minute agreement, I 
would not rule out a deal that would “save” the euro.  I think the markets are grossly 
overreacting towards the euro given the small size of the Greek market in relation 
to the global financial market.  The main problem is the impact on the other 
sovereign debt markets especially the other members of the GIPS nations.   
 
• The influencing factor from the German high court ruling (see Winkler, 2014) on 
the bank bailouts by the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court in 
Karlsruhe on 7 February 2014 was the endorsement of the efficient market 
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hypothesis.  The results from our tests seem to suggest that although there are 
periods where the German sovereign debt market is efficient, however in general 
the market seems to be accepting the null hypothesis of the market being too 
volatile to be efficient.  However, this does not rule out the possibility that using an 
index of the German sovereign debt or the stock market could result in the market 
accepting the efficient market hypothesis.   
5.5  A Review of Possible Future Research  
In looking at future research possibilities based on the findings and limitations of the 
research, two possible routes standout.  The key finding in our research seems to point at 
the further analysis of the overreaction/underreaction steady state, which seems to hint at 
a possible explanation of the efficient market hypothesis within the behavioural finance 
theory.  Another possible research route based on a key limitation; is to analyse the impact 
on the efficiency of the equity and euro/dollar FX market from a volatility spillover effect 
in the sovereign debt market.  Since evidence during both the financial and sovereign debt 
crises, seem to suggest that the sovereign debt market did make the equity, especially the 
financial sector and the euro/dollar FX markets increasingly volatile.  Similarly, the equity 
market had a spillover effect on the sovereign debt market especially during the financial 
crisis. 
One possible future research stems from one of the key conclusions in our research.  Since 
our findings suggest that, the efficient market hypothesis is in reality the steady state of the 
over- and under-reaction during an observed period, this implies a possible rewriting of the 
model for the efficient markets, as the cancellation or balancing effect of the reaction of 
market participants.  If this is the case then the behavioural finance theory can explain the 
efficient market hypothesis.  In its simplest form the model could be represented by the 
equation 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝑂𝑂 − 𝑈𝑈 = 0 where SS is the steady state, O is the overreaction and U is the 
underreaction.  If the steady state is positive than there is an overreaction during the 
observed period and if the steady state is negative then there is an underreaction.   
Having said that a difficult question then arises: how do we get the variables O and U?  A 
possible approach seems to be in the models of switching regimes.  Using a Markov-
Switching Model could allow us to distinguish between an over- and under-reaction.  
 274 
 
Hamilton & Susmel (1994) use the arch coefficients to switch between regimes.  As 
illustrated by our results, this throws another issue in that volatility seems to be sometimes 
reactive and on other times persistent.  In essence, the basis of the SWARCH models is the 
reaction to shocks in the markets.  Therefore, there is a need to use a switching GARCH 
model like the one proposed by Gary (1996) or Dueker (1997).  This would give us the 
required coefficients to calculate the variance bound test for both the high and low volatility 
states.  The variance bound tests for the over- and under-reaction status can calculate from 
the coefficients of the two states.  This approach would not only help in understanding the 
efficiency of the market but also the reasons why the market is efficient or inefficient. 
Another possible future research is to understand the impact of the spillover effect from 
the sovereign debt market to the stock market during the crisis.  While we could use a 
multivariate GARCH model such as the BEKK, however as the results seem to suggest 
there is a difference between negative and positive shocks in the efficiency of the market.  
Hence, the model must account for the asymmetrical effect on both markets and therefore 
it must be an asymmetrical based multivariate GARCH model such as the DAM GARCH 
model proposed by Caporin & McAleer (2011).  A key factor would be to understand the 
spillover effect impact on the steady state of the markets; in reality, the spillover effects 
should make the market inefficient because the market participants are not only pricing the 
information of the market.  Therefore, an underreaction at some point in the observed 
period could cancel out an overreaction to the spillover effect.  It would be interesting to 
see if the efficiency in one market could influence the efficiency in another market, mainly 
due to the efficient market hypothesis stating that prices should reflect only information 
about the market. 
A big problem with our results is that the on-the-run and maturity effect affects the data.  
A possible way around this is to use an index of sovereign debts, this would complement 
the use of an index such as the Dow Jones average or DAX in the stock market.  Another 
key benefit of using a sovereign debt index is that it is a mixture of different maturities, 
and in the case of the Eurozone index, it is also a mixture of different markets.  However, 
the influencing factor is that the use of an index would allow for the use of longer duration 
in the observed sovereign debt markets.  Going back with some indices until 1994, this 
would allow for the research of the impact of the euro on the efficiency of the stock and 
sovereign debt markets. 
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Since the prices gave some out of bound coefficients.  Another possible future research is 
to use the returns instead of the prices to test the efficiency and analyse the behaviour of 
volatility.  On initial tests, we found that using the returns to test the efficiency resulted in 
better coefficients and meant we could combine the variance bound test with the analysis 
of the behaviour of volatility.  This would be interesting, since it would tell us exactly why 
the markets are efficient or inefficient without using a different dataset to estimate the 
models. 
5.6 Reflective Statement 
When I started this research, I was an avid supporter of the fundamental principles of 
neoclassical economics.  Although in general, the research did not change my views on the 
fundamental principles of neoclassical economics.  Yet I do not think the efficient market 
hypothesis explains the pricing of assets.  Throughout this research, I have highlighted the 
main arguments for and against the efficient market hypothesis; however, my concerns are 
two folds in that the basis of some of the simplifying assumptions are the unrealistic 
theories made in neoclassical economics.  The second and more important of my concerns 
is in the end it is not the information that is vital; it is the reaction of market participants to 
the information.  The efficient market hypothesis seems to dictate that no matter what the 
information is, the price of the asset must immediately reflect it.  In essence, this means 
that market participants always react in the right way to the information.  In this research, 
we have proven that this is not the case and it is essential to take the reaction of the market 
participants into account when pricing the asset.  This is at the heart of my concerns with 
respect to the efficient market hypothesis.   
Therefore, I agree in order to understand the pricing of any asset, there is a need to 
incorporate the behavioural finance theory.  The research has highlighted a number of 
areas, only explained by the inclusion of the behavioural finance theory.  However, a key 
but understated factor is that within the overreaction/underreaction hypotheses there is an 
elegant explanation for efficient markets.  This means that the behavioural finance theory 
not only explains anomalies but also efficiency, this is the key for me.  However, a key 
issue is the non-existence of models of asset pricing and tests of the behavioural finance 
theory.  It seems that the academics are more concerned with how the efficient market 
hypothesis fails than testing the fundamental principles underpinning the behavioural 
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finance theory.  Moreover, unless there is a testable hypothesis and a model of pricing 
assets, I am afraid the behavioural finance theory will never be as widely accepted as the 
efficient market hypothesis even though my opinion is, in theory, it is a better model of the 
real world of asset pricing.   
In concluding, the research did find that on some occasions the financial markets could be 
efficient, therein lays the fundamental issue: could a market be partly efficient.  Another 
factor is that it seems that the behavioural finance theory could explain the efficiency in 
the market using the reaction of the market participants.  However, this is missing the point, 
the efficient market hypothesis is a model of where the price has to be given the information 
and this leads to it being ideally suited to be used as a benchmark, used in this way it can 
be a powerful tool to regulate the market.   
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A1 The Timeline of the Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises 
Event Date Source Notes 
Bear Stearns 
Funds problems 
07/06/2007 Federal Reserve Bank of St 
Louis as of 5/4/2013 
Acknowledged as the start of the 
Financial Crisis 
BNP Paribas 09/08/2007 Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis as of 5/4/2013 
Financial Crisis spread to 
Eurozone 
Financial Market 
Pressure Intensify 
01/11/2007 Federal Reserve Bank of St 
Louis as of 5/4/2013 
Diminishing liquidity in 
interbank market 
US Recession 
01/01/2008 
to 
31/05/2009 
NBER as of 5/4/2013  
Eurozone First 
Recession 
01/01/2008 
to 
31/03/2009 
CEPR as of 5/4/2013  
Bear Stearns 
Collapse 
14/03/2008 Federal Reserve Bank of St 
Louis as of 5/4/2013 
 
Lehman Brothers 
Bankruptcy 
15/09/2008 Federal Reserve Bank of St 
Louis as of 5/4/2013 
 
US Economic 
Stimulus Package 
17/02/2009  Initially the package was  $787 
billion, however it was later 
revised to $831 billion 
Greece Revised 
Annual Budget 
Deficit 
05/11/2009 CFA Institute as of 
5/4/2013 
Annual deficit will be more than 
twice previously announced at 
12.7% 
First Downgrade of 
Greek Debt 
08/12/2009 CFA Institute as of 
5/4/2013 
S&P downgrade from A- to 
BBB+ 
First Downgrade of 
Portuguese Debt 
27/04/2010 CFA Institute as of 
5/4/2013 
S&P 2 notch downgrade 
First Downgrade of 
Spanish Debt 
28/04/2010 CFA Institute as of 
5/4/2013 
S&P downgrade from AAA to 
AA- 
Greece First Bailout 
Agreed 
02/05/2010 CFA Institute as of 
5/4/2013 
IMF and EMU grant €110billion 
bailout 
EFSF & EFSM 
created 
09/05/2010 CFA Institute as of 
5/4/2013 
€750billion total funds from 
IMF & EMU 
Greece Debt Junk 
Rated 
14/01/2011 CFA Institute as of 
5/4/2013 
Fitch downgrade to BB+ / Junk 
Japanese Earthquake 11/03/2011   
 298 
 
Event Date Source Notes 
Portugal Bailout 
Agreed 
17/05/2011 CFA Institute as of 
5/4/2013 
IMF and EMU grant €78billion 
bailout 
Volatile Markets 
09/06/2011 
11/06/2011 
CFA Institute as of 
5/4/2013 
Quotes from senior EMU 
politicians leads to backlash 
from investors 
EFSF increased 21/07/2011 CFA Institute as of 5/4/2013 
The EFSF is increased to 
€780billion 
First Downgrade of 
Italian Debt 
19/09/2011 CFA Institute as of 
5/4/2013 
S&P downgrade from A+ to A- 
Eurozone Second 
Recession 
1/10/2011 
to 
present day 
CEPR as of 5/4/2013  
Greek PM puts 2nd 
bailouts to vote 
31/10/2011 CFA Institute as of 
5/4/2013 
Leading to volatile markets 
which leads to his resignation on 
6/11/2011 
Italian PM resigns 12/11/2011 CFA Institute as of 5/4/2013 
 
Spanish Election 20/11/2011 CFA Institute as of 5/4/2013 
A new government, the People’s 
Party  
Table A1.1: Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises Timeline 
 
